Published Airpower Journal -
Summer 1994
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Late in the summer of 1990, two separate yet related events occurred that affected Air Force civil engineering. The more newsworthy event was Operation Desert Shield. On 7 August, hundreds of Air Force personnel, including civil engineers, began deploying to bases in Southwest Asia (SWA). A few weeks later, the other milestone event occurred: the Air Force chief of staff's office approved Air Force Manual (AFM) 3-2, Civil Engineering Combat Support Doctrine. Representing the culmination of two years of rigorous research, analysis, and discussion within the civil engineering and doctrine communities, this document was the first doctrine manual written specifically for Air Force civil engineers. Even as the doctrine entered the final stages of the approval process, engineers thousands of miles away in SWA began to validate it. Although the doctrine's authors focused primarily on the Soviet threat and a conventional war in the European theater, the doctrinal precepts proved to be valid in a different setting. Yet, engineering experiences and insights from the Gulf War also revealed several shortcomings. This article assesses how well civil engineering doctrine stood up to a real-world validation and recommends areas for further study and analysis.
The engineer's mission is closely linked to the operational effectiveness of the air base. This issue proved important in formulating civil engineering doctrine because the 1984 version of AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, avoided any discussion of the air base (an oversight corrected in the 1992 version). To underscore the relationship between engineer and air base, the opening chapter of AFM 3-2 stresses the importance of the air base to aerospace power and the role of the engineer in preparing, sustaining, and recovering bases:
A commander's exercise of operational art has always involved choosing when and where to fight, creating conditions that gave his or her forces the best chance of winning, and exploiting opportunities that resulted. In all of these decisions air base availability and operability were critical considerations.1
The availability, reliability, and capability of the network of bases to support the application of air power were keys to the successful prosecution of the air war during Operation Desert Storm. Bases served as key logistics nodes, airlift hubs, fighter beddown sites, large-frame bomber and tanker installations, and home away from home for thousands of personnel. The number of intertheater and intratheater bases required for the war surpassed most expectations, increasing from an initially planned handful to nearly 30.
The availability of these bases during the early weeks of deployment was a major concern for Air Force planners. Permission to use some bases required negotiations with both local and national political and military leaders of the various SWA countries. For example, some princes allowed only a limited number of American forces on their bases and prohibited offensive or attack aircraft. Clearly, the Air Force benefitted from the expansive and abundant airfield facilities in the region as the size of the deployment grew. The Saudis' tendency to overbuild their air bases, the large airports used during religious pilgrimages, and the oil industry's airfields provided planners many opportunities for basing aircraft. Consequently, Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, commander of US Air Forces, Central Command (CENTAF), was able to disperse aircraft theaterwide and thus reduce the vulnerability of coalition air power to devastation from a single enemy attack.
Members of Air Force Prime base engineer emergency force (BEEF) units bedded down approximately 55,000 Air Force personnel and more than 1,500 aircraft at sites ranging from modern state-of-the-art military bases to international airports to mere runways, taxiways, parking ramps, and sand. Our engineers operated and maintained these bases to varying degrees and prepared to recover them if they were attacked.
USAF civil engineering doctrine recommends posturing a "mobile military engineering capability to respond to worldwide contingencies"2 so that engineers can precede aircraft to a base and prepare for follow-on forces. Having a few days to lay out and construct living and working facilities eases the arrival of aircraft and support forces (and is normally the case during exercises). However, in August 1990 our leaders decided to quickly deploy aircraft to the theater as a deterrent and a show of force. Civil engineers and other combat support and maintenance personnel generally followed the aircraft to bases in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman. Therefore, pilots and aircrews--who customarily find people and facilities waiting for them when they arrive--had to fend for themselves to locate living and maintenance facilities at several sites. Days afterward, the engineers arrived and began constructing tent cities and providing electrical power, water, and air-conditioning in a "catch-up" effort that lasted days--sometimes even weeks.3
Although the best procedure is to deploy engineers and other support forces first, these personnel should not expect to precede weapon systems in all contingencies. Doctrine needs to prepare engineers for deployment to a location where personnel, equipment, and planes are already in place and where priorities are already established. This principle may be the norm for future deployments.
Before deploying, engineers need "the best available data describing the threat, infrastructure, climate, soil conditions, logistical support, concept of operations, and indigenous materials and labor" in-theater.4 The composition of engineering teams and their kits of tools and supplies often depends on accurate information about the beddown location. Without these data, Desert Shield engineers simply had to guess at what they needed, a tactic that sometimes resulted in shortages and/or overages in certain skills and equipment.
