NATO’s Ambitious Response

As detailed here, a number of would-be proliferators are actively involved in the acquisition of materials and the technology to develop these weapons. Recent events in the former Soviet Union make the illicit diversion or theft of weapons and materials ever more likely. Consequently, after much prodding, NATO has embarked on a program to develop and field capabilities to counter the growing proliferation threat.

This article argues, however, that the recently approved program adopted by NATO is not affordable in full and that a number of NATO partners are not interested in actively participating. The reasons include philosophical differences over the defensive nature of the Alliance, counterproliferation efforts being subsumed in larger defense-cooperation efforts, and strong resistance from the public sector to match NATO’s political rhetoric with the necessary funding—which must come from diminishing military budgets. The article further suggests that NATO, because of these realities, should scale back its current program and extend the time lines for implementation.

There are, however, more modest but no less effective functional approaches to the proliferation problem. Three initiatives proposed here focus on intelligence requirements, a program of cooperation, and doctrine/training—all essential to a successful collective response to this threat. Perhaps these proposals will stimulate thought about realistic, unified approaches to counter this threat and will encourage useful dialogue on how both the United States and NATO can successfully meet the proliferation challenge within current fiscal and political realities.

Clear and Present Danger:
The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The paradox of the end of the Cold War is that
there is less threat, but also less peace.

—Manfred Wörner
NATO Secretary-General

The threat of WMD proliferation continues to grow despite long-standing, concerted measures to stem the tide.¹ Proliferators of these weapons include some of the largest and smallest, richest and poorest countries, led by some of the most reactionary and unstable regimes. Although unclassified estimates vary, at least 20 countries²—nearly half of them in the Middle East and South Asia—already have or may be developing these weapons.³

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s annual arms control compliance report gives a gloomy assessment of the continuing efforts of would-be proliferators to acquire these weapons and delivery systems.⁴ For example, Syria and Iran continue to develop biological warfare (BW) capabilities,⁵ and Libya has demonstrated a well-publicized capability of developing chemical weapons in addition to its attempt to establish a biological warfare capability.⁶ New disclosures arise almost daily about Iraq’s NBC programs.⁷ That would-be proliferators continue to see a use for these types of weapons despite nonproliferation efforts is illustrated by the recent report that evidently Bosnia is now also producing and stockpiling chemical weapons.⁸

Growing evidence indicates that Russia has failed to fully dismantle its chemical and biological weapons programs,⁹ and frighteningly loose controls and lax security over Russia’s nuclear weapons and materials stockpiles have raised serious concerns within the international community.¹⁰ Political turmoil and economic problems faced by the former Soviet Union have increased the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, with over two million pounds of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium scattered throughout Russia and the Newly Independent States. Further, the potential for transnational terrorist groups or other state actors to acquire “loose nukes” or the materials to make other NBC weapons is a frightening reality.¹¹

This “creeping” proliferation is becoming militarily more significant. The fact that US forces will operate with other NATO or coalition forces raises questions about the political and military impact of NBC weapons on Alliance cohesion. For example, in the event of an NBC threat, it will not be sufficient for US forces alone to have adequate protective equipment. An adversary might exploit gaps in the passive-defense capabilities of coalition partners, thereby undermining the coalition and posing acute problems for political leaders and military commanders alike.

Given the extensive efforts of certain states and transnational groups to acquire these weapons, one can make a number of assumptions about the threat. First, like our efforts to counter drug smuggling, no matter how effective our nonproliferation efforts may be, we will never achieve complete success. Second, we cannot assume that our deterrence strategies are credible or will work.¹² Third, fixed-site military installations and urban centers will comprise the most attractive targets and will prove more difficult to defend than deployed combat forces. Unscrupulous states may employ transnational terrorists to expand major regional conflicts by conducting NBC assaults against US and allied targets elsewhere—especially inside Europe or the United States. Recognizing the validity of these and other concerns, NATO eventually began to develop new policies and programs to improve its abilities to defend against countries that seek such weapons.

NATO Framework for
Response to WMD
Proliferation: A Work in
Progress

We attach the utmost importance to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
. . . and, where this has occurred, to reversing it through diplomatic means. . . . As a defensive alliance,
NATO is addressing the range of capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use.
It must also be prepared, if necessary, to counter this risk and thereby protect NATO’s population,
territory, and forces.

—NATO Defense Planning
Committee, 8 June 1995

As early as 1991, NATO leaders, by adopting the NATO strategic concept, recognized the risks posed by “the proliferation of . . . weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance” and acknowledged that the proliferation of WMD required special attention by the Alliance.¹³ NATO recognized that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context” of the multifaceted, multidirectional risks to NATO security and “be capable of responding to [WMD proliferation] if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.”¹⁴ Nevertheless, initial response to a US proposal of 1993 to undertake a “counterproliferation”¹⁵ initiative (CPI) similar to the US undertaking was lukewarm.¹⁶

Although some Alliance partners shared the Clinton administration’s evaluation of the WMD threat, most did not—and none have felt the need to respond as strongly as did the United States. Evidence of this attitude includes (1) disagreements over export controls on dual-use technologies, (2) the inability of the United States to prevent the sale of nuclear reactors and other technologies to Iran, and (3) the debate over how to redress North Korea’s nuclear¹⁷ and missile activities.¹⁸ Many Alliance members chafed at US efforts to impose penalties against designated “rogues.”¹⁹

US counterproliferation efforts have been addressed and criticized exhaustively elsewhere,²⁰ and the Department of Defense (DOD) has provided detailed reports on its program.²¹ Briefly, the major objectives of the US defense counterproliferation initiative are to prevent the acquisition of WMD and missile capabilities, roll back proliferation, deter the use of WMD, and adapt US military forces and planning to operate against and defeat a WMD-armed adversary.²² In 1995 the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a prioritized list of 15 “Areas for Capability Enhancements [to] meet the challenges posed by WMD proliferation threats.”²³ DOD estimates that in fiscal year 1995 it spent about $1 billion of its budget to fund uniquely nonproliferation/counterproliferation applications and another $3 billion on strongly related programs.²⁴ It spent about $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1996²⁵ and expects to spend $4.3 billion for fiscal year 1997 (including approximately $2.9 billion for missile defense).²⁶ Setting aside missile defense, these amounts far exceed current and anticipated expenditures by our NATO partners. As of this writing, NATO has not projected any estimates for its proposed counterproliferation efforts.

