Published Airpower Journal - Spring 1997

We encourage your comments via letters to the editor or comment cards.  All correspondence should be addressed to the Editor, Airpower Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112--6428. You can also send your comments by E--mail to aspj@maxwell.af.mil. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.

ON SHULMAN

I was raised in the shadow of World War II.  I always felt that combat veterans lucky enough to make it back were larger--than--life heroes who had made the penultimate sacrifice for freedom, democracy, and the American Way.

In his review of Craig Cameron's book American Samurai, Dr. Mark Shulman (“A Review Essay: Why Men Fight,” Fall 1996) has disabused me of this misapprehension.  Now I have learned that the marines who dismembered the Greater Asian Coprosperity Sphere and set the sun of Imperial Nippon were murdering, racist, homophobic misogynists.  No doubt, the official US Marine Corps histories will soon indicate that amphibious warfare doctrine should have reflected inviting the Japanese defenders to sit on the beaches with us, holding hands and singing “Kumbaya.”

I applaud these resolute authors for hero-- ically using the dialectic to show us errors in our line, and APJ for allowing me to self--confess.

Lt Col George Humphries, USA
Leavenworth, Kansas

COUNTERLINKAGE

I get tired of seeing articles in which Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military commentator of the first half of the nineteenth century, is automatically assumed to be an unquestioned font of infallibility on all aspects of war, although he mostly expressed personal, subjective opinions not derived from any developed analytical process that can be tested and verified for logical consistency or factual accuracy.  Merely seeming to make some statement by Clausewitz fit some contemporary military event or seem to substantiate some pet idea of a military writer hardly proves that Clausewitz had developed a coherent theoretical process that has wide applicability and validity.

I'm particularly irritated by the regularly seen practice of military writers misusing Clausewitzian statements out of context to convey meanings Clausewitz did not intend and to make points not substantiated by Clausewitz's actual words as he used and intended them.  For example, Col Larry D. New claims (in “Clausewitz's Theory: On War and Its Application Today,” Fall 1996) that Clausewitz postulated a “linkage” (a word not used by Clausewitz in the translation quoted by New) between a military commander's ability to communicate and a political leader's ability to grasp the purpose, nature, and conduct of war (page 78).

In fact, New's interpretation would in practice give to military commanders a wedge they could use to develop a role in formulating policy—a role to which Clausewitz, I'm sure, would vehemently object; a role incompatible not only with true Clausewitzian thought but also with American traditions of civilian supremacy, according to which civilians and military commanders are not in effect partners in policy creation.  (I am reminded of French premier Georges Clemenceau's assertion that “war is much too important to be left to generals.”)

Colonel New claims that “Clausewitz called this linkage a paradoxical trinity with three aspects:  the people, the commander and his army, and the government.”  He footnotes the source of this quote as page 89 of Michael Howard and Peter Paret's translation of On War (Princeton University Press, 1989).  However, if we thoughtfully examine what Clausewitz actually asserted on that page, we find that he said, “As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, and its element as a subordination of policy.”  If Clausewitz meant that war is a trinity of (1) the people, (2) the commander and his army, and (3) the government, he would have said so and not described war as a trinity of violence, hatred and enmity, and policy subordination. Although Clausewitz did go on to state that the “first aspect mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; and the third the government,” that is not synonymous, as New believes, with Clausewitz's claiming that war is a trinity of the people, the army and its commander, and the government.  It's just not what Clausewitz said and meant.  One cannot make up unsubstantiated meanings as one goes along.

In that same paragraph on page 89, Clausewitz explicitly states, “But the political aims are the business of the government alone.”  Let me repeat for emphasis—the business of the government alone.  This statement by Clausewitz contradicts New's claims on page 78 of his article about the need for a strong relationship between senior military commanders and the government to achieve political objectives based on the commanders' ability to effectively communicate the purpose, nature, and conduct of war.

It is true that the footnotes New uses at the beginning of his article, taken from page 608 of On War, seem to suggest that the military chief should be a member of the cabinet in order to take an active role in policy formation and, therefore, that Clausewitz believed military leaders should participate in policy formation.  But the footnote at the bottom of page 608 explains that thereby “Clausewitz emphasizes the cabinet's participation in military decisions, not the soldiers' participation in political decisions.”  Thus it's clear that Clausewitz, fairly interpreted, was not advocating a strong policy partnership between military and civilian leaders but actually was emphasizing absolute military subordination in policy formulation.

Joseph Forbes
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

MELANCHOLY REUNION

Col Charles J. Dunlap's article (“Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil--Military Relations in the United States”) in the Winter 1996 issue provides the catalyst to continue needed discussions regarding civil--military relations. Certainly, there is some merit to all of his main points. Unfortunately, their impact was diluted by carrying some of the ideas to absolutely ridiculous extremes.