In the hectic days of August 1990, engineers lacked vital information concerning many potential SWA beddown sites. The size and speed of the complicated deployment overwhelmed the CENTAF planning process and caused many last-minute changes. The Prime BEEF team from Shaw Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina, arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, expecting to proceed to a particular destination but was directed to Al Dhafra Air Base (AB), UAE. Although team members had participated in several training exercises in SWA and had examined CENTAF's reference materials on SWA bases prior to departing Shaw, they had no familiarity with Al Dhafra.5 Additionally, many basing decisions relied on data from a Defense Mapping Agency book at CENTAF dated 1985, despite the fact that much construction had occurred in the region since then. Not until members of CENTAF's Directorate of Engineering and Services deployed to Riyadh and began conducting site surveys did accurate and current engineering information become available.6
Engineers played a vital part in maintaining a high state of readiness at the bases by sustaining the morale of deployed personnel in the Gulf War. Improvements such as hard-wall latrines and showers, wooden doors on tents, jogging paths, and recreational facilities helped relieve the stress of an impending conflict and made the long months of waiting tolerable. General Horner and many deployed wing commanders believed that the construction of gazebos and repairs to swimming pools were not too much to provide people who were risking their lives. Such issues involving the quality of life during war will have to be addressed in future civil engineering doctrine.
Based on the perceived threat, engineers throughout the theater applied "passive defense techniques, including hardening, dispersal, [and] protective construction . . . to increase survivability of critical basing system components."7 Although all bases installed antiterrorism protective structures such as roadblocks, berms, trenches, and revetments, the most elaborate structures were found at bases closest to the Kuwaiti or Iraqi border. For example, the base with the most comprehensive defensive works and recovery preparation lay only 200 kilometers from the Kuwaiti border and boasted underground survival recovery centers and command posts, extensive bunkers, and over five linear miles of revetments. As aircraft began crowding onto bases, Air Force engineers, commanders, and safety people feared the possibility of a Bien Hoa-type incident8 and began to disperse those aircraft or construct revetments to protect them from an attack by enemy aircraft or missiles, a terrorist action, or an accident. This action paid dividends when a missile from a parked A-10 fired into a revetment but caused no injuries to personnel or damage to nearby aircraft. Further, during the phase-two buildup, engineers constructed new parking ramps and hardstands at several bases to reduce potentially dangerous overcrowding.
After the military engineers had deployed, civilians, reservists, and remaining military engineers operated and maintained the bases in the continental United States (CONUS), where activities did not always diminish and sometimes actually increased (e.g., as was the case at Langley AFB, Virginia, despite the deployment of aircraft and people). Often, only a single flying squadron deployed, leaving the remaining planes and the wing commander, who wanted the base to continue operating at a normal pace--a requirement entailing long hours and cooperation from the civilians and military left behind. Despite budgetary and personnel constraints, home-station requirements validated doctrinal precepts urging the Air Force to "posture the civilian force for necessary continued base operations following military deployment [and to] use primarily civilians and contractors for CONUS base operations and maintenance during wartime."9
Air Force engineers should realize that deployments such as Desert Shield involve more than just personnel and facilities in the theater of operations. The fact that European and CONUS bases served as throughputs for hundreds of tons of cargo and thousands of personnel on their way to and from SWA placed demands on engineers at these bases. For instance, at Rhein Main AB, Germany, engineers constructed a tent city for the transient population and redesigned the base fuel system to cut aircraft refueling time. In the United Kingdom, they reopened World War II era hospitals and then upgraded, repaired, or supplemented the facilities' outmoded utility systems. Engineers also reopened the Royal Air Force base at Fairford, England, for conducting flying operations and for housing deployed hospital personnel. Clearly, doctrine should also guide engineers operating outside the theater of operations.
The fact that engineering activities during base recovery and restoration were not required during the Gulf War does not diminish their importance. However, bare-base development and the beddown of people and weapon systems during Desert Shield were critical functions that facilitated the massive buildup of forces. Additional doctrinal precepts in these areas will provide balanced guidance for engineers.
To foster unit integrity and cohesion, AFM 3-2 encourages engineers to "establish a working relationship in peacetime with the operational units supported in wartime [and to] maintain organizational integrity and command when deploying and employing military engineers."10 Training, exercising, and deploying flying and combat support units as a single package will engender familiarity, unit cohesion, and improved capabilities. Approximately half the teams that deployed in August and early September 1990 accompanied their home-station flying units. Air Force bases such as Shaw; Langley; Seymour Johnson and Pope (N.C.); Myrtle Beach (S.C.); England (La.); Little Rock (Ark.); George (Calif.); and Hill (Utah) deployed their flying units and much of their combat support functions as a single package. The advantage of such a deployment is that commanders know the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of their people.
