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Published Airpower Power Journal - Summer 1998
2d Lt Jason Arnold, USAF
Col Samuel Grier, USAF
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IN THE MIDST of radical political restructuring, abiding economic quandary, and enduring cultural tension, the nations of Eastern and Central Europe have arrived at a crossroads. For the first time since World War I, they have the opportunity to experience lasting change in the form of democratic development and economic reform. However, reform comes with a price, and barring unforeseen and substantial increases in annual revenues, expansion of their economic and social spending necessarily means less spending for national defense. Consequently, the potential for lasting economic change is predicated upon the ability of these nations to merge with a security architecture that shelters them from external conflict. |
Four security architectures are available to these former bloc countries since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; it is useful to look briefly at each of them. The first option is for the new democracies to fall under Russian influence once again as Russia recovers its footing, both economically and politically. Such an option appears at the present time to be unacceptable to the democracies of East Central Europe and could occur only through Soviet-era intimidation combined with a complete hands-off policy by the West, both of which seem unlikely.
The second option is for the emerging democracies to seek an alliance among themselves, creating some type of new security organization. Formation of such an alliance would certainly be difficult and force them to turn their attention East when they stand poised on the threshold of Western integration.1 Furthermore, given the disparity and disarray among the nations that might join such a hypothetical organization, it would almost certainly be doomed before it began.
The third option available to the new democracies is the status quo. They can maintain their current interaction with the West through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) and continue their attempts to join the European Union (EU). This option permits continued military, political, and economic cooperation with the West and avoids the costs associated with full military integration. However, reform under this option could be slowed or even halted altogether without at least the prospect of full military integration with the West and the security guarantees that come with it.
Therefore, the fourth security option—NATO membership—is the only practical one. NATO membership carries with it acceptance into the circle of Western democracies, projecting stability and security to the East. It permits Eastern and Central Europe to concentrate their development almost exclusively in the areas of internationalism, free trade, and democratic practices.
Failure of NATO to accept new members could mean a loss of public support for NATO in its member nations and a slow lapse into irrelevance. In contrast, expansion offers revitalization and an enhanced role in Europe’s emerging strategic landscape.2 Hence, whether one views NATO enlargement from the perspective of the East or from the West, the conclusion is the same: the time for enlargement is upon us.
In 1982 NATO invited post-Franco Spain into the Alliance with the clear intent of strengthening democracy and providing the Spanish people with an opportunity to enter the European Economic Community.3 The integration of Spain has been a resounding success. Opening NATO to additional members must be part of the wider process of Europe’s naturally growing together in the post-cold-war era. Failure to open the Alliance contributes to an artificial demarcation that no longer corresponds to European realities.4
With the end of the cold war, an unprecedented opportunity existed to build an improved security architecture that provides increased stability and security for all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area, without re-creating dividing lines.5 Instead of seizing this opportunity, EU and the Western European Union (WEU) were effectively re-creating dividing lines in Europe by stalling the entry of new members and by deciding—unilaterally—which nations of Europe were fit for integration into the West. NATO, on the other hand, offered a strong and vibrant PFP program. Now, with a commitment to enlargement, NATO promises greater inclusion and the elimination of divisions between all interested and willing parties. This larger vision—the provision of increased stability and security for all of the Euro-Atlantic area—is the underlying purpose of NATO enlargement.
The cold war era was one of low risk and high stability. In the wake of collapsed bipolarity, the world has entered a period of high risk and low stability—a situation best illustrated by events in the former Yugoslavia.6 Bloc confrontation has been replaced by diffuse conflict scenarios, with all the risks they entail.7 These risks are multifaceted and multidirectional and—most significantly—they are difficult to predict and assess.8
Consequently, NATO must forge a new vision of its core purposes and missions. The Alliance must transform itself from a traditional military alliance into an organization for addressing Europe’s new security challenges: maintaining the capacity for territorial defense but at the same time placing greater emphasis on contingency force projection.9 NATO must become an organization of both collective defense and conflict prevention,10 taking on new responsibilities in the area of crisis management throughout Europe11 and drawing hard lessons from its failure to act with more determination and purpose in the former Yugoslavia.12
There are currently three forms under which NATO allies contribute to NATO’s collective defense.13 However, we believe that only one—full participation in the integrated military structure and the collective defense-planning process—should be offered to new members. The lack of participation of certain allies in the integrated military structure has caused many difficulties. Repeating those difficulties during a time when nations are seeking entry into the Alliance en masse is a strain that it should not have to endure during the stresses of enlarging. Despite our reservations, NATO has agreed to adopt a flexible approach when assimilating new members.14 The latter are expected to participate in the entire spectrum of Alliance missions with proper consideration given to respective capabilities, taking into account the need for case-by-case consideration of non–Article 5 missions.15
As part of enlargement’s earlier phase, the allies began a comprehensive review of the internal adjustments in command structure, force posture, roles and missions, cost sharing, and NATO staffing.16 Yet to be discussed—and possibly of importance equal to other current PFP activities—is how PFP partners might be integrated into the NATO committee structure, where they can have direct influence on Alliance developments. That PFP lacks political content is underscored by the fact that Russia achieved a political relationship with NATO outside of PFP and that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) remains the only forum for political exchanges and consultations between NATO and its closest neighbors. It has been suggested that the intensification of PFP should eventually include regular 16+1 political consultations within PFP; such a facility could be particularly useful during the enlargement process for its three newest members.17
It has also been suggested that NATO should form a North Atlantic Council “plus” (NAC+) similar to WEU’s expanded council that meets routinely at the ambassadorial and ministerial levels. NATO might also create a Political Council Plus to more effectively coordinate the activities of the recently enlarged Political-Military Steering Committee. Finally, NATO could create one-to-three-month, civilian-and-military-partner internships on both the International and the International Military Staffs in nonsensitive areas and continue inviting partners to attend the NATO Defense College,18 as has been done since Course 87. NATO could also expand the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee to include partners.
