

Bombs, Then Bandages

Preparing the
War Fighter
for the Sojourn
to Peacekeeping

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Henceforth the adequacy of any military establishment will be tested by its ability to preserve the peace.

—Henry Kissinger

IN 1787, attendees at the Constitutional Convention first defined the purpose of the United States armed forces. This definition has undergone significant clarification and redefinition over the course of history. What began as the requirement to “provide for the common Defence” has led, most recently, in the National Military Strategy of the United States of America to that of “fight[ing] and win[ning] our Nation’s wars whenever and wherever called upon.”¹

To most people, that might not seem like such a large leap. There is little question that the writers of the Constitution foresaw that “Defence” would inevitably lead to fighting wars. But what they may not have envisioned is the ever-growing handful of non-combat actions that the United States armed forces are currently being called upon to un-

dertake on shores far distant from those of the original 13 states.

In recent history, US military might has advanced in what some would argue is a direction diametrically opposed to that of war fighting. This new direction is known as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).² Admittedly, the division between MOOTW and war becomes difficult to delineate at times; but generally speaking, such operations focus on deterring war and promoting peace, while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests.³ MOOTW are more politically sensitive, the military may not be the primary player, and they are almost always conducted outside the United States.

In *The Professionalization of Peacekeeping: A Study Group Report*,

David Wurmser and Nancy Dyke observe that although the end of the cold war has quelled our thoughts of military force against

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military force, the use of military forces in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping roles is growing significantly.⁴ The current administration demonstrates selectivity⁵ when determining whether or not to participate in UN peace operations; however, the fact remains that US forces do participate in more and more of these deployments.⁶

It can be argued that this participatory trend reflects a further clarification of the role of the US military in the face of changing history. As early as 1976, Charles Moskos observed that "the very military establishments which are most liable for peacekeeping duties are often the same ones which are undergoing institutional redefinition in the wake of eroding traditional support of military legitimacy."⁷ In light of the end of the cold war and ever-increasing budget pressures, his observation gains even more legitimacy.

It can also be argued that this participatory trend is indicative of an opportunistic society. During peacetime, why not exercise the opportunity to utilize the military instrument of power for military operations other than war? As noted in a recent Defense Analytical Study, "Our willingness to serve may have indeed created unreasonable expectations of those we serve . . . the increasing tempo of OOTW [operations other than war] clouds our individual and collective focus on fighting and winning our nation's wars—providing for her defense! . . . [and we succumb to the] temptation to use military operations as a means to at least 'do something.'"⁸

A healthy segment of defense commentators contends that war fighters lose their edge when called upon to perform operations that require a completely different set of behaviors. They argue that military organizations are formed for purposes other than peacekeeping and that those original purposes are not served while a nation's military units are deployed and engaged in peacekeeping tasks.⁹ In remarks to the American Defense Preparedness Association Symposium in December 1994, the chief of staff of the United States Air Force cautioned that "operations other than war, if sustained without recognition that they do take a toll on the force, will begin to erode our ability to perform our fundamental mission."¹⁰ As Maj Melissa A. Applegate suggests:

One must consider the cost of using a warfighting organization in a benevolent role. Combat forces are just that: commanders concentrate most of those efforts toward instilling an offensive spirit in their soldiers. . . . Americans are quick to condemn involvement in complex situations where there is no clear sense of winning. . . . US actions in a given country can prove counterproductive by providing a focal point for opposition. If this occurs, US involvement can then begin to expand exponentially to solve new problems it may have created on its own. ¹¹

Despite the wishful rhetoric of service chiefs, the reality of the post-cold-war strategic environment demands more deployments of longer duration from fewer people. Senior Air Force officials recently announced that persons will be assigned temporary duty (TDY) no more than 120 days a year. This "allows sufficient time for our people to get the right amount of training at home station and to take 30 days of leave a year."¹² What was once viewed as the exception (i.e., lengthy overseas deployments) has now become the norm. Current trends indicate an inevitable transformation of the military's roles and missions and highlight the need to carefully examine what we are requiring of individual war fighters as we

send them forth to conduct peace operations. As Lt Col Linda Brown suggests:

