Published Airpower Journal -
Special Edition 1995
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact have triggered a complete reappraisal of US national security strategy. Particularly fascinating has been the dramatic shift in policy toward postcommunist states. The previously routinized geopolitical rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, centered on the zero-sum game of containing communism, has gradually shifted to the post-cold-war strategy of full-scale engagement aimed at fostering stability and prosperity in the region by encouraging processes of democratic development.
In August 1994, the Clinton administration released the new national security strategy of the United States in a policy document entitled A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. Its authors argue that "our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper."1
The strategy of engagement calls for pursuing security through "enlargement," a policy based on the concept that "democracies don't fight one another."2 This concept-predominant in recent years in the literature of political science-has also been advanced by Anthony Lake, national security advisor, and Morton Halperin, democratization advisor to President Bill Clinton.
Post-cold-war US foreign policy has redirected the instruments of foreign policy toward achieving the goal of enlarging the community of democracies within the international system. While the responsibility for US assistance to emerging democracies of the former Eastern bloc clearly falls within the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the military instrument of foreign policy has also assumed a significant role. US foreignpolicy makers have come to realize that while military institutions in evolving democracies cannot by themselves cause an overall democratic outcome, a dysfunctional, nondemocratically motivated military institution can become a formidable obstacle to the achievement of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states.
The cornerstone of the US military's contribution to the overall US democratization strategy toward the former Eastern bloc has been the "military-to-military" concept. This approach seeks to exploit the common bonds of military professionalism across states in order to influence institutional processes and behavioral patterns within transitioning postcommunist states.
The US military effort has four main elements: (1) the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), (2) alternative militarytomilitary initiatives conducted outside JCTP's area of responsibility (AOR), (3) the expanded International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, and (4) the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.
JCTP achieves its goals through the deployment of teams of US military personnel into host countries. Once military liaison teams (MLT) are deployed, their objective is to facilitate visits to the host country by teams of US military personnel expert in a particular aspect of military reform. MLTs also staff visits by members of the host military to US military units, either in the United States or in the European theater. The militarytomilitary initiatives directed at states outside JCTP's AOR try to achieve the same results but depend more on the attaché staff than on a permanently deployed team. IMET provides funds for nationals of postcommunist states to study in US military education and training programs to expose students to democratic principles prevalent in the US military. Finally, the Marshall Center-which accepted its first class of students in August 1994-educates senior military and civilian personnel who are engaged in the process of democratic reform. By exposing them to a curriculum steeped in the principles of civilian control, defense planning, and other Western national security concepts, the US military hopes that they will be better prepared to transition from communist to democratic military institutions.
All of these programs could benefit from a greater understanding of the situation that they are trying to influence in postcommunist states. In the summer of 1994, I visited eight of the MLTs deployed in the former Eastern bloc, determined to write a report on the strides being made toward democracy due to their efforts. This opportunity enabled me to observe the transition processes currently under way in each state and to identify any common patterns.
I concluded that external efforts to influence the democratization process will be successful to the extent that they reflect an understanding of the obstacles to democratic ideas inherent in the transitioning nation. A firm understanding of the principles that have guided the development of our own democratically accountable military institutions is also essential. In short, US efforts cannot simply depend on an understanding of "where we want to take them." We must also know where the military institutions of the former Eastern bloc have been.
Although the unique historical experience and political culture of each postcommunist state will dictate a unique path from communism, it is possible to generalize how the common experience of Soviet bloc membership has affected the starting point of each state's democratic transition¾especially within the military. With the exception of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, all Eastern bloc political systems were established by the active or tacit support of the Soviet army following World War II.3 The Soviet army subsequently supervised the transformation of the Eastern European armies according to the Soviet model. The goal was not to create independent militaries integrated within an alliance but to establish militaries integrated with the Soviet military, using the structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) to institutionalize these changes.4 Upon dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the militaries of the region had hierarchical structures, officer education programs, conscription systems, and patterns of civilian interaction that closely paralleled the Soviet army's design.