After enlarging, the Alliance must ensure that it maintains its ability to make important decisions quickly. All decisions made in NATO bodies are expressions of national sovereignty and are therefore achieved through consensus. If there is no consensus, there are no decisions. If there are no collective decisions, there is no collective defense.19 NATO is only as strong as the consensus of its members20—without the ability to reach consensus, the Alliance cannot commit. So instead of hindering the consensus process, enlargement should better enable the Alliance to carry out both its core functions and its new missions. Willy Claes, former NATO secretary-general, expressed this concern: “We must respect the principle of consensus. How can this be done with 22 or 24 members?”21
With the same democratic values yet with different histories, traditions, work cultures, geostrategic preoccupations, military capabilities, and neighbors, the current 16 NATO allies have different viewpoints on the same set of issues. Adding more members with an even greater diversity of traditions is bound to increase the difficulty of reaching consensus and potentially increase the amount of time required to reach a decision. But there are numerous advantages to consensus decision making, and the one essential element of the process is the willingness to compromise.22 Consequently, NATO expects from its new allies a commitment to build consensus within the Alliance in a spirit of cooperation on all issues of concern to them.23
EU has adopted a “weighted consensus” voting mechanism, and some individuals support moving to a similar paradigm, anticipating difficulty reaching agreement in a larger NATO. But if the Alliance can no longer reach consensus, perhaps its working methods are at fault rather than the consensus mechanism itself. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey have prepared the Alliance to negotiate sensitive issues—and if Greece and Turkey can agree upon numerous issues despite their differences, the predicted death of consensus in an enlarged NATO may be premature. For the present time, NATO is determined to keep its consensus mechanism, and a successful pattern of cooperation within an enlarged NATO may give impetus to better cooperation within other European organizations such as EU and WEU.
Although NATO maintains that no nation will exert a veto over its enlargement, it would be counterproductive to enlarge the Alliance with the intent to enhance stability while at the same time alienating Russia.24 From their inception, enlargement talks roused Russian objections, as illustrated by Defense Minister Igor Rodionov’s assertion that his country would take “appropriate measures” necessary to counter expansion.25 The recent Russia-China agreement may be one of the appropriate measures to which he alluded.26
The Russian elite cannot comprehend the means by which NATO escaped its brief post-cold-war identity crisis, since the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated in the face of change. For many Russians, NATO still has a hostile flavor; we should expect Russian opposition to NATO enlargement simply because NATO has always been opposed by Russia. Paradoxically, Russians do not focus exclusively on the increased military threat from a larger NATO—rather, they worry about political-psychological impacts on domestic social, political, and economic stability that may result from what they view as “unnecessary expansion.” There was also vague talk of renewing a strategy of confrontation using the Commonwealth of Independent States,27 but it is unlikely to coalesce, given the lack of enthusiasm on the part of most members and Russia’s own inconsistent leadership.
Claims that another cold war is possible are exaggerated. The truth is that Russia is not in a position to engage in another such confrontation. In an irony of history, it may be that Moscow’s weakness rather than its strength is the cause of concern in Russia with regard to NATO expansion.28 It also seems unlikely that the US public, in its dash to cash in on the “peace dividend,” would support another era of bloc confrontation. The US response to the end of the cold war has been across-the-board force reductions, reducing the likelihood of any future confrontation.
