Published Airpower Journal - Spring 1997
The one who writes gives proof that at any rate he possesses some knowledge, whereas it is quite a possibility that the mind of the inarticulate one may be a military vacuum.
—Capt Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Spitfires, Thunderbolts, and Warm Beer: An American Fighter Pilot over Europe by Philip D. Caine. Brassey's, Inc., 1313 Dolly Madison Boulevard, McLean, Virginia 22101, 1995, 248 pages, $23.95.
Spitfires, Thunderbolts, and Warm Beer is a fascinating account of one of the few Americans who flew for both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Army Air Corps during World War II. The author, Brig Gen Philip D. Caine, USAF, Retired, uses the letters and diary entries of LeRoy Gover from San Carlos, California, to create a well--written and enjoyable read that explains an interesting and vital piece of military history in human terms.
The book begins with Gover's life as a construction worker and crop duster and progresses through RAF flight training and his two and one--half years of fighting in Europe. Caine puts his PhD in history to good use by placing each episode of Gover's journey in historical context. Although most of this book consists of segments from the diary Gover kept religiously throughout the war and from letters he wrote home, General Caine skillfully interposes historical background and analyses, primarily at the beginning and end of each chapter but also as needed elsewhere. Although the reader may find this technique a bit awkward initially, one realizes its value as the story quickly accelerates in both tension and excitement, especially as Gover fights daily for his life over Europe. In fact, as more of Gover's friends and squadron mates are shot down, the reader begins to wonder if the diary entries will suddenly end.
Gover's odyssey begins when the Clayton Knight Committee, an organization formed to recruit American pilots to fly for the RAF, signs him up in May 1941. Britain had lost half its fighter force during the Battle of Britain and badly needed experienced pilots. Between April 1940 and October 1942, the committee recruited over sixty--seven hundred pilots this way. After passing an intense RAF refresher program at Bakersfield, California, which featured a rigorous ground school and flights in the Stearman PT--17 and the North American AT--6 Harvard, Gover graduates in September, remains as an instructor for the next class, and finally sails to Europe in November 1941. Ironically, his boat arrives near Liverpool on 7 December 1941.
The British people welcome Gover with open arms, and the locals frequently invite him and his fellow Americans to dinner. Throughout the book, Gover remarks about the pleasant times he has in London, both with his fellow airmen and with English ladies. In fact, his diary entries frequently refer to his “R&R”—humorous, entertaining vignettes that provide the reader with needed breaks from the frequent accountings of combat.
Caine skillfully selects the diary entries and thoughtfully fills any gaps concerning Gover's activities. One quickly realizes that Gover is a work--hard, play--hard type of person—a talented and responsible pilot who takes his job very seriously. Diary entries range from the heat of combat and the drudgery of daily camp life to lively evenings at the American Eagle Club, Cracker's Club, the Regent Hotel, and other nightspots that Gover and other American pilots frequented in London.
The progression of the diary entries also reveals a common theme in war—the initial excitement of serving in uniform giving way to the reality of demanding training and finally to the harsh experience of combat itself. Only six days after flying operational combat missions, Gover is a pallbearer for a squadron mate. Death becomes commonplace but doesn't affect him as it does others, some of whom are shipped home for “nerves.” In one battle, Gover describes the action at Dieppe, France, an Allied debacle in which five thousand Canadian commandos conduct a raid to test German defenses. While one thousand Canadians are killed and two thousand are taken prisoner, Gover loses his entire squadron; his graphic descriptions of fellow pilots being shot down and of the inability of the airmen to help the commandos illustrate the horrendous human cost of this war.
Gover spends his time undergoing various alert conditions, flying aircraft, performing duties on base, and taking time off. Most missions are fighter sweeps; fighter escorts, which become more common as additional American bombers arrive in England; convoy patrol; and occasional defense of their air base from attack by Junkers 88s or Dorniers. He usually fights with Focke--Wulf 190s and Messerschmitt 109s; by the end of his combat tour, he is credited with destroying three of these aircraft and damaging two.
