Published Airpower Journal -
Summer 1994
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While the demonstrated success of air power in Operation Desert Storm fulfilled many of the prophecies of air power, it has also raised expectations about its effectiveness in other situations, such as using air power to enforce American political demands without committing American ground forces.1 As Professor Eliot A. Cohen notes, "Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment."2
Can air power alone be used to fulfill American political objectives? While this article does not answer that question definitively, an examination of the "air pressure strategy" developed during the Korean War in an attempt to force the North Koreans to accept a peace agreement offers some indication of the potential problems of relying on this approach in the future. Given the lack of historical experiences in which we can assess the effectiveness of influencing political behavior through air power in general and by bombing in particular, this air pressure strategy is an important case study for understanding the problems involved with such an approach.
The author would like to thank Professors Dave Mets, Tami Davis Biddle, and Ms Liz Griffith for their help on this article.
The attempt to influence the North Korean leaders solely through air power resulted from the stalemate between the ground forces on the peninsula. In contrast to the fluid situation in the early months of the Korean War, the opposing ground forces became deadlocked near the 38th parallel after the Chinese Communists intervened in November 1950. When peace talks began in July 1951, the objective of the United Nations (UN) ground forces changed from defeating the opposing army to stopping any further territorial gains by the Communist forces while minimizing UN casualties during the negotiation process. Thus air power became the only military means available to directly influence the North Korean government.3
The initial attempt to compel the Communists to accept a cease-fire agreement was an interdiction campaign begun in September 1951 known as "Operation Strangle." This effort, aimed at both the North Korean rail and road systems, attempted to stop the flow of supplies from the rear areas to the front lines, weakening the Communist forces and making them vulnerable to a UN ground attack. Presumably, successful air attacks would force the North Koreans to withdraw towards the Yalu River to shorten their supply lines or to agree to a peace settlement.4 This air effort was successful in cutting off much of the Communist resupply capability, but it was unable to "strangle" the frontline troops. The Far East Air Forces (FEAF), the United States Air Force component in Korea, noted that they had destroyed 95 percent of the prewar rail transport capability; however, the remaining five percent "was still enough to permit the slow accumulation of Communist stockpiles behind the static battle line."5
While the interdiction campaign may have delayed or even prevented a Communist ground offensive, it fell short of its stated goal of "strangling" the enemy and forcing an armistice.6 In addition, the effort was costly: from August 1951 to March of 1952, FEAF lost 236 aircraft on interdiction missions.7 The US Navy was also involved in this bombing effort, and a naval analysis of the interdiction campaign noted that the cost to the UN, just in terms of aircraft lost, exceeded the value of the material destroyed.8 The lack of success in stopping the Communist resupply effort, coupled with the costs of the operation (both in terms of aircraft lost and in the loss of prestige to the newly independent Air Force), resulted in a search for alternative methods of employing air power to bring pressure on the enemy.
The new strategy was based in large part on a study commissioned early in 1952 by Maj Gen Jacob E. Smart, the FEAF deputy commander for operations, and was written by Col Richard L. Randolph and Lt Col Ben I. Mayo, both Korean combat veterans and members of the FEAF staff.9 They began their study with a review of the ongoing interdiction effort, concluding that it was ineffective in applying pressure to the Communist forces in North Korea primarily due to the inability of aircraft to completely stop the resupply effort. The most promising avenue, they felt, for pressuring the North Korean government was to use air power to "destroy or damage enemy supplies, equipment, facilities and personnel."10 They proposed three criteria for selecting targets:
The authors acknowledged that many of the targets in this type of "destruction" or "pressure" offensive would be similar to an interdiction campaign, but they stressed that there would be differences between the two. While interdiction was aimed at delaying supplies, the new campaign would focus on destruction that would cause "a permanent loss to the enemy and produce an accumulative drain on his strength."12 Some interdiction targets that were already being attacked, such as locomotives, vehicles, and supplies, would also be hit under the pressure attacks, but the authors also identified another potential target, electric power, which they considered "one of the most lucrative air targets remaining in North Korea."13
While the primary rationale for attacking electrical power may have been the desire to pressure the North Korean leaders by increasing costs, the official explanation given for attacking the power facilities was that of curtailing war production. According to this argument, previous bombing had largely eliminated North Korean industry, forcing the dispersal of war production to small workshops and underground facilities. These defensive measures made the destruction of manufacturing by conventional bombing difficult at best; hence, the elimination of electric power at its source was deemed the most efficient and effective method for cutting North Korean production.14
Some Air Force planners also advocated attacking electrical power to affect the morale of the North Koreans. They hoped that the destruction of the electrical power system would cause an "adverse psychological effect on [the] civilian and military population."15 How this psychological effect would translate into a peace agreement, however, was left unexplored.
