Published Airpower Journal - Special Edition 1995
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The Increased Role of Latin American Armed Forces in UN Peacekeeping:
Opportunities and Challenges

Maj Antonio L. Pala, USAF

In his opening speech for the Summit of the Americas, President Bill Clinton expressed his optimism for the future of the Western Hemisphere:

Here at the Summit of the Americas, the people of the United States will meet a whole new generation of leaders, a generation no longer subject to the dictates of military juntas who stifle liberties and loot their nation; a generation that has proved in Central America that bloody regional conflicts can be peacefully concluded through negotiation and reform and reconciliation; a generation which has pledged to support democracy collectively wherever it is imperiled in this hemisphere.1

Thirty-four presidents representing every nation in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba gathered in Miami to chart a convergent course for a more prosperous future. The last regional summit was held in 1967 in Uruguay, where nearly a dozen of the participants were dictators. Presently, Fidel Castro is the only leader in this hemisphere who was not democratically elected. Economic integration and a commitment to democratic governance were at the forefront of the summit's agenda. Curiously, military cooperation and alliances, which have been the staple of negotiations in this hemisphere, were not addressed. Inter-American democratic sentiment was documented in 1991 with Resolution 1080 of the Organization of American States (OAS), better known as the Santiago commitment to democracy, which essentially stated that representative democracy would be the standard for its member states.

This democratic surge in Latin America is due in large part to the end of the cold war. Changes in the international system since the fall of the Berlin Wall have provided a promising environment for Latin American leaders. Internal security threats previously posed by the East-West struggle are no longer present in most of the hemisphere. The spread of democracy, the control of the debt crisis, and an increased focus on economic integration appear to be at the apex of regional issues. At present, only Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru face a serious internal security struggle, although incidents like the Chiapas uprising in Mexico bring to light the possibility for internal conflict.

For the most part, Latin American countries are at peace, and their armed forces are faced with the challenge of adapting to the new international situation. This does not mean that the need for armed forces has gone away or that they will relegate themselves to police or civic-action duties. As Gabriel Marcella put it, "Defense of the nation from external enemies is the irreducible sine qua non legitimating function of the armed forces."2 The armed forces are an integral institution within a state, and the absence of a present enemy does not invalidate their existence. In light of the current international environment, several Latin American armed forces have incorporated United Nations (UN) peace operations as a secondary role within their defense doctrine. The Argentine army highlights the support of peace operations as a secondary role, along with providing logistical support to combat narcotrafficking, providing community support in emergency situations, and helping to protect the ecological system.3

Does UN peacekeeping provide a viable role for these armed forces? What are the advantages, if any, of incorporating these armed forces into the UN peacekeeping environment? Latin American participation within the UN or other multilateral operations is not a new phenomenon. Jack Child documented the contribution of Latin American contingents to UN missions in 1980.4 Latin American officers served as observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Lebanon as early as 1948, with others participating in the India-Pakistan observer mission in 1949. Brazil and Colombia deployed infantry battalions to the Suez in support of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956.5 UNEF I was commanded on two different occasions by a Brazilian general. In 1960 the Argentine air force provided pilots and maintenance personnel to operate DC-3 aircraft in the UN mission in the Congo. These crews flew more than 200 missions in combat conditions, providing critical transport and humanitarian relief.6 In 1974 Peru provided infantry for the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, with a Peruvian general serving as the interim commander of UNDOF for six months. UN participation by Latin American forces, although significant, was not an established part of their defense doctrine. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, India, and others provided the bulwark of UN peacekeepers prior to the end of the cold war.

Since 1989, however, the participation of certain Latin American armed forces with the UN has increased exponentially. As of 30 September 1994, there were 2,816 Latin American military personnel from 10 different countries serving in 13 UN operations throughout the world (tables 1 and 2).7 In 1990 the UN deployed 1,060 troops, including an 800-man Venezuelan battalion, to 14 locations throughout Honduras and Nicaragua as part of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The UN secretary-general praised the Venezuelans' participation, stating that they had served "with great distinction."8 Contingents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela are currently serving in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), monitoring the cease-fire and disarmament process. These new roles can help form a new image for these historically controversial armed forces.