In August 1942, Gover receives orders to American Eagle Squadron 133 at Martlesham Heath. The RAF had established three fighter squadrons as exclusively American units, and most of the Americans flying for the RAF hoped they would eventually transfer to these. Life as an American Eagle had its advantages, such as higher pay, $10,000 in free life insurance, and the privilege of being some of the first Americans to fly World War II combat in American units. However, life in other ways did not change much. Gover flew out of an RAF base in a Spitfire, normally served under an RAF officer, and often remained under RAF radar control. Americanization of these three squadrons progressed slowly. He flew his first operations mission as an Eagle on 9 October 1942 during a mission involving five hundred fighters escorting 118 B--17s over Lille, France.
Gover continues flying the Spitfire until January 1943 because of the paucity of new P--47 Thunderbolts. He makes a quick transition to the P--47, flying solo on his first flight, with little ground school or other preparation. Gover obviously enjoys flying the much larger and more sophisticated Thunderbolt. He finishes his combat flying in the P--47 in January 1944, when he returns home for a 30--day leave and is reassigned as a flight instructor in the United States.
LeRoy Gover earned one Silver Star, three Distinguished Flying Crosses, and eight Air Medals; achieved the rank of major; and earned the respect of his fellow airmen, commanders, and subordinates. The modest yet brutally frank accountings from his diary and letters home of his forays in the cauldron of aerial combat attest to his courage, modesty, and leadership, and make for fast--paced reading. General Caine masterfully recounts these events without maudlin or superficial hype. Gover achieved his dream of being a fighter pilot while valiantly serving Britain and then his own country—he even survives it all. Of the 43 pilots in his operational training unit (OTU) class, 33 were killed, and six others were wounded so badly that they could no longer fly. By the end of this book, one realizes the tremendous sacrifices made by the airmen of World War II.
Spitfires, Thunderbolts, and Warm Beer is an excellent book. As a historical accounting of war through the diary entries and letters of a stereotypical all--American young man gone off to war, the book accomplishes that rarity in modern literature—the accurate portrayal of an important piece of history in human terms without unnecessary hype. I highly recommend Spitfires, Thunderbolts, and Warm Beer but suggest that as readers make their way through it, they drink their beer cold.
Maj Phil Bossert, USAF
Scott AFB, Illinois
The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making and Deterrence Failure by John H. Maurer. Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881, 1995 168 pages, $49.95.
Author John H. Maurer does an excellent job of examining the circumstances and decisions that led to the start of World War I. While there are many works that detail these events, few actually examine these events with an eye to understanding why they occurred. This is where Maurer makes his true contribution, for the focus of his book is on understanding the reasoning behind the decisions made that led Austria--Hungary and Germany to adopt a high--risk offensive strategy. These decisions did not occur in a political vacuum, but rather were the results of conscious choices—choices directed at achieving specific political ends for each nation. It was the political ends sought that made war inevitable, not the simple fact that Europe's militaries had mobilized.
It is in this light that Maurer examines the events and circumstance that led Austria--Hungary and Germany to take the course of action they did at the beginning of the war. Maurer accomplishes his task in three stages. Part one (chapters 1–3) of his book examines the strategic planning of the Austro--Hungarian and German general staffs prior to 1914. The second part (chapters 4–8) examines the July Crisis of 1914. While the crisis was precipitated by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, this section carefully examines why the leaders of Austria--Hungary and Germany chose a mix of offensive and defensive strategic options. In the third and final part of this work (the concluding chapter), Maurer finishes his examination of the decisions that led Austria--Hungary and Germany to war by examining why deterrence failed.
In the years leading up to World War I, Europe's leaders had certain perceptions regarding the nature of war, perceptions that would color how they decided for or against war. Prevailing politico--economic beliefs held that any modern war would be of very short duration because of the interdependence of the European great power economies, the prohibitive cost of modern warfare, the supposed imperviousness of a nation's economy to government intervention, and a fear of social revolution. This combination of factors seemed to indicate that future wars would be short. Military doctrine of the day also supported the idea of short wars and came to place more value on offensive rather than defensive operations. Thus, military leaders also supported the idea of short, decisive wars fought to gain national objectives. This led military leaders to concentrate their planning efforts on such a war, largely ignoring defensive operations and long--range plans of employment.