One crucial difference, however, was that the subordination to Moscow often resulted in the perception that the native militaries could not be relied upon to defend their own states. The native communist leadership always had to consider the Soviet army as a threat to its regime, while the native population could not depend on its own military to defend it from either the native communist regime or Moscow. This situation contributed greatly to the negative perception that most Eastern and Central Europeans had of their own military establishments when the Warsaw Pact dissolved.
Many postcommunist states under study are also experiencing the phenomenon of national independence-some for the first time and others for the first time in five decades. In these cases, such as the Baltic states and Belarus, the problem is not retooling a communistera military to serve a postcommunist state but creating military structures from scratch. The recent experience of these countries has not been one of heavyhanded influence by the Soviet military but actually being a part of it. Integrating former Soviet officers into newly independent military structures poses a particularly formidable challenge to these states.
As I traveled across the region, I quickly saw that a litany of problems plagued each transitioning state¾problems that resulted directly from participation in the Soviet bloc. Most of these problems were noted by frustrated Westerners assigned to assist the postcommunist states. These people were confronting systems completely foreign to someone who has internalized the values and processes of democratic societies.
Many of these issues were also highlighted by citizens of the transitioning postcommunist states, not only as a means of contrasting where they have been with where they want to go, but also as a means of pointing to the obstacles that continue to hinder the progress toward Western models of reform. It is important to be cognizant of these trends in order to maximize attempts to overcome them through assistance programs.
Presence of Soviet trained Officers. Soviet models of military professionalism and leadership are most prevalent, of course, in the form of the Soviettrained officers who still comprise the majority of the officer corps in the postcommunist militaries. Some people argue that the last vestiges of the former Soviet Union can be found in the ranks of the postcommunist states' militaries.5 These officers feel threatened by increasing Western influence and are reluctant to change, because admitting the need to change implies that their specific experience is irrelevant or somehow inappropriate to the postcommunist era.6
Indeed, the opportunity to continue a career as a professional military officer, or at least to maintain a comfortable lifestyle within the officer corps, is threatened when transition issues are seriously considered. Devising force structures compatible with postcommunist budget realities and threats means that significant downsizing will result and that many officers will be forced out of the only career they have ever known.7
This issue is made more difficult by the differences in the retirement systems of the Western and Eastern models. Unlike the US officer corps, Eastern officers never worried about planning for life in the civilian sector upon retirement. Officers typically retired in their late fifties and lived until their early sixties, making the planning of a second career a moot point. Additionally, officers of the East were trained in military educational systems that were not accredited by the civilian sector, a fact that makes their education and training much less marketable. Compound these factors with a marked reprehension for Soviettrained officers within many of the postcommunist societies, and it's not difficult to understand the prevailing motivation to resist change.8
Of course, not all Soviet-trained officers are resistant to reform, and-to the extent that changes are happening-such changes are being driven by officers trained in the Soviet model. However, the dependence of these fledgling democracies on Soviettrained officers to fulfill their national security needs is frustrating to reformers in other government structures; indeed, they are pressing for even greater change.