The desire to stop war production and lower civilian morale merged with another factor in the air planners' decision--the Air Force's institutional perception of the value of electric power as a target. During the 1930s, faculty members at the Air Corps Tactical School had developed a theory of strategic bombardment that relied on the identification of vital targets, such as electrical power, which, if attacked through strategic bombardment, would destroy both the war-making capability and the morale of the opposition. The theoretical work of those officers at the school became a reality in the first air war plan for World War II--Air War Plans Division-1 (AWPD-1)--which identified electrical power in Germany as a high-priority target.16 Despite the value these airmen placed on electrical power, it was never systematically attacked during the war because intelligence analyses of the German and Japanese economies accomplished by other agencies minimized the potential benefits of bombing the electrical power systems. After the war, however, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey seemingly confirmed the air planners' convictions by noting, "Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicated that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production."17 For air officers, the lesson was clear--hit electrical power at the earliest opportunity.
For the Korean air planners, the North Korean electrical system was particularly attractive because it was highly concentrated and thus vulnerable to air attack. Five hydroelectric plants (Fusen, Chosin, Kyosen, Funei, and Suiho) generated 90 percent of the power produced in North Korea. Suiho was considered the most important target both because it was the largest power plant in the Orient and because it supplied 10 percent of the power used in Manchuria.18 Destruction of these targets would inflict financial costs, both in terms of repair and lost production, and would also inflict indirect damage on Manchuria, an area that provided a sanctuary for the Communist forces and support for the North Korean troops. Eliminating the Suiho plant would also inflict additional burdens on the Chinese leaders, who were supporting the North Korean forces.
The selection of the North Korean electrical system rested not on one factor but on many diverse and often unexamined motivations. In addition to the Air Force's institutional predisposition to attack electrical power, these motivations included the desire to inflict costs on the North Korean and Chinese leaders, to cut war production, and to lower civilian morale. While all of these provided justification for the bombing, air planners devoted little attention to the possible reactions of the Chinese or the North Koreans or to how this pressure would translate into a peace agreement.
The effects of bombing the electrical power system were easy to judge from a tactical or military viewpoint. United States Air Force and Navy aircraft pounded the five plants from 23 to 27 June 1952, destroying 11 of the 13 generating facilities and eliminating 90 percent of the power capacity in North Korea.19 The impact of these attacks was widespread. In North Korea there was a two-week blackout throughout the country that hindered and even stopped much of the war production going on in the small factories and shops. The outage hampered vehicle and railcar repairs because of problems with electric welders, and impeded agriculture by disabling the electric pumps used for irrigation and stopping the rice-milling machines.20 In addition, the damage to the Suiho facility resulted in a 23 percent loss of the electrical power requirements of northeast China for 1952. As a result, 30 out of 51 important industries in Manchuria did not make their production quotas for the year, and four achieved only a quarter of their projected goal.21
Although these first attacks largely destroyed the North Korean electrical system, they did not result in the quick peace agreement that the air planners had hoped for, and bombing under the air pressure strategy continued. With the destruction of what they termed the "most lucrative air targets remaining in North Korea," air planners turned to other "decisive" targets. On 11 July, the Air Force launched a concentrated strike on Pyongyang under the name "Operation Pressure Pump." This attack involved 1,254 bombing sorties against 30 military targets such as communications sites and supply areas in the city, resulting in the complete destruction of three targets while heavily damaging all but two of the remaining ones. With no changes at the negotiating table, the air pressure attacks continued, and on 29 August, Pyongyang was hit again with 1,403 sorties.22 Despite the quantity and ferocity of these attacks, "there was little direct evidence to show that the Communists were ready to concede . . . as a result of this bombing."23
However successful the air pressure attacks were in crippling the supply of power or in the destruction of other targets, the real impact must be judged in light of the original objective--bringing about a peace agreement. Although the initial attacks caused a loss in electrical production, the North Koreans worked around the power interruptions by staggering shifts to take advantage of the power available and by buying small generators for mines and manufacturing plants.24 The Russians and Chinese reacted by sending technicians to repair the damage to the electrical system, giving no indication that the attacks affected their willingness to continue the war.25
While the attacks seemingly stiffened the opponents' resolve, they generated or exacerbated political difficulties. The British press and Labor Party vehemently protested these strikes out of fear that the attacks would cause the Communists to discontinue the peace talks and because the British government had not been consulted before the attacks.26 These complaints, along with those of other allies, weakened international political support for the United States. The bombing attacks also caused the Chinese to break off negotiations with the Indian government. These talks had made progress in resolving some of the problems involved in the stalled peace talks, but the Chinese stopped negotiating because they did not want to appear to be forced into an agreement.27
The obvious paradox between the military and political results of the air pressure strategy in the Korean War highlights a major shortcoming in using this approach--the lack of any valid measure of effectiveness. How do you know if you are succeeding? While it is possible to measure how many planes attacked the target, the tonnage of bombs dropped, and even the results of the raid in terms of destruction to the physical structures, it is far more difficult to determine the actual impact of the raid on the opposing nation. For example, in the electrical attacks on North Korea, the amount of electricity eliminated and the time it was interrupted could be determined through various intelligence sources and, by inference, extrapolation of the amount of manufacturing stopped.