But reality did not match the expectations of Europe's leaders. The war that followed lasted four years, was highly destructive in terms of property and capital, and resulted in the loss of almost an entire generation of European men. While military deployment plans were very detailed and developed for almost every contingency, they could not resolve the basic political differences of the parties involved. Too, political and military leaders failed to recognize, or even consider, the ramifications of their actions, actions that were often of a very provocative nature. When the opening battles of World War I did not resolve the war quickly, the lack of long--range plans helped insure the stalemate and attrition warfare that followed. These factors resulted in a war that was a far cry from being short and decisive in nature.
While at times a bit repetitious, John H. Maurer's book is an excellent study about why nations go to war. It offers many lessons. To those who believe that in the new post--cold--war world old truths are no longer seemingly true, it shows the error of such thinking. For those enamored with a world image of highly interdependent economies and a worldwide outpouring of democracy that will temper the severity of future conflict, this work stands as a warning. For the military professional, it serves as an admonition to the dangers of failing to adapt established doctrines to existing conditions. Finally, this book once again points out the importance of understanding how political and military matters interrelate at the strategic level.
Maj John E. Brence, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Code--Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb by Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar. Simon and Schuster, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York 10020, 1995, 351 pages, $25.00.
Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen present a clear repudiation of the idea that the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary. Instead, the United States was planning a massive invasion of the Japanese home islands, code--named Downfall, in which the detonation of the bombs was nothing more than the United States trying to do everything in its power to end the war as quickly as possible. Whether the bombs ended the war or simply made the invasion easier was not an issue in deciding whether or not to use the bomb. The fact was that the bomb was a weapon in the arsenal.
The authors lead the reader through a concise but thorough background of both prewar plans involving a war against Japan and through the war itself, from the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor to the surrender of Japan aboard the USS Missouri. The background is excellently laid, and the authors do a great job of bringing the war to life. From memoirs and interviews the reader gains insights into what the commanders on both sides of the lines were actually thinking.
Overall, Code--Name Downfall is an excellently researched book that proves its thesis well beyond a reasonable doubt. Almost all sources used are primary sources, including official memorandums from national archives; interviews; memoirs; official military plans, studies, and communications; and, most importantly, recently declassified Magic intercepts (of Japanese secret communications) that are on repository at the National Security Agency.
Polmar and Allen masterfully prove the thesis that the United States was going to invade whether or not it used the bomb (unless Japan surrendered, of course). As the United States and its Allies made their way across the Pacific, the authors chronicle not only how the battles were fought but how the lessons learned would be applied in the plan for the final invasion of Japan. As the Allies drew nearer to Japan itself, the reader is exposed to the vastly intricate deception plans as well as the contingency plans for the use of terror weapons (chemical and biological). The final invasion plan is also intricately laid out, from the arguments over when and where to land the invasion force to which forces were going to land on which beaches.
The key to the thesis, however, lies with the Magic intercepts. These intercepts clearly showed that the Japanese were in no way considering surrendering just because their homeland was about to be invaded. Rather, that only strengthened their will as the military prepared the entire population, including women and children, to defend the homeland against the Allies. Not only were the Japanese not open to negotiations in the least, there was no guarantee that the dropping of the two atomic bombs would end the war. In fact, American planners were calculating how many more bombs would be available for the invasion that was scheduled for 1 November 1945.
Thus, the invasion was destined to take place unless the atomic bombs ended the war. Code-- Name Downfall, despite its shortage of detailed maps, shows that the atomic bombs were necessary considering the fact that the Japanese showed no intention of surrendering without a fight to the finish. Only the dropping of the bombs precluded that end.
Lt Vern Conaway, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
The Divided Skies: Establishing Segregated Flight Training at Tuskegee, Alabama, 1934–1942 by Robert J. Jakeman. University of Alabama Press, 315 University Boulevard East, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401, 416 pages, 1992, $37.95.
Divided Skies is not just another book in a recent series of publications attempting to chronicle the exploits and achievements of the black Army Air Corps pilots of the Second World War. Much has been written and conveyed about these men in books, articles, television documentaries, and a recent HB0 movie. But until the publication of this book, very little has been written to cover black aviation from the end of the First World War up until the beginning of the Second World War. In addition to covering the genesis of black military aviation training, Divided Skies covers the exploits of America's first black pilots, the only black combat pilot of World War I, black civil aviation between the wars, and the increasing pressure by black Americans to be allowed to enter military flying.