Meanwhile, as Soviet-trained officers predominate at the top levels, big gaps exist in the lieutenant and captain ranks. These junior officers are either leaving the service for better opportunities in expanding civilian economies or staying within the Russian military, where the pay is higher. In fact, in Belarus it is possible to complete the military academy and choose to be commissioned in the Russian army.9 Some of these young officers are also leaving due to their frustration with the lack of progress in reforms in a process that is still very much "top down."10
Western personnel in positions to assist and advise transitioning militaries of the postcommunist states should be aware of the continued presence of Soviettrained officers and of their motivation to resist change. People in a position to influence the transition processes of these militaries should also understand the standards of professionalism and leadership that were inherited from the Soviet model. Western military personnel who are incountry to assist the transitioning militaries of the East have noted fundamentally different concepts of officership and attitudes toward a military career. The American defense attaché in the Czech Republic observed that officers of the East and West are motivated by quite different factors. In the West, there is a tradition of becoming a career officer for love of country even though, historically, this has meant accepting a lower standard of living than what might be possible in the civilian sector. In contrast, the Soviet model attracted people in search of stability and better living conditions than might be expected in the civilian sector.11
Observations of military officers from the postcommunist states are telling as well. A former Soviet officer and aide to the Lithuanian general staff was impressed with the way that Americans talk about their military careers. "They sound like they're proud of their job." He went on to say that he thinks that it's very good to love a job. He was particularly impressed with the fact that American officers would work hard for their boss, even if they didn't like him. He also noticed that "Americans love their country and working for their country and are proud to display the flag." In Lithuania, however, he thinks that officers work only for money.12
Treatment of Enlisted Personnel. One of the most glaring differences noted by military personnel from both the West and the East is the idea that the "duty of an officer is to take care of his troops."13 While American officers are taught to lead by example and to put the needs of their troops ahead of their own, the Soviet model institutionalized a widespread system of hazing and general mistreatment of conscripts.
American and native military personnel have admitted that mistreatment of conscripts persists. The MLT chief in Lithuania reported that it was not uncommon to see blackandblue soldiers working in the ministry of defense (MOD) building, where MLT had its offices.14 If evidence of beatings is obvious within the halls of a military headquarters monitored by the American advisory staff, then it seems logical that similar-and probably even more brutal-punishments are being meted out in the military outposts of the country.
It is impossible to overemphasize the differences between the Western and Eastern models with respect to standards of treatment of soldiers. In almost every case, when I asked a military member of the postcommunist states which aspect of the Western model had made the greatest impression on him, his answer dealt with the emphasis on the individual soldier.
Even high-ranking commanders were shocked at the relatively comfortable living conditions that are common for even the lowestranking troops in the West. A junior member of the Lithuanian general staff, who accompanied some senior members of the staff on a tour of US military facilities in Germany, related that these officers were impressed by the presence of hot showers in the barracks and deemed this a good idea to bring back home.15
Although living conditions of conscripts may be upgraded as economic resources become more available, trying to change the patterns of motivating conscripts to perform will be much more problematic. Officers of transitioning militaries yearn for the type of professionalism among enlisted soldiers that they have witnessed in the West, but they are skeptical about giving up their system of motivating through fear.
A Soviet-trained Lithuanian staff officer marveled at the intellectual ability of US Green Berets he saw working together as a team, but he struggled with trying to determine how to attain such an outcome within his own system. "A soldier must still accomplish his orders without thinking," he remarked, as if stumped by the prospect of motivating a soldier to think for himself or to carry out orders because he wanted to.16
Beating soldiers has become so associated with an overall system of maintaining good order and discipline that fundamental reform of the concept of relating to troops will be necessary to change this practice. Additionally, other deficiencies in leadership training have so reinforced this problem that only great changes across the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) training systems will produce an alternative system of leadership. Postcommunist officers need to understand how they can attain respect from soldiers under their command while simultaneously maintaining control of these troops.
Absence of Effective NCOs. This issue is very much related to both an NCO corps without any significant responsibility or expertise and to an officer corps with very limited leadership skills in motivating troops. One Western observer remarked that Soviettrained officers and NCOs have very limited "experience with and exposure to interpersonal relations, management techniques, or leadership as we know it where leaders must motivate their people to do things."17 Until postcommunist states establish NCO corps that invest real responsibility in their leaders and teach them how to motivate troops, the vacuum of leadership in the enlisted ranks will continue, and habitual patterns of punishment will persist.18
Additionally, the widespread perception that conscripts are routinely abused in the militaries of the former Eastern bloc is probably the single most significant issue negatively affecting the relationship between these militaries and their societies at large. The postcommunist militaries are fighting an uphill publicrelations battle against populations, many of which have come to genuinely hate the military.19
This poor reputation stems from perceived unfairness in mandatory conscription systems that abound with loopholes and exempt the privileged. Additionally, the widespread perception that postcommunist militaries do not provide any valuable education or training leads to the belief that military service is a waste of time. Finally, deplorable living conditions and routinized systems of corporal punishment that sometimes result in the death of young conscripts do little to enhance the public image of these military institutions.
