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Published Airpower Journal -
Spring 1998
Loyalty to petrified opinion never yet broke a chain or freed a human soul.
--Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Among the most spectacular successes in Operation Desert Storm was the quick defeat of Iraq’s air forces. Early attacks against Iraqi air bases showed how vulnerable these facilities are to attack from a modern foe. Iraq soared confidently into the war from air bases that both defended its borders and housed valuable aircraft within some of the most formidable bunkers ever designed. However, like all highly valuable static targets in Iraq, once identified, they were subjected to merciless attacks. The beginning of the Gulf War begat the end of the combat air base.
The demise of the air base in light of new technology and doctrine has historical parallels. Because of technology limitations (lack of effective mobile artillery with which to demolish a well-designed fortification) and resource constraints (troops and their associated costs), in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conflicts centered upon sieges of fortifications. Armies constituted a capital expense so large that they had to be used with caution. They were also limited in range to an area they could reach quickly by march from their magazines. Fortresses, within which the magazines lay, therefore became the locus of warfare.1
The French Revolution ended the obsession with elaborate fortifications.2 Revolutionary armies lived off the land, endured privations, and marched deep into enemy territory. The fortification no longer mattered—but the army did matter. Faced with mobile armies possessing improved, more lethal artillery, the fortification in many cases became a weakness rather than a strength.
Since Napoléon, ground wars have been won by forces best able to maintain offensive mobility. The Navy, under the goading of Adm Hyman Rickover, transferred these attributes to the sea, freeing US sea power from limitations of range and deployment dictated by available coaling stations and ports. Ironically, as the other arms of military power have become more mobile, air forces have become more restricted to their air bases.
Although the modern battlefield dooms static facilities, mobile platforms survive. During Desert Storm, fixed Scud launch sites were quickly identified and eliminated. Despite its air supremacy, however, the coalition had virtually no success against mobile Scuds.3 Iraq continued to launch these missiles throughout the war. In contrast, Iraq’s air force, flying from known, fixed locations, was quickly defeated. The lesson is clear: dependency upon fixed sites, whether air bases or other critical nodes, risks defeat.
Unlike their static Air Force counterparts, mobile air bases, such as aircraft carriers and Marine assault ships, can maneuver to place massive firepower on targets and then withdraw when located by the enemy. They have the additional benefit of operating upon the open seas, allowing naval aviation to attack most of the world’s military and industrial centers. They also have fewer political and social constraints placed upon them than do their land counterparts.
Floating platforms similar to oil rigs represent another basing option. For instance, the United States has investigated using such platforms to replace some installations in Okinawa. The platforms would include a three- thousand-foot runway, housing, and space for 60 helicopters.4 Further, these structures could deploy to crisis regions and move when located by adversary intelligence.
If we are to reduce our dependency on air bases, we must change aircraft design and procurement. We might consider adopting the Russian philosophy of aircraft design: a rugged, structural approach that permits aircraft to deploy to natural surfaces. Only recently the Air Force had an aircraft designed for deployment nearly anywhere—the A-10. Despite the tremendous capability this aircraft showed in the Gulf War, the Air Force has shown no interest in developing a similarly capable follow-on.5
Short takeoff and landing (STOL) and vertical (V)/STOL aircraft, such as Marine Harriers and Army attack helicopters, also are less dependent on fixed air bases. V/STOL aircraft can operate despite airfield limitations and intensive attacks on air bases. Such aircraft are flexible, in that they may be deployed on either land- or sea-based platforms.6 Trade-offs in weight and performance, however, have tended to retard interest in these aircraft. The Air Force has shown little interest in V/STOL and continues to emphasize performance in the air over survivability on the ground.
Another way of protecting air bases entails placing them beyond the range of most threats. However, air bases would have to be quite far away indeed. Nearly every potential theater of war is thick with ballistic missiles. Countries such as Libya, India, Iran, North Korea, and Syria have missiles with ranges from 500 km to more than 2,500 km.7 Some of these missiles may be armed with chemical, biological, or even nuclear warheads. Given the increasing availability of global positioning system (GPS) technology and advanced computers, the accuracy of even conventional weapons could begin to match that of US Tomahawk cruise missiles. Moreover, arms exporters are selling advanced long-range aircraft, along with packages of precision-guided weaponry.
Range also can reduce the power and effectiveness of an air force—witness the Battle of Britain, in which British fighters flew far more sorties per aircraft than their German adversaries, who flew exhausting distances to attack England. Thus, it is possible for a small air force to overwhelm a much larger and better equipped foe.
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) also can reduce air force dependency upon fixed operating bases.8 Recent advances in propulsion systems, expert systems, and materials technology have expanded the missions UAVs will play in future conflicts. These vehicles may soon augment—or replace—many piloted aircraft, including combat aircraft, that depend on air bases. Experiments already have been conducted on UAVs modified to deliver ordnance. Indeed, the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board has reportedly begun notional studies into stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV).9
UAVs provide other advantages. They can be launched and recovered away from airfields. They can loiter all day, reconnoitering or awaiting their prey. They are free of G-load restrictions mandated by human frailty. But they cannot replace the manned fighter or fighter-bomber soon—at least not entirely—because mobile targets and missions calling for on-the-spot decisions will still require a human’s presence. However, the UAV offers another means of removing some airpower resources from the air base.
An air force less dependent upon bases will be radically different from today’s organization. Different missions will require different solutions. For example, Harrier follow-ons and helicopters capable of conducting sorties either from floating platforms or from numerous, hastily prepared logistics supply points will provide close air support. Other airpower will come from cruise missiles and extended-range, air-delivered munitions.
Manned strategic combat aircraft will remain, but in far fewer numbers than today. They will attack only the most politically sensitive targets or other targets requiring instantaneous decision making by humans. Typically, they will fly longer distances, perhaps flying to and from the continental United States to conduct missions. Airlift will remain manned but will be located farther to the rear.
Decades from now, much—if not most—of the Air Force’s firepower will likely come from UAVs. They will conduct almost all missions now assigned to manned aircraft, from intelligence gathering and counterair operations, to operational and even strategic attack. Freed from fixed air bases, UAVs could launch and land from numerous, unpredictable locations.
At present, however, it does not appear that the Air Force has come to grips with the need to free itself from combat air bases. Fortunately, the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps have done so. If the Air Force remains saddled with aircraft that depend upon smooth concrete and steel hangars, in some future conflict it may find itself an onlooker while its sister services conduct the struggle for air superiority.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. H. Rothfels, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943), 97.
2. Henry Guerlac, “Vauban: The Impact of Science on War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 45–46.
3. David Shukman, Tomorrow’s War: The Threat of High-Technology Weapons (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1996), 123–24.
4. David Shukman, “US Plans Floating Army Base off Japan,” The London Sunday Times, 22 September 1996, 1–19.
5. See, for instance, Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 264.
6. Roy Braybrook, V/STOL: The Key to Survival (London: Osprey Publishing Limited, 1989), 13–14.
7. Won Yu Yong, “The Hyonmu versus the SCUD,” Wolgan Choson, April 1991, 378–93.
8. See Wing Comdr Mark Lax and Wing Comdr Barry Sutherland, “An Extended Role for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the Royal Australian Air Force,” Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Studies Centre Paper no. 46, 1996; on-line, Internet, 7 June 1997, available from http://www.adfa.oz.au/DOD/apsc/apsc/pubs.html.
9. Bill Sweetman, “Pilotless Fighters: Has Their Time Come?” Jane’s International Defense Review, June 1997, 559–61.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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