Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, RCAF

In July 1964 Canada launched the first phase of a major reorganization program calling for the integration of its armed forces as a first step towards the complete unification of the forces.

Now, close to three years after the start of this unprecedented organizational move, I would like to cite the reasons for the program and review its progress, current planning, and the general effect the reorganization has had on the men and women of our armed forces.

when the Canadian government announced in a White Paper on Defence, tabled in the House of Commons in March 1964, its intention to integrate its forces under a single Chief of Defence Staff as the first step toward a unified defence force, the announcement created wide interest not only in Canada but in many other countries. It was the subject of considerable speculation and, inevitably, some skepticism. And although it was generally acclaimed in Canada by the press and the general public, it had its critics—including a few retired senior officers. The interest shown by other nations ranged from idle curiosity to deep interest, mixed, in some cases, perhaps, with a degree of alarm. In this connection, the story is told of a military attaché in Ottawa who cheerfully admitted that his instructions were to report only on the program’s failures.

One of the lessons of the Second World War, reiterated in one form or another by many senior military leaders, among them Field Marshal Montgomery and General Eisenhower, is that the scope and methods of modern warfare and defence technology have largely made the conduct of war by individual services operating in separate and independent roles an anachronism.

For some years military writers and defence leaders have been writing and talking about the integration and unification of armed forces. Many considered them an inevitable outcome of modern technology. Theory and principle were easily defensible. But here was a nation actually proposing to put the principles into practical application. Canada had taken the pioneering step.

Canada did not, however, embark on this momentous course for the sake of being first. This was not change for the sake of change. It was a move born of economic and organizational necessity. In the 1960s, with the increase in government expenditures on social programs and the rising cost of government in general, the defence budget was fixed at a figure of approximately $1.5 billion. Both the Navy and the Army needed re-equipping. Each service was bidding for the defence dollar without any means of ensuring that its slice of the financial pie would be adequate for its needs and within the best interests of the country as a whole. Maintenance and operational and personnel costs were taking an increasing proportion of the total defence budget and forcing a decline in the money available for equipment needed to modernize the forces. In 1963 a projection of operating and maintenance costs, taken as a percentage of the total budget, indicated that by 1968/ 69 practically no money would be available for the purchase of operational equipment.

Assuming that Canada intended to maintain modern military forces, there were only two possible courses of action—increase the budget or reduce operating and maintenance costs. In fact there was no guarantee that a larger budget would solve the problem; operating and maintenance costs as a percentage of the total budget would continue to rise unless a fundamental change was made. All means, therefore, of reducing operating and maintenance costs which did not prejudice operational efficiency had to be explored.

At the same time, since the White Paper had placed considerable emphasis on the need for Canada to maintain highly flexible and mobile forces in anticipation of continued, if not increased, participation in peace-restoring and peace-keeping missions, the structure of our forces had to be adapted to this policy. We needed a force structure which would permit us to operate effectively with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in support of other commitments, including United Nations peace-keeping operations. We also recognized that we could not take full advantage of recent advances in science and technology unless we established a single top management for all three services. In short, the situation pointed clearly to the need to integrate the three services as the means of providing a defence force suited to Canada’s requirements and financial means.

Before 1964, each service—Navy, Army, and Air Force—existed as a separate, independent entity with its own headquarters and its own command, administrative, and support organizations. There was considerable triplication of functions among the services. We had triplication in logistics, communications, transport, recruiting, training, pay and finance, personnel administration and services, and even in such static engineering functions as building maintenance.

In the postwar period there had been a natural evolution towards greater interdependence and cooperation among the services and towards integration of common functions.

In 1946 the three wartime ministers, one for each service, were replaced by one Minister of National Defence, providing single political control over the armed forces. In 1947 centralized coordination of research activity for the three services was achieved when the Defence Research Board was established. Two years later, in 1949, changes to our National Defence Act standardized the regulations governing Canadian military law and justice and introduced a common approach in the three services to the legal aspects of defence.

Our training program for officer cadets in our Canadian services colleges was established on a triservice basis. The cadets, while retaining individual service affiliation, have been brought together in an identical academic atmosphere during the four years of their training, which leads to a university degree and commissioned service in the regular forces.