Although key NATO allies expressed misgivings over the US counterproliferation initiative,²⁷ growing awareness existed within NATO that nonproliferation efforts had failed to prevent proliferators from developing WMD capabilities.²⁸ In particular, Southern Flank members became increasingly concerned over the well-publicized efforts of some Middle Eastern states at acquiring NBC weapons and missile capabilities. Subsequently, with US prodding, at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit of January 1994, the Alliance directed that “work begin immediately . . . to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.”²⁹

This marked a new stage in the Alliance’s growing recognition of the need to expand NATO’s political and defense efforts against the proliferation threat. France identified WMD proliferation as a “serious danger to the nation’s vital interests.”³⁰ Great Britain, who, like France, had interests outside the NATO arena, also supported measures to allow for out-of-area responses by Alliance forces against a potential proliferator but saw less risk and therefore less need to respond to such threats to the United Kingdom (UK).³¹ Other NATO members, however, saw less urgency in embarking on an Alliance initiative to counter proliferation threats.³²

Two expert groups were established in accordance with the decision of the summit of January 1994. The first group, designated the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), was responsible for consulting on specific proliferation threats, developing the broad policy framework for the Alliance approach to proliferation, and—on a continuing basis—determining how NATO could best complement ongoing prevention efforts in other forums. The second group, the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), focused on the defense aspects of proliferation. Its task involved identifying the security implications of proliferation for Alliance defense planning, assessing allied military capabilities to protect against and discourage WMD proliferation, and recommending additional as-required capabilities.³³ The group was also asked to consider how NATO’s defense posture might complement the Alliance’s prevention efforts.³⁴ A Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP) consolidated and harmonized the work of the two groups. However, since the JCP, chaired by the NATO deputy secretary-general, meets irregularly, the real focus of work remained in the DGP.

The SGP quickly drafted an “Alliance Policy Framework” document that was subsequently issued as an agreed statement of NATO policy during the meeting of foreign ministers in Istanbul in June 1994.³⁵ Here, for the first time, the Alliance endorsed a work program to address the military capabilities needed to deter threats or use of WMD.³⁶ The DGP was tasked to (1) conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks to the Alliance posed by proliferation, (2) identify a range of capabilities needed to support NATO’s defense posture against WMD, and (3) assess Alliance and national capabilities with the objective of identifying current efforts to overcome vulnerabilities and recommending specific measures to meet existing deficiencies.

In a recent article, Ambassador Robert Joseph discussed at length the DGP’s accomplishments and findings in fulfilling the first two tasks.³⁷ Essentially, the assessment of risks, completed in December 1994,³⁸ parallels in most respects US assessments, although because of political sensitivities over identifying specific regions and countries of proliferation concern, the report remains classified. As with public pronouncements by the United States,³⁹ the report differentiated between the different types of threats and the kinds of weapons the Alliance might face. Subsequently, the Alliance publicly recognized that a number of states on the periphery of the Alliance continue to develop or are acquiring the capability to produce WMD and that these efforts pose a potential threat.⁴⁰

The next report, among other things, addressed the implications of NBC proliferation for NATO defense planning and identified a range of capabilities needed by the Alliance.⁴¹ These findings emphasized the need for the Alliance to possess a “core” set of capabilities, such as

The identification of these needed capabilities tracks with the CPI of the United States.⁴³ The report further stressed the need to integrate these core capabilities since a mix of capabilities would provide the firmest basis for deterring or protecting against proliferation risks.⁴⁴

The third and final DGP report identified deficiencies or shortfalls in Alliance military capabilities; identified requirements for embedding proliferation concerns in Alliance and national policy, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising; examined areas for improvement and cooperation; and established a work plan to address identified shortfalls. The NAC subsequently endorsed the DGP recommendations for improvements to Alliance military capabilities as well as the program of work and time line set forth in the report.⁴⁵ A key shift in focus occurred, however, at the meeting of 13 June 1996 in Brussels, when the defense ministers emphasized that, in view of NATO’s new (non-Article 5) missions,⁴⁶ they would place greater emphasis and a higher priority on the protection of deployed forces rather than homeland defense.⁴⁷

The report accomplished several things. First, it identified a number of capability shortfalls. The shortfalls and needed capabilities parallel in large extent those identified by the report of the US Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC)⁴⁸and those previously discussed.⁴⁹Second, it prioritized the requirements of defense systems. Finally, it recommended that NATO institutionalize the assessment process in the Alliance’s future defense planning efforts. The report prioritized the shortfalls into three “tiers.” Tier one includes those “core, integrative capabilities” discussed in the second report.⁵⁰Shortfalls were identified in each of the needed capabilities, and the first 23 of 39 “action plans” were developed to address tier-one shortfalls.

Tier two includes those military capabilities that—when combined with the core, integrative capabilities—would contribute significantly to Alliance political aims and operational objectives, as well as respond to existing conditions and expected near-term trends. These capabilities include

The rest of the action plans were designed to address shortfalls identified in these areas.⁵² Finally, tier-three capabilities are those identified as important but not essential at the present time in addressing proliferation risks; consequently, they were not considered.

The DGP recommended pursuit of a time-phased approach for implementing the recommended capability improvements. Near-term (undefined but probably no later than 2002—the current five-year planning period)⁵³ efforts include implementation of an initial program of work (identified in 39 action plans contained in the report) by the end of 1997. The DGP recognized that, given the normal two-year planning cycle, it was not possible to include the shortfalls in the force proposals for 1996, although it did recognize that existing force goals already addressed some of the capabilities.

Consequently, the DGP proposed the ini-tiation of “catch-up” force proposals as an extension of the Force Goals process of 1996.⁵⁴ It suggested the utilization of common funding or procurement and recommended the initiation of additional force proposals to meet described shortfalls, including revision of existing force goals, where necessary, to supplement the already approved Force Goals package.⁵⁵ The DGP recognized, however, that further weighing and prioritization of capability improvements would need to occur in the context of NATO’s overall requirements.

The DGP recommended (and the ministers approved) that these revised goals focus on the protection of deploying out-of-area forces through both defensive and responsive capabilities.⁵⁶ Based on the approved DGP recommendations, the NATO military authorities and military staff reviewed existing force goals and drafted an action plan to address all required capabilities, both short- and long-term.⁵⁷ A number of NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) staff members emphasized that near-term counterproliferation efforts would focus on enhancing or creating capabilities for large formations of deployable NATO forces. The latter included a combined (several countries) joint (several services) task force (CJTF)⁵⁸ or the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),⁵⁹ operating in a WMD environment but not enhancing a current defensive capability.⁶⁰ Although staffers clearly recognized the long-term proliferation threat, such as ballistic missile developments by proliferant countries, they considered current progress in developing defensive capabilities sufficient.⁶¹

At its meeting in December 1996, the NAC endorsed the new and revised force goals,⁶² but a number of hurdles remained—not the least of which was an unwillingness by many NATO members, for political and economic reasons, to fully accede to the anticipated costs of this ambitious program. The Alliance would need to commit resources in a period of declining military budgets to meet the proliferation challenges. The question is, Will Alliance members be willing to devote necessary resources in a time of shrinking budgets? More than likely, the proposed full program and timetables, though laudable, will not be met.