The purpose of this book is to show the reader the difficulties faced by black Americans in an attempt to earn the right to pilot aircraft for the Army Air Corps. The author, who is head of the Public Services Division at the Alabama Department of Archives and History in Montgomery, has done an incredibly detailed job of researching pertinent information. This prewar history of the black American struggle is replete with both first-- and secondhand sources, making this book both accurate and interesting. Although the book tends to slow down at times, lively and timely anecdotes interspersed throughout the book help to bring the story to life. They also give the reader a feel for what the black leadership in America was probably going through while trying to get legislation passed to correct the blatant discrimination practiced by the US military establishment.
In dealing with a subject of this nature, the author has done well to avoid pointing fingers or casting blame on any particular party, regardless of how culpable they were for the events that took place leading up to the reluctant admittance of black pilots into the Army Air Corps. This lends quite a bit of credibility to his work and does not tend to put the reader on any kind of defensive.
In all, this well--written book is presented in a very pleasant and understandable manner. It is a great stand--alone reference book on the subject of early black aviators and aviation pioneers. Although it does discuss the formation of the black combat units of World War II, its real value lies in serving as a complementary edition to the other volumes that have been written about the Tuskegee airmen. People seem to either forget or not know the struggles faced by black Americans simply to earn the right to fly airplanes in this country. This book takes a giant step in that direction and will be a valuable tool for any historian interested in this area of historical study.
Maj Robert Tate, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs by Richard M. Bissell Jr. with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. Yale University Press, P. O. Box 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520--9040, 1996, 296 pages, $30.00.
Richard M. Bissell's career at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) placed him in the inner circle of the most powerful and influential leaders in American government during the height of the cold war. Indeed, he had access to the most sensitive national security intelligence of the day. This book provides his insights and observations of many key events of this era. The book was written with the assistance of Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. The basis of this memoir is a series of one--on--one interviews conducted with Bissell between 1991 and 1993. Lewis's research of personal papers, files, and interviews with colleagues provided the framework for these interviews. Ms Pudlo, who was Bissell's administrative assistant for 20 years, served as an editor of the manuscript.
Bissell was born into a wealthy Connecticut family and led a rather privileged childhood. He attended prep school at Groton and completed his undergraduate degree at Yale. After college graduation in 1932, he studied at the London School of Economics and eventually returned to Yale to earn a PhD in economics. The war years of 1942–1945 saw Bissell employed at the War and Shipping Administration, whose primary charter was to coordinate sealift of cargo to the theaters of operation. In this capacity he attended the Yalta Conference of 1945 and was witness to the increasing friction between the US and Soviet Union that would eventually develop into the cold war. After World War II, Bissell held various positions in the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Ford Foundation. He played a role in formulating the Marshall Plan. In 1954, he joined the CIA ini--tially as a special assistant to the director and later as deputy director of plans from 1959 until 1962. He was heavily involved in the development and employment of the U--2 reconnaissance aircraft. He was also instrumental in the development of the SR--71 aircraft and the Corona spy satellite. His memoirs provide an insight into President Dwight Eisenhower's decision--making process for authorizing overflight of the Soviet Union. Bissell also discusses the events surrounding the Soviet shootdown of Francis Gary Powers's U--2 in 1960.
I believe the highlight of this book is the discussion of the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs invasion. He explains the origin of the plan, the manner in which events changed the plan, President John F. Kennedy's involvement; and he outlines the reasons for its total failure. For the student of military history, this offers a case study in the wrong way to plan a military operation. Through Bissell's recollection and analysis, we can understand how we became involved in such a precarious operation and perhaps how it made sense at the time. After leaving the CIA, Bissell held various executive positions in private industry and worked as a consultant on numerous projects.