In any case, Russian perceptions must be taken seriously,29 and NATO enlargement must occur within a Europe where democratic Russia has its rightful place. Thus, while NATO responds to the legitimate expectations of Central Europe to be integrated into a Euro-Atlantic security structure, it should also build a strong NATO-Russia relationship.30
NATO is prudently avoiding formal treaties with Russia that place it in the position of having to coerce Russia to take certain actions. Signing agreements that make NATO a willing partner and require voluntary compliance on Russia’s part removes the Alliance from an enforcement role and lessens the potential for friction. The recently signed Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation is one such agreement. For its part, Russia was seeking some formal agreement that might limit, if not the enlargement process itself, then the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure.31
To lessen tensions still further, the Alliance has clearly stated there is no a priori requirement for the stationing of NATO troops on the territory of new members; nor is the peacetime stationing of forces on other allies’ territories a condition of membership.32 The Alliance realizes that stationing allied forces on the territory of new members could give a misleading impression of Alliance concerns33—unspoken but clearly vis-à-vis Russia. These positions emphasize the point that there is no perceived external threat to Central Europe and that the forward deployment of troops and the fortification of borders are not required.34
Russia cannot be expected to cooperate on some issues, and NATO must be sensitive to the perceptions of its partners. Recent signs of a stable political situation with almost no evidence of unrest and reports that the Russian economy shows signs of stabilizing after six years of decline are promising indications that Russia may finally be pulling out of its downslide35—and provide hope for better cooperation. Tense though the relationship may sometimes be, NATO and Russia appear to be making headway in establishing a strong, stable, and enduring partnership that properly recognizes their common interests in security and cooperation on the European continent.36 The current dialogue offers the best assurance for the peaceful enlargement of NATO and provides an atmosphere in which credible security guarantees can be established and defended.
With no desire to actually gain full membership, the Ukraine plans to seek associate membership in NATO when the Alliance expands. However, the Alliance has rejected appeals for associate membership, opting for nothing less than full membership, which is deemed essential to maintain collective defense. Anything less could be perceived as a “paper guarantee,”37 undermining expansion efforts.
Although security guarantees are important to most of the nations struggling to enter the Alliance, one can argue that Article 5 will do little to meet what some people claim are the real threats facing Central Europe: political and economic turmoil and ethnic tension.38 These problems may be better addressed by setting standards that new members will be expected to meet, either before their admission to NATO or after they enter the Alliance.
The Alliance has indicated there are ways for nations to prepare for entry, although it has not issued a list of rigid criteria. Active participation in PFP, for example, is expected to play an important role in preparing countries for accession, though it does not guarantee Alliance membership.39 Similarly, new members will not be required to achieve full interoperability of their forces with NATO standards before joining the Alliance, but they are expected to meet certain minimum standards.40
Nevertheless, at some point the Alliance must insist that selected applicants either meet certain criteria or forgo membership—both to maintain ideological and political compatibility among members and to ensure that enlargement is completed in a reasonable time frame.41 During the integration process, the Alliance must guard against NATO members’ attempts to put undue pressure on invited nations to settle personal differences with NATO countries to their disadvantage before they join, which might cause future friction and conflict. The prospect of joining NATO has proven to be the most powerful incentive for reform and resolution of ethnic and territorial conflict among aspiring members.42 This fact alone should be a clear signal to doubters of NATO enlargement that it is the right course of action.
In the end, NATO must guard against creating too much competition among nations vying for membership. There is friction enough now that the first group of new members has been announced by the Alliance.
Stated in its simplest terms, “the who” was a political decision. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were on the shortlist of virtually everyone who endorses NATO expansion. Verbalizing the potential of these nations to become members of NATO built a general expectation that lessened any negative reaction on the part of Russia; it also prepared for rejection those nations who were not admitted with the first wave. “Second tier” candidates included Slovenia and Slovakia. Romania was considered a “dark horse” by some proponents, a status granted in consideration for its enthusiastic participation in PFP.
It might prove useful to examine what made some countries good candidates and why certain countries were not good risks for the first wave. Nations more distant from NATO and closer to Russia were not good candidates for admission. The Baltics are a prime example: adding them to NATO at the present time might be construed as a direct affront to Russia and add unnecessary friction to the enlargement process. However, inviting Poland to join compensated for not adding the Baltics to the first wave; as a prosperous neighbor and member of NATO, Poland can strengthen the Baltic economies as well as their identification with the West.
The corollary to our earlier observation is that countries in geographic proximity to NATO were good candidates for early admission. That those nations in proximity—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—have developed the furthest democratically and have the strongest free-market economies made them easy choices. If contiguity had been an issue, then Slovenia could have provided a link between NATO and Hungary. Slovenia was a solid candidate for early admission, having adapted quickly to democracy and a free-market economy. However, Slovenia borders the Balkans, potentially reducing its attraction. As an aside, contiguity was apparently not a primary consideration when deciding which nations were invited to join. As core functions of the Alliance are changing, collective defense—and the importance of common borders—has become less important.
