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Special Edition 1995
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent Russia emerged with about one-half of the population, three-quarters of the territory, and the lion's share of the armed forces and nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Russia became the Soviet Union's legal successor, assuming all rights and obligations resulting from the treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union, inheriting its place as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and taking on the responsibility for the foreign debts of the Soviet Union. Russia's political elite thought that such an inheritance would also include the Soviet Union's superpower status but that was not the case.
The new Russia found itself in an international situation drastically different from that of the Soviet Union or the prerevolutionary Russian Empire. In the place of the empire-be it Communist or old Russian-emerged 15 new independent states with Russia the biggest but still smaller than the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire at the time of Peter the Great's death in 1725. With the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, Russia lost its allies in Central and Eastern Europe that provided forward staging areas for the Soviet military might. Transition from the stateowned and centrally planned economy to a privately owned market economy inevitably resulted in a serious decline in production, severe inflation, and a sharp decline in the living standards of the big social groups. The transition from a totalitarian empire to democracy has just started, and the political situation is far from stable. Because of all that, Russia's position in the world is seriously weakened. At the same time, Russia with its geostrategic location, its armed forces and nuclear weaponry, its science and technology, its natural resources, and its highly educated labor force is potentially a firstrate global power. And this contradiction between current weakness and potential greatness determines Russia's position in the postcoldwar world.
From the very beginning, Russia's democratic leadership rejected the expansionist foreign policy of the Soviet totalitarian empire and embarked on a search for a new foreign policy. Leaders thought that transition to democracy would make Russia the partner of the United State's in world affairs. Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote in Foreign Affairs that
Partnership is the best strategic choice for Russia and the United State's. Rejection of it would mean the loss of a historic opportunity to facilitate the formation of a democratic, open Russian state and the transformation of an unstable, postconfrontational world into a stable and democratic one.1
Russian leaders began to act in concert with the United State's in various international situations, trying to go along with US foreign policy. However, they soon realized that Moscow's interests and positions were not always compatible with those of Washington. The Russian political elite was offended by a number of American foreign policy actions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) plans to admit former Warsaw Pact members into the alliance, strongly resisted by Moscow, were seen as a blatant attempt to isolate Russia and endanger its national security. Members of the Russian political elite greatly resented what they considered to be American interference in the relations between Russia and the newly independent states that were former members of the Soviet Union and American attempts to deny Russia its leading role in the post-Soviet space. The United States's apparent refusal to take into consideration Russia's position in the Balkan conflict was seen as an attempt to deny Russia its proper role in European affairs. Russian national pride was hurt by a number of petty humiliations. For example, the Russian president was not invited to the festivities commemorating the Allies' D day landing in Normandy, as if the Soviet Union did not play a major role in the war against Hitler's Germany.
All of these actions were a great disappointment for Russian leaders. They gradually began to perceive that Washington was not interested in having Russia as an equal partner, did not want to share with Russia leadership in world affairs, and wanted the United State's to be the sole global superpower.
Russian politicians and foreign policy experts began to advocate that Russian foreign policy turn from its orientation towards the West to orientation towards Russia's national interests as guiding principles of the country's foreign policy. The general guiding principles of national interests included the following:
To those principles, Russian experts add some specific national interests of today's Russia:
Russian foreign policy then began a transition towards orientation on Russia's national interests. In the spring and fall of 1993, documents were published that formulated basic guidelines of this new foreign policy. In these documents and in a number of speeches, Russian officials stressed that orientation on national interests does not mean the return to ideologically oriented expansionist foreign policy. For example, Gen Pavel Grachev, the defense minister, wrote in summer 1994 an article entitled "Military Doctrine and National Security of Russia":
For the first time, we declared that we will defend not ideology but vital national interests of the country. Russia's national interests do not affect, even in the slightest, the security of other countries and are and will be ensured within the framework of equal and mutually beneficial relations between the states.2
Changes in Russian foreign policy were met with growing suspicions in the West. In many publications, Russia was and is accused of aggressive actions and attempts to dominate former parts of the Soviet Union and to restore the empire. Aggressive statements of ultranationalist politicians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky reinforced these suspicions. Ultranationalists were not the only ones who contributed to that. The emerging orientation of Russian foreign policy on national interests was accompanied by nationalistic rhetoric from highly placed government officials, though it was obviously designed for domestic consumption. This rhetoric-not founded on political, economic, or military realities-only served to strengthen the suspicions of Russia's coming "imperial revenge," first of all on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Actions aimed at promoting political, economic, and military cooperation with former republics of the Soviet Union were interpreted in the West as a course of action to restore the Russian Empire, which would ultimately lead to a new cold war.