In 1956 the medical services of the Navy, Army, and Air Force were integrated, and in 1958 an integrated chaplain service was formed The medicals and chaplains were not the first services to be integrated, however, as the office of the Judge Advocate General had been formed on an integrated basis immediately following the war. In addition, some services, although not integrated, have functioned on a triservice basis. For example, dental services have always been provided for all three services by the Army’s Royal Canadian Dental Corps and all postal services by the Army’s Canadian Postal Corps.

Another indication of the trend towards the integration of the services was the strong attempt made to develop common methods and policies in the three services through a number of triservice committees established at National Defence Headquarters. At the same time an effort was made to create the machinery for coordinating the operations of the three services by establishing the position of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee had consisted of the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff, with the chairmanship being held by the senior chief. In 1951 a full-time chairman was appointed, independent of the three services. He did not, however, have executive authority over the services, and, to a degree, the Committee became a forum for discussion, although some progress was made in coordinating and standardizing the activities and procedures in the three services, But since each chief of staff had direct access to the service’s minister and maintained his independent position, each service was able to push its own interests and its own equipment programs in isolation.

Since the Committee required unanimous agreement before it produced any recommendations, each chief of staff exercised a veto on its deliberations. Even when agreement was reached, the implementing decision often bogged down in the maze of different practices and methods within the three services. This "rule by committee"—there were over 200 at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa—resulted in delays, frustrations, and continued triplication.

A Royal Commission on Government Organization, which examined all aspects of federal government administrating, in making its report in January 1963 on the Department of National Defence made some pointed comments:

There is a growing range of activities of common concern to the services, for which the traditional basis of organization is unsuited. It is increasingly recognized that to maintain three separate organizations for such functions is uneconomic.

The traditional pattern also aggravates the rigidities in the defence establishment resulting from collective arrangements. It has meant, for example, that in finding signallers for the Congo at short notice the Canadian Army could look only to its own resources in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, having no access to the large reservoir of communications personnel in the other two services.

The stage was set and the climate was ripe for integration. In July 1964 Parliament approved a bill which amended the National Defence Act and provided for the appointment of a single Chief of Defence Staff to replace the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff. Thus, one man became responsible to the Minister of National Defence for the administration and employment of the 120,000 men and women who were serving at that time in Canada’s regular forces. This was a fundamental and essential step towards integration. It made possible the reorganization of the Naval Headquarters, Army Headquarters, and Air Force Headquarters into a single Canadian Forces Headquarters, with four functional branches, each headed by a lieutenant-general or an officer of equivalent rank. These branches, with some readjustments and changes in designation over the last two years, have become

—the Branch of the Vice Chief of Defence Staff, who is primarily responsible for military operations, plans and operational readiness, and, in conjunction with the Deputy Minister, the development of the Integrated Defence Program

—the Personnel Branch, headed by the Chief of Personnel, who formulates personnel policy, including medical, dental, and chaplain services

—the Technical Services Branch, whose Chief is responsible for all engineering and development programs and plans and policies for the procurement of materiel and maintenance

—the Comptroller General Branch, which is responsible for three main fields: administration, financial, and manpower control and management.

The elimination of the three chiefs of staff and the appointment of a single Chief of Defence Staff with executive authority over the three services was a fundamental departure from the traditional military organization in most Western countries, and it drew some criticism. The main objection was that it placed too much power in the hands of one man or, alternatively, that the responsibilities would be so great as to overwhelm him. In practice, neither criticism has been shown to have any validity, and today there are few critics of the single chief concept.

Even before completion of the integration of the Canadian Forces Headquarters, which began on 1 August 1964, the planning for the second major phase in the integration process, the creation of an integrated command structure for the field forces, was begun.

This was announced publicly in April 1965. The structure was designed on a functional basis, streamlined to reduce overhead, and mission-oriented to fulfill the roles in support of government commitments to the maximum effect within the resources available, responding as integrated, highly mobile forces rather than according to the traditional functions of sea, land, and air.

The plan called for the replacement of eleven separate service commands by six integrated functional commands: three of them operational commands—Mobile, Maritime, and Air Defence; and three support commands—Materiel, Training, and Air Transport. A diagrammatic outline of the field command structure is shown in the accompanying chart.

Mobile Command. Established on 1 October 1965, Mobile Command has the role of providing tactical air and land forces for quick deployment in any part of the world. With headquarters at St. Hubert, near Montreal, it is our largest command and consists of the mechanized 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (serving in Germany tinder NATO command); the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, a mechanized brigade designed to support the NATO land forces in Europe; and the1st and 2nd Brigade Groups, which are being converted to airportable brigades and will be specially trained and equipped for rapid deployment by air. Two battalion groups in one of the airportable brigades will be trained for operations with Allied Command Europe Mobile Force under SACEUR’s command, but they will be based in Canada.