Argentina is currently the most active Latin American country within the UN framework. The number of Argentines deployed with the UN has increased over 400 percent in the last six years-from 20 observers in 1988 to over 1,400 troops in 1994.9 At present there are 890 Argentines in the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and over 500 others stationed in eight other UN missions. If the current Argentine troop-rotation pattern continues, it is expected that within three years, better than 50 percent of the military's permanent personnel would have served with the UN.10 In the last two years, four Argentines have lost their lives in the service of the UN, and several others have been injured. Uruguay provides the second largest contribution to the UN from Latin America, with nearly 900 Uruguayan troops presently in the UN Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and over 75 more serving in six other UN deployments. Brazil has contributed 264 troops to ONUMOZ, constituting the first deployment of Brazilian combat troops to a foreign country since the 1965 US/OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic.11 Brazilians are also taking part in three other UN deployments. At the end of the Gulf War, the Chilean air force provided a helicopter squadron to monitor the UN-imposed buffer zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Presently there are 20 Chileans in UN service. Additionally, military and police contingents from Latin America and the Caribbean have been instrumental in Haiti's effort to consolidate its newly restored democratic government.

The increased Latin American participation in peacekeeping has drawn the attention of prominent UN advocates. In a recent interview, Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN undersecretary, praised the important and varied contribution of Argentina to peacekeeping: "Argentina has provided hospitals, troops, engineers, police, and electoral observers. I wish that all countries would participate at this level and diversity."12 Active participation with the UN missions will yield domestic, regional, and international benefits for these Latin American states.

Domestic Implications

At home, military participation in UN peacekeeping serves political as well as military objectives. Argentine army general Carlos Maria Zabala, a former UN sector commander in Croatia, cited many of the advantages of peacekeeping for his army:

On a professional level, it is an occasion to operate in a complex operational environment. You have the opportunity to work with other armies and appreciate their capabilities as well as your own. It provides first hand knowledge of the effects of war, allowing our troops to appreciate the importance of the UN and its peace operations. On a personal level, it lends opportunity for travel to foreign locations and exposure to other cultures and customs. Additionally, it allows the troops to feel as representatives of their country in an important mission abroad.13

On a political level, the participation of national contingents in a multinational capacity provides a level of prestige for the national government. Armed Forces Journal International recently stated that President Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina has developed a military policy directed at "increased participation in peacekeeping activities and projecting the image of a reliable international partner."14 This policy also offers the government a degree of leverage in the international arena. This can include offering the participation of armed forces in exchange for political and/or economic concessions from the world community. One concession obtained by Argentina, despite opposition from the British, was the addition of radar to A-4M Skyhawk fighters recently purchased from the US. A statement by US Embassy officials in Buenos Aires confirmed that Argentina's participation in peacekeeping and its commitment to regional arms-control agreements were contributing factors to the sale of the upgraded A-4M aircraft.15 Regional experts argue that Argentina's increasing participation in peacekeeping is part of a broader foreign policy strategy intended to gain economic, commercial, and political concessions from the US. During a recent visit to Argentina, Vice President Al Gore recognized Argentine peacekeepers at a special ceremony:

The troops assembled here today, veteran United Nations peacekeepers, are proof of their nation's commitment to such noble endeavors. They are the ones who risked and sometimes, sadly, gave their lives for the sake of others. . . . They are the ones who returned full of pride, able to report to their countrymen, Argentina was present_mission accomplished. . . . To these brave soldiers who will carry forever in their hearts the honor symbolized by the blue berets they were privileged to wear, we give our thanks!16

Concessions from the US may include favorable debt renegotiation arrangements, a free-trade agreement, and the possible purchase by the US Air Force and Navy of the Argentine Pampa jet trainer.

Several of the Latin American armed forces active in peacekeeping have derived benefits that appear linked to their UN commitment. Argentina and Uruguay obtained several surplus C-130 transports from the US Air Force. The Argentine navy acquired two frigates, and the Chilean air force received additional helicopters and spare parts to support its deployment to Kuwait. In addition to hardware, the Latin American contingents assigned to the former Yugoslavia have received North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training and doctrine to facilitate communication with NATO aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone.