The Budgetary Dilemma and
Other Obstacles

No matter what they’re telling ya, they ain’t telling
the whole truth; and no matter what they’re talking about,
they’re talking about money!

—Western American aphorism

A number of obstacles stand in the way of full implementation of this program. The first is primarily conceptual—that is, what the Alliance thinks about the security implications of proliferation and deterrence. Indeed, one critical factor remains how Alliance political leaders truly perceive the threat—specifically, whether they see NBC and missile proliferation as representing a fundamental change in their individual and collective security environment. Perhaps the DGP’s greatest accomplishment has been NATO’s acceptance that proliferation has the potential to profoundly affect the Alliance’s security and its ability to act in regions beyond its borders.⁶³

On the other hand, the national leadership and the public in several key allied nations do not see WMD proliferation as a significant threat—certainly not to the degree so vividly and dramatically reflected in President Clinton’s declaration of a national emergency.⁶⁴ Interestingly, except in the context of NATO antiproliferation efforts, none of the other Alliance members have expressly addressed or claimed that proliferation is a high national priority. When asked, United Kingdom, German, French, Dutch, Italian, and other allied defense officials admitted that both their publics and their parliaments perceived the threat as small and would not support increasing defense budgets.⁶⁵ Although the DGP did an admirable and thorough job of ranking the types of threats and developing action plans to address shortfalls, it was not tasked to address the question (nor probably should it have been) of where within a hierarchical order of national or Alliance security interests counterproliferation should fall. NATO pronouncements to the contrary, for most parliaments looking to save scarce fiscal resources, the answer lies not very far up on the list.

The Alliance would need to commit resources in a period of declining military budgets to meet the proliferation challenges

An arguably insurmountable hurdle is the present fiscally constrained environment that has already resulted in declining military budgets for virtually every Alliance member. Indeed, at the NAC ministerial meeting of June 1996, foreign ministers recognized that significant force reductions and lower readiness levels have occurred as a result, at least partly, of perceptions of an end-of-the-cold-war dividend.⁶⁶

Unfortunately, with its CPI goal of eliminating perceived vulnerabilities, the United States appears to be unilaterally working on all shortfall areas, even though the allies have similar programs. One DOD official even indicated, notwithstanding prior political pronouncements, that the United States is not interested in burden sharing when it comes to addressing proliferation concerns.⁶⁷ Although probably overstated, such a remark does reflect the fact that cooperative efforts, if any, are more oriented towards sharing information, addressing interoperability concerns, and standardizing equipment and systems, than towards establishing collaborative efforts or supporting a particularly promising national acquisition program over other similar, but less promising, programs.

Further, shrinking or stagnant defense budgets will make it difficult to support new initiatives. Cuts in nonmilitary spending have already spawned a number of protests in Europe, and no government is willing to risk political immolation by sacrificing social programs to meet unspecified future threats. Alternatively, cutting military spending is relatively safe politically because of a perceived absence of threat and a pervasive ambivalence about any separation of European and American defense interests. As one senior French defense official said, “It is true that you have some countries in Europe that are completely relying on American protection and have abandoned any idea of their own defense. They have paper headquarters and paper armies.”⁶⁸

NATO-Europe has collectively seen its defense expenditures shrink from 3.6 percent of the gross national product to 2.3 percent. Key allies are slashing their budgets in such a way as to make any new initiatives problematic. The French military procurement budget of 1996 had already been slashed by $5 billion, and France has been forced to back out of a number of joint procurement projects. For example, in April 1997 France announced its withdrawal from joint development (with the United States, Germany, and Italy) of a medium extended air defense system (MEADS)⁶⁹ and initially refused to provide financial backing for the European Future Large Aircraft (FLA), a long-distance transport plane designed to include NBC protection equipment.⁷⁰ Ironically, one of the biggest supporters of NATO’s counterproliferation efforts has already been unable to support two key programs.⁷¹

Germany is also dramatically cutting back its military, and the German public has no interest in spending more on defense.⁷² As one German staff officer noted, “There is no nationwide interest in spending more on defending against proliferation risks. It is just the opposite.”⁷³ The United Kingdom is projecting zero budget growth with modest reductions in personnel and, in terms of the General Defense Plan, an actual slight decrease in defense spending from 3.1 percent to 2.7 percent by 1998–99.⁷⁴ Other Alliance members are suffering from similar or even harsher defense budget cuts.⁷⁵

According to NATO officials, by approving the DGP report, several defense ministers made it clear that they were by no means signing up or agreeing to fund the proposed action plans when the costs are fully assessed. That, of course, will have to await the outcome of the catch-up Force Goals process. Whatever the merits of a counterproliferation program within NATO, one can certainly make the case that NATO enlargement and not proliferation concerns will take center stage politically and demand the most for reprioritizing already scarce budgetary resources.⁷⁶ A recent RAND study estimates that $20 to $70 billion would be required of the 16 current members over a 10- to 15-year period for three new members,⁷⁷ with the total cost of NATO expansion projected between $61 and $125 billion.⁷⁸

In the face of these competing interests, it is no wonder that Alliance members have been less than enthusiastic. One DOD official argued that the DGP is not assuming any increase in defense budgets but is looking for a reallocation of resources.⁷⁹ Yet, while one might argue that agreeing to amended 1996 Force Goals simply means realigning budget priorities, surely adding new force proposals means increasing budgets, giving up other programs, or making reductions in other areas that Alliance members are not likely to make—at least not without painful trade-offs. Discussions with NATO and SHAPE staff members and national military representatives to NATO headquarters indicated not only that support for DGP action plans would require increased spending but also that agreement to do so would remain unlikely.⁸⁰

Surmounting the Cold Reality of Constrained Resources:
Proposals for a Realistic Counterproliferation Program

There are, however, alternatives worth pursuing that would give NATO an enhanced antiproliferation capability without breaking the bank—politically as well as economically. Although the work of the DGP was comprehensive, it is—in the current political and fiscal climate—overly ambitious, too expensive, and therefore unrealistic. Those ongoing programs—already funded and validated for reasons other than the proliferation threat—obviously should proceed. But for the near term (within the next five years), a more achievable (and supportable) program should encompass three core initiatives: (1) collaborative intelligence sharing through the creation of a NATO Proliferation Risk Intelligence and Analysis Center, (2) firm commitment to truly cooperative and collaborative efforts and support of common funding and burden sharing, and (3) reorientation of doctrine and creation of realistic training and exercises for adapting selective forces to operate in out-of-area WMD environments.