In addition to the two airportable brigade groups, the Mobile Command order of battle will include the Canadian Airborne Regiment which will be formed this year. The regiment will have a strength of about 1200 of all ranks and will give us a highly trained, immediate-reaction parachute force. It will consist of two small infantry parachute battalions, each with a support company, three rifle companies, and a reconnaissance company; a light artillery battery; an engineer squadron; and a communications company.

The tactical air element, consisting of squadrons of CF-5s (an improved Canadian version of the Northrop F-5), is to be phased in during the next two years, and additional mobility and flexibility will be provided by Buffalo aircraft, by light and heavy helicopters, and by strategic transport from Air Transport Command and sea transport, as required, from Maritime Command.

Maritime Command. All maritime forces, sea and air, have been placed under Maritime Command, which was formed on 17 January 1966. The command headquarters is in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and there is a deputy commander with a small staff in Esquimalt, British Columbia, to facilitate local direction and control on the west coast. Maritime Command’s primary role continues to be antisubmarine warfare, and planning is under way to increase its capability for general-purpose tasks.

Air Defence Command. The operations of Air Defence Command, with headquarters in North Bay, Ontario, were not significantly changed by the integration of our forces. It continues to contribute to the defence of our continent in partnership with the forces of the United States and is equipped with CF-101 Voodoo interceptors and Bomarc surface-to-air missiles. In addition, it operates a number of radars in support of its role.

Air Transport Command. Integration has had little impact on Air Transport Command, which continues to be responsible for air transport operations for all the services. Its function has been more intimately integrated into the overall control and planning of the forces, however, with the result that its operating efficiency as a carrier has been greatly increased. Command headquarters is located at Trenton, Ontario.

Training Command. Based on the former RCAF Training Command Headquarters in Winnipeg, Manitoba, the new integrated Training Command became effective in January 1966, and by 1 April 1966 it had absorbed all training establishments in the three services. The command is responsible for all individual training for the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Its main roles are the selection and classification of personnel, training up to advanced levels, and the provision of training and study material for trade and rank advancements. Unit training and operational training, however, are under the jurisdiction of the operational commands.

Materiel Command. Materiel Command, brought into being 1 August 1965 with headquarters in Rockcliffe near Ottawa, provides the logistic support for the Canadian Forces. It is responsible for materiel procurement, warehousing, distribution, and major repair and overhaul. The programs of consolidating, integrating, and automating the separate supply systems of the services, with which it is now involved, will not be completed for several years.

1 Air Division. Our Air Division in Europe with its CF-104 Starfighters has not been greatly affected by our integration program because of the nature of its role in 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.

Other significant reorganizational results of the integration process were the consolidation of several hundred units, camps, and stations into 39 Canadian Forces bases, which came into being on 1 April 1966; a centrally controlled reserves organization under a Deputy Chief Reserves (a major-general) at Canadian Forces Headquarters, with 12 regional district headquarters across Canada for the supervision of the reserves of the three services; the construction engineering branches and services integrated into an effective, streamlined organization with the elimination of duplication and triplication in the implementation of projects, technical review, engineering advice, design services, and real property services; and the creation of an integrated Canadian Forces Communications System, to coordinate and manage the fixed communications facilities of the three services and eventually integrate them into a single system.

Although it was originally planned that the changes would take place step by step—and in broad terms this has happened—it was found that the whole complex, interlocking project not only had to be evaluated in time and adjusted as found necessary by practice but also, once launched, had to be planned concurrently. For example, it was difficult to arrive at a final decision on the staff structure required at Canadian Forces Headquarters before the command structure was established. Similarly, there was an interdependence between the functions and organizational establishments of the proposed functional commands, and all had to be developed in line with the overall aims.

There were some headaches involved: the constant problem of manpower control, repositioning personnel within the changing organizations; conducting a continuing review and re-evaluation of the new structures; revising policies, procedures, and regulations to bring them into a common form and making them consistent with the new look; and operational and administrative problems involved in the concurrent phasing out and phasing in of the old and new commands.