Although the political leaders of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic wanted very much to join NATO, the views of their populations varied. Public opinion polls in these three nations indicated that the majority of their populations strongly or somewhat supported their entry into NATO; when asked if they would defend another country, permit NATO exercises in their country, or permit NATO troops to be based in their country, the majority of the populations in Hungary and the Czech Republic said no. All three nations opposed spending a larger share of their bud-gets on military needs.43 These sentiments may in fact drive the Alliance toward adopting criteria for membership that keep accession costs to a minimum.
Equally important to the question of who would join the Alliance in the first wave was the question of when enlargement would actually occur. NATO’s position is that the only criterion for timing should be that the manner and speed of the enlargement process increase stability in the whole of Europe.44 Speculation regarding expansion’s exact timing centers around April 1999—NATO’s 50th anniversary. This symbolic date provides a unique opportunity to mark historic change in the nature of the Alliance.
The enlargement issue was the focus of NATO’s December Ministerial of 1996. Specific names and dates when new members would be asked to join were not announced; such an important decision lay more appropriately with NATO’s member states. Consequently, final discourse on the subject took place at the July 1997 summit in Madrid,45 where the Alliance extended membership invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.46
The Alliance should make clear that enlargement is expected to be an evolutionary process that will continue indefinitely. President William Clinton made the US view of the enlargement process public when he promised to thousands of disappointed but eager Romanians, “Stay the course and Romania will cross that milestone.”47 In the meantime, PFP must be maintained, enhanced, and deepened not only as a stand-alone instrument of European security,48 but as the gateway to a larger NATO.
There are concerns that NATO would evolve from a security organization into a round-table forum if it expands beyond some “magic” threshold. The maintenance of a common worldview is unlikely in a large community of states, and it can be argued that institutional integrity cannot be maintained with too many members. Although we have earlier defined “evolutionary enlargement” as an indefinite process, we recognize that “infinite expansion” is not possible. The purpose of gradual enlargement is not only to identify and eliminate problems in the process, but also to cautiously approach the boundaries of an effective threshold without crossing the line. Conventional wisdom calls for limiting the size of NATO to about 25 countries, most likely due to the very real problems already faced by EU at 20 full members and six associates.
As NATO reaches some maximum size, the important question of who will be left out must be considered. It is important that nations not invited to join understand that new dividing lines are not being drawn on the Continent. We believe that this imperative calls for a new NATO to be comprised of nations with common values and common worldviews—nations that are naturally aligned. Such a membership strategy ensures that those nations not invited to join feel less on the outside, since they are unlikely to share the viewpoint of NATO members on numerous issues anyway.
It might also be important to consider for membership those nations whose borders include territory that has historically been the object of contention. Leaving such nations outside the Alliance may create a vacuum that could lead to unnecessary strife. Placing such nations into the Alliance—much like NATO did with Greece and Turkey—could be expected to increase stability in the region. Regardless of NATO’s final composition, making PFP a worthwhile cooperation program can bring some sense of security for its partners with the result that NATO may never have to hang the “no vacancy” sign over the door.
Although Russia seems to have accepted that it will never be in a position to join EU and seems satisfied with the cooperation agreements recently signed, it has consistently tried not to foreclose the option to join NATO, however remote such a development may seem.49 Russians seem to accept the fact that many allies oppose their entry into NATO—especially while the internal situation in their country is insufficiently stable and unpredictable, which would prohibit them from meeting reliably the obligations and responsibilities expected of them as members. The fact also remains that the political leadership of the former Warsaw Pact countries would object to finding itself in the Russian shadow in the new NATO, that many parts of Russian society are not ready for NATO membership, and that Russia’s own military leadership rejects the idea.50
The following arguments have been or could be used to exclude Russia from membership:
Certainly, any new command structure would have to be huge to absorb Russia’s size, and the addition of Russia could reorient NATO overnight toward events in China and the Pacific. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that Russian integration may not work. For example, the Poles are learning English for entry into NATO, but the Russians want NATO members to learn Russian.52 It has also been argued that Russian membership might remove NATO as the shield of Western Europe, since NATO obligation does not extend to protecting its members against each other.53 For nations that wish to join, NATO’s value lies in its potential to restrain what may be an increasingly unpredictable Russia, and some do not believe that NATO’s members can restrain Russia if the latter is a member.54 We believe that the history of animosity between NATO allies Greece and Turkey proves otherwise: were it not for the Alliance restraining their actions, Turkey and Greece might have gone to war years ago.