The US military needs to step up to the fact that the Operations Other Than War will comprise the majority of the contingencies that are foreseen in the near future and be prepared for the challenges that these missions offer. . . . The services must build and train a force that understands and is proud of all the missions the military is tasked to accomplish. ¹³

Preparing War Fighters to Serve as Peacekeepers

Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) lists eight specific types of MOOTW ranging from “Arms Control” and “Noncombatant Evacuation Operations” to providing “Support to Insurgencies” and “Peace Operations.” Closer examination of *Peace Operations* reveals that the term actually refers to three types of activities: peacemaking (which focuses on diplomatic actions), peace enforcement (which focuses on coercive use of military force), and peacekeeping (which focuses on noncombat military operations). ¹⁴

War fighters have long been accustomed to and contented with leaving the practice of peacemaking to diplomatic persons and processes. Traditionally, war fighters have restricted their involvement to the conduct of peace-enforcement activities. The metaphorical lines in the sand are blurred philosophically, doctrinally, and literally, however, when combat forces are called upon to conduct the noncombat military operations characteristic of peacekeeping. As William Lewis observes in a recent National Defense University (NDU) paper:

We learn in our United States [military] schools the need for overwhelming force for achieving decisive results. We have a cultural problem, I would submit, in terms of adjusting the manner in which we operate to be more effective in this sort of political-military [peacekeeping] environment. ¹⁵

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The dialogue of cross-cultural communication often includes the envisioning of foreign lands and distant shores. In this article, however, the authors examine the cross-cultural activity taking place intrapersonally when the trained war fighter assumes the role and responsibility of the peacekeeper, crossing into an unfamiliar cultural domain. Lt Col N. Winn Noyes, US Army, alluded to this cross-cultural movement, or paradigm shift, in “Peacekeepers and Warfighters: Same Force, Different Mindset” when he stated:

The problem with using the same force for sequential combat and peace keeping operations is not one of tasks and subtasks. It is a problem of changing required mindsets, desired automatic reactions and conditioned responses, with insufficient time and training for reorientation of the soldier who must accomplish the tasks. The required mental transition is significant. ¹⁶

This movement is officially addressed by the military in Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Doctrine for Joint Operations other than War*, as follows:

- Post-Peacekeeping Mission Training:
- a. Planning for mission specific training should be part of the force’s pre-deployment activities. Before the peacekeeping mission, training is provided to transition the combat ready individual to one constrained in most if not all, actions. At the conclusion of the peacekeeping mission, certain actions

are necessary to return the individual to a combat-oriented mind set.

- b. Unit commanders must allow sufficient time after a peacekeeping mission for refresher training and for redeveloping skills and abilities that have unavoidably been affected by the nature of any PKO [peacekeeping operation]. This will require a training program to hone skills necessary to return the unit to combat ready status.¹⁷

Still, however, failure to properly prepare has unfortunately garnered US military forces less-than-desirable stays in the spotlight. On the 1994 fatal shoot down of two friendly Black Hawk helicopters, Noyes stated:

OPC (Operation Provide Comfort) personnel did not receive consistent, comprehensive training to ensure they had a thorough understanding of the USEUCOM [US European Command] directed ROE [rules of engagement]. . . . The "if it flies, it dies" approach these two pilots took to this mission and their response to two unknown helicopters showed the mindset that had made them successful in their combat training and careers so far.¹⁸

The authors focus on the "cultural problem" of utilizing trained war fighters in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, suggesting that employing the military in peacekeeping or noncombat operations entails a

cross-cultural movement at the individual level. This movement is characterized as a paradigmatic shift of mind-sets—from the military culture of the war fighter to the civil-military culture of the peacekeeper—with social, behavioral, philosophical, and even methodological implications.

To explain this shift from the war fighter to the peacekeeper mind-set, three operational variables (see table 1) defined in Brig Gen Morris J. Boyd's "Peace Operations: A Capstone Doctrine" will be utilized. These variables are force, consent, and impartiality.¹⁹ These three variables characterize the mind-sets of the war fighter and the peacekeeper.