Because it is an involved, complex process, extending into every aspect of our activities, careful and thorough planning has to be maintained throughout the process. PERT programming and computers are being used to maintain overall control and to coordinate and monitor the progress of the approximately 300 major activities involved, to determine the connection between them, set time limits and intermediate aims, and allocate responsibility for them.

There are four key and pacing programs. The first is the development of the functional command organization and the assignment of missions to each of the commands. This is nearing completion and requires only some adjustments and refinements.

The second is the development of the force structure for the operational commands —Mobile, Maritime, and Air Defence—so that they can carry out their assigned missions. Once the operational force structure is approved, the optimum base configuration can be worked out. Only then can the force structure for the support commands be worked out.

The third is a major modernization program which includes a computerized logistics system for Materiel Command, an automated switched network for the Canadian Forces Communications System, and a modernization of training methods in Training Command.

The fourth pacing program is the personnel management program to establish a single personnel management system.

A bill to amend the National Defence Act and give parliamentary approval to the final phase, unification, was passed by Parliament in April. In the popular mind, the first two phases, the establishment of an integrated Canadian Forces Headquarters and the functional commands, constituted integration, whereas the third, unification, is often regarded as a separate and distinct phase. Literally, integration of the three services began when the National Defence Act was amended abolishing the three separate chiefs of staff positions and creating a single Chief of Defence Staff. Integration, then, is the process whereby the three services were brought together under single control and management with common logistics, supply, and training systems, operating within a functional command and organizational structure but retaining their separate legal entities and the legal barriers between them. Unification is the creation of a single service in which all officers and men will be held in one entity rather than three.

One is always asked, What has the integration process achieved so far? What benefits have been derived from the organizational changes? In some areas it is difficult to measure the progress of the new functional posture in relation to the former traditional organization because of the totally different basis. However, when an assessment of the progress is made in terms of the stated aims, a number of advantages and benefits become clearly evident. The main aims in integrating the forces were, in outline.

1. To reduce overhead costs and costs for nonoperational activities and thereby to allot a larger percentage of the budget and resources to operational needs and equipment.

2. To change our top-level decision-making process and modernize our management to take optimum advantage of our resources.

3. To build more flexible forces, more in keeping with the changing nature of our international commitments.

4. To provide our men and women with more satisfying careers.

First, consider the reduction of overhead costs. The first and obvious place to look for unnecessary overhead was in the various headquarters. There was at one time justification for relatively large headquarters. If the Canadian Forces were to be capable of rapid substantial expansion, there might be justification for employing more personnel than required in a headquarters. These personnel would form a base for expansion. In the context of the present world situation, however, we need forces in-being. There may be no time for expansion. The size of the headquarters, then, should be related to the functions we must be able to perform on short notice.

With one or two exceptions, we had complete triplication of functions by the three services. Each, for example, had headquarters personnel responsible for the logistics function, although each service had these located at a different level in the organization.

To reduce this overhead in headquarters, a single top-level headquarters, Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ), and a new command structure were put into effect.

Triplication also existed in some of the functions such as logistics, communications, transport, recruiting, training, pay and finance, personnel administration and services, and some engineering functions such as building maintenance. Single management of these functions at either CFHQ or command levels will alleviate this triplication. Some programs to bring this about have been completed, and others are now being introduced.

Finally, triplication or duplication also existed in the bases and other facilities—three electronic schools, for example, each with its own expensive training equipment and other special facilities. The creation of functional commands and Canadian Forces bases permits the rationalization of these triplicate facilities. As a result of these and other programs, our establishments—that is, our manpower requirements-have already been reduced by about 7000 establishment positions. Other reductions will be identified as the program progresses.

The second aim was to change the emphasis of our top-level decision-making so that policies, plans, and decisions concerning major procurement programs would be decided on the basis of the total Canadian military forces’ needs rather than on the narrower needs—and sometimes incompatible needs—of individual services. With the creation of a CFHQ and functional commands, the framework for such decision-making was built. The introduction of the integrated defence program created the machinery

The validity of military policies and plans is now measured against government defence policy as outlined in the White Paper, rather than against each service’s interpretation of its part of it. The validity of recommended procurement programs is now measured against three criteria: Does it make optimum contribution to the accomplishment of an approved mission or role as expressed in the plans? Does it fit within the percentages of our total budget that we have decided to devote to each step in the war escalation ladder, which ranges from aid and observer teams through limited war to nuclear holocaust? Does it fit within our budget and manpower limitations?