The DGP report recommended the development of a common, centralized database containing comprehensive information on WMD proliferation and proliferators. Although sound and worthwhile, the recommendation does not go far enough. NATO needs a NATO-controlled, centrally located, commonly funded, and politically supported intelligence and analysis center. The goal is to provide NATO policy makers with a fully integrated intelligence center that supports efforts to prevent the acquisition of WMD, roll back existing WMD programs and capabilities, deter the use of these weapons against NATO security interests, and assist in the adaptation of NATO military forces to respond to the threat.

NATO has no independent intelligence-gathering function or capacity of its own; instead, it collates and disseminates intelligence provided by national authorities.⁸¹ Clearly, this procedure is inadequate. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has already formed a nonproliferation center to help focus, among other things, US development and acquisition of needed technologies and systems. The United States should take the lead in building a similarly focused and fused NATO Proliferation Risk Intelligence and Analysis Center to support NATO responses to proliferation threats. Such a center would receive largely unfiltered, raw data from numerous, diverse sources for analysis by an analytical support team culled from the very best intelligence analysts from all NATO nations.

The United States has already shared ballistic missile early-warning information with its NATO allies in conjunction with the development of a theater missile defense (TMD).⁸² There is no reason to assume that—with an effort reflective of the same patience, compromise, and ingenuity displayed during the cold war—the United States could not share other intelligence data. One example is the unprecedented way in which intelligence is being shared and new commercially based data-dissemination technologies are being exploited during the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia.

The creation of such a center would have several advantages. First, it would be a NATO instead of a national intelligence product and thus would have more credibility, even if the primary assets used in collecting the information were largely American. Second, more information would be available to clear up any lingering doubts about proliferation risks.⁸³ Third, Alliance members could use the center to collect and analyze all information from all sources (diplomatic, military, economic, and law enforcement) that are currently, for the most part, responding independently to the threat. Law enforcement agencies, for example, have already established procedures for sharing information, and that information could be shared with NATO military authorities.

Fourth, data from international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which tracks and analyzes cases of nuclear smuggling,⁸⁴ could be made available. Information gleaned from meetings on the export control regime—the Australia (chemical and biological) and Nuclear Suppliers Group constitute the two prime examples—would also be funneled into the center. Intelligence products generated by the center could be used by other national agencies (e.g., customs agencies) to help them in their nonproliferation efforts.

There are other advantages as well. A NATO intelligence center with its own assessment capability could relieve political pressure on countries such as France and Germany to field their own independent satellite-collection program. They could cancel the problematic Helios 2 and Horus satellite programs and save billions of dollars.⁸⁵ Imagery from American satellites would be analyzed by French, German, and other imagery specialists, and estimates would be presented as Alliance—not US—work products. Collaborative efforts in developing the center’s collection capabilities could lead to transatlantic cooperation on several information systems, including US-European partnering on future satellites. Partnering in the development of such satellites might offer more affordable choices on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly, any initial costs incurred by creation of the center will be more than offset by these savings.

NATO has created the JCP (which includes the DGP) to establish a framework for defense activities related to proliferation, but true cooperative efforts in the full panoply of needed capabilities is lagging. With the possible exception of ballistic missile defense,⁸⁶ little has been done to create a fully cooperative effort in improving counterproliferation capabilities. As argued here, shrinking defense bud-gets make it politically unrealistic for Alliance members to independently pursue the necessary capabilities to combat or defend against WMD proliferation. In view of the high cost of full implementation of many of the DGP’s action plans, cooperative and collaborative ventures are both inevitable and necessary.

Cooperative programs are not new. One of the original purposes of the DGP was to assimilate or at least coordinate with other groups within NATO that were working on programs related to the counterproliferation effort and redirect the focus of these groups to the approved work plan. A number of groups have a related, complementary role within NATO. These include, but are by no means limited to, the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), tasked with assessing the conceptual and operational aspects of extended air defense and ballistic missile defense;⁸⁷ the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), a defense research group studying command, control, and communications systems; and the NATO Industrial Advisory Study Group (NIAG), which studies various technologies, concepts, and cooperative programs.⁸⁸

NATO clearly needs to create a group whose sole purpose is to oversee collaborative efforts in the full range of counterproliferation technology applications. This “new” organization or group could simply be a reenergized CNAD with more authority and a clear political mandate to push for cooperative programs. It could also be a NATO-minus group, organized only with key nations that have significant armaments industries, having the sole purpose of focusing on NATO military interdependence by providing incentives for successful armaments and collaboration on research and development (R&D).

Another possibility is that the SGP could assume this responsibility. In that regard, a program worth emulating is the Technical Cooperation Program (TCP)—a long-standing program for collaborative efforts among the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The TCP takes as its premise the idea that no nation possesses the total resources and ingenuity necessary to provide for its own defense R&D needs. The object of the program is straightforward; it provides

Although the TCP has no funding, it has been successful because of a recognition of mutual defense requirements and the willingness of the subgroups to collaborate in joint research activities through consultation, collective decisions, and formulation of recommendations for operation requirements.

Obviously, NATO members cooperate on a variety of projects and programs. Although cooperative R&D programs do go on within NATO (TMD being the most obvious),⁹⁰ no organized structure similar to the TCP currently exists to oversee and help generate cooperative, collaborative programs. Creating such a TCP-like program would prove a forceful tool in prodding and pushing Alliance members into more productive and economical collaborative efforts. This not only would strengthen the counterproliferation effort as a whole but also would strengthen the political will of the Alliance to work together. Fiscal reality is already forcing Alliance members to cooperate on testing and evaluation of weapons systems.⁹¹ National defense industries are also in the painfully slow but inevitable process of merging to create efficiencies.⁹² A structured program similar to the TCP would enhance NATO’s prospects for developing needed capabilities at affordable costs in an environment of maximum cooperation.

Cooperative efforts should not be restricted to R&D alone, of course. Recently, DOD formed “International Cooperative Opportunity Groups” to identify “programs for international cooperation in the areas of major systems, science and technology and advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD’s).”⁹³ Yet, support for such programs within DOD is not widespread, and cooperative armaments projects remain the subject of widespread mistrust on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, the inevitability of coalition warfare, coupled with declining defense acquisition budgets, makes cross-border defense-procurement agreements a political and economic imperative.