As we prepare war fighters to serve as peacekeepers, it is imperative that US military forces be trained for the specific requirements of peacekeeping. Commenting on the Black Hawk shoot down, Colonel Noyes said that soldiers must be given the time and opportunity to "make the mental transition required for their success and survival before they are committed to the mission. Failure to do so will be as irresponsible as sending untrained recruits to their death in a pitched and violent high intensity battle."²⁰

Military Culture: War-Fighting and Peacekeeping Mind- Sets

The US Military [i.e., war fighters] and American Private Voluntary

Table 1
Operational Variables

	Force	Consent	Impartiality
Peace Enforcement	Sufficient to compel/coerce	Low	Low
Peacekeeping	Low (self-defense/defense of mandate from interference)	High	High
Support to Diplomacy	Low	High	High

Source: Brig Gen Morris J. Boyd, "Peace Operations: A Capstone Doctrine," *Military Review* 75 (May–June 1995): 24.

Organizations [i.e., peacekeepers] are unlike in every important way. Indeed, it's difficult to imagine two more dissimilar cultures. The former is highly disciplined, hierarchical, politically and culturally conservative, tough, with a mission to defeat the enemy. By and large, American PVOs are independent, resistant to authority, politically and culturally liberal, sensitive and understanding, with a mission to save lives.

—Andrew S. Natsios

In his seminal work *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Samuel P. Huntington convincingly argues the thesis that the military profession is a peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The distinct sphere of military competence, common to officers independent of service, branch, or nationality, is the “management of violence,” and the responsibility of the profession is to enhance the military security of the state. The very existence of the military profession depends upon the existence of competing nation-states and presupposes conflicting human interests and the use of violence to further those interests. Consequently, the military culture is embedded within a universal pattern of conflict that permeates nature and society.

The soldier's calling differs fundamentally from other professions. To be a soldier is to embrace a distinctively defined set of values, attitudes, and perspectives that inhere in the performance of the professional military function and that are deductible from the nature of that function. The military function is performed by a “public bureaucratized profession expert in the management of violence and responsible for the military security of the state.”²¹ Tradition, morale, esprit, discipline, unity, cohesion, integrity—these rate high in the military value system. At the same time, military organizations are highly centralized with multilevel hierarchical struc-

tures emphasizing logic, proof, linear organization, precision of definition, objective values, abstractive communication found in low contexts, and factual inductive or axiomatic inductive decision-making structures. As Huntington suggests, “For the profession to perform its function, each level within it must be able to command instantaneous and implicit obedience of subordinate levels,”²² with loyalty and obedience being among the highest military virtues.

The military culture is, however, more than a system formulated around and for the “management of violence,” and peace is more than the “prevention of war.” This non-summative, preventative posture is particularly relevant in light of the interrelationship between the mind-set of the war fighter and the mind-set of the peacekeeper.

The War-Fighting Mind-Set

The roots of armed conflict as far back as the Paleolithic era can be traced to culture. In his acclaimed book *A History of Warfare*, John Keegan defends the notion that the act of war is the basis for all that currently exists. As he explains:

War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it . . . the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilisation itself. All civilisations owe their origins to the warrior; their cultures nurture the warriors who defend them, and the differences between them will make those of one very different in externals from those of another.²³

History demonstrates that massive firepower and mobilization of preponderant resources, sustained by an engaged or aroused citizenry, have proved a consistent recipe for military success.²⁴ Humans have always lived under conditions of conflict. If they continue to pursue their individual interests by imposing their will on the enemy, they most likely always will.

For the war fighter, the idea of the imposition of will implies the use of force, the first of three operational variables identified earlier as mechanisms for identifying mind-sets. Continual employment as a "manager of violence" has engendered a military mind-set disposed towards the use of force.²⁵ This mind-set emphasizes timeliness and speed to overwhelm and disorient the enemy. It does not waste time discussing feelings; it dispenses destruction.²⁶

Second, for the war fighter, the imposition of one's will over another naturally implies a lack of consent. The very idea that violence is used is indicative of the fact that war fighting is conducted in the absence of consent. War fighters are never welcome individuals on the battlefield. They simply hope to make their journey to the battlefield, fight their fight, and return home. Finally, inherent in the act of forceful persuasion is the relinquishment of all semblance of impartiality, the third operational variable. There is no such thing as neutrality on the battlefield. To the war fighter, identification of friend or foe is critical.