One bit of controversy that arose during the development of AFM 3-2 was the question of who had operational control of RED HORSE units during wartime.11
One procedure involved implementing the regional wartime construction manager (RWCM) concept and giving control over the theater RED HORSE units to the RWCM. Based on the support received from engineers during past contingencies and wars, the Air Force decided to "keep operational control of RED HORSE units within Air Force channels in both peace and war."12
During the Gulf War, elements of the 823d and 820th RED HORSE Civil Engineering Squadrons (RHCES) and the 7319th RED HORSE Civil Engineering Flight deployed to SWA. These units provided heavy engineering capability for CENTAF by constructing taxiways, parking aprons, munitions areas, integrated combat turn pads, tent cities, and revetments. The shortage of engineering capability in-theater meant that RED HORSE could have easily been co-opted by other services. Prior to the August deployments, however, General Horner decided to keep operational control of RED HORSE within Air Force channels. Thus, the 823d RHCES worked directly for General Horner and received taskings from the CENTAF director of engineering and services. US Central Command set theater construction priorities for all services, and RED HORSE supported both the Army and Marine Corps, a fact that validated another doctrinal precept: "Plan to receive engineering and construction support from and to provide it to other services."13
Logistical support is the lifeblood of engineers. Because of the demands placed on airlift during the early weeks of the deployment, however, many Prime BEEF teams could deploy with only a small amount of equipment and supplies. Recognizing that heavy, bulky engineering equipment and basing assets could not compete for airlift during a contingency of war, AFM 3-2 recommends "prepositioning and stockpiling equipment and materials to rapidly support theater requirements [and] plan[ning] for and us[ing] local materials and equipment when appropriate."14 The engineering experience in the Gulf War validated both of these precepts.
Bare-base assets were the first choice of engineers for effectively bedding down forces. Indeed, Harvest Falcon basing sets proved to be one of the operation's bright spots. Air-conditioned tent extendible modular personnel (TEMPER) tents, shower/shave units, latrines, field kitchens, aircraft maintenance hangars, and hard-wall shelters made living and working in sometimes desolate locations bearable. Because many of these assets had been staged at prepositioning locations throughout the region, they could be brought quickly to the sites by intratheater airlift or overland transportation instead of being flown in from Europe or the CONUS.15 However, engineers had too little voice in the distribution of assets. Not responsible for the basing equipment until it arrived on site, engineers were at the mercy of logisticians and transporters, who seemingly shipped bare-base equipment haphazardly and in no particular order. Oftentimes the absence of a single key item hampered the beddown process. For example, engineers scrambled to establish a water distribution system without pipe fittings and tried to construct a functional tent city without generators to power the lights and air conditioners. Such experiences suggest that the doctrinal role of engineers in the total bare-base war reserve materiel program and distribution process needs further examination.
In accordance with AFM 3-2's recommendation, engineers relied heavily on local sources for equipment and supplies. Working closely with contractors, engineers rented equipment such as dump trucks, front-end loaders, backhoes, and graders and purchased building supplies from local lumberyards and hardware stores. Because the region had a sizeable construction and oil industry, this type of equipment was usually available.16
The paucity of spare parts, however, was a vexing problem during the Gulf War. AFM 3-2 points out that such has been the case since World War II and warns the engineer to expect similar difficulties in the future: "Maintain an adequate supply of spare parts. Lack of spare parts for engineering equipment is a major problem for sustained theater operations."17 Engineering equipment and Harvest Falcon assets have war readiness spares kits (WRSK) designed to meet requirements for spare parts and maintenance. However, because funding was insufficient to complete the Harvest Falcon WRSK, deployed engineers often complained of fill rates of less than 50 percent in some WRSKs, especially for belts and filters. This deficiency proved troublesome because equipment and vehicles brought out of deep storage and operated in the harsh SWA environment used belts and filters at a high rate. This was especially true of filters for the vital Mobile Electrical Power-12 (MEP-12) 750-kilowatt (kw) generators. The shortage of filters forced engineers to run equipment beyond the normal maintenance cycle, purchase filters locally, or use T-shirts and panty hose as makeshift filters. The lack of maintenance in the early weeks and months of the deployment led to repairs and malfunctions later on.
AFM 3-2 urges "military engineers to be multiskilled and experienced in a variety of specialties."18 These virtues were put to the test during Desert Shield/Storm. Beddown required nearly everyone to pitch in and construct billeting and kitchen tents, wire them, and install environmental control units. Because many people found themselves sleeping in hot, crowded hangars, commanders had no trouble establishing priorities or motivating the engineers--everyone wanted a hot meal and an air-conditioned place to sleep. Later on, engineers of all job classifications worked on special projects such as ammunition storage areas by driving trucks and operating heavy equipment.