Essentially, NATO has three options for funding and fielding any part of the ambitious DGP program. One entails NATO’s asking members to procure necessary systems to meet the identified shortfalls. Clearly, some nations will not be able to afford or will be politically unable to purchase expensive systems for reasons described earlier. Another option calls for nations to share in purchasing systems to meet the capability shortfalls identified by the DGP. Not everyone participates, but costs are shared by those who do. One example is MEADS, initially a project undertaken jointly by France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. When France dropped out for budgetary reasons, the other three countries were able to launch the program after restructuring it and slightly increasing the percentage in the sharing of costs, hoping that France would eventually be able to return.⁹⁴

The third option—the one endorsed here—is common funding, which entails members contributing funds for NATO to own a particular system or asset outright. This too is not uncommon. For certain capabilities such as ground surveillance—something needed at all levels within the spectrum of conflict⁹⁵—common ownership is the most attractive, politically and economically. Having each country agree to support pro rata WMD response capabilities will strengthen the commitment of all members to the program and lower the cost for everyone—especially those partners who have committed the most (and who have the most to lose) to respond to the threat.⁹⁶ Common funding and ownership would make the sale more palatable to civilian populations of NATO countries, and experience suggests that it would accelerate standardization and interoperability.⁹⁷

Commanders must now begin to prepare for the possibility of having to fight in regional out-of-area operations that will likely involve the use of WMD. Consequently, the NAC should direct that the international military staff, in conjunction with the major NATO commands, begin the development of realistic training situations for individuals and units, down to the lowest levels of training and indoctrination. Doctrine publications should be reviewed and revised (or new ones added) to include material about warfare in WMD environments. All combined exercises should include WMD events. The silence of current standard exercise scenarios on this issue⁹⁸ is not a realistic approach for the area (the Middle East) primarily identified for out-of-area deployments.

The United States should take the lead in initiating combined WMD proliferation exercises within NATO. Recently, the Clinton administration proposed spending up to $23 million to conduct realistic exercises involving a nuclear terrorist incident.⁹⁹ Such exercises will lead to the development of procedures for responding to proliferation contingencies, such as compatible rules of engagement (ROE), and help build political awareness of the importance of planning, training, and equipping NATO forces to operate in WMD environments. This will require the US military not only to accept the reality of fighting in a WMD environment but also to plan, train, and equip for fighting such a war. As one expert noted, military planners tend to discount the value that NBC weapons may have to potential proliferators because, after the cold war, they have much less value to the United States.¹⁰⁰

Going hand in hand with developing doctrine and training is the question of what forces would be committed to such situations and at what cost—politically as well as economically. All-member participation in a WMD risk environment is problematic because all countries have not invested in the capability (e.g., BW vaccines, adequate protective clothing, etc.). Rather, Alliance members would choose to participate in NATO counterproliferation efforts à la carte rather than accept the full political and military menu, based both on perceptions of predominantly national versus Alliance interests and a desire to limit their roles and responsibilities in new and costly NATO programs.¹⁰¹

Nations that have not made up-front investments in these capabilities will have preempted themselves from direct participation. The reasons are clear. In any out-of-area mission, all deployed forces are potential WMD targets, whether they are logistical-support or combat forces. Consequently, designating forces for out-of-area missions and funding their training and equipment becomes more fiscally (and politically) supportable. If a member nation chooses not to participate directly, it would still be obligated to provide political and pro rata financial support. The ideal solution, however, calls for a dedicated force already designated and trained for these types of missions. Further, nations that already have such commitments or that have contributed or designated forces to combined NATO commands (e.g., the CJTF or ARRC, discussed above) should focus their efforts on training and equipping only those forces for fighting in WMD environments.

One way to ensure their participation is to have the United States fund the training and necessary equipment for forces designated to the combined-force command. Once the United States has developed and fielded the capability, it would be warehoused for allied use. Doing this would prove cheaper and politically more attractive than either going it alone or providing additional forces to make up for those that could not participate for lack of such training or equipment.

Conclusion: The Way Ahead

Everything in strategy is very simple,
but that does not mean that everything is very easy.

--Carl von Clausewitz

NATO has embarked on a program that will fulfill its strategy for defeating the forces of proliferation, but the current program is overly ambitious and therefore unrealistic. As argued here, more realistic options exist in terms of cost and political supportability. Those initiatives focus primarily on intelligence (the first line of defense against proliferation); collaboration and true cooperation; and identifying, training, and equipping quantifiable but limited forces, based on the fiscal realities of funding expensive counterproliferation programs.

The DGP and its efforts represent a significant milestone in achieving political consensus on proliferation risks and a strategy for response. The Alliance, finally matching its political rhetoric, made a good start towards the development of adequate capabilities to respond to potential adversaries. It has given greater impetus to a number of NATO’s ongoing initiatives, such as developing an effective airborne ground surveillance and TMD; it has served as a useful vehicle for sensitizing members to the deadly potential of WMD, particularly biological weapons; and it has established a prioritized list by which the Alliance can make allocation or reallocation decisions.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, mustering the fiscal means and sustaining the necessary political will to take the actions proposed are unlikely in the present fiscal and political climate. The DGP program is a good one, and in a world that sees the proliferant threat as a world emergency, it would have greater public support and chances of success. Building a combined approach to the problem, however, will necessitate more modest programs in which the United States will have to continue its lead role. This will require mustering the required political support, sharing intelligence assets, and undertaking truly cooperative and collaborative R&D efforts.

The initiatives suggested here would serve as the basis for all future cooperative efforts and would provide the solid political foundation necessary for a successful counterproliferation program. First, creation of the proposed Proliferation Risk Intelligence and Analysis Center would serve as a catalyst for achieving the information dominance necessary for successfully meeting this challenge. An integrated intelligence center would provide multisourced information unencumbered by the political baggage associated with single-source information and analysis.

Second, a fully cooperative and collaborative program of R&D and a program for the acquisition of equipment necessary to defend against and respond to proliferation risks must be initiated. The TCP model is a good one. Achieving efficiencies and lowering costs argue strongly for more collaborative efforts, even though other concerns (such as current arguments over the future of national defense industries) would make this contentious.

Finally, because not all Alliance members are or will be able to produce the necessary forces, either now or in the future, forces within NATO must be identified, trained, and equipped for operations in potential WMD environments. Creating and training such a force cannot be limited to reactive measures. Given the potential for irrationality on the part of many of today’s potential proliferators, it would be foolish to stand idly by while one’s enemy delivers a fatal blow, all the while holding firm to the false belief that overwhelming counterforces are a sufficient deterrent.¹⁰³ NATO must develop the capability to fight with credible, combat-capable, rapidly deployable war-fighting forces that have the wherewithal and confidence to operate in a potential WMD environment. That is the only feasible route towards ending the gaps in our ability to respond to and counter any future proliferation concerns.¹⁰⁴

Success depends on NATO’s preparedness to deal with proliferation threats and recognition of the essential aspect of adapting to the new security environment.¹⁰⁵ Meeting the challenge of proliferation is one of the most vexing security problems the United States and NATO will face for many years to come. It will require a truly dedicated effort if it is to succeed. US leadership coupled with effective and timely intelligence, a military capability to respond effectively to proliferation threats, and confidence in the solid political support—and will—of all members of the Alliance will ultimately stand the best chance of eliminating this scourge on mankind.