The Peacekeeping Mind-Set

Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is conducted with a different view of these operational variables. As explained in the *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, the

critical variables of peace operations are the level of consent, the level of force, and the degree of impartiality. . . . These variables are not constant and may individually or collectively shift over the course of an operation. Success in peace operations often hinges on the ability to exercise situational dominance with respect to the variables; failure is often the result of losing control of one or more of them.²⁷

The mind-set of the peacekeeper differs from that of the war fighter in two critical ways. First, the objective of a peace operation is settlement, not victory. "Peace-enforcement operations follow several constraints: the employment of force is always

restrained; force may be used to compel but not necessarily to destroy; and settlement, not victory, remains the objective. Second, the conflict—not the belligerents—is the enemy."²⁸

An examination of the three key variables as they apply to peace operations suggests that for the peacekeeper, force is a matter of last resort. Rather than seeking termination by force, peace operations are conducted to reach a resolution by conciliation among the competing parties.²⁹ In all peace operations, particularly peacekeeping operations, the peacekeeper must continually be cognizant of the goal—"to produce conditions which are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy."³⁰ As F. T. Liu suggests in *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*:

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense is central to the concept of United Nations peacekeeping . . . any problem between UN peacekeepers and [parties directly concerned] can be resolved peacefully by negotiation and suasion, and therefore the use of force becomes unnecessary and counterproductive.³¹

An examination of the second operational variable, consent, suggests that consent is a condition generally enjoyed by the peacekeeper. By the time the peacekeepers arrive, both sides have tired of war. Keegan points out that "the effort at peace-making is motivated not by calculation of political interest but by repulsion from the spectacle of what war does. The impulse is humanitarian."³²

The peacekeeper comes with supplies to heal the wounds of war and, as a result, is generally welcome. A populace that has recently experienced the horrors of war generally consents to and accepts the presence of a peacekeeper armed not with bullets and bombs, but rather with bread and bandages.

Finally, an examination of the third operational variable, impartiality, confirms that peacekeeping demands impartiality. As a matter of necessity, military members con-



USAF C-130s airlifting Irish troops for UN peacekeeping duties in the Congo, July 1960. "The mind-set of the peacekeeper differs from that of the war fighter in two critical ways. First, the objective of a peace operation is settlement, not victory. Peace-enforcement operations follow several constraints: the employment of force is always restrained; force may be used to compel but not necessarily to destroy; and settlement, not victory, remains the objective. Second, the conflict—not the belligerents—is the enemy."

duct peacekeeping operations alongside civilian members of various nongovernmental organizations (NGO) or private voluntary organizations. NGOs and PVOs maintain their authority as peacekeepers only as long as they remain impartial. Once even the perception of favoritism leaks into an NGO or PVO, all credibility is lost, and the actions meant to serve the furtherance of conflict resolution may in fact act to stir the simmering coals of discontent. In an effort to retain a visible separation from any particular government, particularly those that might not be agreeable to the peace-seeking parties,³³ PVOs are reluctant to accept money. It is imperative that peacekeepers remain impartial and avoid all possible perceptions of showing any predisposition towards one side or the other. Liu explains that

military personnel must not take sides in the conflict that they are sent to contain. They must maintain friendly relations with both sides and act with complete impartiality. If the peacekeepers were to use force against one of the parties concerned, they would cease to be impartial and would become part of the problem and not its solution.³⁴

It seems, therefore, that to be a war fighter is to use force in the absence of consent, relinquishing all semblance of favoritism. In contrast, to be a peacekeeper is to avoid the use of force at all costs in a consenting environment and maintain impartiality while executing the operation.

Crossing Cultures as a Sojourner

There are two things which will always be very difficult for a democratic na-

tion: to start a war and to end it.

—Alexis de Tocqueville

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The military war-fighting culture and the military peacekeeping culture represent distinct professional mind-sets. In this article, the authors address the sojourn being made by war fighters as they mindfully cross into the peacekeeping culture.