Legacy of Soviet Thought Processes. One factor that looms above all others relates to the very processes that direct the thinking of people who have lived in the Soviet bloc. Even ardent reformers who point their fingers at "Red colonels" and "Communists" admit their own handicap of having been raised within the Soviet system. "All Lithuanians are somehow Soviet," lamented a member of the national security committee of Lithuania's parliament as he tried to explain the difficulty of rooting out the truly Soviet mindsets from the Lithuanian military.20
Taking Responsibility. Officers from postcommunist states also observed the tremendous differences in responsibility and initiative between the US model and their own system. An officer on the headquarters staff of the Iron Wolf Brigade in Lithuania noted that on an exchange visit with Green Berets, he learned that "every person was taught to think and to take responsibility for what they do." He added, "They had an individual approach to each person." He was very much impressed by this experience and was determined to try to apply these principles to the development of his own forces.21
Legacy of Soviet Professional Ethics. A retired US Army lieutenant colonel and EstonianAmerican employed by the Estonian government as the prorektor of the defense academy commented on the absence of professional ethics within the Estonian military and within the society in general. "In reality, there's a thin veneer of Western civilization here¾everything else is the Soviet system." In one instance, he ran into great resistance when he tried to get the officers on the academy staff to pay for the coffee that the government bought for the guests of the academy. He ran into even greater resistance when he proposed that an honor code be established at the academy along the lines of the codes at US service academies.22
The MLT chief in Budapest, a HungarianAmerican, agreed that it is difficult for postcommunist militaries to transcend the culture of corruption. "In the Warsaw Pact, officers learned that corruption was the standard." He went on to add that whom an officer knew was¾and still is¾more important than an officer's performance or character.23
Individual Power. One of the greatest impediments to reform is another holdover of Soviet political culture-individual power versus the good of the organization. A Latvian-American serving as an assistant to the minister of defense and advisor to the president of Latvia argued that the pursuit of power to the neglect of longrange planning in every situation is still the dominant mode of operating among policymakers in postcommunist Latvia. "Even simple courtesies such as introducing people are not done because not to do so reflects some type of power or control over the situation."24
Related to this issue is the prevailing notion that "information is power." When the president of Latvia asked a highranking defense ministry advisor for a breakdown of the specific functions of various actors involved in Latvian defense policy, he discovered that no such organizational chart existed within the ministry. The advisor insisted that the absence of such a document was intentional and that the policymakers in the MOD were deliberately unclear on the issue. As a result, he was never able to complete his tasking for the president.25
This aversion to information sharing also significantly affects the ability of transitioning militaries to improve their relationship with civil authorities and the public. The public affairs officer in the Lithuanian MOD remarked that public affairs officers in other ministries do not have access to information that should be disseminated to the public or civilian authorities. "In this building, some are for spreading information, and some are against it." Fortunately, her boss, the minister of defense, feels that "it is good to spread as much information as possible."26
Western observers note that although the transparency of militaries in the region is improving, they still have a long way to go. The situation ranges from poor in some cases to improvement in others. The worst case is Belarus, the state most closely identified with the Soviet-and now Russian-military. According to the French attaché to Belarus, "It's a military secret when soldiers are killed until the body is delivered. The policies of the Afghanistan war era still apply." He went on to say that Belarus's director of foreign affairs still doesn't allow Belarussian officers to have contact with foreigners except under strict provisions of the MOD.27
In improving situations, the MOD will be responsive in cases in which the press or public has unilaterally discovered an incident. In these states, however, transitioning militaries are still reluctant to initiate bad news. One example in the Czech Republic involved a firingrange accident in which a shell exploded in a nearby village. The chiefs of the general staff and the MOD went out to inspect the accident site and to answer press questions. However, the transparency of the Czech military is still incomplete because it routinely makes distinctions between events that can be denied and those that cannot.28
The reluctance to share information has also affected US militaryassistance efforts. When a traveling contact team (TCT) briefs one unit on a certain topic, the team assumes that other neighboring units will receive the information. Although it is certainly not practical for TCTs to brief every battalion in the country, it is not unusual for information briefed to remain within that unit.29
The continuing struggle to overcome a Soviet bureaucratic culture characterized by competing fiefdoms and an informationispower mentality will complicate the transition processes, both within the postcommunis militaries and within their societies in general. These vestiges of the Soviet system come into conflict with democratic systems, which put a high value on vesting control in a broader group at the top of the structure of which the military is just one part.
