Unequal Neighbor and National Sensitivity

Air University Review, January-February 1967

Unequal Neighbors and National Sensitivity

Former Ambassador to Canada Livingston T. Merchant must have had trouble choosing an appropriate title for his recently published collection of essays on United States—Canadian relations. I have puzzled over a more suitable alternate and produced the one borne by this review. Neighbors Taken for Granted* as a title seems hardly even half correct. Indeed the United States may in some areas take Canada for granted, but the reverse is not often true. Large portions of the book discuss the cultural and economic invasions and other problems which generate continuing Canadian concern.

The reasons for this “taken-for-granted” attitude and for others which characterize U.S.—Canadian relations have been extensively analyzed by writers on history, geography, demography, politics, commerce, and so on almost ad infinitum. It seems to me that perhaps the attitudes remain now only to be psychoanalyzed.

Many of these attitudes can be found in the Merchant book. “Americans, then, are uninformed about Canadians, but infinitely well disposed, and, too often, infuriatingly patronizing.” Accordingly, most American writers feel impelled to engage in some breast-beating after they confess that the principal solid fact held by Americans about Canada is that it is the source of all our cold fronts. America is said to be indifferent to Canadian sensibilities; Canada to be fearful of her national identity, economic integrity, and political independence. “. . . America’s closest neighbors. . . apparently feel that there has been a failure of communication across the border.” The list of virtual clichés can easily be extended.

The American attitudes are viewed as unnatural, if not somehow sinful, and as reserved exclusively for Canadians and none other. The Canadian concerns are accepted as historically indisputable. Take, for example, fear for Canadian political independence. Looking back 100 years to the time of Canadian Confederation in 1867, one can indeed find a few expressions of American ambitions in that direction. But there is only a handful of them. Most frequently quoted is House Speaker Champ Clark’s 1911 hope that he would one day see all North America under the American flag. We surely must know on both sides of the border that, under our democratic processes, isolated aberrations of this kind are not only inevitable but without significance. Furthermore U.S. politicians have no monopoly on them.

As to Americans’ failure to understand Canada and Canadians, the trend may get worse before it gets better. With the increasing tempo and complexity of our personal and official lives and environments, an individual’s attention must be measured out by priorities. Call it management by exception, or greasing the squeaky wheel, or whatever you will, an individual will look first at his personal problems and those public problems which most affect him. In world events, it is unfortunate but true that the situation in a remote, newly emerged African state whose location, capital, or ruler the average American (or Canadian) cannot identify may have implications for world peace and security more significant than events in Canada.

In international dealings, the United States will be the usual major focus of Canadian attention. This is the inevitable result of the disparity in size and the facts of North American economic and geographic life. The United States on the other hand in scanning a 360° horizon will more often than not find its priority problems in directions other than the north. The best we can hope for is that there be adequate channels of communication for our official dialogues as well as competent personnel familiar with the background of U.S.—Canadian relations to participate in them. On both counts the picture today appears good.

From this brief essay at do-it-yourself psychoanalysis, I conclude that we might well stop flogging Champ Clark and beating our breasts about the casual American attitude toward Canada. Both the government officer officially concerned with U.S.—Canadian relations and the private citizen wishing to be better informed should devote their energies to study of current problems and their backgrounds. The Merchant book is an excellent vehicle for this purpose.

It is in fact a series of essays by selected Canadians and Americans. Canadians Bruce Hutchison and I. Norman Smith contribute background on the border and diplomatic histories and on the domestic development of Canadian nationhood. Michael Barkway and Ivan B. White present the Canadian and American viewpoints, respectively, on some of the current major economics problems troubling the two governments, particularly American investment in Canada and the balance of payments. James Reston of the New York Times discusses briefly the impact of American communications media on Canada.

The remaining two essays will be of greatest interest to armed forces readers of the Air University Review. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson issues a no-punches-pulled, but quite gentlemanly, indictment of what he sees as a schizophrenic Canadian approach to its international security policy. General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff from 1951 until 1960, looks at some of the problems of joint defense.

