Published Airpower Journal - Winter 1997
We encourage your comments via letters to the editor or comment cards. All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112--6428. You can also send your comments by E--mail to aspj@maxwell.af.mil. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.
I applaud the critical look that William Arkin takes at the Desert Storm air campaign in his article “Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm?” (Spring 1997). The article’s central theme appears to be the apparent lack of understanding on the part of leaders who have failed to grasp what happened in the strategic air campaign. The “understanding” most people have of the air campaign, and of airpower in general, seems to be formed from a mixture of television reports, general impressions, and emotions. Indeed, when reading about Desert Storm, we see many conclusions, with numbers of bombs and targets used to support whatever assumption the author champions. In this article, Arkin provides us with assessments, not of what was damaged but what the effects of damages were. His assessments seem to be based on results, not simply numbers and statistics arrayed to suit his ends.
People claim that Desert Storm has taught us many “lessons”—most of one extreme view or another. In fact, many of these lessons are supported only by a selective presentation of data. For example, the General Accounting Office’s report on Desert Storm claims that precision-guided munitions (PGM) weren’t as effective as the Pentagon and contractors claimed, and that unguided weapons could have done the same job at a much lower cost. It’s certainly not uncommon for contractors to paint their products in the most favorable light. And, in some cases, I would agree that Pentagon officials overstated the capabilities of various PGMs. Since it was in the best interests of the war effort for the Pentagon to highlight the successes of precision strikes and not suboptimal results, perhaps this is understandable.
Yet, a shallow, or total lack of, understanding of strategic bombing—and airpower in general—isn’t limited just to Army and civilian officials, as Arkin addresses in his article. It is alarmingly common in the Air Force as well. We have a wealth of experts (probably the best in the world) thoroughly versed in how to employ airpower, yet few people can talk intelligently about planning a conventional strategic bombing campaign. Some proponents offer the crutch of an automated targeting process. This is nonsense—far too much emphasis is placed on automating target selection (such as the joint force air component commander [JFACC] planning tool or on-the-shelf prioritized target databases). We really need experts and a great deal of study. Perhaps automation proponents believe we can be freed from having to study (in great detail) the enemy, his systems, and potential targets. Or perhaps automation seeks to fill a void in targeting and campaign planning expertise. This void was exacerbated by the termination of the intelligence officer and enlisted targeteer career fields. Or perhaps the root cause is the trepidation we Americans feel at planning offensive operations before the need arises. We don’t feel right making these plans, so we wait until there’s a need to go on the offensive.
It’s much easier to criticize proposals than to devise a plan. This is as true of a strategy for offensive planning as anything else—witness the commentary on Col John Warden’s centers of gravity that have appeared in Airpower Journal. Letters and responses have focused on what’s wrong or what’s right with the theories he presented in his book The Air Campaign and his Instant Thunder plan. Although debating the merits of his approach is a valuable exercise, we should recognize Colonel Warden for actually developing a theory. Far too many “experts” simply provide reasons why they believe that strategic bombing or centers of gravity don’t work. The pages of Airpower Journal have been lacking in alternative plans. Yes, Desert Storm was a major success and demonstrated some of the awesome capabilities of airpower. But our overall success in Desert Storm doesn’t automatically validate the targeting there. Who in the Air Force today is prepared to develop the next air campaign? Will we see a repeat of the Instant Thunder genesis—a plan developed by a group of experts, not part of the theater planning staff? I suspect that the answer is “yes.”
Capt Jonathan Dagle, USAF
Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
The article by Lt Col Rhonda Cornum, Dr. John Caldwell, and Lt Col Kory Cornum, “Stimulant Use in Extended Flight Operations” (Spring 1997), addresses a topic that has been controversial for decades, not just because of its aeromedical complexity but also because of its potential for abuse by media representatives who see its value only in generating alarmist headlines.