There are political forces on the Russian political scene that would welcome a renewal of the cold war. In Russia one can find politicians who would like to provoke a crisis in relations with the outside world and to put Russia once again into a hostile encirclement, without which they could not even dream of achieving power. But they represent a very tiny fraction of public opinion in Russia and by no means determine Russian foreign policy thinking.
Nationalistic rhetoric was greatly intensified before the December 1993 elections. The election results brought about an impression that ultranationalists' aggressive stand in foreign policy was supported by large segments of voters. But the surveys conducted after the elections showed that this was not true. It certainly was not a position of the Russian leadership. Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in his article, published in Foreign Affairs, that "a firm and sometimes aggressive policy of defending one's national interests is not incompatible with partnership [with the West]."3 Kozyrev stressed in this article that "Russian foreign policy inevitably has to be of an independent and assertive nature. If Russian democrats fail to achieve it, they will be swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism, which is now exploiting the need for national and state selfassertion."4 In a speech to leaders of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service in April 1994, President Boris Yeltsin, analyzing Russia's relations with the West, stressed that Russia must henceforth distinguish between partnership with the West and attempts by the West to dominate Russia and to impose upon Moscow "actions that run counter to Russia's interests." In this speech, President Yeltsin emphasized Moscow's intention to pursue a more assertive foreign policy.5
In December 1994, President Yeltsin denounced as "anti-Russian" NATO plans to admit countries of Eastern Europe and warned of the dangers of a single superpower world. In a criticism of what Russia considered the United State's intention to emerge as the only superpower, President Yeltsin said, "History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that destinies of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital."6 A few days earlier in Brussels, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, protesting NATO plans to admit countries of Eastern Europe, refused to sign the "Partnership for Peace" program of cooperation between Russia and NATO.
Apprizing these Russian actions, the New York Times in an article entitled "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," wrote,
To explain such unruly conduct, consider the possibility that the end of Communism hasn't transformed the West and the Russians into friends. And that, for all their good intentions, they have different ways of seeing the world, different fears to calm, different domestic needs to meet.... Sobered by the new assertiveness in Russia's foreign policy, mindful of Moscow's history of expansionism, the Western powers have begun to realize that Moscow cannot be counted on as a reliable strategic partner.7
Russian public opinion was bitterly disappointed with the setback in relations with the West. The Moscow newspaper Segodnia (Today) wrote in the beginning of December 1994:
One period of the postcommunist Russia's transformation has finished and a new period started. First period was characterized by the course on rapid westernization, "inclusion in Europe," absolute proWestern orientation of foreign and domestic policies with great hope for decisive Western economic aid and Western solidarity with the country which rejected communism.... This period ended with defeat and disillusionment. It was defeat of the West which lost the possibility of "easy" integration of Russia into the "Western world" and put political forces in Russia which were oriented on Western perspective in a position of political outsiders.... A new period of transformation which started now is and will be national period. Russia will be getting out of the most difficult and most inevitable crisis itself, without any outside help.... From now on we should not look all the time at the West being afraid to get grade "F" for "democracy" or for "foreign policy behavior."
The article's conclusion was that the period of "learning how to live" has ended. "We need partners, we do not need mentors."
Post-Communist Russia's place in the post-cold-war world and appropriate strategy to ensure that place became a major concern of the Russian political leaders. In spite of Russia's current economic weakness and political instability, they still claim for Russia a superpower status. Russian officials and the political elite resent the fact that Russia is and will be treated as a regional power, a great regional power with its region spread across the two continents, but nevertheless a regional power.