Overall, this book contains valuable information and offers a unique perspective on a difficult and dangerous yet interesting period in American history. I do have some criticisms of the book. We never really get to know Richard Bissell from these memoirs. The narrative has a rather cold and detached quality. He rarely provides any insight into his personal life. He freely discusses the decisions he made and, to his credit, readily accepts responsibility for the failures. As stated in the final chapter, Bissell chose to include only events he believed would benefit from his personal perspective while other topics receive only cursory treatment or are not discussed at all. For example, early United States involvement in Southeast Asia and several other crises of the period are only superficially discussed. I believe Bissell was too conservative, as he was in a position to make some valuable observations on a wider range of events.
I would recommend the reader approach this book as a reference work as opposed to a book for purely personal enjoyment. By this I mean I fully recommend selected sections of the book because of the excellent insight they offer. Specifically I recommend the chapter on reconnaissance system development, Cuba, and the discussion of covert operations. I do not, however, recommend the book as a whole.
Lt Col Chris Anderson, USAF
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II by Nathan Miller. Charles Scribner's Sons, 866 Third Avenue, New York 10022, 1995, 592 pages, $32.50.
Various 50th--anniversary celebrations of World War II have launched dozens of books about the war at sea. One of the broadest and most readable, Nathan Miller's synthetic volume draws on much of the English--language scholarship of recent decades (plus some materials in the Public Record Office, invariably referred to as the Public Records [sic] office) to assess the leaders and operations of the German, British, Japanese, Canadian, and American navies. Miller, an experienced writer on sweeping topics as varied as a history of the US Navy and corruption in American politics, aimed to produce a history of “World War II at sea that treat[s] the struggle as a conceptual whole.” He nearly succeeds, but his planned comprehensiveness is marred only by virtually ignoring the Russian navy and dealing with the Italian only as an opponent of Britain's Royal Navy.
Personalities loom large in Miller's narrative; he regularly summarizes the main issues debated by historians and then cogently states his own view. Typical of Miller's assessments is his endorsement of criticism leveled at Vice Adm Frank Jack Fletcher's “ill--founded decision” (page 268) to withdraw his carriers from the waters off Guadalcanal three days after marines went ashore in August 1942, followed by a summary of John Lundstrom's defense of Fletcher in an extended footnote. Most of his judgments are conventional (e.g., his criticism of Churchill's decision to transfer troops from Egypt to Greece in 1941 and of Gen Douglas MacArthur's failure to defend the Philippines more adequately). Miller has kind words for the Canadian navy and for Adm Ernest J. King in the Battle of the Atlantic but argues that it was US industrial capacity more than anything else that determined the outcome of that long, bitter campaign. Especially good is his lucid treatment of British admiral Andrew B. Cunningham and the Mediterranean campaign of 1940 to 1942.
In the Pacific, Miller indirectly exonerates Gen Walter C. Short and Adm Husband Kimmel by placing primary responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle on officials in Washington. He credits the Japanese with forming a brilliant plan and executing it flawlessly, though he is highly critical of Adm Isoroku Yamamoto's conduct of the Midway campaign six months later, saying his plan “smacked more of the war--gaming table than reality” (page 245). He endorses Vice Adm Raymond Spruance's decisions not to seek the main Japanese fleet at Midway and the Philippine Sea; indeed, he describes Spruance as taking “an immense risk” (page 252) at Midway when he launched all his planes in pursuit of the Japanese while retaining none to defend his ships. In a few cases, Miller renders no judgment, as in his assessment of Vice Adm William Halsey's run north during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, though he does imply that Halsey committed an error—but one for which Thomas Kinkaid must share responsibility because of his failure to order air searches north of the battle area.
Although he focuses on major battles, Miller does not ignore submarine operations or the role of intelligence. His discussion of Allied cooperation is not balanced by a critique of the failure of Japan and Germany to coordinate campaigns; nor does he assess lost opportunities, such as Japan's decision to limit operations in the Indian Ocean in 1942.
Individuals new to naval warfare can learn much from War at Sea, and specialists will find his assessments interesting. Miller's work can be profitably supplemented with Walter J. Boyne's Clash of Titans (1995). Boyne, a retired Air Force colonel, provides a valuable perspective by describing the importance of land--based aircraft to both the Americans and the Japanese—especially during the Battle of Midway—and to victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. Still, War at Sea replaces Richard Hough's The Longest Battle (1986) as the best single--volume overview of the naval war.
James C. Bradford
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
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