I was a flight surgeon for a tactical fighter squadron during the time that sedative and stimulant medications could be used under controlled conditions. At that time, sedatives were used to help the flier get to sleep at an unusual hour, so that he or she was rested when the flight began. Stimulants were used when the flier had been awake for many hours and was expected to be fatigued. Generally, fliers would take the stimulant about two hours before landing so that they would be wide awake and alert during this most critical phase of flight. For transoceanic deployments of single-seat fighters with multiple midair refuelings, the landing might occur at sundown after the flier had been awake for 13 hours, strapped into the seat for nine hours, with only fair nutrition and hydration.
Using these medications exposes fliers to a risk beyond that of ordinary flight. Clearly, then, such medications should not be used unless the estimated risk of not using them exceeds the risk associated with their use. Assessing such risks involves a joint line-medical assessment. As with any situation in aviation, the flight surgeon and the unit commander decide whether or not an operational situation seems more hazardous without the medications. Only then do they decide if they will be made available to aircrews who have been cleared to use them. If offered the medications, fliers will decide for themselves whether or not to use them on the mission. All unused medications must be returned.
For this procedure, commonly used in Tactical Air Command during the 1960s on trans-Atlantic deployments, fewer than half of the fliers would opt to take the medications (100 mg of secobarbital and 5 mg of dextroamphetamine). I recall no ill effects or adverse incidents being reported at my base or at any others during this era.
Col David R. Jones, USAF, Retired
Montgomery, Alabama
I applaud Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired, for the contributions he has made to the Air Force, but I take exception to a great many of his observations, particularly “Educating Air Force Officers: Observations after 20 Years at Air University” (Summer 1997). He wrings his hands over “irrelevant” graduate-level education and then uses business degrees as an example. Excuse me, Colonel Drew, but over the last 19 years, I have been asked to plan, program, budget, and develop management-information systems; to schedule and manage resources; and to lead people. I have never been asked to devise military strategy. My business degrees were hardly irrelevant in accomplishing any of these tasks. Would I have been a more effective leader with a degree in military history? Would my people have been more efficient or effective if I spouted Clausewitzian theory to them? I think not. What then is irrelevant—the degrees I use or the professional military education (PME) I have completed and then, to a great extent, have immediately discarded?
Colonel Drew calls for Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and Air War College (AWC) commandants with greater experience in academia. He’s wrong! Air University needs leadership with a broad background; we need commandants with a balance of academic and operational experience. We call them “general officers” because they’re supposed to have general backgrounds—a decent understanding of many subjects rather than a detailed emphasis on a small subset. Overemphasis on academia leads to turbulence and confusion in curricula. What do tomorrow’s leaders need more—an understanding of the Peloponnesian War or an understanding of the role space plays in future war fighting? Until recently, AWC placed more emphasis on the former.
We emphasize the importance of the right level of PME at the right time. I contend that the knowledge represented by a graduate-level business degree is far more relevant to field grade officers than is 90 percent of the current AWC curriculum. As for elimination of nonresident PME programs, fine! Personally, I would have spent much more time over the last year with “relevant” personal professional development, but I was too busy reading literally thousands of pages of an AWC seminar curriculum that is out of touch with today’s operational Air Force.
Colonel Drew’s suggested actions will place yet another barrier before true operational leaders who are attempting to rise to leadership positions. In his envisioned world, we have leaders who are “well schooled in the theory, doctrine, and history of aerial warfare.” Those leaders have been to school at Maxwell—probably twice. All they are missing is the ability to operate their weapon systems effectively or to relate to their people. The key has always been, and always will be, balance. From Foulois to Fogleman, our truly outstanding leaders have found the balance between academia and operations. Spare me (and my Air Force) from leaders who can’t lead a unit into combat because they have overemphasized doctrine and have never learned how to refuel or put bombs on target. Perhaps I’m just one of those illiterate truck drivers.
Lt Col David J. Maher, USAF
Colorado Springs, Colorado
My article obviously touched a very sensitive and emotional nerve in Lieutenant Colonel Maher. I appreciate his concerns and opinions. I am sure they are strongly and honestly held. Three of his points deserve special comment.