The slow rate of progress in developing a culture of information sharing also has negative repercussions for the prospects of postcommunist militaries becoming democratically accountable through civilian oversight. The lesson that is slowly being learned is that democracy is a competitive process whereby all agencies of the government¾including the military¾have to explain themselves to civilian authorities and the public in order to compete effectively for limited resources. Military leaders must become comfortable telling the appropriate authorities what they are doing and why. As long as the maturation of a culture of information sharing is delayed, postcommunist militaries will fall short of being democratically accountable institutions within the transitioning governments.30
Another series of issues hindering reform processes in the militaries of postcommunist states is related to the systemic structures and processes of the Soviet era that still endure across the region. Chief among these is the hierarchical nature of bureaucratic structures embodied in centralized planning procedures.
Limited Budget and Acquisition Skills. The centralized planning procedures that characterized the Soviet era meant that military commanders were not involved in budgeting and acquisition processes. Consequently, in the postcommunist era, when such skills are demanded of commanders, there is little ability to make budget tradeoffs or to maintain fiscal responsibility.31 Additionally, inexperience with longterm defense planning makes the newly independent states vulnerable to spending limited defense resources without first developing a national security concept against which scarce resources can be applied.
This limited ability to make budgetary tradeoffs also affects the capacity of these commanders to understand that tradeoffs are inherent in Western assistance efforts as well. There is a perception that aid is unlimited and, therefore, that every proposed opportunity is desirable. In reality, aid is limited in each case, and certain opportunities cost more than others. Military leaders in the postcommunist states are not yet comfortable with the idea of questioning the costs of various programs. Although the programs are "free" to them, selection of one opportunity may preclude the prospect of others.32
Maintaining Past Infrastructures. Another obstacle to reform is the tendency to overlay military structures familiar to the postcommunist military leadership, usually the Soviet model, as a starting point for both newly independent satellite militaries and militaries that are building structures for the first time.33 While the maintenance of past infrastructures is the prevailing trend, at least one instance of the inappropriate, wholesale adoption of Western staff structures has occurred. Specifically, Albanian military staff working with the American MLT acquired a copy of the organizational chart of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. They used this model to draw up the new Albanian military structure-complete with an office known as the Exercise Coordination Section. The Albanians then asked their MLT advisors what function that office should perform. The American advisor called SHAPE and learned that the office coordinated peacekeeping exercises between Turkey and Greece.34
Although it is understandable that postcommunist military leaderships would adopt structures that are familiar to them, this trend reinforces the general observation of a lack of planning skills to develop structures tailored to the distinct needs of the much smaller and leaner transitioning militaries. Additionally, with starting points of inherited military structures, the relabeled "new" structure will not include all the positions necessary in militaries in democratic societies but will include positions superfluous to militaries in a democracy. Even more serious in the national security sense, such schemes will include organizational structures inappropriate to militaries with completely new roles and missions.