The development of new roles for the Latin American militaries is a fundamental component for democratic consolidation. Previous attempts to expand military roles into nontraditional missions such as counternarcotics and civic action proved minimally effective at best. In fact, these activities may very well increase the possibility that the military will be tempted to exercise dominant political roles, undermining the democratic process. For example, in 1990 Bolivian president Jaime Paz Zamora explicitly denounced US insistence on expanding the role of the Bolivian armed forces in the nation's antidrug campaign.17 He warned that such a role might undermine civilian control over the military, increase levels of repression and social violence in the Bolivian countryside, and thus pave the way for a future military coup against his democratically elected government. Similar concerns were expressed by former presidents Cesar Gaviria of Colombia and Alan Garcia of Peru.

The interventionist tradition of Latin American armed forces has fostered a sense of mistrust on the part of civilian society, particularly with regard to human-rights violations and the armed forces' lack of respect for civilian rule. Service in UN peacekeeping offers these militaries an opportunity to improve their image and prestige. The protection of innocent civilians in Croatia, the clearing of minefields in Cambodia, and the operation of a hospital in Mozambique can only enhance their profile at the national and international levels. These new roles cannot erase past mistakes but can offer the prospect for a better partnership with civilian authorities and society. As Deborah Norden observes, "The military's participation in peacekeeping allowed the armed forces to become a valuable player in the government's foreign policy, bringing praise and recognition, where they had previously found disdain."18

During a period of worldwide reductions in military spending and the apparent demilitarization of the drug war, Latin American armed forces are being pressured to find new roles. In the past, these kinds of pressures were perceived to threaten the integrity and corporate interests of the military. Under these confrontational conditions, the military has been known to lash out against democratic governments in an attempt to reassert its status and import. UN peacekeeping missions essentially provide this traditionally restless institution with an operational environment to exercise a military role. The primary motivation of UN participation may be institutional survival or the avoidance of large military reductions. However, the unintended consequences may promote democratic consolidation, increased professionalism, and a willingness to become subordinate to civilian rule.

In 1993 the foreign ministry of Paraguay-a country with a recent history of military rule-solicited a report on reforming and restructuring the ministry and its foreign policy. The report recommended that Paraguay contribute troops to UN peacekeeping as a means of institutionalizing and accelerating Paraguay's incorporation into the international community.19 Recently, the Paraguayan ambassador to the UN, Jose Felix Fernandez Estigarribia, officially proposed the use of Paraguayan military personnel to the UN Security Council. The participation of Paraguayan troops in peacekeeping also has the intended purpose of keeping an interventionist military from subverting the country's fragile democratic transition.20

United Nations pay supplements also offer an important benefit to these armed forces. The average supplement for a member of a unit on a UN deployment is over $980 (US) per month. Specialists within the unit receive an additional 25 percent pay hike. Officers assigned on UN observer missions receive a per diem rate that varies from $85-$120 (US), depending on the particular operation. When one considers that an Argentine captain's salary is roughly $1,500 (US) per month, these pay supplements are of considerable consequence. Defense cuts and low salaries are affecting morale and readiness throughout the Latin American forces. Peacekeeping can help alleviate these ailments by providing both additional pay and reimbursement for operational costs incurred in the missions.

Linking UN participation to democratic ideals adds further motivation for governments to promote UN involvement for their troops. UN missions provide these armed forces with a new role that requires obedience to civilian authority as a condition for inclusion. Additionally, these multilateral deployments foster regional cooperation, thus reducing the likelihood of conflict with neighboring states.

Regional Implications

It is impossible to talk about security in Latin America without addressing regional security issues. Each particular region faces its own geopolitical challenge and historical antecedents. To propose that Argentina will become the peacekeeping equivalent of Canada in the southern cone is absurd. Canada does not share borders with countries that pose a military threat-real or perceived. A large part of the Argentine military establishment still lives with the constant preoccupation of threat hypothesis rooted in geopolitical thought and the fear of neighbors closing in on their territory. Latin America has seen very few interstate conflicts in this century, and-in contrast to Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and most parts of Africa-it is a lightly militarized region. In Latin America, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) are small compared to other parts of the world.21 Participation (preferably cooperation) in peace operations, whether under the auspices of the UN or OAS, can only improve regional security.