1. It is not the purpose of this article to delve into the reasons why states may decide it is in their national security interests to seek WMD. For a discussion of the rationale for WMD acquisition, see Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); idem and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation, After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994); Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); Munir Ahmad Khan, “Toward a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint,” in Joseph F. Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, eds., Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime (New York: Plenum Press, 1990), 89; Gregory J. Rattray, Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going beyond the Security Dilemma, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 1 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, July 1994); and Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, “Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment,” Comparative Strategy 15, no. 1 (1996): 59. For an examination of US efforts to control proliferation, see Zachary S. Davis, Nonproliferation Regimes: Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missiles, Congressional Research Service Report 93-237 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 18 February 1993).

2. See Senate, Testimony of R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 25 January 1994, S. Hrg. 103-630, 18; and The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Central Intelligence Agency Non-Proliferation Center Report, March 1995. See also Marc Dean Millot, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,” Washington Quarterly 17, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 41–50.

3. See for example, John M. Collins, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Impact of Proliferation on U.S. Military Posture, Congressional Research Service Report 95-673S (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2 June 1995), fig. 1, page 3.

4. Bill Gertz, “China, Russia Still Producing Biological Weapons, Study Says,” Washington Times, 8 August 1996, 6.

5. See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Germ, Nuclear Arms Top Pentagon’s List of Threats,” Washington Post, 12 April 1996, 32. See generally, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1996).

6. See generally, Central Intelligence Agency Nonproliferation Center, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat, CIA Nonproliferation Center Publication, March 1996.

7. Ruth Wedgwood, “Truth Sleuth in Iraq,” Washington Post, 19 June 1996, 19; and “Evidence Lacking That Iraq Destroyed Arms, Report Says,” Baltimore Sun, 12 April 1996, 22. See also, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat.

8. “Bosnia Producing Chemical Arms, Report Says,” New York Times, 4 December 1996, 11.

9. Joseph D. Douglass Jr., “Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked,” Wall Street Journal, 2 November 1995, 18; and Gertz.

10. Carla Anne Robbins, “Russia’s Nuclear Stockpile Still Raises Concerns Despite Major Cutbacks and Improved Security,” Wall Street Journal, 18 April 1996, 1.

11. See Marilyn Greene, “Japan Cult Shopped for Nuclear Weapons,” USA Today, 1 November 1995, 1; Guy B. Roberts, “Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials,” Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 8 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, February 1996); and Peter Grier, “‘Loose Nukes’: Threat Growing,” Christian Science Monitor, 25 August 1995, 1.

12. There is no one best way to assure deterrence through credibility or uncertainty. Certainly, the United States has had enough experience in Vietnam and elsewhere to know that military superiority is not necessarily enough. What deters regional adversaries is complex, and what works in one case may not work in another. See sources cited in note 1; John J. Mearscheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); and John Arme, “Deterrence Failures: A Second Look,” International Security, Spring 1987, 96–124.

13. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 7–8 December 1991), pars. 12, 50.

15. In its broadest sense, the term counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) across the full range of US efforts to combat proliferation. It includes supporting proliferation prevention and intelligence activities, deterring the use of NBC weapons, defending against NBC weapons, protecting against their effects, and maintaining a robust capability to find and destroy NBC weapons-delivery forces and their supporting infrastructure elements with minimum collateral effects, should this become necessary. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, May 1995), 2 (hereinafter CPRC Report). The term counterproliferation has an interesting history. After a protracted interagency battle over DOD’s role in combating proliferation (the author was actively involved as a member of the Joint Staff), in which the State Department objected strenuously to an expansive definition and increased DOD responsibility in the area, Daniel Poneman, senior director for nonproliferation, National Security Council, crafted a “compromise” definition: “the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.” In other words, anything DOD does is counterproliferation; everything every other agency does is nonproliferation. This definition appeared in Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 1994).

16. See Natalie J. Goldring, “Skittish on Counterproliferation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994, 12. The author participated in a number of briefings to defense officials in member states that year and in early 1994. The response was uniformly negative.

17. William E. Berry Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s Response,” Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 3 (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, March 1995); and Stephen Engelberg with Michael Gordon, “Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb,” New York Times, 26 December 1993, 1.

18. See “North Korean Missile Could Reach US, Intelligence Warns,” Washington Times, 29 September 1995, 1

19. This disagreement over how best to address WMD ambitions by rogue states continues, as demonstrated by the recent failure of the United States to convince NATO allies to bar arms trade with Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Turkey also signed a $20 billion gas agreement with Iran despite potential penalties for doing so under the recently enacted Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Jeff Erlich and Brooks Tigner, “Allies Balk at Rogue Nation Penalties,” Defense News, 19–26 August 1996, 4.

20. See Harald Muller and Mitchell Reiss, “Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine in Old Bottles,” Washington Quarterly 18, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 143–54; idem, eds., International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, Wilson Center Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 1994); Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, “The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation,” Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 153–66; Zachary S. Davis, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report 94-734 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 21 September 1994); and Steven M. Kosiak, Nonproliferation & Counterproliferation: Investing for a Safer World? (Washington, D.C.: Defense Budget Project, April 1995).

21. Since 1993 yearly reports on DOD’s counterproliferation program have been published. The most recent reports include William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 1996), 53–62; Proliferation: Threat and Response; and CPRC Report. See also, William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 1995), 13–15; and National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 15.

23. Because of their relationship to NATO efforts, discussed below, these 15 counterproliferation priorities bear repeating here:

24. Pamela Pohling Brown, “Technologies for America’s New Course,” International Defense Review 27, no. 10 (1994): 33–38. Of that amount, $522.1 million was for counterproliferation and another $1.9 billion for strongly related programs and activities. See William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1995), 74. Because of the multiuse nature of many programs, it is difficult to pin down exactly how much is directly spent on counterproliferation. Arguably, categorization is arbitrary in many cases.

25. CPRC Report, ES-2. For fiscal year 1996, DOD requested $165.2 million for counterproliferation. These funds are for specific, high-priority acquisition activities to provide required military capabilities. The rest of the funds are for related programs and systems that have multipurpose capabilities in addition to counterproliferation relevance. The US government’s fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September.

27. See Goldring, 12–13. NATO members have leveled criticism at the potential unilateral use of American military force to destroy WMD. See also Dr. Klaus Kinkel, federal minister for foreign affairs, “German 10-Point Initiative on Non-Proliferation Policy,” circular note from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna, 13 January 1994 (on file with author).

28. These concerns continue. Recent revelations about Iraq’s BW and missile program are particularly disturbing. In addition to having an extensive BW program, Iraq also was trying to develop a missile with a range of two thousand kilometers, placing NATO’s Southern Flank at risk. See Wedgwood, 19.

29. “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” in NATO Communiqués 1994 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 10–11 January 1994), 13.