If Russia does not fit into any existing organization, then a new Russia-NATO forum must be created to respect Russia’s status and to lessen the perception that expanding NATO eastward is an anti-Russian strategy.55 Ideally, this forum should reach a point where Russia’s membership in NATO doesn’t matter because that country has been integrated into all European institutions—economic, political, and military—and all are working closely together.
EU, WEU, and NATO claim the same objectives: to enhance stability in Europe as a whole and to create a security environment in which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can accomplish their reform processes and further their economic and political development.56
Certain NATO allies believe that EU membership should come before NATO membership, since security guarantees will not be credible if they have no solid political and economic foundation.57 Further, there cannot be a lasting Alliance without the affirmation of a strong European pillar.58 At the present time, it’s not clear that EU has the necessary capabilities to respond to the new security challenges facing Europe, whereas NATO does.59 EU’s shortcomings might be addressed using combined joint task forces (CJTF), which could serve as a basis for creating available force structures that are separable but not separate from NATO.60 But even with the advent of CJTF, enlarging EU may prove to be much more difficult than enlarging NATO, particularly in light of the strict economic criteria required by the former. It is noteworthy that EU extended invitations for membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia only after NATO announced its own first wave of new members.61
NATO should continue to take advantage of the cold war’s lingering military emphasis in its new partners and expand ahead of EU—using its influence to better prepare its new members for entry into EU. However, if the Alliance continues to expand first, fledgling NATO members who are not also participants in EU may not learn to “think European” and instead adopt an Atlanticist view. This might inhibit WEU’s ultimate goal of becoming the dominant security pillar on the Continent. In the short term, the key issue might well be to preclude NATO and EU from becoming interblocking rather than interlocking institutions. Both organizations seem committed to that end.
The Alliance has categorized its enlargement as a parallel process designed to complement expansion of EU. Though the two organizations are expected to enlarge autonomously, each organization is expected to consider developments in the other during the process.62 EU’s recent decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the union so soon after NATO extended its invitations is an indication that this strategy is already in place. Linking the enlargement of NATO with the enlargement of EU serves four primary purposes. The first is that concurrent expansion invigorates the efforts to promote stability eastward.63 Second, EU can provide what Central Europe needs most: economic growth and political integration into Western Europe. Third, the impact of military integration can be downplayed through a carefully paralleled economic integration, minimizing the risk of backlash in Russia.64 Fourth, and most importantly, coordinated enlargement provides for common memberships in NATO and WEU.
At the present time, all full members of WEU are members of NATO. Because of security guarantees provided by NATO and WEU to their respective members, the Alliance states that maintaining common member states is essential.65 There is also general agreement within NATO that forces of European allies should be “separable from NATO” but not “separate”;66 one can infer from this agreement that members of WEU should also be members of NATO.
Finally, there are other important membership issues. What the neutral nations eventually decide to do in post-cold-war Europe could affect both NATO and WEU. Should EU and WEU develop a common foreign policy, they must remember that five nations in EU are not members of WEU and that four nations are not members of NATO. With a membership invitation from EU now also extended to Slovenia and Estonia, the issue promises to generate continued debate.
A significant degree of US involvement in Europe is crucial to counterbalance a potentially unstable Russia67 and to support further European integration. The current US administration views NATO as the foundation of American policy in Europe and identifies it as the essential organization for peace on the Continent.68 The trans-Atlantic link serves the interest of both sides of the Atlantic,69 and the United States should remain a European power and help its NATO allies forge a strategic vision for the future.
Although cost estimates may dampen NATO’s enthusiasm for enlargement, numerous options are available to lower costs: spread them over a greater period of time, limit the degree of change that new members will be required to make to their forces and their infrastructures after they matriculate, and do not station NATO forces on the territories of new members.
NATO makes it clear that potential members face considerable financial obligations when they join.70 However, NATO member nations must also be prepared to expend resources and make sacrifices.71 The bottom line is that membership means there is no free ride on defense, but it also means that new members do not have to embark on an ambitious armaments program. The goal should be to provide new members with enough security so they can concentrate on rebuilding their societies and economies—the components of stable democracy.
If NATO decides to configure new members’ forces only in the areas of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) and logistics support, the cost of enlargement will be relatively low.72 If new members are permitted to contribute strategic position rather than strategic forces—as did both Iceland and Spain—then costs can be driven much lower. Current cost projections we have seen in the literature seem to indicate that NATO plans to build a new Maginot Line, and that is clearly not the case. Sen. Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) estimated most recently that the US share of NATO expansion costs would be $5 billion to $19 billion over a 15-year period.73
Perhaps the most attractive option available to the Alliance involves improving the existing militaries of new members by upgrading them sufficiently so that integration with NATO air defenses, logistics organizations, and communications networks is feasible. This option capitalizes on the ability of NATO’s in-area assets to extend their umbrella eastward, while still operating from bases in Western Europe, and would involve few costs in the short term.