The outlook for a security framework based on the OAS is not positive. The OAS is a remnant of the post-World War II security mentality of limiting foreign intervention within the hemisphere. The Rio Treaty and the charter of the OAS are ill equipped to handle regional security problems. Additionally, the OAS-sanctioned Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF)-created to alleviate the Dominican crisis of 1965-was seen by many member states as a US cover for its unilateral intervention. The OAS is taking steps to improve its capabilities in the field of security. In 1992 it established the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security, headed by Hernan Patiño Mayer, Argentine ambassador to the OAS.22 This OAS committee has been very concerned with the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBM) in the hemisphere. The powerful influence of the US within the hemisphere has always precluded smaller states from trusting the OAS as an impartial advocate of hemispheric needs. For these reasons, the UN appears to provide more hope as an interlocutor of security concerns and peace operations within the Latin American system. Recent interviews with Argentine officers reflect that nearly 75 percent of them believe that the UN should increase its role in international security, while less than 40 percent felt that the OAS was capable of handling security problems.23

What possible improvements to regional security can multilateral cooperation within a UN framework provide? One important benefit should be to foster regional integration and expand the mind-set from a zero-sum nationalist perspective to a broader image. Regional economic integration is a fact of life in the hemisphere, with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) being the most recognized of the initiatives. The announcement during the Summit of the Americas of Chile's incorporation into NAFTA has yielded some high expectations. Also during the summit, President Clinton and his 33 counterparts committed themselves to the establishment of a hemispheric free-trade zone by the year 2005. Additionally, the Common Market of South America (Mercado Común del Sur-MERCOSUR), encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has been progressing since 1993 and should be fully implemented by late 1995. MERCOSUR countries have begun to address the role of the armed forces within the member states and possible limits on defense expenditures.24 Proposals for the establishment of a collective security regime within MERCOSUR are also being considered.25 Interstate economic and security issues are currently being addressed by civilian and military leaders. This is a promising development for Latin America, where decision making in security matters was historically the exclusive domain of the military.

Additionally, a positive increase in the establishment of CBMs in the region has improved the security outlook. Jack Child states that "CBMs have had the greatest impact on the so called 'ABC' countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) and have been linked to attempts at economic integration in the same area (MERCOSUR)."26 Argentina's recent commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and its dismantlement of the Condor II missile program are positive indicators for the region. The establishment of an OAS commission to address CBMs and the recent surge in civil-military dialog in this field are promising omens for the hemisphere.

International Implications

The new international order, particularly the disintegration of the bipolarity of the cold war, has afforded small states considerably more maneuvering room as it relates to their foreign policy. During the cold war, states were normally aligned with one of the superpowers, a situation that determined-for the most part-the type of foreign policy that could be expected of them. By the same token, the superpowers looked toward their allies with protective and often possessive intentions. The dissension of an ally was a gain for the opponent's camp-containment was the operative word. Kenneth Waltz explains the particular nature of bipolarity:

In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them. Bipolarity extends the geographic scope of both powers' concern.27

With the end of bipolarity, peripheries are becoming a visible reality. The vast majority of the African continent is a clear example of this situation. The superpowers have lost their interest in that region, and without their support, many of those states have slipped into chaos. Latin American leaders are concerned about becoming part of the periphery. The Argentine ambassador to the OAS stated recently that "the biggest challenge facing Latin America was to avoid becoming marginalized by the world community."28 He added that if Argentina were to disappear from the face of the world, the loss would not be recorded in a single major stock exchange, and stressed that Latin American countries could no longer afford to close themselves to the world community. These are astonishing revelations by an Argentine politician, particularly a Peronist.29 The Menem administration has taken considerable effort to ensure that Argentina becomes a reliable and participating member of the international community. Menem's decision to send Argentine naval ships to the Gulf War was not popular, either with the population (nearly 70 percent opposed it in February 1991) or the opposition parties.30 For the Menem administration, the international benefit of making such a decision must have outweighed the domestic political gamble and is a clear indication of Menem's desire to integrate his country into the world community.

Peacekeeping and increased participation with international organizations provide opportunities for smaller states to project themselves on a global stage. Canada, India, and several Scandinavian countries_among others-have enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the UN for many years. The decision on the part of several Latin American states to increase their participation in these ventures will be of great assistance to a UN attempting to provide triage for the world's ailments.

