Air University Review, May-June 1967
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Konigsberg
In his address to the 1966 graduating class of the Air Force Academy, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown asserted the hope that there “is such a thing as a military mind”—meaning, in his further words, “officers who are professionals in military affairs. . . [who] have an outlook that is conditioned by the requirements of their profession just as the lawyer or doctor must have a legal or medical outlook”
The good sense of this view is so readily apparent, and so clearly beyond argument at this point in our defense experience, that one must wonder why profound reservations persist in some quarters concerning the capacities, the roles, and the influence of military men armed with their supposed “military minds.” It is the purpose of these reflections to examine some of the factors contributing to the continuing reservations of our critics and suggest ways by which we can invalidate those reservations.
Evidently the critics to whom Secretary Brown’s remarks were addressed have
been motivated by something more than considerations on the legitimate
application of the lessons of military training and experience to defense problems. Indeed, we are once again reminded that a
persistent and pervasive strain in American thought, since before our inception
as a nation, has been an “antimilitary” bias. This bias accompanied many of our
early colonists across the ocean and was reinforced by acts of British imperial
forces in our prerevolutionary period (hence, for
example, the antipathy, later embodied in the Constitution, to quartering
troops in private homes without consent or law) and by several abortive schemes
to initiate an American monarchy or dictatorship. The bias was reinforced also
by popular reaction to the organization of the somewhat “militaristic” Society
of the
In such manner and on such sandy historical foundation was the antimilitary bias introduced into American thought. As Major William E. Simons notes in a recent article in Air University Review:
Without historical evidence of a civil threat from the military, one is left to conclude that the American concern for civilian control has been conditioned largely by the mistrust of military attitudes and mental processes.1
That has been the rub, of course: “mistrust of military attitudes and mental processes.” We can say, however, that the cruder, stereotypic devil of the “military mind” is no longer given credence by any significant sector of American opinion (or opinion-makers), despite such works in recent years as Dr. Strangelove, Seven Days in May, Fail-Safe, The Warfare State, The Passion of the Hawks, and The Power Elite. These works reflected (or exaggerated) the old stereotype of the “rigid, inflexible, unimaginative, tradition-bound” man-on-horseback with “illiberal value preferences” and a “strong inclination toward ultra-nationalism and ethnocentrism”; a parochial ultradisciplinarian, “lacking in inventiveness,” abhoring complexity, assuming an “authoritarian approach to social and political issues,” “unable to understand the temporizings of politics,” and in the end “tending to see critical decisions not as moral choices but as technical problems.” These views, by and large, are no longer respected or accepted, and the American military has been accorded a large measure of earned respect in the contemporary period, a respect based, as Secretary Brown emphasized, on professionalism in military affairs.
But mistrust continues. In the same issue of the Review, Dr. Gene M. Lyons, writing with sympathetic understanding on “Liberal Education in the Military” (p. 90), reflects this mistrust in his reservations on the ability of those in the American military education system to help develop men “with a driving sense of inquiry as well as a deep devotion to duty.”
In his critique, Dr. Lyons—whom we may take as representative of friendly critics of the military—discussed Major Simons’ book, Liberal Education in the Service Academies (1965), from which the Simons article quoted above was adapted; but Dr. Lyons had in earlier writings expressed a similar and not uncomplimentary disenchantment with the capacities of “The Military Mind” (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1963) and its role in “The New Civil-Military Relations” (American Political Science Review, March 1961). While conceding and generally applauding a significant degree of “civilianization” of the military, Dr. Lyons’ reservations appear to derive from his view of the military mind as a “model produced by a particular set of career demands [though] not exemplified by everyone who has lived under these demands. . . . Nevertheless,” Dr. Lyons argues,
there is a military mind and all military men, to one degree or another, possess it. It is a mind that is used to order and predictability, that insists on decisions being made, that cannot tolerate procrastination, that is comfortable in the manageable world of a military post and often unconsciously makes over any other setting . . . with the same characteristics of punctuality, rank and simplicity. . . .
Within these terms, the military mind is largely a product of the military system, the repetitious training, the requirements of obedience, the instilling of assured responses to known stimuli, and the development of trust through a respect for position and hierarchy. The system, in turn, is essentially determined by the demands of combat. . . .2
An understanding critic, Dr. Lyons shuns the stereotype but again expresses serious reservations in view of the combat-oriented military environment and development process:
There can be no question about the wisdom of rigorously indoctrinating habits of loyalty and response as preparation for combat responsibility. The real question relates to the attitudes and perspectives on non-military-especially political-issues that this kind of professional training develops. . . .3
As he had put it in an earlier article, l
. . . however “civilianized” military officers may become, the profession itself will continue to be anchored in the distinct nature of its trade, the process that has so succinctly and meaningfully been called the “management of violence” . . .4
And, hence, “The pervasive requirements of combat set limits to
civilianizing tendencies... “5
We must concede to Dr. Lyons much of his analysis. Combat considerations have predominated with us, as indeed, for the most part, they have had to and must continue to. This was Secretary Brown’s point and a view which Dr. Lyons fully shares. And yet, “combat considerations” have come to involve so much more than what the traditional experience connotes. More generally, a larger and perhaps unresolvable problem is created: What are “military” and “nonmilitary”? How and where to draw the line? It is obvious, in any case, that we must learn to broaden our strategic and tactical perspectives without diminishing our traditional combat competence.