Russia's place in the world and her possible global strategy were thoroughly analyzed recently by research institutes, influential independent groups like the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and independent experts. For example, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy published in August 1992 a report entitled "Strategy for Russia." The authors stated that the publication of the report was brought about by their concern that the Country's leadership does not have a coherent understanding of Russia's interests and aims in the field of foreign policy. They thought that a proWestern orientation would not only damage Russia's interests in other directions of Russian foreign policy but would also bring about a very strong negative reaction of the country's public opinion.8 In the summer of 1994, the council published a new document, "Strategy for Russia2," which contained detailed and thorough analyses of Russia's place in the world, its national interests, its foreign policy aims, and possible global strategy to achieve these aims.9 Conclusions and recommendations of the council and other experts are worth paying attention to-first of all because they are trying to define objectively Russia's new position in the world, and to suggest a general strategy to defend and promote national interests and appropriate policies towards different countries and issues. And ultimately, their analyses influence government policy.
Apprizing the new international situation, Russian experts concluded first of all that Russia will be acting within a multipolar, not a bipolar, model of international relations. They argued that it would be impossible to develop a realistic foreign policy strategy without developing the general theory of modern international relations-international relations in a postcoldwar, multipolar world. Without such a theory, practical actions in foreign policy will be dictated by pragmatic interests of the moment. From that general conclusion, Russian experts set out to evaluate the country's position in the world arena.
Confrontation with the West, and first of all with the United State's, has ended. Now and in the foreseeable future, Russia has no enemies, which is a tremendous advantage in Russia's geostrategic position. "The cornerstone of our military doctrine," wrote General Grachev, "became a statement that Russia does not consider any state to be its enemy."10 At the same time, it is obvious that hopes to acquire new allies, first of all in the West, did not come true. No new effective security system has been created to replace the old system of two military blocs. And Russia needs a new security system in which it would consider itself at least to have relative security. But instead of the declared "new world order" has emerged a "new world disorder" in which Russia is most of all concerned with the conflicts in the territory of the former Soviet Union, around Russian borders.
After a comprehensive analysis of the postcoldwar international situation and national interests of major countries, experts of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy came to the conclusion that the contradictions between the vital national interests of Russia and the principal countries of the West are small. In the majority of cases, their interests are compatible and not contradictory. Contradictions emerge mostly in connection with the realization of national interests of secondary importance. The conclusion from this was that there are no real and insurmountable reasons for the worsening of relations between Russia and major Western countries.
Russian analysts admit that Russian foreign policy interests in many cases are not taken into consideration, nor are they respected by Western governments. The major cause of this is Russia's relative economic weakness. If Russia does not put an end to economic depression and start economic recovery, it most likely will be doomed to the further weakening of its position in international relations, to possible isolation in the world arena, and even to direct threats to its territorial integrity. These Russian analysts conclude that the major objective of the Russian global strategy should be an "accumulation of forces," using the phrase coined by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister, after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War of the last century. Without an accumulation of forces and without first drastically improving its economy, Russia would not be able to ensure the wellbeing and freedom of its citizens and its international position as a respected member of the community of civilized nations. Experts admit that as of now neither political parties nor the Russian government nor President Yeltsin are able to develop and put forward a coherent program of the longterm global strategy.
Politicians and foreign policy experts actively discuss principal aims and policies towards different groups of countries: former members of the Soviet Union, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, West European countries, the United State's, and leading countries of Asia and other geographical regions. Their general conclusion is that Russia in its present, relatively weakened state should pursue a flexible policy of balancing between major power centers, policies of building favorable balances of power with different states and in different regions. They advocate the policies of cooperation and presence in those regions where there exists interest in such cooperation and where cooperation may bring about economic dividends and increase Russia's political influence. In their opinion, the objects of such cooperation may be India, countries of Southeastern Europe, and the Near East. Some experts suggest that Russia should pursue the policy of "balancing at equal distance" from the old and new power centers. This position may be compared with the role that England played in European politics for centuries when England, according to its interests, joined one or the other coalitions of continental powers as an additional force in that coalition.
Relations between Russia and the newly independent states that were former members of the Soviet Union are the most important focus of Russian foreign policy. For Russia, these states constitute the "Near Abroad." Economic and security interests of Russia as well as of these countries call for the closest possible political cooperation. Dissolution of the Soviet Union abruptly severed economic ties between industries, plants, suppliers and producers, and producers and consumers.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was historically inevitable. But it brought about a very serious decline in living standards and quality of life for the majority of people in the former Soviet Union, and it led to numerous conflicts and confrontations, some of them violent and bloody. Economic conditions worsened everywhere. In spite of the fact that Russian economic conditions also worsened, its economy is in better shape than the economies of the countries of the "Near Abroad."