AFM 3-2 also recommends that the Air Force "train military engineers as they intend to fight. Training must be realistic, stressful, evaluated, and of sufficient duration to physically and mentally prepare the military engineer for the rigors of contingencies and combat."19
Gulf War engineers validated this precept by exception because contingency training for military engineers during the 1980s concentrated on base recovery after attack. The limited beddown training time dealt primarily with Harvest Eagle tents or 30- and 60-kw generators. Consequently, few Prime BEEF personnel had any experience with MEP-12 generators, TEMPER tents, shower/shave units, or aircraft maintenance hangars. The absence of technical orders for this equipment exacerbated the problem, although the engineers' skill and initiative gave them enough flexibility to complete their taskings. Again, wartime experience suggests that the training of engineers should include more doctrinal emphasis on the beddown of forces and weapon systems at bare bases.
The formulation of civil engineering doctrine also focused on the ambassadorial role of engineers, in addition to their role as warriors and professionals. As ambassadors, engineers were to be "knowledgeable and sensitive to local political and social environments to enhance Air Force mission effectiveness."20 Although many reviewers questioned the relevance of such a role in a war-fighting doctrine manual, engineers often found themselves acting as ambassadors during the Gulf War. Engineers shared many bases with host-nation and coalition personnel, so respect for cultural and religious customs was vital to ensuring local support. For example, when a host nation prohibited the display of the American flag at one location, the site engineer proposed separate poles for the American, Canadian, French, and host-nation flags. After the host wing commander approved the suggestion, engineers from Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Spangdahlem AB, Germany, designed and constructed the flagpole area, which became the camp's focal point and helped foster smoother relations between the countries' military personnel. In fact, the host wing commander requested that the area be left intact when the foreign troops departed.21
After the war, the ambassadorial skills of engineers from United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) were tested again when they returned to the region to open sites for Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey and northern Iraq. These engineers not only constructed and operated several base camps for a multiservice, multinational force, but also provided direct assistance to Kurdish refugees.
If doctrine manuals such as AFM 3-2 are to remain viable and relevant, they should be able to incorporate new sets of experiences. For that reason, doctrine analysts should prevail upon the commanders, engineers, and thousands of personnel who lived and worked at deployed bases during the Gulf War to offer their insights on how Air Force engineers should organize, train, deploy, and perform their mission. Their suggestions should be added to the wealth of information already derived from past conflicts so that Civil Engineering Combat Support Doctrine will continue to guide engineers on the best way to fight the next war.
Notes
1. AFM 3-2, Civil Engineering Combat Support Doctrine, 26 April 1991, 5.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. A Prime BEEF team of 62 people (50 engineers and 12 firefighters) from Langley AFB, Virginia, deployed to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, to support the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. Although this team was one of the first to deploy, the F-15s still beat them to Dhahran by about 24 hours. Capt Mario Mastrangeli, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, interview with author, 1 November 1991.
4. AFM 3-2, 9.
5. Capt Marvin N. Fisher, 363d Civil Engineering Squadron, interview with author, 12 August 1991.
6. Capt Wayland H. Patterson, Headquarters CENTAF, interview with author, 10 July 1991.
7. AFM 3-2, 10-11.
8. In May 1965, a bomb on a B-57 accidentally exploded at Bien Hoa AB, Republic of Vietnam, destroying 40 unprotected aircraft and killing or wounding over 100 personnel.
9. AFM 3-2, 9, 13.
10. Ibid., 15-16.
11. As the Air Force's heavy engineering force, RED HORSE performs major force beddowns, heavy damage repairs, and heavy engineering operations during wartime.
12. AFM 3-2, 16.
13. Ibid. Some of RED HORSE's first projects included constructing a road to an ammunition storage area for the Army and building K-Span shelters for the Navy.
14. Ibid., 19, 22.
15. These assets were soon depleted, however, so other basing sets had to be flown in from Europe and the CONUS.
16. The engineers did have to use metric-sized supplies or talk the suppliers into cutting the wood in inches. They then had to explain why a two-by-four is not a two-by-four (because it's really 1 5/8" by 3 5/8").
17. AFM 3-2, 21.
18. Ibid., 23.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 25.
21. Lt Col Rodney L. Hunt, 820th RHCES, interview with author, 26 September 1991.
Dr Ronald B. Hartzer (BA, Oral Roberts University; MA, PhD, Indiana University) is the historian at the Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency, Tyndall AFB, Florida. Previously, he was historian at Lowry AFB, Colorado. He has also done historical work for the US Army Corps of Engineers and the US Forest Service. He directed the Lessons Learned study for Air Force Engineering and Services in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm/Proven Force/Provide Confort. Dr Hartzer has written numerous articles on engineering history and coauthored AFM 3-2, Civil Engineering Combat Support Doctrine, 26 April 1991.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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