But we must recognize also that in the more immediate, day-to-day context
certain attitudinal consequences may result from our necessary combat
orientation, especially for those who have had appreciable combat experience.
(The matter is a particularly important one now that so many men are acquiring
combat experience in
The combat situation, then, compels rejection of complexity and demands simplification –often, if not invariably, oversimplification. Things tend to be viewed in a straight black-and-white, either-or fashion and the grounds for action taken accordingly. This is the necessary combat pattern of thought and behavior, understandable, and not difficult to accept. What is perhaps not so well known or readily grasped is that such combat experience, in satisfying certain instincts and reducing or eliminating life’s normal complexities, becomes psychologically and intellectually attractive to many of those involved. It is far easier to live life on this black-white, simplified, either-or level of view, emotion, and decision-making. This component of the combat experience helps to explain why some men have such a difficult time readjusting to the noncombat environment of complexities and complicated human relations; also why some of us, consciously or unconsciously, may seek to carryover the combat approach and perspective into the noncombat situation.
However, serious difficulty may arise if and when this occurs. We may insist on simplistic, combat-type modes of thought and response in situations in which the “grays” always predominate over the blacks and whites, in which complexities and subtleties must be confronted. In such situations where qualifications, equivocations, and the pursuit of several alternatives may be essential (and where the “driving sense of inquiry,” of which Dr. Lyons wrote with concern, may and should be encouraged), failure to do so may aggravate rather than simplify a problem and its resolution. It may, indeed, inhibit or complicate accomplishment of the combat-related mission.
It behooves us to be aware of these difficulties. We must be conscious of the degree to which our combat training and experience may shape our general thought and our modes of response. We must adjust and readjust as we move between the combat and noncombat situations. And this need is particularly pressing in the modern period when so much with which the military is concerned lies somewhere between, or partakes of both, the combat and noncombat.
It is apparent that while responsible critics may no longer insist upon the stereotype of the military mind, they retain, nevertheless, serious reservations about our intellectual capacity, conceiving it, as they do, to be limited by our training and experience. This would seem to fall under the sociological rubric of “trained incapacity,” “professional deformation,” or “occupational psychosis.” On this basis, “combat mentality” would perhaps more accurately describe their conception than does “military mind.”
But it need not be so. The point is not that we should become noncombat oriented but that we must develop the ability to adjust as appropriate, to turn it off and on, so to speak. Though observers of the modern military like Dr. Lyons appear to doubt it—hence their continuing reservations—this can be done; and it must begin with our awareness and understanding of the problem.
What we have discussed heretofore relates primarily to the possible influence of combat training and experience. But, to state the obvious, there is more to the military life and profession than that. For one thing, we are also encompassed in a vast bureaucratic structure, and in common with all large-scale bureaucracies (civil or military, government or private) ours, too, tends to develop a life of its own, creating virtually irresistible imperatives to insure its continued and unaltered existence.
This, also, must be fully comprehended about the environment in which we operate. The setting throughout most of our professional lives is a bureaucratic one, the adverse effects of which may be further heightened by the necessarily more rigid, hierarchical loyalty and response requirements of military organization. It is this bureaucratic condition which may in the end be more difficult to overcome or to counter than the problem of the “combat mentality.”
Although, once again, the stereotypic references to military characteristics are no longer insisted upon, we must, if we are to be honest with ourselves, acknowledge that ground for reservation and room for self-improvement still exist in our bureaucratic home. Consider, for example, how often we hear those very pointed admonitions: “Don’t make waves!” “Don’t rock the boat!” Certainly established ways and concepts must be respected. But it is not an argument for revolution or radicalism in the military system—it is not a challenge to traditional authority/loyalty concepts and arrangements—to suggest that as in any organization, no matter how successful, policies and practices can be improved and that, if they can be, they should be. Reducing the “Don’t make waves! pressure would also help to encourage the “driving sense of inquiry” that thoughtful critics like Dr. Lyons believe is in short supply among us. The really crucial point, moreover, is that any system without the means for and encouragement of change toward improvement is, in the end, without the means of its own preservation—an axiom well known to student of political science and sociology and fully relevant in the present context.
It is sometimes discouraging to note the pervasiveness of the “Don’t make waves! theme in all bureaucratic settings. I confess to my own irritation at times at having to face up to new ideas and suggest new ways. On reflection I remind myself, and I do try to act in the awareness, that those policies, practices, and their organizational structure which I had be defending at the moment were at one time—and not very long ago—seen as “radical innovations” arising from some man’s visionary a perhaps even irreverent dream of something better. No doubt this gentleman was repeatedly warned not to rock the boat. But shot we not try to remember that “today’s practical view is, almost always, yesterday’s unfamiliar theory; and tomorrow’s practical view will for sure be drawn from today’s long-haired theories?” Billy Mitchell and those who fought for an independent Air Force are obvious examples. Where would we be today without them? (And, after all, you sometimes do have to rock the “vehicle” to get it out of the rut.)