The greatest theoretical obstacle to the application of democratic principles to transitioning postcommunist militaries is the tendency to misinterpret the concept of democracy. This misunderstanding may be attributed to the Soviet propaganda campaigns of the cold war era, as well as to the general vacuum of accurate information on the principles of democracy available in the postcommunist era. This lack of understanding is particularly damaging within military institutions that are trying to balance the principles of freedom and discipline.
One widely accepted interpretation of democracy in the former Eastern bloc is that people can do whatever they want. The USAID representative in Romania related that this logic extends to such things as the routine violation of traffic laws and other symbols of an ordered society. He said that it's not uncommon for a citizen who tries to correct another citizen for such infractions to be called Securitate! 35
The difficulties encountered when one attempts to balance rights and responsibilities in a military environment are illustrated in an interview with a career Soviet officer now serving in the Lithuanian army. "We have now just the beginning of a democratic society: It's hard to get used to the fact that people can leave when they want. . . . It's not uncommon for a soldier to spend half the day in one unit and the other half in another unit. Now things are improving because they are beginning to understand that they have a responsibility to their unit."36
Another officer lamented that "sometimes there is too much democracy in the military. Everybody doesn't understand that they still have to do what they're told." He went on to add that the attitude that "democracy means that I am free to do what I want" makes it hard for the general staff to implement reforms. If commanders in units don't agree with the changes, they'll ignore them because "that's their understanding of democracy."37
While some officers have an understanding of democracy that assumes that military discipline somehow goes by the wayside in democracies, other officers insist that the principles of democracy and military discipline are completely incompatible. The problem with the latter attitude is that such officers are resistant to reforms addressing the standards of treatment of conscripts, discussed above. Or they may have an understanding of how democracy should work in the society at large but do not think that such principles can be applied to the military.
In every post-communist country I visited, the military leadership recognizes the need to improve its image with the public and parliament. In some cases, the opposition is so antimilitary that it argues that pressing budget limitations and the lack of serious threats to national security make continued support of the military an unaffordable luxury, given the rest of the challenges that confront postcommunist states.
Military leaders think that they can earn respect and improve their image by achieving a level of effectiveness on par with Western militaries.38 However, as discussed earlier, without fundamental reform-including improved conditions for conscripts and the introduction of alternative models of professionalism and leadership-it is unlikely that the relationships between postcommunist societies and militaries will be substantially improved.
The overall poor state of postcommunist economies also limits the progress of transitioning militaries. Although the economic conditions vary across the former Eastern bloc from markedly improved in the Visegrad countries to extremely strapped in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, the fight for resources will continue to be fierce. All aspects of reform-even organizational-drain scarce coffers. Both reformers in postcommunist militaries and Western advisors must realize that military budgets will continue to decline-at least in the short term.
This situation necessitates a keen emphasis on prioritization of reform objectives and the development of longterm strategies of national defense and the utilization of resources to best achieve reform. Previously, these militaries were part of the overall Soviet defense puzzle. Now, they must consider their own defense needs and develop appropriate doctrine to guide the shifting of strategic assets to best fit these new strategies. Western assistance efforts can help-and, indeed, already have helped-these states develop processes required to achieve this goal.
Policymakers-both within the former Eastern bloc and in positions external to it-must realize, too, that the militaries' transitions are occurring within the general context of wholesale transitions in every aspect of society and government. The reality is that a vast interconnected web of transition is taking place across all institutions of postcommunist society. People who seek to assist postcommunist militaries must be cognizant of how reforms within other transitioning institutions affect reform within the military.
Even within the military institution, one must address many interrelated processes of transition simultaneously in order to achieve overall progress. If "democratizers" in the West and reformers in the East hope to realize their goal of establishing democratically accountable militaries in postcommunist states, then they must try to address the issues outlined in this article. These include the existence of psychological blind spots, the lingering impact of systemic vestiges of the Soviet era, the need to reform approaches to professionalism and leadership, and the requirement to provide education in democratic principles to civilian and military leaders as well as soldiers.