This system of deciding on major procurement programs is a far cry from the old method whereby each service tended to jockey for all the funds it could justify. It is demonstrably resulting in a more balanced and effective military force, dollar for dollar.

A single management system enables us to take advantage of the latest advances in science. In the support functions such as logistics, pay and finance, and training, economies of scale permit the introduction of computerized systems which the three separate services could not afford to buy The modern management processes being computerized include program control, pay system, logistics system, management information system, and personnel records-keeping system. The significance of these innovations is not so much that the processes are computerized as that they make use of the latest and most modern of management techniques, that they produce substantial increases in effectiveness and efficiency, and that they demonstrate to our servicemen that they belong to a progressive and forward-looking organization.

In the operational functions, the reduction in nonoperational overhead costs makes it possible, within a limited budget, to introduce new operational equipment. We have embarked on a modernization program to improve the operational effectiveness of the forces. Modern equipment either under procurement or planned includes:

CF-5 tactical support aircraft, selected primarily for the support requirements of land forces of Mobile Command

M113A armoured personnel carrier, to improve the mobility of the land forces 

Additional C-l30E Hercules aircraft, for the strategic mobility of the forces 

A new tracked reconnaissance vehicle 

Buffalo aircraft and helicopters for Mobile Command

New propulsion system and automatic short-range air defence system for the DDH’s (helicopter destroyer), employing the most advanced techniques

New fire-control system for Maritime Command

The Falcon small jet transport for Air Transport Command

Backup interceptor control system (BUIC) for Air Defence Command.

And a study in depth is being made of the fixed communications needs for the Canadian Forces Communications System, with a view to complete modernization.

These examples of our modernization program are all possible within a budget which, without integration, would have been devoted almost entirely to day-to-day operations and maintenance, i.e., maintaining tired old equipment.

So that we can contribute to all ranges of the war escalation spectrum, rather than mainly to the direct deterrent to all-out war, we require flexible forces. Flexibility of this sort requires at least two things: a wide range of equipment (which, without integration of our forces, we could not afford) and a joining together of sea, land, and air elements under common management. Considering the characteristics of modern weapons and the requirements for quick response, the three services must be capable of reacting together. The chances of achieving this quick, coordinated reaction are much greater with a unified force.

The personnel management program is involved but is one of the most rewarding aspects of our reorganization. A common trade structure has been implemented, reducing over 300 trades to approximately 100, and a common pay structure for the three services has been put into effect. Integration has created the necessary climate and conditions for many changes that will result in more meaningful and satisfying careers for the men and women in our Canadian Armed Forces.

The reorganization of the Canadian Forces is a monumental task. I doubt whether a fundamental reorganization of this magnitude has ever been undertaken by any other large military or civilian organization. Creating the new and modern military concepts, doctrines, and procedures has been for many of us a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Whether the Canadian plan serves as an example for any other nation in the integration or unification of its forces must depend on the size of its forces and their roles, on the economic and political necessity, and on the many factors which affect a nation’s capability to accept such radical reorganization.

We are living in an era of significant and rapid changes. Major advances in science are changing our traditional way of doing things, and the rapid development of defence technology is diminishing the value of traditionally organized services as independent entities. As Arnold Toynbee points out, technology is a unifying force. In the context of the spiraling cost of defence, independent traditional services, as presently constituted, may become a luxury only the most wealthy nations will be able to afford.

Air Marshal Frederick Ralph Sharp is Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario. On graduation from the Royal Military College, Kingston, in 1938 he joined the Royal Canadian Air Force and trained as a pilot. He served as a flying instructor until he attended the War Staff College, in 1944 he went overseas and flew heavy bombers of 408 Bomber Squadron, 6 Bomber Group, eventually as squadron commander. Postwar assignments have been in the directorate of postings and careers at Air Force Headquarters; as officer commanding the Central Flying School, Trenton; as student in business administration, University of Western Ontario; as an exchange officer to the directing staff of the RAF Staff College; as Commander, RCAF Station North Bay; at the directorate of organization and establishments, later the directorate of management engineering, AFHQ; as student, National Defence College, Kingston; as Deputy Commander, 25th Region, North American Air Defense Command; as Commander, Bangor Sector, 26th Region, NORAD; as Director General, Management Engineering and Automation, Canadian Forces Headquarters; as Commander, Training Command, to July 1966, when he was appointed to his present position.