Costs can be expected to be significantly larger if steps are taken to develop the military infrastructure of new members so that NATO forces can deploy. If their infrastructures were upgraded, new members would gain access to NATO airpower, intelligence, and resupply. To absorb the full benefits of NATO logistics and communications, however, new members would also be required to improve existing port, rail, and road facilities. These so-called baseline improvements for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia alone are estimated to cost about $60.6 billion.74
Should NATO determine that new air base facilities were needed or seek to permanently station ground forces, estimates for adding new members to the Alliance could reach $124 billion.75 Other estimates put high-end costs at around $110 billion.76
Depending on the choices the Alliance makes, costs will vary widely. Assuming that the midlevel $60.6 billion figure is credible, even this amount may be plausibly affordable. By comparison, the life-cycle cost of a US Army division is about $60 billion, and the acquisition cost of individual US weapon systems often runs $20–30 billion or more.77 Furthermore, the $60 billion figure amounts to only 2–3 percent of what NATO already plans to spend in defense of its current borders.78
Based on traditional NATO practices, new members can probably be expected to pay for 20–30 percent of the total amount needed to fund national programs and their fair share of common infrastructure spending. The remainder will presumably come from NATO’s current members.79 If $60 billion is a reasonable figure to pay for expansion and if the new members can be expected to pay for at least 20 percent of the total, what are the implications? The Visegrad states (minus Slovakia) have a total combined gross domestic product (GDP) of about $354.2 billion.80 If they are expected to contribute their fair share of at least $12 billion (20 percent x $60 billion) over a 10-year period, then joining NATO would cost them just over 0.3 percent of their GDP each year—not including other financial obligations they will owe to the Alliance. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic already spend about 1.5 percent of their GDP on defense.81 Expecting them to increase their defense budgets by over 20 percent is in our view unrealistic in the short term. We therefore believe that NATO should require the configuration of new members’ forces only in the areas of C3I and logistics support, while permitting the gradual integration and modernization of the rest of their military capabilities over an extended period of time.
If NATO drags out the ratification process, especially with regard to the first accession of new members, then its failure to act quickly could be interpreted that the West is unsympathetic to the Central and Eastern European states—that it views them at best as unimportant and at worst as “outside of Europe,” undercutting reform in the new democracies.82 Consequently, we believe that ratification of the first wave will take place at a steady pace in NATO capitals now that invitations have been issued and once negotiations for entry are completed.
PFP was expected to die a natural death when NATO enlarged. But PFP has worked so well that after the first group of nations is admitted to the Alliance, it is expected to play an important role both to help prepare new members for membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries unlikely to join the Alliance. NACC is expected to play a significant role in establishing confidence-building measures between NATO and its cooperation partners.83
Goals established for the continued development of PFP sound remarkably similar to the contributions to be made by NATO enlargement.84 The character of the projected relationship between new members and NATO and the relationship between PFP partners and NATO is blurring, and suggestions have been made to convert NATO’s entire structure so that it does less NATO-unique work and caters equally well to both partners and members.