Clearly, people engaged in facilitating democratic outcomes in postcommunist states are not confronting a "clean slate." Yet, the US effort falls short on its recognition of specific, preexisting obstacles to democratization and the incorporation of specific program elements to combat them. The US assistance effort must be aware of the obstacles to reform that have resulted from Soviet bloc membership and must overcome them. Further, we should better understand the model of a democratic military that we are attempting to foster in the region.
To be fair, the efforts of incountry teams-given their resources, guidance from Europe and Washington, and specific "rules of engagement"-have been commendable. They have admirably performed the rolemodeling function and have made strides toward facilitating change in obstacles established by the Soviet model. Particularly noteworthy is their work in public affairs and the law, which is designed to assist host nations in progressing toward the democratization of their militaries.
However, the program could benefit from redirecting its measures of success away from tracking the frequency of events toward tracking how well it has addressed obstacles to reform or how much closer the transitioning military is to democracy. The problem is that progress in these areas is sporadic because the underlying principles and theory that should drive the program are not universally understood.
The success of the US military's effort to facilitate the democratic consolidation of militaries in postcommunist states depends on many factors. Highly trained professional military personnel who are fluent in foreign languages enhance the process, as does coordination among all members of the US team incountry, including the embassy staff and the defense attaché. Additionally, the attitude and support of host militaries are key factors. How motivated are they to reorient their defense structures and processes toward Western models? How severe are the limitations induced by obstacles to reform? What holdovers from the Soviet era must the military overcome or what advantages do they have? The overall condition of the web of political, economic, social, and military transitions within each postcommunist state also affects the degree of influence that external actors can have on internal processes.
Issues of incomplete coordination and internal turf battles continue to plague the overall effort of influencing postcommunist states. Parts of the US defense bureaucracy that have traditionally played a role in politicalmilitary relations are reluctant to share their role or delegate substantial powers to a new program within the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, defense attachés do not universally support the program, and the attitude of some of them actually undermines the effectiveness of the program, sending the signal to host militaries that US defense structures are not complementary or united in purpose.
Additionally, self-imposed limitations-such as providing only information that falls short of actual training-also curtail the effectiveness of the program. Host militaries universally express concern that their continued need for information briefings is shortterm or has already expired, while their need for real training will persist indefinitely.
Bureaucratic shortcomings-such as frequent rotations of MLT members and the assignment of personnel untrained in the transition in progress-could be easily overcome. If the goal of positively influencing military institutions of postcommunist states is a matter of such national import and a major thrust of postcoldwar defense policy, then the US military should embrace this role and ensure that the most competent officers and NCOs are selected and appropriately trained to serve within the program.
Finally, the participation of Russia, Ukraine, and other postcommunist states still does not fall within the geographical area of responsibility of US European Command (USEUCOM); thus, matters are handled separately in an ad hoc, less systematic process of militarytomilitary contacts. This division within the military bureaucracy is indicative of defense policymakers' inability to reach a consensus on how best to coordinate US defense resources and personnel within a single program.
As with any process influenced by both external and internal forces, outside actors can only maximize factors that they themselves control. It is imperative, then, that US policymakers strive to develop and implement the best overall plan possible for outside influence. I contend that this effort entails a comprehensive understanding of both the Eastern model that they are attempting to influence and their own Western model.
By using obstacles to reform as a guide to issues that must be overcome and by using the American military as a model, one can enhance the effectiveness of the democratization effort. Policymakers must also work out some of the organizational and bureaucratic issues-such as overlap between the role of defense attachés and MLTs and of reserve and guard forces-that limit the effectiveness of the overall effort.
Makers of foreign and defense policy agree that the role of the military instrument in the democratization efforts of the United States has become institutionalized in recent years. The politicalmilitary role of the US armed forces is destined to continue. Meanwhile, the processes of democratic consolidation in postcommunist states and other theaters of the world are far from complete and continue to pose a destabilizing threat to consolidated democracies of the West. We must continue to study the processes of external influence so that the "Western insert" to the complex web of transition of postcommunist states strengthens the overall democratization processes that are under way.
