Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1998

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FODDER

In “Fodder for Professional Development: Reference Works for the Air Warrior/Scholar” (Spring 1998), Dr. David Mets brings up a basic point about the study of both the evolution of airpower and the people who have contributed to its development. There is no organized program to nurture and encourage airpower studies, inside or outside the United States Air Force, and this deficiency has potentially serious implications for our future.

Although such a program is vital to encouraging the study of airpower, it is probably not within the Air Force’s charter to oversee such a program. The free give-and-take of the academic community scares many individuals within the ordered bureaucracy of the military. Some members of the academic community would choose not to participate because of the military connection even though their contributions could be vital to the examination and evolution of airpower doctrine and its application. Also, any service-run program can be held hostage to the vagaries of politics and the budget process. That should not discourage us from participating in and supporting such a program, however. Any such program that evolves would have several components, only one of which I shall address here.
As Dr. Mets makes clear, there is no central repository or archive of primary airpower- related research materials. This basic, fundamental problem must be solved to permit the fullest growth of airpower studies. Papers of our key leaders, movers and shakers, theoreticians, innovators, and gadflies are scattered across the country at numerous libraries and other institutions. Although it may not be possible to physically relocate many of these papers to a central location, we can take certain steps. The Air Force’s Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, is building a web site with information about the extent and location of the personal papers of key leaders (http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/ pp2.htm). This inventory is a valuable first step.

Organizing, describing, and annotating these papers will require the cooperation of many groups. Sponsoring the studies of qualified graduate students or scholars is likely to produce some in-depth work. The answer lies in cooperation.

For instance, to facilitate the study of the Air Force Academy’s collection of papers by many early Air Force leaders, the Air Force History Support Office (AFHSO) might write no-cost orders permitting selected military or civilian scholars to use billeting and dining facilities for reasonable, specified periods of time that are mutually agreeable. This arrangement would allow a significant reduction of costs incurred in the research effort.

Organizations such as the Air Force Association and Air Force Historical Foundation could cosponsor this research, providing fellowships funded by industry and philanthropic foundations interested in promoting the study of airpower-related subjects. These organizations could also organize a periodic or even ongoing review panel of academics and military-aviation historians to consider proposals for research, approving and perhaps even rank-ordering desirable proposals. AFHSO could then sponsor these researchers. This type of plan would work for papers located at or near any military installation such as Air University at Maxwell AFB, the National Archives, or the Library of Congress (researchers could stay at Bolling AFB or Andrews AFB). This proposal leverages the strengths of each group to the advantage of the field as a whole.

For locations not near military bases, local airpower groups and individuals could work with local hotels for reduced rates or even on-campus guest housing. The possibilities are limited only by how many times one is willing to hear the words, “No, we don’t do that; we haven’t tried that before,” and so on, ad nauseam.
Papers are ready for use, and the next step is making them available. Again, cooperation is paramount, since institutions (especially private universities and archival facilities) may have to overcome the desire to limit access to or retain control of what they view as “their” property. Scanning and digitizing, along with the growing availability of read-write CD devices, give us a cost-effective means of quality reproduction, especially when the collection includes photos. We also have the opportunity to access papers through the World Wide Web as well as distribute copies via CD. Some will be worthy of publication through Air University Press. Although the author or editor won’t make any money, publication credit may be worth the effort. Other university presses and specialty academic presses are alternatives, but their products, often of high quality, can be somewhat high-priced.

The encouragement and assistance of retired military members—especially senior officers—will be crucial, as is support from airpower groups, prominent historians, and academics. These are the movers and shakers who can both reach out to attract bright young minds and solicit the academic and financial support necessary for the long-term success of this kind of effort.

With a bit of luck and hard work, we may be only a few years away from having one or more sets of airpower-related papers on Dr. Mets’s next recommended reference list.

MSgt Gerald A. White Jr., USAF
Washington, D.C.

IN SEARCH OF THE WEAK FLANK

Having read “In Search of High Ground” (Spring 1998) by Lt Col David K. Edmonds, as well as a number of other popular theories on airpower, I’m somewhat amazed by the way airpower is treated. Too often it is viewed as the ultimate strategic weapon or as inherently “strategic” in nature. Is that really an accurate assessment?

As many authors and theorists have noted, airpower came to be viewed by some as a means to avoid another World War I–style slaughter. It would free militaries from future wars of attrition. However, ground warfare also changed considerably between the world wars. The Germans during the Second World War found a weakness in the early Allied armies and exploited that weakness with devastating effectiveness from September 1939 until about November 1941. During that period of time, they only suffered one significant defeat—the Battle of Britain. Although the German daylight air campaign was relatively short, the losses as a percentage of strength were significant, and the results far from a decisive German victory. Next, look at the American daylight bombing campaign. Examine the losses and the duration of the campaign. Don’t they resemble a war of attrition? Clearly the campaign lacked the quick and decisive results of the German blitzkrieg.

Now let’s view Desert Storm and modern airpower. From my memory, weren’t the ini-tial objectives of the air campaign to achieve air superiority by attacking radar and air command and control centers? Aren’t those tactical objectives to set the stage for hitting strategic targets? Isn’t that the same as the Germans creating a hole in the French and British lines in May 1940 and then exploiting that hole and capturing Paris, a strategic objective? Wasn’t France defeated in about the same amount of time that it took to liberate Kuwait?