When the initial euphoria of independence wore off, the leadership of these countries began to understand the pressing necessity of much closer relations with other former members of the Soviet Union, first of all with Russia. Experts of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy came to the preliminary conclusion that many, if not the majority, of these newly independent states could not survive as absolutely independent without close cooperation with Russia and other newly independent states.
Foreign policy experts stress that the most important task now is to define Russian strategic aims towards the former members of the Soviet Union. They argue that without clearly defined strategic aims, policies towards these countries could be ineffective. Effective and longterm solutions for problems like maintaining stability, promoting cooperation in the fields of economy and finances, politicalmilitary cooperation, promoting human rights and freedoms-all these could be achieved only within the framework of the general political strategy. And at present, Russian leadership does not have a longterm general political strategy towards these states. Political decisions are made to solve current problems or contradictions.
Attempts to define Russia's role in the postSoviet space revealed different positions. A number of leading parliamentarians and political scientists tried to formulate a "Monroe Doctrine," according to which all territory of the former Soviet Union would be in Russia's sphere of influence. President Yeltsin himself called for the world community to recognize Russia's special role in that realm. In his speech to leaders of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, quoted earlier, President Yeltsin stressed that Russia viewed these new states as areas of Russia's vital interests and would step up its efforts to promote their integration with Russia. Yeltsin stated that Russia would vigorously protect the interests of Russians living in the former Soviet republics. And it should be taken into consideration that there are 25 million ethnic Russians living in the postSoviet space outside the borders of the Russian Federation. In this speech, President Yeltsin dismissed Western concern that Russia's assertiveness toward these states represented a form of neoimperialism. He also claimed that forces within both these newly independent states and in the West are attempting to use the charge of neoimperialism to exacerbate tensions between Russia and its neighbors.11 Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote in Foreign Affairs:
At first, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the West openly recognized the role of Russia as the stabilizing factor and engine of economic reform in the former Soviet Union. We never refused that role, even though it costs us billions of dollars. What is wrong with Russia announcing as its goal the gradual reintegration-primarily economic reintegration-of the postSoviet space on a voluntary and equal basis?12
Russian foreign policy experts admit that the price of Russia's special role in the post-Soviet space would be too high, and many of them put forward the question, Does Russia need this role? They acknowledged the existence of the wide gap between Russia's ambitions and its military and economic capabilities. At the same time, all experts agree that Russia would not be able to isolate itself from its neighbors. Whether Russia wants to or not, it would have to play a major role in any entity that would replace the Soviet Union, be it a new empire, union, confederation, or sphere of influence.
They admit that presently Russia does not have a strategic vision or perspective, to say nothing about necessary resources, to become a stronghold of security and stability in the post-Soviet space. Instead, it is more likely that Russia will become the force supporting the status quo in which a certain level of stability already exists. These experts presume that Russia will concentrate its efforts in the limited sphere of influence that would include Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Moldova. All these states need Russia as guarantor of the status quo. They need help and good relations or a military presence to ensure status quo.
