Air University Review, January-February 1967
Counterinsurgency became a byword within the Air Force following President
Kennedy’s budget defense message of 28 March 1961. The President pinpointed the
need for countering “subversive and guerrilla warfare” by trained military
forces. When the White House National Security Action Memorandum appeared one
year later, the Air Force directed that specialized training be provided to
selected officers in the new arena of insurgency warfare.
Insurgency, at the outset, was to the Air Force a threat that never would assume the characteristics of a general or even limited war. As a threat, it is less obvious than either. Furthermore, its origins are imbedded in the social, political, and economic structure of a society. Nevertheless, the Air Force launched an intensive effort to develop and implement plans to provide selected officers with the implications of insurgency in general and Communist insurgency in particular.
Over the past five years counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine has developed
slowly, and many officers in the U.S. Air Force have no clear understanding of
what it is or should be. Furthermore, doctrine is dynamic—it must be updated
continually. Therefore, the time has come to articulate the United States Air
Force concept of low-intensity conflict. Clear guidelines must be established
from which Air Force policy-makers can formulate actions to support the
national objectives in conflicts similar to
COIN doctrine
The primary objective for air power in counterinsurgency warfare is to end
the conflict as soon as possible on favorable terms and at the lowest
practicable level of intensity. This objective provides an insight into what is
meant by “winning” in this type of operation: the attainment of
On the other hand, the pivotal point of the Air Force view of low-intensity operations is a firm conviction that success at any level of the spectrum of conflict is contingent upon the maintenance of a superior general-war capability. Air power must be capable of responding with whatever application of force is necessary. Unquestionably this basic tenet of Air Force doctrine must remain in clear and sharp focus and not become obscured as the student studies the complexities of insurgency operations. Of almost parallel importance, however, is a need to balance the general-war tenet with a declaration that the application of force will always be used to the selective degree required to achieve the objective.
To provide an example, we can draw upon the
In its continuing educational endeavor, the Air Force must persistently
stress that there can be no artificial distinction between low-intensity forces
and general-war forces. If such a barrier does exist and the reasons for
eliminating it are not set forth, the interacting strength of these two facets
of
Perhaps the most salient feature of any Air Force educational program should
be the study of policy. The Air Force should emphasize to the student that any
policy which appears to lower the risk of retaliatory action in the eyes of the
aggressor will encourage his aggressive acts. It must be a firm Air Force
belief that the one risk that is unacceptable to any Communist state is the
threatened loss or neutralization of its military capability. Senator Everett
Dirksen has recently urged “maximum use of American airpower against all
significant targets in
the requirement
Air Force COIN educational programs should be aimed squarely at developing within the student an open mind that is receptive to the need for changes in doctrine, concepts, methods, and equipment. Furthermore, COIN operations should be discussed in seminars, schools, and Air Force educational activities as a type of combat that cannot be won by the usual techniques of conventional air warfare. In these discussions it should be emphasized that the essentials of COIN combat are high mobility, quick reaction, good reconnaissance –all under the limiting conditions of terrain and visibility. The strategic objective must be recognized as the need to win the support of a civilian populace that is easily intimidated and whose loyalty is capricious in nature—a populace that is subject at any time to attack from guerrillas who dress and behave like peasants.
Present Air Force concepts and methods of communications also should receive a searching reappraisal. Are they effective in COIN operations? Is there a better way to communicate? One excellent example of new Air Force thinking toward old methods has been a novel employment of the ancient but reliable C-47 airplane. C-47’s not only have been armed for use as attack aircraft in Vietnam but have been equipped with external loudspeakers so that while circling low they can be used to instruct villagers in remote areas. Perhaps there are many other such applications.
Key advantages favoring the use of air power in counterinsurgency warfare should be illuminated in Air Force instruction: jungle rebels, for example, are not equipped with an interception capability, and air superiority is thus practically assured. The disadvantages also should be stressed: targets are fleeting, hard to locate, and, in general, not subject to pattern bombing attacks. Some new thoughts on tactics could now be generated in the vitally important areas of reconnaissance and assault airlift. Should these two missions be considered equal in importance to the delivery of weapons on target? Another fertile field for new thinking is in the employment of close-support air power in counterinsurgency operations.
some suggestions
It requires little speculation to conclude that the
This writer has no quarrel with the established counterinsurgency training courses within the Air Force. Unquestionably they are achieving the intended objective. The Air Force educational system, however, now must take an additional step. A new idea, the generation of a thoughtful analysis of Air Force doctrine, should be injected into every phase of instruction throughout the system. As former Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert recently observed, “There are thousands of first-rate minds in the Air Force that produce a tremendous range of original, stimulating thought.” We should use those minds.
It appears that most Air Force officers have not had channeled to them the questions and the thought-provoking issues surrounding counterinsurgency. COIN problems need to be solved, and the educational system appears to be the most likely place to assign the task. The institutions are already established, the courses are developed, and the requirement exists for a continuing effort. The Air Force educational system, therefore, should seek out every new and unique means to identify and examine every Air Force doctrinal statement, concept, or method concerned with low-intensity conflict. The objective of this approach would be to relate these concepts to today’s strategic variables surrounding this type of warfare. Where the concept or doctrine applies, it should be restated, if necessary, to reflect the current situation. Where there is a void new ideas should be generated from which a method or doctrine could evolve.
The strategic diversity of counterinsurgency operations presents the Air Force with a host of problems that are new and different from those of all-out war. There has been wide appreciation of what air power can do, but the Air Force officer must be able to counter opinions that indicate disappointment because air operations have not been successful in ending the Vietnam war. The Air Force officer who understands doctrine realizes that air forces almost invariably are a vital element in achieving objectives but not the only element. He also knows that if that vital element is not employed in the degree and application for which it is designed, something less than total achievement of objectives must then result.
It is central to any effort in the Air Force educational field to appraise
doctrine continually. It is imperative that this appraisal be phrased in
relation to counterinsurgency. Some valid questions could frame seminar
discussions: What are the different strategic and environmental factors
separating all-out war and low-intensity conflicts? What Air Force concepts
would need revision if a low-intensity conflict should erupt in Latin America,
Such questions presently are not being raised within the Air Force educational system in the frequency and scope demanded. The USAF does not believe that low-intensity conflicts can be won by air power and air power alone. It does believe these conflicts can be lost without air power.
Colonel Thomas H. Curtis (USMA;
M.S.,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of
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