First, let me assure him that I harbor no ill will toward people with business degrees. My first graduate degree was an MBA, which proved very helpful in conducting my daily, routine managerial duties as an Air Force officer. Had I been a factory owner, a corporate executive, or a small-business owner, it would have been equally useful in conducting my routine managerial duties.
The universal managerial utility of a business education, however, reinforces a basic premise of my article (i.e., we don’t need business managers masquerading as wartime military leaders). Rather, we need military leaders educated (and trained and experienced) in the profession of arms, in our most basic mission—preparing for and waging war. I don’t worry very much about how officers cope with routine management problems. I do worry a great deal about how officers perform when suddenly and unexpectedly thrust into the “Black Hole” air strategy cell in Riyadh, or the combined air-operations center in Vicenza, or similar functions in future crises. The people responsible for sending American airmen into harm’s way must be much more than skilled managers.
Second, I am surprised that Lieutenant Colonel Maher opposes the concept of school commandants with at least some experience in academe. Apparently he would have us continue our 50-year tradition of assigning well-rounded but academically inexperienced senior officers to these important billets. At the same time, he bemoans an irrelevant and out-of-touch Air War College curriculum. Perhaps he should ponder the influence of a school’s leader on a school’s curriculum.
Third, the experience of nearly every modern air force indicates that the most vexing problem airmen face in wartime is not the technical challenge of putting bombs on target. Rather, the most vexing problem lies in the intellectual challenge of selecting the best targets to bomb with limited aerial assets. It is a problem that our downsized force will exacerbate. Success in this intellectual challenge will come only to airmen well schooled in the theory, doctrine, and history of aerial warfare.
Dennis M. Drew
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
It seems to me that the role of Airpower Journal as the home for professional dialogue in the Air Force depends on one major factor. The Journal must be the place where one finds serious disagreements over professional issues spelled out and debated.
If the Journal is to achieve that role, I think (at least) two conditions are necessary. First, your readers must see the Journal take on and explore contentious issues. Second, your readers must be convinced that the Journal is the place where they can forcefully express loyal dissent without penalty. In fact, you should take the position that forceful expression of loyal dissent is a career enhancer—you help your boss and the leadership make better decisions, which you then support.
If, as editor, you want to pursue this line, you might consider some of these potential topics as suitably contentious:
Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired
Alexandria, Virginia
My gut reaction to the privatization idea suggested in your editorial for the Fall 1997 issue is negative. I think that APJ has always been a freer and opener forum for debate than some people have made it out to be, and it enjoys more autonomy now than it used to. Both the US Naval Institute (USNI) Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette are peculiar to those professions, and we cannot duplicate them. I would guess that any privatized USAF journal would resemble Air Force Magazine or Strategic Review much more than Proceedings. This would be especially true if the Air Force Association, through its Aerospace Education Foundation, were part of the sponsoring organization. What you suggest would put you into direct competition with Strategic Review and Air Force Magazine. And, if privatizing APJ did not work out, it might be very difficult to come back home. We need to be careful about what we pray for—we might get it!
USNI was established a long, long time ago under conditions that were unique and that cannot be duplicated now. The Navy officer corps was a sleepy, slow-paced organization. There was no satellite TV and Monday night football, and there was nothing to do on blockade duty other than read and write—or fall into depression. It was similar in the “From Here to Eternity” Army Air Corps. Now, especially in the Air Force, the life of the officer is much busier and less contemplative. At least the free government distribution puts APJ in front of the officers, and some of them will pick it up to read if they cannot find a Golf Digest to browse. That will yield more visibility for your writers than would initially (and maybe always) be the case with any USAF private journal—and that is the payoff for them. Now, if you could add more substantial monetary awards without going outside the government, that would supplement some professional satisfactions.
In my time, and I think still, Annapolis graduates understand that it is a part of their professional obligation to subscribe to Proceedings—and if they are to become full-fledged professionals, to be published in its pages. To make that happen in the USAF context will take a lot more than privatization—and many, many decades of change.
Dr. David R. Mets
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
It is not big armies that win battles; it is the good ones.
--Maurice de Saxe, 11732
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
[ Back Issues | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]