Many aspects of Canada’s international security policy since World War II have been little more than disappointing to the United States. Despite Canada’s having played a leading role in the development of the NATO concept, her heart has never been in it as primarily a security system against Soviet aggression. Her interest in NATO apparently centered mainly in its potential for political and cultural growth of an Atlantic community. This potential never developed significantly. Compared to her post-World War II capabilities, the Canadian contributions to Free World security efforts, particularly in land forces for NATO, have been modest. Although Canadian participation would have been welcome in the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, none was forthcoming. In the U.N. as well, Canadian support of that organization’s war effort in Korea was disappointing to the United States; a larger contribution to the U.N. Command seemed compatible with Canadian resources. The share of economic and military assistance borne by Canada after World War II has been considered even by Canadians as scanty.

The power vacuum in western Europe and Canadian resources at the end of World War II—her substantial armed forces and production capabilities—made her a leading middle power. She saw a role for herself as leader of the unaligned middle and smaller powers. The ambivalence of this Canadian third-force mystique alongside ostensible adherence to NATO has often vexed Washington policy-makers. Since the storage of American nuclear warheads in Canada would prejudice this Canadian role, U.S. and Canadian forces in Canada had to do without them until the new Liberal Government, which had committed itself to their acceptance, took over in 1963.

The hoped-for third-force role did not materialize. The resurgence of western Europe moved Canada down several notches in the ranks of the middle powers. The unaligned and newly emerged states of Africa and Asia found their leadership elsewhere. In general, the United States has rarely been able to take for granted the Canadian view in this and in other foreign-policy problem areas like the Vietnam war, recognition of Communist China, East-West trade, and intercourse with Cuba.

In the defense arena, General Foulkes has pointed out some new and hard facts of life for Canadians. Heretofore the air defense of the two countries has been in fact a single continental problem. On the military level there has been general agreement on the nature of the threat, with sufficient agreement at the political level to permit the establishment of the NORAD system. Since the NORAD radar systems and interceptor and missile deployments in Canada were essential to U.S. as well as Canadian defenses, the U.S. has shared substantially in the cost of the systems and has deployed defense forces in Canada and elsewhere in northern North America.

As the Soviet strategic capability shifts to a predominantly ICBM force, however, the present systems will need to be replaced. ICBM trajectory characteristics and new radar technology eliminate the need for deploying to Canada the Nike-X elements for AICBM defense of the U.S. If Canada is to have AICBM defenses like the Nike-X, she will have to provide them herself instead of sharing the high cost of such a system with the U.S.

The physical separation of the systems may alleviate another problem that has troubled Canadians: the combined command arrangements under NORAD. Concern over the possible dangers of combined command has been a virtual obsession of the Canadian government for 25 years. Admittedly Canada had some unhappy experiences in this regard in World War I (even as did the U.S.), but there has really been none of consequence since the start of World War II. Nevertheless questions of combined command have necessitated extensive deliberations, for reasons that are not apparent. I would be hard put to recall a case since 1940 of a commander who under orders of an allied senior was made to take some action which he or his government opposed. It would be easy to recall a number of cases in which the commander took with impunity an action opposed by his allied senior but desired by his government. The Canadian concern has thus seemed unwarranted.

Whatever the defense complication pointed out by General Foulkes, I am confident the Canadians can cope with it. They need only to use the vigor and common sense shown in the solution to other recent Canadian forces problems, like the unification program and the purchase of the F-5 as the Canadian: tactical support aircraft.

Arlington, Virginia

*Livingston T. Merchant (ed.), Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada and the United States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1966, $4.95), xv and 166 pp.

Contributor

Dr. Stanley W. Dziuban, Colonel, USA (Ret), (USMA; Ph.D., Columbia University) has been with the Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, since 1964. His last military assignment was as Chief, Strategic Planning Group, Department of the Army, 1962-64. During much of his Army career he was engaged in engineering assignments; he was also U.S. Member, NATO Standing Group Logistics Staff, 1960-62. He is a graduate of the Army-Navy Staff College, the Army Management School, and the National War College. Dr. Dziuban is author of Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-45 in the US Army in World War II series, and his articles have appeared in military and professional journals.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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