30. Robert Joseph, “Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation, and NATO,” Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 117. France’s views on proliferation should be considered in light of its new and pragmatic relationship with NATO. See Robert P. Grant, “France’s New Relationship with NATO,” Survival 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 58–80. See also Gregory L. Schulte, “Responding to Proliferation—NATO’s Role,” NATO Review, July 1995, 15–19; and Joachim Krause, “Proliferation Risks and Their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?” Survival 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 136.

31. UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) official, interviewed by author, 24 June 1996. See also MOD, Statement on Defence Estimates 1994 (London: MOD, 1994), 20.

32. NATO officials and NATO member representatives, interviewed by author, 26–28 June 1996. The initial report of the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation consisted of an assessment of WMD risks. That report, adopted by the NAC, recognized that nonproliferation efforts would not be enough and that the risk of WMD was growing, but no conclusions were being made on the immediacy of the threat and the extent to which NATO countries were at risk. Numerous interviews with NATO member representatives produced a range of views on the nature of the threat; a large majority stated that no immediate threat existed.

33. Basic fact sheet, “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, May 1996).

35. “Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in NATO Communiqués 1994 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 9 June 1994), 43.

38. The report was presented to the NAC in May 1995. See “Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 30 May 1995,” in NATO Communiqués 1995 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 16.

40. “Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in NATO Communiqués 1994 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 9 June 1994), 43–44.

41. “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” NATO Press Release 95, no. 124 (29 November 1995): 3–4.

42. NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) officials, interviewed by author, 26–27 June 1996. See also Arms Control and Disarmament Review, no. 40 (1 November–29 February 1996): 98; and Perry, 57.

44. “NATO’s Response to Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” (1995).

45. “Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996,” Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (96)63 (Brussels: NATO Press and Media Service, 1996), 7.

46. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires that any armed attack against one or more parties to the treaty be considered an attack against all. The treaty contemplates collective action of the members in Europe and North America with adequate armed forces for both deterrence and defense. The treaty does not contemplate member forces, acting as a NATO force, undertaking missions such as peace enforcement out-of-area. Consequently, as NATO evolves and takes on new responsibilities beyond the mandate of the original treaty, we can expect controversy over and resistance to these types of missions.

47. “Final Communiqué, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session on 13 June, 1996,” Press Communiqué, M-NAC(DM)-2(96)89 (Brussels: NATO Press and Media Service, 1996), 5.

51. DOD official, interviewed by author, 13 June 1996; interview with MOD Officials, 25 June 1996; and interviews with NATO/SHAPE officials, 26–27 June 1996.

53. NATO officials, interviewed by author, 26 June 1996. “Midterm” was assessed as five to 10 years.

54. “Final Communiqué, Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, 29 November 1995,” in NATO Communiqués 1995 (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 2.

55. “Final Communiqué, Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group,” Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (96)88 (Brussels: NATO Press and Media Service, 13 June 1996), 2.

56. Interview with NATO/SHAPE officials, 26–27 June 1996; and Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (96)88.

57. Interviews with NATO/SHAPE officials, 26–27 June 1996. The author is indebted to those staff officers at SHAPE who helped explain the anticipated process by which the DGP’s 39 action plans might be implemented.

58. At the defense ministerial meeting in Brussels in May 1994 and the NAC ministerial meeting in Istanbul in June 1994, the Alliance endorsed the concept of a CJTF concept to enable the Alliance to more efficiently and more flexibly conduct multinational and multiservice military missions such as peacekeeping with non-NATO partners. It was seen as promoting a cooperative effort with the Western European Union (WEU) and facilitating the involvement of Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries in various missions. The CJTF concept, recently approved by the NAC at the ministerial meeting of June 1996, will allow NATO to mount contingency operations and promote the “use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance” in operations such as those in Bosnia. See “Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996,” Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (96)63 (Brussels: NATO Press and Media Service, 1996), par. 6. Although the concept has been approved, the CJTF remains controversial. It will take two or three years to define practical procedures to make the CJTF a reality. The political-control issue will be the most intractable. See Brooks Tigner, “Will Alliance Embrace or Evade CJTF Issue?” Defense News, 3–9 June 1996, 4.

59. ARRC is the land component of the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces (the other two being Reaction Forces Air Staff [RFAS] and the Immediate Reaction Forces—Maritime). Its role is to deploy as necessary to augment or reinforce local forces in a NATO country and to respond rapidly to a wide range of crises, including out-of-area missions. It is designed to have a broad spectrum of capabilities tailored to respond to multifaceted and unpredictable risks, including response to a WMD-equipped adversary. Its peacetime structure includes 10 divisions plus corps troops from 12 NATO countries. Its headquarters is in Rheindahlen, Germany; commanded by a British three-star general, it became operational in 1995. The United States has approximately 33 personnel assigned to Headquarters ARRC and funds approximately 9 percent of its operating expenses. US forces participating in the ARRC include an armored division from US Army Europe. For a more detailed explanation of these forces and NATO command structure, see NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, October 1995), 165–84.

62. “Final Communiqué, Defense Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 18 December 1996,” Press Communiqué M-NAC(DM) 3(96) 172 (Brussels: NATO Press and Media Services, 1996), pars. 23–25.

63. A close second is France’s concerns over WMD proliferation, which has led to its active participation, lead within the DGP (an initial cochair of the group), and movement towards full participation in NATO affairs.

64. Executive Order 12938, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12 November 1994.

66. See David R. Francis, “End of Cold War Brings Huge Savings,” Christian Science Monitor, 26 July 1996, 1.

68. Quoted in Rick Atkinson and Bradley Graham, “As Europe Seeks Wider NATO Role, Its Armies Shrink,” Washington Post, 29 July 1996, 1.

69. “France Quits Anti-Missile Project,” London Financial Times, 17 April 1996, 3.

70. “FLA Failure Plays into U.S. Hands,” European Defense and Technology, U.S.-Crest Online, 14 June 1996. Although France now appears to have committed to funding its part of the program, current French funding is insufficient for the program. NBC-capable planes will have to be separately funded once the program is fully launched in early 1998. See Giovanni de Briganti and Michael J. Witt, “U.K. Edges Closer to FLA Program as Partners Pen Needs Agreement,” Defense News, 2–8 September 1996, 3.

71. See also Peter Lewis, “French Security Policy: The Year of the Disappearing Budget,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 1996, 42.

72. Germany’s Ministry of Defense is projecting a $30 million budget reduction for the 1997 budget (approximately $34 billion). See Jeff Erlich, “Germans Give Top Priority to Overseas Commando Unit,” Defense News, 23–29 September 1996, 36.

74. Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1996 (London: Directorate of Defence Policy, MOD, 1996), 47–52.

76. See Javier Solana, “NATO Charts Firm Course,” Defense News, 17–23 June 1996, 9. (NATO enlargement will provide a “strong and coherent alliance in Europe” and a desire for more equitable defense burden sharing.)