There are natural advantages to the UN's seeking large-scale cooperation from Latin American armed forces. They not only offer an abundant pool of troops and a diversity in national participation, but these armed forces should be well suited_due to their language and culture-to serve in peacekeeping missions in Latin America and parts of Africa.31 The increased number of Spanish-speaking forces participating with the UN has prompted Argentina and the UN to open a peacekeeping training facility in Buenos Aires.32 This base will provide training for civilian and military personnel destined for UN missions. Symbolically, perhaps, the site of the UN facility is the Campo de Mayo army base, where in 1987 rogue military officers attempted a coup against the democratically elected government of President Raul Alfonsin. The base was scheduled to open in 1994, but a lack of funding threatens to prevent that from happening.

Skepticism of peacekeeping still remains in several countries-particularly in the third world-because some UN troops come from countries with a long history of imperialism. Major powers carry the historical baggage of their colonial or imperial past, making their presence unwelcome and counterproductive in many countries. The difficulties faced by US and Italian contingents in Somalia and by French peacekeepers in Cambodia demonstrate the dilemma faced by former colonialist powers in the delicate world of peacekeeping.33 An important benefit for the UN and its peacekeeping missions is that Latin American militaries do not have an imperial history in the global arena. By contrast, countries with smaller military forces not associated with unilateral foreign intervention appear to provide less of a threat to countries hosting UN missions. This situation enhances the probability of success. French troops assigned to the UN in Cambodia (UNTAG) failed to gain the confidence of the populace and were constantly harassed, probably due to France's long imperial history in Southeast Asia. The French unit was replaced by Uruguayan troops, who proved to be considerably more successful in fulfilling the UN mandate.34 The importance of impartiality for UN troops was recently illustrated by Canadian prime minister Chretien, who stated that "as a medium sized country, Canada has always been able to play roles in peacekeeping, because very often we are more acceptable-just because we're small and nobody is afraid of us."35 If this assumption is true for Canada-a medium military power and NATO member-what threat can a Latin American force pose?

Implications for the United States

These new roles also offer the US some opportunities to improve its position in the region. It is critical for the US not to overlook the important contributions that these forces are making in the field of international security and to recognize the positive aspects of this new role for the region. US State Department officials in Argentina are very cognizant of the effect of peacekeeping on Argentina's foreign policy and military. The briefing book prepared by the US Embassy for important visitors dedicates the first three pages to enumerating the partnership position of the Argentine efforts. The recognition of Argentine peacekeepers by Vice President Gore during a time-critical visit demonstrates the priority given to peacekeeping by the US ambassador. The Department of Defense (DOD)-particularly United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)-should give the same priority to these types of efforts on a theaterwide basis.

USSOUTHCOM should recognize the importance of these contributions and develop programs to foster multilateral cooperation. Integration is a better vehicle for professionalization than the indoctrination approach currently employed by DOD. US military influence in Latin America continues to decline, particularly due to reductions in US military-aid programs to the region.36 Efforts should be made to promote the transfer of surplus US military equipment into the region. These transfers should include materiel that supports peacekeeping functions, such as transport vehicles, communications equipment, and other nonoffensive items. Additionally, most of these items are also valuable for disaster relief and civic-action programs. Much of this equipment is available through US military missions in-country, but the recipient country is responsible for the cost of transporting the equipment from the US. These expenses are often prohibitive for these cash-starved countries. Revisions to the current policy should be made to eliminate or reduce the transportation costs of these transfers. This equipment would alleviate the in-country shortages posed by having units permanently deployed to UN missions. The slow and cumbersome UN reimbursement process further exacerbates this situation. US contributions could improve the readiness of Latin American armed forces and would reward their contribution to international security.

Increased US military participation and cooperation in the hemisphere is imperative. During a recent interview, Gen Juan D. Paulik, Argentine air force commander, stressed his desire to expand the number of exercises and deployments with the US Air Force. He wanted his units to participate on an operational level with the US in an effort to develop an interoperative capability.37 In 1994 Argentina participated for the first time in the US Navy exercise FLEETEX. UNITAS, the joint US and Latin American naval exercise, has been a success for a number of years. These exercises provide a positive operational experience for all the forces, as well as promote regional cooperation. Participating side by side with a first-world military power can do more for professionalizing these armed forces than placing them in special schools exclusively for Latin American students. Peacekeeping missions also offer the opportunity to serve with first-world armies, and most UN veterans stress this as a particularly valuable feature.