Relations between the Russian army and armies of the newly independent states that are former members of the Soviet Union presented a very serious problem for Russian leadership and the Russian military. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet armed forces were divided between new independent states. Russian generals had to establish a new relationship with their former colleagues and classmates in the Soviet military academies who are now commanders of the foreign armies. Nine members of the Commonwealth of Independent State's (with the exception of the Ukraine, Moldova, and Turkmenistan) signed the Tashkent Treaty for Collective Security. With this treaty came the establishment of a Council of the Defense Ministers and the Staff for Coordination of Military Cooperation. It should be stressed that this treaty was not aimed at the unification of the armies of its members. ColGen Boris Pyankov, first deputy chief of staff for coordination of military cooperation, firmly stated in an interview published in the summer of 1994, "We are today absolutely not ready to unite the armed forces. That would mean to scare the world and our present NATO partners.... We think about ensuring collective security with minimal expenditures and minimal personnel in the national armies."13
Russian military experts are seriously concerned with the fact that of the Western members of the Commonwealth of Independent State's, only Belarus participated in the Treaty for Collective Security. The other members, besides Russia, are countries of the Central Asia and Transcaucases. Because of its membership, this treaty covers territory quite different from the territory covered by the Warsaw Pact. In these new military agreements, Russia becomes the geopolitical center of Central Asia instead of being the geopolitical center of Eastern Europe. This move towards Asia may raise a question of competition and cooperation with the new militarypolitical groupings, which at present are at the periphery of world politics. Russian military experts admitted that this could be welcomed by NATO leadership, by Central European countries, and by Ukraine and the Baltic states. They stressed at the same time that Russian Ministry of Defense and Russian political leadership were most strongly against it.14
Discussing the aim of creating or recreating the federal state, experts from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy argued that this would be too costly politically and especially economically. They reject outright the proposals of ultranationalist's-unification through forceful expansion and the disruption of the stability of neighboring states. Such policies are, in their view, not only amoral but also impractical; instability would inevitably move to Russia itself. At the same time, they argue that unification using strictly political and economic means would also be counterproductive. Such a course would force Russia to support the collapsing economies and to directly subsidize the living standards of the neighboring states to make them at least comparable with Russian living standards. Following such a course, Russia may again become an economic colony of the states which it would unite. Unification would inevitably lead to a sharp decline in the living standards in Russia, inciting social disturbances, and strengthening disintegration tendencies among Russian provinces. In this case, the national strategy of accumulation of forces would become impossible. This course would inevitably lead to the overburdening of Russian resources and perhaps the collapse of Russia like that of the Soviet Union.
Instead of the unification, experts from the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy propose integration through the creation of political, military, and other conditions for economic cooperation and unity, which would ensure and support Russia's political and defense interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union. It would be a policy of creating around Russia a system of friendly states, economically open for Russia. The aim of this policy should not be the recreation, in a modified form, of the situation that existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The aim should be to implement a modernization of relations that are favorable for Russia. This modernization should allow Russia to preserve many advantages of its former geostrategic position and at the same time to create for itself much more favorable economic relations with these states. The philosophy of such an approach would be "leadership instead of direct control."
It is necessary to admit that the position of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy with respect to integration goes along with the predominant trend in Russian public opinion. Public opinion surveys have shown that people in all social groups who favor integration with the republics of the former Soviet Union greatly outnumber those who are against it. But Russians are ready only for the integration in which they would gain something and lose nothing. Russians are not against integration but against its implementation on conditions unfavorable for Russia. Russians will not sacrifice their interests for the wellbeing of the peoples of the former republics of the Soviet Union.
In summary, practical actions in the relations between Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union-economic cooperation, military cooperation, and use of Russian troops as peacekeeping forces on the territory of the former Soviet Union-should not be interpreted as attempts to restore the Soviet or Russian empires. The principal aim supported by the majority of the Russian population is not unification but integration, and integration on definite conditions favorable to Russia.
Russian political leadership and foreign policy experts are very much concerned about relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's general aim here is not to have hostile relations with these countries. On the contrary, the aim is to have friendly partners, first of all in the economic field.