NATO’s goal for PFP should be to offer to its partners—those who do not wish or cannot presently attain membership—all benefits of membership except a security guarantee and a vote at the table: to treat them the same as NATO members on a day-to-day basis in both political and military cooperation. Partners must be made to feel that they are important to the West, and they should be brought to a point where they are as close to a security guarantee as is possible in the existing political climate. One can argue that one of the unintended consequences of PFP has been to make the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe obsolete and that NATO should recognize the implications of that reality as it continues to strengthen and develop its Partnership Program. It has been suggested that Russia might reject a continued role in PFP. However, through PFP, Russia has a historic opportunity to join the larger community of industrialized democracies and to emerge from the isolation that characterized its international role during most of this century.85
In addition to performing its traditional role in collective defense, NATO must develop a strategy that includes flexible procedures to undertake new roles in changing circumstances. NATO forces must become more mobile, able to react to a wider range of contingencies, and flexible enough to respond quickly to crisis situations. The growing proliferation of countries with ballistic missiles could seriously complicate NATO operations in out-of-area contingencies and even deter NATO intervention;86 it may be important for the Alliance to consider the benefits of a layered missile defense system for deployed forces. As the delivery range of ballistic missiles grows longer, NATO might also have to consider wide-area defenses for the protection of its territory and population.87 If the Alliance is serious about making CJTF work in the context of effective crisis management, then procedures for making separable, but not separate, NATO resources available to the Europeans must be formalized.88
NATO’s most pressing current priority is the Implementation Force (IFOR) operation in Bosnia. The spring of 1996 was the first in four years without a major military offensive, and NATO led the IFOR that both built and kept the peace in that area. The 18-month extension of IFOR’s mandate was probably deemed necessary to preserve the work that NATO accomplished and to ensure the mission’s continued success. The success of the IFOR mission is clearly essential since it proves that NATO can effectively manage crises that affect the whole of Europe, while inspiring extraordinary and unprecedented cooperation.89
Regardless of the final command structure adopted by the Alliance, effective coordination of forces by the integrated military structure in an enlarged NATO will be challenging. NATO must look at new adaptations for its headquarters and simplify its command structures.90
The NATO enlargement study acknowledges that a broad plan is necessary to ensure that maximum effectiveness and flexibility are maintained following the accession of new members.91 Now that the decision regarding “the who” of new members has been made, work on the command structure can begin in earnest. We believe that the final command structure should be flexible enough to absorb the effects of future enlargements.92
In this era of emerging Russia-NATO cooperation, it would be counterproductive to insist on the right to maintain Alliance nuclear weapons in the territory of new members. In no other way could NATO more effectively undermine its efforts to cast itself in a new role. It would be extraordinarily difficult to insist that NATO is no longer an alliance directed against the former Soviet Union, while at the same time holding fast to the old concept of strategic one-upmanship.
European security no longer relies on proliferation as an avenue for deterrence, and if the Alliance ever hoped to gain Russia’s outright approval, or even its grudging acknowledgment of enlargement, it had to concede the nuclear issue.93 In the words of the director of the Marshall Center, the new way ahead for NATO-Russian relations has been marked: partnership instead of deterrence.94 NATO’s current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged Alliance, and we believe there is no need to change or modify any aspect of NATO’s current nuclear posture or policy.
The time is right for NATO enlargement. It is an idea consistent with historic pressures and offers the Alliance revitalization and enhanced relevance in Europe’s emerging strategic landscape. The most monumental task facing the West since the cold war, NATO enlargement represents the true spirit of the emerging international order: removal of dividing lines, evolution of cooperation, and joint maintenance of regional stability to mutual benefit. Inviting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join is a modest beginning and in keeping with NATO’s goal to enhance security and project stability. Although lingering distrust between cold war enemies and the inherent problems caused by conflicting priorities promise to be a source of contention between current NATO countries and its new members, one can expect that the new NATO will renovate European security and ultimately strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship.
Notes
1. Flora Lewis, “What East Europe Seeks Is a Model of Civilization,” International Herald Tribune, 13 June 1997, 9.
2. Council on Foreign Relations, Should NATO Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force, 1995, 11.
3. Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 3.
4. NATO secretary-general Javier Salano, “NATO: Towards the Twenty-First Century,” dinner address at the 13th International NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making, Warsaw, 19 June 1996.
5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, 1.
6. Gen Klaus Naumann, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, speech to the 13th International NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making, Warsaw, 22 June 1996.
7. Klaus Kinkel, “The New NATO: Steps Towards Reform,” NATO Review, May 1996, 10.
8. Study on NATO Enlargement, 5.
9. Should NATO Expand? 4, 14.
10. Naumann speech.
11. Kinkel, 10.
12. Should NATO Expand? 4; and Mary Battiata, “War of the Worlds,” Washington Post Magazine, 30 June 1996, 8–26.
13. Study on NATO Enlargement, 17.
14. Ibid., 18.
15. Ibid., 20.
16. House Committee on International Relations, Testimony of Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rudolf V. Perina on U.S. Policy toward NATO Enlargement [hereinafter Perina Testimony], 104th Cong., 2d sess., 20 June 1996, 5.
17. Sankt Augustin, “The Future of Partnership for Peace,” Arbeitspapier, April 1996, 16.
18. Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon, “Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement,” Strategic Forum, no. 57 (December 1995): 3–4.
19. Dr. Bernd A. Goetze, NATO Decision-Making: How the Council Works, (Rome: NATO Defense College, 26 June 1996).
20. James Sherr, “After the Cold War: The Search for a New Security System,” presentation at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) School, 1995.
21. Quoted in James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 25.
22. Ibid.
23. Study on NATO Enlargement, 15; and Walter Slocombe, “Speech at the Atlantic Council on NATO Policy,” Washington File, no. 117 (21 June 1996): 24.