The promotion of military professionalism in Latin America has been a constant concern for the US. The US Army School of the Americas as well as the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, by direction of the US Congress, include human-rights training within their normal courses. The incorporation of these topics within military training schools is perceived by many of the students to be a form of indoctrination. As Sam Fitch explains, "The notion that US officers could teach their Latin American counterparts to support democracy, to respect human rights, or to see the world as the United States sees it, has always been ethnocentric and often resented by the recipients of the instruction."38 One of the four main objectives of USSOUTHCOM's peacetime operations plan involves

enhancing the role of the military in democratic society. Host nation military forces that can defend their nations against internal and external security threats, support the continued development of democracy and protect and promote the human rights of their citizens [sic].39

Additionally, in its most recent fact sheet, USSOUTHCOM stated that "enhancing military professionalism" is one of its main objectives.40 Ironically, USSOUTHCOM does not include the promotion of peacekeeping roles or the contribution of these armed forces to the UN anywhere in its mission statements or objectives.

Peacekeeping has become an important mission for many of these countries. The incorporation of courses that support multilateral operations in the curriculum of the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, the US Army School of the Americas, or the Inter-American Defense College is necessary in order to capitalize on this positive trend. These training institutions need to evolve with the post-cold-war environment and recognize the importance of peacekeeping as a valuable military role. Latin American officers with peacekeeping experience should be invited to serve as faculty members at all the above-mentioned schools. Additionally, more traditional US service-school slots should be made available to Latin American officers and civilians.

Conclusions

The participation of the Latin American armed forces in UN peacekeeping is a no-lose situation. Not only does it provide a vehicle for these armed forces to enhance their prestige at home and abroad, but also it allows national governments to play a greater role in the international arena as members of an increasingly interdependent post-cold-war world. The international community also benefits from Latin American multilateral participation by gaining additional troops to wear the blue helmets of the United Nations. At a time when the UN finds itself unable to fill its ranks, the willingness of the Latin American armed forces to participate in peacekeeping may offer the UN an abundant source of troops. The active participation of Latin American countries with the UN-and peacekeeping in particular-is a trend that should be neither overlooked nor underestimated. Moreover, international peacekeeping provides positive opportunities for nations undergoing sensitive regime changes, such as transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. As Latin American militaries seek to define new roles in the post-cold-war period and improve their tainted image at home and abroad, peacekeeping offers them a professional role that can help ease tensions in both the military institutions and their societies at large.

Further, the OAS should focus on these multilateral efforts by developing an organizational framework to better coordinate the lessons learned from the peacekeeping experiences of member states. Latin American participation in peacekeeping provides a wide array of opportunities for the hemisphere.&127;

Notes

1. Miami Herald, 10 December 1994.

2. Gabriel Marcella, "Warriors in Peacetime: Future Missions of the Latin American Armed Forces," Small Wars and Insurgencies 4, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 14.

3. Ejercito Argentino, "Mision Principal y Subsidiaria del Ejercito," Verde Oliva, no. 8 (November 1993): 4.

4. Jack Child, "Peacekeeping and the Inter-American System," Military Review, October 1980, 40-51.

5. The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, 2d ed. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 331.

6. For a complete account, see Carlos Eduardo Azcoitia, La Guerra Olvidada: Argentina en la Guerra del Congo (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Marymar Ediciones, 1992).

7. US Mission to the UN, "Summary of Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations," 30 September 1994.

8. "ONUCA Mission Deemed a Success," UN Chronicle, September 1990, 42.

9. "Argentine Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping and the Possible Use of Force," Argentine Military Joint Staff, Senior War College, 1993, 5.

10. Deborah L. Norden, "Keeping the Peace Outside and In: Argentina's United Nations Missions" (Paper presented at the meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Ga., 9-13 March 1994), 7.

11. Claudio Camargo and Pedro Agilson, "De olho na ONU," Istoe, 14 September 1994, 84.

12. Maria Luisa Mac Kay, "Blue Helmets, an Argentine Industry," Clarin, 6 November 1993, 16.

13. Gen de Division Carlos Maria Zabala, "Una Oportunidad Historica," Revista del Suboficial, no. 611 (March-April 1994): 24-25.

