Maj Chris Daehnick's response to the "Base Access Constraints and Crisis Response" article by Adam B. Siegel in the Spring 1996 issue was an attempt to defend the indefensible. Moreover, many of the flawed arguments are his, not Mr Siegel's.

He says that the problem with European overflight authorization for the strike against Libya is a "timeworn example that proves little." On the contrary, it is a great example of problems faced by land-based airpower and it, along with the other examples, is pertinent. It is especially relevant considering that we were dealing with allies and had aircraft and bases in-theater. You can add others, too. For example, during the 1973 Mideast war the US couldn't gain basing rights in Europe, so it had to fly SR-71s round-robin from the East Coast. Recently, the USAF has had a difficult time in obtaining permission to relocate its U-2 operations out of England to the Mediterranean region for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We never were able to get permission to put the U-2s in Italy. In addition, it has taken a significant amount of political will, effort, and time to move the U-2's small Mobile Stretch system into Italy. We still haven't been able to put the larger Deployable Ground Station there.

Major Daehnick also suggests that "to focus only on military-employment issues is to miss the forest for the trees." He goes on to discuss factors which require an enormous expenditure of US time, will, resources, capital, and obligations as if they are easily surmountable. The result is almost always expensive and is seldom responsive. Oftentimes, as Mr Siegel points out, the problems aren't solvable. The Navy doesn't have to deal with these issues nearly as often as does land-based aviation. I would suggest that it is the major who is missing the forest for the trees.

He also compared a 30-knot aircraft carrier with a 400-knot aircraft. Of course the Air Force can fly a bomber from the US and overfly virtually any spot on this earth as a demonstration of national resolve, but airpower is transitory. The two don't equate, however. Long-range, land-based aircraft, simply by virtue of their characteristics, have limited staying power, do not provide adequate presence, and are incapable of providing long-term power projection for crises for other than actual hostilities in which the US might be involved. Under most circumstances, a carrier battle group provides all of these.

The Navy has responded to far more crises than the Air Force simply because it can get to them, steaming at 30 knots, and stay. When a crisis does occur, the deployed Navy moves forward at 30 knots. At the same time, the Air Force is busy trying to decide what to do. Did I hear site survey? And the Navy steams forward at 30 knots. Meanwhile, the Air Force continues to seek basing rights or overflight permission and also, more than likely, approval from the Department of State. And the Navy steams forward at 30 knots. By the time the Air Force has authorization to do what it needs to do, if it ever gets it, the Navy has been on station working the crisis or has already gone home. At guess what? 30 knots.

The author also says that "operational experience indicates that one big-deck carrier can generate strike sorties for three to six days before standing down for one or two." I spent a year on an aircraft carrier during the Vietnam War and can tell you that we stayed up to 55 days on the line conducting operations 12 hours a day and did not stand down more than twice except to transit from day to night operations or vice versa during any of those periods. I need to note, too, that during that seven-month Westpac deployment, which also included visits to Hong Kong and Japan and three to the Philippines, the carrier's aircrews flew more than 50,000 sorties without a single loss of life due to operations. With two aircraft carriers, the Navy can provide round-the-clock operations for days on end, and can operate virtually indefinitely with three.

I know it offends some Air Force people when I say that any military service that starts and ends its war day from a VOQ room does not have a very good clue about presence or power projection. That is tongue in cheek, of course, but I say that because many of my fellow officers do not fully understand nor do they adequately appreciate the Navy's role and look at the Navy air mission and the funds expended on it with a little envy or, worse, feel that these funds could be best spent on Air Force programs. Moreover, many have a tendency to gloss over, minimize, or ignore the problems so clearly illustrated by Mr Siegel until they are faced with the reality of a crisis situation. As Mr Siegel's examples indicate, that is often too late.

The Air Force has to acknowledge that the Navy is always in a moving, emphasis on moving, deployment mode—not forward deployed, ready to deploy, or practicing to deploy. The US Navy is the world's premiere sea power and we need to ensure that the capability provided by the carrier battle group remains robust. Navy and Air Force roles are complementary, not competitive. It doesn't help the Navy's cause, nor ours, to ignore the evidence and fire needless shots across their bow.

Col S. J. Gudmundson, USAF
Edwards AFB, California

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