We have heard so much in recent years about “creative leadership” and the encouragement of creative thought and practice, yet the refrain continues: “Let’s not rock the boat.” I reminded of the directive issued by a major headquarters concerning an education and training program, the mission of which would be to help develop “future creative leadership” (par. 1a) but “in conformity with existing policies and practices” (par. 2f). Apparently the inherent contradiction was overlooked. And there is reflected in this little tale the not uncommon tendency to be all for creativity long as one’s own system is not challenged.
We must face it. There is a contradiction or paradox—and a very difficult problem to contend with—in any organization, but particularly the large bureaucracies, which seek to develop and allow operating room for creative thought by the inquiring mind, for innovation by the creative person. The status quo is placed in danger-almost automatically so, we might say. And so it is not surprising, though unfortunate, that an organization professedly dedicated to “creative leadership” is often highly disturbed by any real sign of it. Yet we cannot encourage creativity in our military bureaucracy any more than can the personnel in any other large-scale organization without to some degree jeopardizing established ways and policies. It is an acceptable risk. The gain will outweigh the risk. If we are unwilling to accept the hazard, then we should not delude ourselves about wanting creative leadership. It would be self-deceptive to believe otherwise; and it would provide grist for the mill of our critics.
I believe that we do want and must encourage truly creative leadership in the military, and that we must have a system which facilitates its development and which offers opportunities for its expression. In addition to the manifest benefits, active efforts in this regard would unquestionably help us improve the retention rate of many promising young officers who otherwise depart for what they anticipate as “greener pastures” in terms of greater job satisfaction. I believe that the officers, younger and older, who would fill the bill are level-headed enough not to require external restraint on their innovating efforts. If we keep in mind that the crucial requirement of any system is the fulfillment of its function, the accomplishment of its mission, and not alone the continuation of existing structure, personnel, policy, and practice, then we can appreciate that one can be both creative and a good “system man,” inventive yet organized, critical yet disciplined, challenging yet subordinate, questioning yet respectful. . . . There really is no reason whatever that the military cannot liberate the critical intellects, the inquiring minds, among its personnel and thus ensure the means of even greater success and the preservation of its proper influence, as well as confound its critics.
In a sense, we really have no choice in this regard. Either we do develop such creative leadership and offer increasing opportunities for its expression, or we shall continue to see our influence diluted, the military voice increasingly muted, and the views of our critics vindicated. A proper degree of “wave-making” and “boat-rocking,” prudently pursued, will help keep the military ship on course to its own salvation.
It is possible, of course, that nothing we manage to do by way of improvement along the lines suggested will ever fully satisfy the critics of the military, given the strong, persistent antimilitary bias in American thought, and given that it is we who “manage the violence” of the awesome, unprecedented armed might of the United States. In the present era of rapid change—of general instability, uncertainty, and tension—it is not surprising that the old fear of the military mind renews itself. In the soil of fear and uncertainty, old biases inevitably take new root.
What has been presented here was written out of the desire to help us understand ourselves better. If we do, and if we pursue efforts toward self-improvement and toward a more effective accomplishment of our defense mission, the biases will be disproved.
It is important that, along the way, we do not overplay our recognized vital role—it speaks plainly enough for itself—and we should be leery of misconceived claims that in the pursuit of our military function we are “guarantors of freedom,” etc. Our role is to help ensure national security. As Professor William T. R. Fox and others have pointed out.
Security is a word used to describe the efficiency with which the basic values of the self are protected (or are felt to be protected); security is not itself one of those values. . . .6
The role of the American military is to help ensure the physical survival of our society, in the manner analogous to the doctor who helps his patients survive but who cannot determine or guarantee the nature or quality of life the patient leads thereafter. The important distinction is between “necessary” and “sufficient” conditions. The military performs the absolutely necessary function of preserving the physical bases of American society, but this alone is not sufficient to guarantee freedom or the general character of our society.
This is not to imply to any degree that we are not or should not be
committed to and involved in our society as a democratic system. Clearly we are
both involved and committed—as military men who have taken the oath to the
Constitution of the
The new era also requires, since the solder and statesman must now work together to elaborate national security policy in peace as well as in war, an understanding on the part of the military of the values of the civil society they are committed to try to conserve. . . .
We have demonstrated that understanding. As President Johnson
recently observed:
Hq
Air Defense Command
Notes
1. “The Liberal Challenge in the Military Profession,” Air University Review, July-August 1966, p.34.
2. “The Military Mind,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1963, p.19.
3. Ibid.
4. “The New Civil-Military Relations,” American Political Science Review, March 1961, p.63.
5. “The Military Mind,” p.20.
6. In “Representativeness and Efficiency—Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations,” Political Science Quarterly, September 1961, p.355.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Konigsberg (Ph.D.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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