14. Jose C. d'Odorico, "Argentina Waiting in the Wings for a Chance to Join NATO," Armed Forces Journal International 130, no. 7 (February 1993): 38.

15. Ovidio Bellando, "EE.UU. vendera los aviones con radares," La Nacion, 2 February 1994, 5.

16. US Information Agency message from Argentina, 21 March 1994.

17. Bruce M. Bagley, "Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on Drugs," in Peter H. Smith, ed., Drug Policy in the Americas (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 140.

18. Norden, 11.

19. Fernando Masi and Jose Luis Simon, "Lineamientos Estrategicos y Programaticos para la Politica Exterior del Paraguay de la Consolidacion Democratica," Report for the Paraguayan foreign minister (Asunción, Paraguay: December 1993), 43.

20. Hoy (newspaper, Asunción, Paraguay), 23 March 1994.

21. See Jim Campbell, "Exposing the Myth of the Economic Impact of Latin American Military Spending" (Unpublished paper, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, Summer 1993).

22. Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The OAS and Confidence Building in the Americas," North-South Magazine, September-October 1994, 36-39.

23. Author's research questionnaire completed by 250 Argentine officers.

24. "El Rol de las Fuerzas Armadas en el MERCOSUR," proceedings of a symposium by the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 25-26 November 1993.

25. Virgilio Beltran, "Buscando Nuevos Roles para los Ejercitos de America Latina," International Congress of Military Sociology, Valparaiso, Chile, 29-31 August 1992, 37-38.

26. Jack Child, "The Military and the Americas: Peacekeeping, Confidence-Building" (Paper presented at the 17th Latin American Studies Association Congress, Atlanta, Ga., 12 March 1994), 14.

27. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 171.

28. Amb Hernan Patiño Mayer, speech to the Argentine National Defense University, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1 September 1994.

29. Traditionally, the Peronists have been nationalists, stressing Argentine greatness and promoting isolationism.

30. Manuel Mora-Araujo, Graciela Di Rado, and Paula Montoya, "La Politica Exterior y la Opinion Publica Argentina," in Roberto Russell, ed., La Politica Exterior Argentina en el Nuevo Orden Mundial (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Facultad Latino Americana de Ciencias Sociales [FLACSO], 1992), 237-38.

31. Virginia Page Fortna, Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping: Experiences in Latin America and Africa, Occasional Paper no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), 16.

32. Alfredo Vega, "Entrenara Argentina tropas para misiones de paz de la UN," La Nacion, 13 March 1994, 1A.

33. The United States has not been a colonial power, but it is considered imperialist by most of the third world_particularly Latin America. US intervention in Central America and the Caribbean has fostered a sense of mistrust on the part of many leaders in this hemisphere.

34. Information based on interviews with Uruguayan peacekeepers who had participated in UNTAG.

35. Quoted in Tad Szulc, "Don't Take Canada for Granted," Parade Magazine, 20 February 1994, 5.

36. For a complete analysis, see J. Samuel Fitch, "The Decline of Military Influence in Latin America," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 1-49.

37. Gen Juan D. Paulik, Argentine air force commander, interview with author, October 1994.

38. Fitch, 32.

39. Col Antonio J. Ramos, Col Ronald C. Oates, and Lt Col Timothy L. McMahon, "A Strategy for the Future (Southern Command)," Military Review 72, no. 11 (November 1992): 39.

40. "Profile of the United States Southern Command," fact sheet (Quarry Heights, Panama: Headquarters United States Southern Command, Public Affairs Directorate, 20 June 1994), 2.

Contributor

Maj Antonio L. ("Tony") Pala (BA, Florida International University; MA, Webster University) is an AFIT PhD candidate at the University of Miami. A pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours in B-52s and trainers, Major Pala served from 1984 to 1987 as a foreign-language and T-41 instructor at the United States Air Force Academy. For the next three years, he was an exchange pilot with the Spanish air force's pilot training program. In 1990 he became chief of pilot courses and eventually chief of officer courses at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy, Homestead AFB, Florida. A graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Marine Command and Staff College, Major Pala has authored several articles and papers on the Latin American military.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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