In both cases, the attacker applied his own strengths against the weaknesses of his opponent. This application of force against weakness is probably the most fundamental concept in executing any conflict. For the Germans it was a superior combined arms doctrine emphasizing mobility, and for the United States it was superior airpower. The Iraqis were incapable of defending against stealth aircraft and cruise missiles. The initial US attack took advantage of this to create a huge “hole” in the Iraqi defenses and to then exploit this hole with overwhelming airpower. The incredible results were not achieved simply by airpower but because of the relative Iraqi vulnerability to air attack, or in essence, a weak flank. Without the stealth aircraft or cruise missiles, Iraqi vulnerability would have been much less and the results of an air campaign far less decisive.

That’s the true advantage enjoyed by the United States at this point in time—we have the capability to punch a hole in nearly any air defense. If we fail to maintain this advantage, future air campaigns could again closely resemble the indecisive war of attrition. It’s important to note that we only control half of the equation, for while we build an ever-more effective Air Force, other nations will seek to improve their air defenses.

Capt Robert A. Dietrick
Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia

EDMONDS REVISITED

I challenge a number of points made by Lt Col David K. Edmonds in his article (“In Search of High Ground,” Spring 1998) concerning the Clausewitzian theoretical “trinity of war” and the National War College schematic construct illustrating that trinity. Upon careful examination, these points do not seem to me to be fairly based upon the actual words and intent of Clausewitz himself as stated in his work On War.

In book 1, chapter 1, section 28, “The Consequences for Theory,” Clausewitz expressed his opinion that the dominant tendencies of war make it a trinity of (1) violence, which concerns mainly the people; (2) chance, which concerns mainly the army and its commander; and (3) its subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason and concerns mainly the government. Clausewitz described these three tendencies as “variable in their relationship with one another.” He rejected any theory that seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them. And he went on to discuss developing a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, a task which he explored in book 2.

I think it’s very important to regard the idea of “balance” in light of Clausewitz’s assertion that the three are “variables” in their relationships and his rejection of an “arbitrary relationship” between them. The questions I think must be asked are (1) What are proper and improper balances between the three? (2) How can it be determined what is an improper or proper “balance”? (3) Are there really proper “balances” as contrasted to improper “balances” between these variable tendencies? These questions are not answered by Clausewitz in book 2, or in the quoted section from book 1. But Colonel Edmonds and the National War College seem to believe that they have the answers. Nowhere does Clausewitz define proper and improper balances, and his assertions about the elements of the trinity being variable and his rejection of arbitrary relationships seem to negate proper and improper balances between the three.

Edmonds says, “If one element gets out of balance, then, as Clausewitz warns, war has the tendency to spiral out of control” (page 6). And he claims that in World War I and the Vietnam War, one or two elements got out of balance. However, nowhere did Clausewitz make any warning about war spiraling out of control because of a lack of balance in the trinity. Such a statement simply wasn’t made by Clausewitz. Clausewitz merely said that the theory of war should maintain a balance between the three—not that the three themselves should be in some sort of defined balance.

Further, Clausewitz, in discussing a theory involving his postulated trinity of war, was being descriptive—not prescriptive. He was providing insights to understanding, not directions, when he discussed theory. In book 8, chapter 1, Clausewitz said, “Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side” (page 278).

In book 2, chapter 2, both titled “On the Theory of War,” in the section “Theory Should be Study, not Doctrine,” Clausewitz has this to say: “Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war . . . to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books. It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield . . . not lead him by the hand for the rest of his life” (page 141).

In view of the actual words of Clausewitz, I question the purpose for which the Clausewitzian theory of the “trinity of war” is employed in Colonel Edmonds’s article.

Joseph Forbes
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

COLONEL PARRINGTON’S RESPONSE

In response to the critiques of my article, “Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited: Strategic Doctrine in Question” (Winter 1997), I offer my full assurance that I am 100 percent pure Air Force and not an Army or Navy man in disguise as they imply! I also agree with them on many of their counterpoints, including their criticism of the sweeping generalizations made. But as anyone who has published will confess, it is nigh impossible to compress textbooks of material into the few pages of a journal article and still get your point across. The idea is to challenge, not prove, a point, and to cause further research and thinking on the subject, which I hope I have done.

The two letter writers seemed most disturbed with the possibility that without a strategic mission, the Air Force could not justify its separate existence. One suggested I wanted us back in the meat-grinder days of World War I and attrition warfare. How far from the truth. After fifty years of leading our nation in national security, there is plenty of reason for a separate US Air Force. Such accusations also do a great disservice to our sister services. It may surprise the writers to learn that the US Army actually flies more aircraft than the Air Force and that the concept of maneuver warfare is all about avoiding head-on battles, not pursuing them.

More importantly, as I wrote in “MAD Revisited,” airpower has proven itself the decisive factor of warfare in the twentieth century. No one has lost a battle without first losing air superiority, and when used correctly in concert with land and naval power, airpower greatly reduces attrition and casualties on all sides. But our focus must be on the enemy’s military capability, not on his people. To paraphrase Capt Alfred Thayer Mahan, US Navy (perhaps the most widely respected strategic thinker in American history), “The principal mission of a navy in war is the destruction of the enemy navy just as the principle mission of an army is destruction of the enemy’s army.” It follows that the principal mission of an air force (or space force) is destruction of the enemy’s air forces (or space forces) and the establishment of air (space) supremacy. If we do that, as we have done since 1943, then all the other missions, whether on the ground, in the air, or at sea, can succeed in their own tasks. But if we fail, or more likely ignore, that imperative and pursue a strategy of our own, then our nation will relive the bloody lesson of Pearl Harbor, Schweinfurt, and even the Somme. Air supremacy is reason enough for a separate Air Force; we need explain no further.

Col Alan J. Parrington
London, United Kingdom

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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