Notes
1.A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1994), 2.
2.Gen James P. McCarthy, USAF, Retired, Colorado Springs, Colo., interview with author, 22 April 1994.
3.Zoltan D. Barany, "CivilMilitary Relations in Communist Systems: Western Models Revisited," Journal of Political and Military Sociology 19 (Summer 1991): 88.
4.Ibid., 89.
5.Lt Col Steven Chambers, USMC, MLT member, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 19 June 1994.
6.Mr Scott Dean, political officer, US Embassy, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.
7.Col Louis Boros, USMC, MLT chief, Budapest, Hungary, interview with author, 11 July 1994.
8.Col Paul B. East, USA, MLT chief, Prague, Czech Republic, interview with author, 14 July 1994.
9.Lieutenant Colonel Klochko, international liaison officer, Belarussian general staff, Minsk, Belarus, interview with author, 27 June 1994.
10. Col George H. Dunkelberg, defense and air attaché, Prague, Czech Republic, interview with author, 15 July 1994.
11. Ibid.
12.Senior Lt Arturas Indicianskis, liaison officer to MLT from the Lithuanian general staff, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 18 June 1994.
13.Mr Tonu Toomepuu, prorektor of the Estonian Defense Academy, Tallinn, Estonia, interview with author, 14 June 1994.
14.Col Robert Barziloski, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, MLT chief, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
15.Indicianskis.
16.Maj Aleksandr Temnolonskij, deputy commander for rapid deployment force, Headquarters Iron Wolf Brigade, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
17.Col Wayne C. Koppa, Michigan Army National Guard, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.
18.Dunkelberg.
19.Boros.
20.Dr Kestutis Gaska, member of national security committee of the Seimas, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 20 June 1994.
21.Temnolonskij.
22.Toomepuu.
23.Boros.
24.Mr Gundars Zalkains, MOD liaison to the Latvian MLT, Riga, Latvia, interview with author, 15 June 1994.
25.Ibid.
26.Lt Lolita Zegeriene, public affairs chief, MOD, Vilnius, Lithuania, interview with author, 22 June 1994.
27.Lt Col Jean Bourhis, French attaché, Minsk, Belarus, interview with author, 27 June 1994.
28.Dunkelberg.
29.Indicianskis.
30.Dean.
31.Mr Kert Volcker, political officer, US Embassy, Budapest, Hungary, interview with author, 12 July 1994.
32.For instance, the Latvians agreed to participate in a very expensive IMET course in Germany on war surgery that will cost the US government $41,000. Col Wayne C. Koppa, the MLT chief, tried to convey to them that this may not be the optimal use of aid resources unless war surgery is a top priority of the Latvian military. He suggested that they might prefer an opportunity to put a Latvian officer in an officers' training course or war college. Koppa.
33.Senior Lieutenant Indicianskis related that the headquarters structure of the new Lithuanian military parallels very closely that of the Soviet military, even to the point that there is a chief of culture and sports¾usually a major or lieutenant colonel¾in every brigade, as in the Soviet military. Indicianskis.
34.Tom Cossaboom, Air Force historian, Colorado Springs, Colo., interview with author, 22 September 1994.
35.Mr Richard J. Hough, USAID representative, Bucharest, Romania, interview with author, 30 June 1994.
36.Colonel Vizbaras, commandant, NCO school, Kaunus, Lithuania, interview with author, 21 June 1994.
37.Indicianskis.
38.Volcker.
Capt Mary Beth Peterson Ulrich (USAFA; MA, University of Illinois) is an AFIT PhD candidate at the Uiversity of Illinois. Captain Ulrich has served as an instructor in the department of political science at the United States Air Force Academy and as an KC-135 instructor navigator/evaluator at Beale AFB, California. She has published previously in Swords and Ploughshares: The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security; and Encyclopedia of Policy Studies.
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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