Scholars have long sought to describe the differing responses humans exhibit as they come into contact with those from other cultures. German sociologist Georg Simmel first established the concept of the “stranger” in 1908, suggesting that although some people may be physically near, the fact that their disposition and communications are rooted in another culture leaves them, socially speaking, far away.³⁵ According to Simmel, the removedness experienced by the stranger is completely acceptable; that is, the stranger desires no assimilation into the new culture. In 1928 Robert Park, influenced by Simmel’s stranger, advanced the notion of the “marginal man.”³⁶ This construct shed light on the experience of the growing number of ethnic minorities coming to reside in American cities at the time of his writing. According to Park, these individuals, unlike the stranger, desire assimilation into the new culture; however, this desired assimilation is unachievable.³⁷

It is the sojourner social type, however, that offers perhaps the most interesting and compelling parallels as war fighters embark on their sojourn to peacekeeping. Paul C. P. Siu first introduced the concept in the early 1950s, defining the sojourner as “a stranger who spends many years of his lifetime in a

foreign country without being assimilated by it.”³⁸ In contrast to Park’s marginal man, however, Siu’s sojourner has no intention of remaining permanently in the new culture. Rather, he has three objectives: (1) he wants to do the job he has come to do, (2) he wants to remain tied to his own culture while he does it, and (3) he wants to get back “home” as soon as he can. These three defining aspects of the sojourner are central to understanding the sojourn of the war fighter.

Characteristics of the Sojourner.

According to Siu, to understand the sojourner, one must first understand why the sojourner goes abroad. Simply put, “the sojourn is to do a job and do it in the shortest possible time.”³⁹ Although the sojourner social type wants to return home soon, he generally wants to have done a good job and to have made a difference. He wants to return to his own culture but not without a sense of accomplishment from the culture he is leaving behind.⁴⁰ This desire for a sense of accomplishment does not include a desire to fully participate in the new culture. As a matter of fact, the sojourner is viewed by the people of the other culture only in terms of the job he has come to do and not as a separate and distinct person. As Siu put it, “He is a person only to the people of his own ethnic group or to a social circle related to his job.”⁴¹ Additionally, the job that the sojourner does is often “alien” to the culture in which he accomplishes it. In Siu’s particular case, he was primarily referring to the role of the Chinese laundryman in America.⁴²

To understand the sojourner, we must next understand the sojourner’s in-group tendency. In other words, regardless of the distance from the home culture, the sojourner tends to live with his own kind. Rather than abide in and amongst the natives of the new culture, sojourners choose to live, eat, and play with their own “countrymen.”⁴³ The underlying effort is to ease the stress associated with relating to a new culture by creating a home away from home.⁴⁴

The last defining characteristic of Siu’s sojourner is that of the movement back and

forth between cultures. From the moment they arrive in the new culture, sojourners have every intention of returning home. Beyond the necessary linguistics required to survive, there is no perceived benefit to learning the language of the new culture. As long as the necessities of life can be acquired, the sojourner is satisfied. The ways of the new culture are viewed as having no long-term benefit; hence, there is no inducement to expend energy and effort in assimilating those ways. As Siu explains, "In his lifetime several trips are made back and forth, and in some cases the career is terminated only by retirement or death. . . . Movement is characterized by ethnocentrism in the form of social isolation abroad and social expectation and status at home."⁴⁵

The War Fighter to Peacekeeper Sojourn. Soldiers trained for war fighting, predisposed to killing and destroying, are increasingly being tasked to flip the switch and assume the roles, responsibilities, and mind-sets of peacekeepers—to change both behaviors and mind-sets. This military cross-cultural transformation requires education, training, and preparation. The sojourner social type offers an interesting perspective from which to view the dynamics between the war-fighting and peacekeeping mind-sets. The sojourn from the mind-set of the war fighter to the mind-set of the peacekeeper is one in which the individual journeys from a mind-set prone to using overwhelming force to one requiring restraint; from a mind-set predisposed to a presence of nonconsent to one of general consent and acceptance; from a mind-set that relinquishes all semblance of partiality to one of impartiality.

Central to this paradigmatic shift from the war-fighting mind-set to the peacekeeping mind-set are the sociological conflicts that accompany the sojourner experience. From the vantage point of Siu's sojourner description, we see the individual soldier operating within a dynamic military culture—wanting to complete the job in a timely manner and return home, having no desire to fully merge in the culture, live among the natives, or as-

similate. However, within the military culture certain mind-sets prevail across services, branches, professions, and career fields. War fighters are reluctant to assume peacekeeping responsibilities; however, when directed, they strive to accomplish the peacekeeping job as quickly as possible and get back to war fighting. They have no desire to fully participate in the peacekeeping culture, live among peacekeepers, or become assimilated by peacekeepers. The behaviors change, but the mind-set does not. This is perhaps indicative of a military culture representative of the larger US culture:

Serious points of friction exist between US participation in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and American strategic culture. . . . Americans have yet to internalize peacekeeping into their psyche and do not understand the peacekeeping mission.⁴⁶

Numerous factors complicate the military cultural shift from the mind-set of the war fighter to the mind-set of the peacekeeper. "In our looking glass, we see two identities but only one image: one represents the dynamic approach required of our service members fighting and surviving at the farthest reaches of violence that humanity has the capacity to develop. The other is the one required when attempting to prevent and suppress violence."⁴⁷ The sojourn from the mind-set of the war fighter to that of the peacekeeper entails a paradox

in which the military functions of peacekeeping—segregating the belligerents—conflict with the role of a third party in conflict resolution: bringing the parties together. . . . That peacekeepers should be responsible for both separation and rapprochement of belligerents is not such a strange idea: it is analogous to the dialectic of offensive and defensive action that underpins operations in war. The peacekeeper works with the opposing forces against the conflict. . . . The soldierly skills of patrolling, establishing observation posts, and mounting shows of force are well developed, but are not enough. The procedures for holding meetings, negotiating agreements, escalating problems, arbitrating disputes, shuttling between opposing forces, and conciliating



A coalition forces briefing. Recent US military conflicts have placed a premium on coalition operations, carefully managed violence and avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage. Are skills such as diplomacy, once the realm of high command, now appreciated at lower levels? Have soldiers come to expect limitations on how they can fight and ambiguities as to who is a combatant? Given the practical realities of Kuwait or Kosovo, is the role of peacekeeping that different?

when possible are evolving in today's mission. Research offers a choice of new contact skills that need to be developed by military leaders and practiced with civilian colleagues.⁴⁸

Conclusion

Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.

—Unnamed United Nations peacekeeper

In his book *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*, John Lederach argues that culture should not be viewed

as a challenge to be mastered and overcome through technical recipes. Culture is rooted in social knowledge and represents a vast re-

source, a rich seedbed for producing a multitude of approaches and models in dealing with conflict. . . . Training across and in other cultures should seek methodologies that create an encounter between people in a given setting and their own rich but often implicit understandings about conflict and how to handle it.⁴⁹

The evolving nature of our nation's armed forces requires a propensity for adaptation. "If strangers successfully overcome the multitude of challenges and frustrations that invariably accompany the process of cultural adaptation, they develop a mental and behavioral capacity more adaptable, flexible, and resilient than that of people who have limited exposure to the challenges of continuous intercultural encounters."⁵⁰

War fighters cannot maintain the disposition of a sojourner and succeed in the military of the future. Indeed, "success in such operations will be determined by the degree to which all of the players can step outside of their individual cultures and value systems, surrender some of their autonomy, and seek the best, rather than the worst, in those with whom they must solve the problems they will confront."⁵¹ War fighters must explore paths to more effectively make the sojourn. It may be that all that is required is little more than "the acquisition of culturally appropriate skills."⁵² Ambassador Howard Walker, vice president of National Defense University (NDU), said in his remarks as chair of a workshop sponsored by NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies on Future Security Roles of the United Nations that "well trained units do not need a major reorientation of their training program in terms of predeployment training, but, they will need sensitivity training or cultural training to get them immersed in the social milieu into which they will deploy."⁵³

Either way, the "problem of making the mental transition from the aggressive vio-

lence of midintensity war to the requirements for restraint and control of violence necessary for peacekeeping situational dominance [must be overcome]. Although all of our service members have the inherent skills to do both, they must be given the time and training to mentally transition to each of these different environments."⁵⁴

The *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* specifically states:

First, the primary mission of our Armed Forces is not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened. Second, while the international community can create conditions for peace, the responsibility for peace ultimately rests with the people of the country in question.⁵⁵

As the future unfolds, the role of the war fighter broadens. We owe it to our Founding Fathers, to our soldiers, and to ourselves to sufficiently prepare our armed forces for whatever role they may be tasked to undertake and wherever they may be asked to journey for the "common defence." ■

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They have no lawyers among them, for they consider them as a sort of people whose profession it is to disguise matters.

—Sir Thomas More