One can reasonably see how total quality management (TQM) can be perverted to the point of having some individuals believe that if an Air Force instruction (AFI) doesn't make sense, it can be ignored.  This is a real problem that needs to be discussed in order to change that perception.  It is the responsibility of leadership at all levels to enforce Air Force standards as stated in the AFIs. This problem, however, is a far cry from the scenario painted in the article.  It is simply unrealistic to think that trying to see the business of our profession in terms of products, customers, and suppliers and trying to track our efficiency and effectiveness with metrics can somehow lead us to see combat as too costly, regardless of the political objectives. Similarly, it is laughable to think that spending on unmanned weapon systems will break the “man--in--the--loop” premise and result in the disestablishment of the Air Force.  As with all weapon system acquisitions, it is important for doctrine to clearly define roles and missions and to ensure positive command and control.  Concern over unchecked spending on technology that has not been shown to have doctrinal significance is legitimate, but this was taken too far.  Overclassification, especially in the realm of information warfare, is also a subject that deserves considerable debate. However, I find it offensive to accuse unnamed men and women of honor of protecting “rice bowls,” and even more offensive to characterize nonrated airmen as “lower--status” and imply that they would stoop to something as ridiculous as restricting information in order to make themselves “feel” like a warrior.  Delusions aside, they are warriors by virtue of being uniformed service members.  Furthermore, information warfare is a largely undefined battle space and to suggest that the “who” and the “what” should categorically be made public is naive. For example, the “who” and the “what” can equate to the target.  Targets and targeting guidance are always classified, and for good reason—operations security.  We don't want enemies to be forewarned and therefore better able to defend a given target. Finally, I think the characterization of “Weinberger's rules” as mushy standards is unfair.  In my view, these “rules” were offered by a civilian to act as a sanity check for civilian leadership considering the use of military force.  If these rules are echoed by military leaders, it falls into the category of what Colonel Dunlap calls apolitical candor.  Certainly every effort should be made to keep these discussions private between civilian and military leadership, but when asked direct questions, men and women of integrity are required to answer honestly in accordance with their deeply held beliefs.  There may be times when the only appropriate answer is “no comment.” This, again, is a far cry from military leaders becoming political animals who are reluctant to risk even minor casualties.

As I stated at the outset, Colonel Dunlap has provided us the catalyst to continue an honest dialogue on this important topic.  I applaud his efforts and look forward to reading more on this subject in your publication.  I just hope that his points were not lost in the absurdity of his scenario for 2017.

Capt Stephen A. Smith, USAF
Yakima Training Center, Washington

THE AUTHOR RESPONDS

I'm extremely pleased that Captain Smith found my essay so stimulating!  I must, nevertheless, disagree with some of his assertions.  His spirited defense of total quality management, for example, underestimates the insidious effect of TQM's business--styled nomenclature on the weltanshauung of those in uniform. His view of “our profession” as a “business” illustrates the kind of misguided thinking that results. In truth, the altruistic essence of the vocation of military service has far fewer synergies with “business” activities than the overzealous minority of TQM proponents suppose. Few businesses ask their employees to die for them, for example.

Prof. John Keegan, perhaps the greatest living military historian, warns that “soldiers are not as other men—that is the lesson that I have learned from a life cast among warriors. The lesson has taught me to view with extreme suspicion all theories and representations of war that equate it with any other activity in human affairs.” Before we embrace the next business school fad, we ought to consider those words carefully.

Captain Smith also believes it is “ridiculous” to think that future unmanned systems could ever lead to the disestablishment of the Air Force. Could cavalry officers have said much the same thing about internal combustion engines in the 1930s? With all due respect to the thousands of nonrated people performing magnificently in hundreds of other jobs, it is the aviator—the supposedly irreplaceable “man--in--the--loop”—who is the raison dêtre of a separate air force. But the increasing reluctance to place aviators at any risk may condemn manned combat aircraft to the realm of the politically unusable. Moreover, the rapidly growing capabilities of high--tech unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), satellites, and cruise missile systems may make it simply unnecessary to put pilots in harm's way.  Without manned combat aircraft, the remaining Air Force transportation and space responsibilities might justify a joint command but not a separate service.

My interpretation of the “who” and the “what” of information operations is evidently broader and more philosophic than Captain Smith's understanding. With information operations being openly touted as powerful tools “to influence the perceptions and decision making of others,” the nation needs a comprehensive, informed discussion to develop suitable policy for them.

Is it wise, for example, to allow a self--selected group of secretive military officers so much power over operations with such a profound capability to affect democratic government? Furthermore, shouldn't a civilian agency have a controlling role akin to that enjoyed by the Department of Energy with respect to nuclear weapons? Likewise, if information operations have as much potential as their supporters claim, then perhaps deterrence is best served when potential adversaries have a keen understanding of “what” they are facing—even if they are deprived of the “how” as I recommend. Of course, I too am offended by the notion that people overclassify information activities to preserve their “rice bowls,” but I am not so naive as to assume it would not occur.

Until someone can define for me with specificity the meaning of such terms as national interest, public support, and overwhelming force, I'll still insist that intellectual shorthand like the “Weinberger rules” is “mushy.”  There is certainly nothing wrong with anyone—military or civilian—using such “rules” as a template for discussion. However, once they become viewed as more than a framework, then anyone—including a politicized or “TQMized” military officer—can conjure up a reason to contend that almost any use of force fails to meet one “rule” or another.

Col Charlie Dunlap
Offutt AFB, Nebraska

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