Russian political leaders are very strongly against these countries being included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They consider the admission of these countries into NATO as a very serious hostile move against Russia, aimed at its isolation from Europe and from the West. Russian leadership, which brought home Russian troops from Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic states, argued that these countries have nothing to fear from democratic Russia and do not need NATO's defense guarantees against Russia. On the other hand, Russia's isolation may bring to power ultranationalist's who might try to restore domination over Central and Eastern Europe. President Yeltsin in his Brussels speech asked, "If there are no blocs, splits, enemies or suspicions, why do you in the West still need NATO? Why shouldn't Russia be the eastern pillar of European security?" Evaluating the possibility of NATO expanding to the east, Yeltsin stated that "Europe, which has not yet thrown off the legacy of the cold war, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace."15 But in Budapest, Russian leadership had to realize that their efforts to block NATO expansion to the east failed. Answering Yeltsin, President Bill Clinton firmly stated, "NATO will not automatically exclude any nation from joining. At the same time, no country outside will be allowed to veto expansion."16
This was a humiliating defeat for Russian leadership and diplomacy. The newspaper Isvestia, analyzing the situation, stated that it was obvious even two years ago, when just an idea of the possibility of East European countries joining NATO was put forward, that Russia was powerless to prevent it. And President Yeltsin's promises "not to allow" NATO's expansion were not founded on anything real. Isvestia asked,
And what was the idea of making such a fuss about NATO expansion? Would not it be much better from the very beginning not to dramatize the situation and not to put itself into a deadlock? The more so, if we believe official statements of Russian leaders, that Moscow now considers NATO to be a partner, and not a potential enemy.17
Summarizing the American position, the New York Times stated, "From the American standpoint, NATO is still the center of Europe's security universe. Why? Because Russia, it seems, cannot be trusted completely."18
Russian foreign policy experts admit that leading industrial countries of the West began the division of the former Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of them think that what is going on may amount to the third great division of the spheres of influence among major countries. The first two divisions were implemented after the two world wars. The third started after the collapse of the Soviet Union and is being implemented by political and economic means. This geopolitical process of redivision of the spheres of influence, which is unfavorable for Russia, manifested itself in the economic and political orientation of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic states, and some former "socialist" states of Southeast Asia and Africa toward the other power centers.
Russian foreign policy experts admit that the geopolitical consequences of the West's economic expansion in Central and Eastern Europe will be fully apparent in the beginning of the next century. Russia may be confronted by then not only with economic but also with political and military unification of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the West, first of all with Western Europe. Because of that, Russia's influence in this region in the beginning of the next century would be minimal, and the geopolitical and strategic consequences of that would be very serious.
Post-Communist Russia rejected the Soviet Union's expansionist foreign policy and declared that it would follow a course determined by vital national interests. The Russian political elite hoped that Russia, being a legal successor to the Soviet Union, would inherit the Soviet Union's superpower status. New Russia retained great power potential in its transition from communism, but it finds itself in a currently weakened state. This contradiction between potential greatness and current weakness defined Russia's position in the postcoldwar world. Russia's current weakness encouraged the West to deny Russia superpower status. Western treatment of Russia as a regional power, denying Russia a leading role in global politics, hurts national pride and strengthens nationalist feelings.
Russia, with its potential, could eventually overcome its current weakness and become a global superpower. Western actions aimed at denying Russia this status may help Russian ultranationalist's to come to power. And it may lead to fundamental changes in Russian foreign policy, which may once again become expansionist. And the world once again would be in a cold war. That is why the Western attitude towards Russia is of paramount importance. Foreign policy actions that would help President Yeltsin and democrats, despite all their obvious shortcomings, to stay in power would be in the interests of the United State's and the world community. Former president George Bush once observed that democrats in the Kremlin would ensure the national security of the United State's better than any number of nuclear warheads.&127;
1. Andrei Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," Foreign Affairs 73 (May-June 1994): 59.
2. Nesavisimaya Gaseta, 9 June 1994.
3. Kozyrev, 62.
4. Ibid.
5. Rossiiskaya Gaseta, 29 April 1994.
6. Elaine Sciolino, "Yeltsin Says NATO Trying to Split Continent Again," New York Times, 6 December 1994, A10.
7. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," New York Times, 11 December 1994, E4.
8. Nesavisimaya Gaseta, 19 August 1992.
9. Ibid., 27 June 1994.
10. Ibid., 6 June 1994.
11. Rossiiskaya Gaseta, 29 April 1994.
12. Kozyrev, 69.
13. Nesavisimaya Gaseta, 4 June 1994.
14. Ibid.
15. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," E4.
16. Sciolino, "Yeltsin Says NATO Trying to Split Continent," A10.
17. Isvestia, 7 December 1994.
18. Sciolino, "Why Russia Still Bangs Its Shoe," E4.
Vladimir M. Shamberg (BS, Institute of International Relations, Moscow; PhD in economics, Institute of Economics, Moscow; doctor of science in economics, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow) is a distinguished visiting professor, US Air Force Academy. Prior positions include visiting professor at Connecticut College; Georgetown University, New York. Before that he was senior research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and director of the Department of Economic Literature in the State Publishing House of Political Literature in Moscow. His fields of specialization include the economics and politics of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet countries and US economics and politics.
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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