24. Dmitri Trenin, “Avoiding a New Confrontation with NATO,” NATO Review, May 1996, 20.
25. Quoted in “NATO Seeks to Allay Russian Fears of Alliance’s Expansion,” Gazette Telegraph, 19 January 1997, A20.
26. Ira Straus, “NATO, Go East,” National Review, 11 August 1997, 39.
27. Russian Foreign Policy Council Report on NATO Expansion, “Russia and NATO: Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 June 1995.
28. Gerhard Wettig, “A New Type of Challenge to European Security,” Aussen Politik 46, no. 2 (1995).
29. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” in NATO Handbook (Paris: NATO, October 1995), 237.
30. Salano address.
31. Edmund L. Andrews, “Russia Hints at Compromise over NATO,” New York Times, 31 January 1997, A8.
32. Study on NATO Enlargement, 16, 19.
33. Ibid., 19.
34. Should NATO Expand? 11.
35. “Yeltsin Enjoys Big Comeback,” Gazette Telegraph, 4 July 1997, A12.
36. Salano address.
37. Slocombe speech, 24.
38. Should NATO Expand? 13.
39. Study on NATO Enlargement, 4.
40. Ibid., 13.
41. Ibid., 14.
42. Perina Testimony, 5.
43. “Take Three—NATO Enlargement,” The Economist, 29 June 1996, 31.
44. Simon, NATO Enlargement, 41.
45. Tim Zimmermann, “They’re Still Poles Apart,” U.S. News and World Report, 24 March 1997, 37.
46. “Clinton Ends 8-Day Trip to Europe in Denmark,” Gazette Telegraph, 13 July 1997, A13.
47. “Romanians Cheer Clinton Despite His NATO Snub,” Gazette Telegraph, 12 July 1997, A11.
48. Naumann speech.
49. Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams, “NATO Enlargement and the European Union,” The World Today, May 1995, 87–88.
50. “Russia and NATO.”
51. Morrison, 50.
52. Ibid., 51.
53. Ibid., 57.
54. Sherr presentation.
55. Morrison, 61.
56. Simon, NATO Enlargement, 41.
57. Morrison, 63.
58. Charles Millon, “France and the Renewal of the Atlantic Alliance,” NATO Review, May 1996, 15.
59. Sean Kay, “NATO and the CSCE: A Partnership for the Future,” Paradigms: The Kent Journal of International Relations 7, no. 2 (1993): 60.
60. Morrison, 7.
61. “Eastward Ho, They Said Warily,” The Economist, 19 July 1997, 43.
62. Study on NATO Enlargement, 7–8.
63. Ruhle and Williams, 85.
64. Should NATO Expand? 3, 20.
65. Study on NATO Enlargement, 8.
66. Morrison, 5.
67. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” 238.
68. Perina Testimony, 1.
69. Naumann speech.
70. Ibid.
71. Should NATO Expand? 9.
72. Simon, NATO Enlargement, 15.
73. Mike DeWine, “The Cost of Not Expanding NATO,” Washington Post, 19 August 1997, 13.
74. Tim Zimmermann, “Pricing a Bigger NATO,” U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1996, 14.
75. Ibid.
76. Theresa Hutchens, “Larger Alliance Could Yield Savings,” Defense News, 5 August 1996.
77. Simon, NATO Enlargement, 191–92.
78. Ibid., 194.
79. Ibid., 205.
80. The World Defense Almanac 1996–1997, issue 1, January 1997, 78, 106, 122.
81. Ibid.
82. Morrison, 30.
83. Study on NATO Enlargement, 11.
84. Ibid., 12.
85. Strobe Talbott, “Talbott Says New NATO Should Not ‘Create New Iron Curtain,’ ” Polish Radio, 20 September 1995.
86. David Martin, “Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defense/Theater Missile Defense,” NATO Review, May 1996, 32.
87. Ibid., 35.
88. Millon, 14.
89. Salano address.
90. Simon, NATO Enlargement, 14.
91. Study on NATO Enlargement, 18.
92. Naumann speech.
93. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation (Paris: NATO, 27 May 1997), sec. 4.
94. Dr. Robert Kennedy, director, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, “A New NATO for the Twenty-First Century: The Alliance after the Madrid Summit,” speech to the 44th Annual Conference and Seminar of Anciens, 4 October 1997.
2d Lt Jason Arnold (USAFA) is undergoing intelligence training at Goodfellow AFB, Texas.
Col Samuel Grier (USAFA; MS, University of Colorado; PhD, University of Texas) is permanent professor and head of the Department of Computer Science at the United States Air Force Academy. A KC-135 command pilot with over twenty-four hundred flying hours, he has previously served as chief of NATO’s Situation Center in Brussels, Belgium. Colonel Grier is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Air Command and Staff College, and NATO Defense College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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