77. Cited in Carla Anne Robbins, “Devil Is in Details of NATO Expansion,” Wall Street Journal, 9 August 1996, 1.

78. Jonathan S. Landay, “Is Eastern Europe Ready for NATO?” Christian Science Monitor, 18 June 1996, 4. US contributions would be in the $5–19 billion range. See also David D. Newsom, “The Go-Slow Approach to NATO Expansion,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 July 1996, 19; and Theresa Hitchens, “Voices Rise for Slow NATO Growth,” Defense News, 22–28 April 1996, 46.

81. NATO has also created a NATO Intelligence Board (NIB) that meets once or twice a year. Its members include the heads of national intelligence services, and its work is coordinated by the international military staff. The DGP has requested that the NIB develop plans for a centralized database—an encouraging request but one that doesn’t go nearly far enough.

82. See David Martin, “Towards an Alliance Framework for Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence,” NATO Review 44, no. 3 (May 1996): 34.

83. Interestingly, during the author’s research for this article, a number of NATO officials and staff members expressed skepticism about the extent of the risk, implying that the Americans were simply crying “wolf” in order to enhance American arms exports or garner support for future “preemptive” military operations against proliferators.

84. The IAEA, for example, has established a database to begin tracking and analyzing cases of the trafficking of fissile materials, and it has a number of nuclear-materials forensic laboratories.

85. See Giovanni de Briganti, “Delays Force French to Rethink Satellite Plans,” Defense News, 12–18 August 1996, 14; and Peter B. de Selding, “Multinational Satellite Plan Stalls; Countries Move on Own Projects,” Defense News, 16–22 September 1996, 58. The estimated cost of Helios 2 (Helios 1A was launched in 1985) and Horus is $4.5 billion. France and Britain are also working on a four-satellite telecommunications system, to be in place by 2005, that will cost an estimated $2.6 billion. Italy is developing its own military communications satellite (called Sicral) for $457 million, to be in place by 1999.

88. A detailed discussion of these and other NATO group efforts lies beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say there exists a bewildering variety of these groups, often operating without coordination. See NATO Handbook. No wonder Secretary of Defense William Perry and General Sheehan, commander in chief, Atlantic Forces (and a major NATO commander) has called for streamlining and better coordination. See “Interview,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 June 1996, 48.

89. The Technical Cooperation Program, TCP Document on Interim Policies, Organization, and Procedures in Non-Atomic Military Research and Development, Doc-Sec-1-1996, 4.

91. Jeff Erlich, “Nations Eye Joint Weapons Test,” Defense News, 26 February–3 March 1996, 8.

92. Although it will be a struggle—as change always is—national defense industries are slowly awakening to the reality that if they are to have any industry at all in the face of shrinking national defense budgets, they must cooperate and collaborate—and at times be forced to merge. See, for example, “British, French Firms Clear Guided Weapons Venture,” Wall Street Journal, 19 August 1996, 8; Len Zuga, “Protectionism Defeats Protector,” Defense News, 12–18 August 1996, 25; Peter B. de Selding, “Europeans OK $2.6 Billion Satellite Plan,” Defense News, 9–15 September 1996, 3; Giovanni de Briganti, “Most FTA Members Accept Single Development Contract,” Defense News, 9–15 September 1996, 14; and “Building Eurospace Corp.,” Economist, 7 September 1996, 59.

93. Transatlantic Armament Cooperation: Into the 21st Century (Arlington, Va.: U.S.-Crest, 1996), viii.

94. Giovanni de Briganti, “Partners Say MEADS Will Proceed,” Defense News, 22–28 April 1996, 4.

95. “SHAPE to Stress Need for Surveillance System,” Defense News, 9–15 September 1996, 2.

96. Some people have even argued that commitment to acquiring the identified capabilities will be demonstrated only when NATO members fund specific programs, such as the joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) and a theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD)-type TMD system. See Joseph, “Proliferation,” 128. Recently, SHAPE officials told the military committee of an urgent need to acquire an airborne ground system, giving impetus to efforts to acquire JSTARS for NATO. JSTARS will be commonly owned. “SHAPE to Stress Need for Surveillance System,” 2.

98. Two recent joint/combined exercises are the latest examples. In April/May 1996, the United Kingdom and the United States participated in Exercise Purple Star on the eastern seaboard of the United States, involving 45,000 US and 12,000 British troops—the largest deployment of American and British forces together since Operation Desert Storm. The scenario involved a CJTF being deployed to provide assistance to a country invaded by a neighboring aggressor. There was no WMD play. In August 1996, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, US forces participated with NATO (Canadian, Danish, and Dutch) and PFP (17 Eastern European nations) forces in Exercise Cooperative Osprey. The exercise involved humanitarian peacekeeping scenarios. There was no WMD play.

99. Todd S. Purdum, “Clinton Suggests an Array of Steps to Foil Terrorism,” New York Times, 10 September 1996, 1.

102. France’s active participation has been almost as important, signaling a new and closer relationship with NATO. One French official noted that this is the first time France has taken external analysis into account in its national-defense decision making. Interviewed by author, 3 June 1996.

103. Support from Alliance members was notably absent when the United States vowed to blow up Libya’s suspected CW plant at Tarhunah. See “U.S. Will Annihilate Attackers, Perry Vows,” Washington Times, 19 April 1996, 6. Again, part of the reason for Alliance reluctance to become more involved is the lack of independent intelligence and assessments of the activities of rogue states like Libya. The proposed center could remedy that and ultimately make preemptive actions by a NATO force more palatable politically. See Douglas Wallter, “Target Gaddafi, Again,” Time, 1 April 1996, 46.

104. Recently, the British MOD publicly advocated a change in NATO’s defensive posture and urged the development of a policy on preemptive strikes. The sooner this debate occurs, the easier it will be to deal with the reality of WMD threats in the post-cold-war world. See Charles Miller, “U.K. Military: Take Offense,” Defense News, 28 October–3 November 1996, 3.

105. Success also depends on whether the United States and the allies do something that is beyond the scope of this article: persuade countries of the world to work together in keeping the peace; extending the rule of law; promoting economic growth, human rights, environmental protection, and cultural dignity; and remaining strong in the face of forces that, feeding on the movements of rage and economic stagnation, would use weapons of mass destruction to impede the development of democratic institutions and global economic growth—forces so vital for humanity’s future.

Col Guy B. Roberts, USMC (JD, University of Denver; LLM, Georgetown University; AM, University of Southern California; MA, Naval War College), is the staff judge advocate for the Second Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Previously, he was assigned to the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff, where he served as the Joint Staff representative to arms control discussions on biological warfare; nuclear arms and disarmament issues at the United Nations; the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Colonel Roberts recently coedited a book entitled National Security Law Documents (1995), and his articles on terrorism, laws of war, arms control, and military justice have appeared in numerous military and legal journals.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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