Determining the physical impact of the bombing is not enough, however, to analyze the actual effectiveness of air pressure attacks. Short of the enemy's conforming to the political demands, it is difficult to determine whether the bombing was even worthwhile.28 For example, if the electricity lost by the North Koreans did not significantly affect their war production effort, their social cohesion, or the leadership's political resolve, then the actual effectiveness of the electrical power attacks may have been zero (or even of negative value if you consider that those aircraft might have been used to greater effect on another target).29 During the Korean War, FEAF resorted to measuring the "tempo and volume of Communist propaganda" as indicators of bombing effectiveness. An increase in propaganda was interpreted as a clear indication that the air pressure strategy was having the intended effect.30
While this may have overstated the effectiveness of the bombing, it nonetheless highlights the difficulty of determining the strategic effectiveness of an air pressure campaign in reaching the political objectives of the war.
Another difficulty in applying an air pressure strategy is the demonstrated resiliency of a nation toward conventional bombing, especially a nation under totalitarian rule. This resistance to pressure through air attack has been demonstrated in both Germany and Japan during World War II, as well as in Korea and Vietnam. The North Koreans were extremely resourceful during the interdiction campaign. As Gen Otto P. Weyland, the commander of FEAF, noted after the war, "The enemy reacted quickly in an all-out effort to recuperate from the interdiction program. He developed remarkable ingenuity and perseverance in rehabilitating his railroad and bridge system and in dispersing and hiding his supplies and equipment."31 This adaptiveness to attack was also demonstrated in the bombing of the electrical power system by the use of staggered shifts, small generators, and increased imports that substituted for the loss of the national electrical system. Perhaps the importance of electricity to American society resulted in a tendency on the part of US air planners to impose American expectations and reliance on electricity and thus overemphasize the value other nations placed on electrical power. In any event, depriving people of lighting and heat will cause a decrease in morale, but as the Korean case demonstrates, it is unlikely to cause a change in political behavior.32
The air pressure strategy, as applied during the Korean War, did not force the Communists to negotiate a peace agreement and thus failed to achieve it primary objective. Despite air power's failure in this particular strategy, its use probably made a contribution toward the ending of the hostilities. Without access to North Korean, Chinese, and Russian archives it may be impossible to separate the distinct role of air power; however, most authors agree that it was "a combination of military, political, and economic factors" (emphasis added) that ended the war.33
Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected president in November 1952 on the promise to end the war. He and his advisors discussed and made clear that they were prepared to escalate the conflict to secure a decision. These escalation plans included the use of nuclear weapons, the conventional bombing of China, and a resumption of ground operations by UN forces. Additionally, the air pressure strategy, which by May 1953 included attacks on irrigation dams in North Korea, may have contributed to the armistice because of the rising economic devastation these attacks caused in North Korea.34 Some historians argue that the most significant impetus towards ending the war was the death of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and its impact on the ability of the Communist nations to reach an agreement.35 Thus the bombing of the dikes earlier would not have had an impact on ending the war. Although the official Air Force history of the Korean War states that "airpower was triumphant,"36 the actual record is more complicated. While air power contributed to the peace agreement, the air pressure strategy alone was not successful and its impact took much longer to be felt than the planners had originally anticipated.
Certainly there were unique political circumstances in the Korean War and our technological capabilities have changed; however, there are still some basic considerations on the use of air power in a pressure role that should be noted. Politically, the North Koreans had an advantage in being supplied by the Soviet Union and China, which obviated many of the material losses caused by bombing. While other nations may not have the same level of support, they will likely be able to substitute for the losses due to bombing and will probably be able to acquire supplies from some source.
It is true that technological advances since the Korean War enable us to better identify targets and determine the effects of bombing. Moreover, precision guided munitions available today not only lessen collateral damage but also put fewer American aircrews at risk and can potentially increase the tempo of air attacks. But, unless we destroy everything--something that is not politically possible today--states can still innovate without changing their political behavior. Precise intelligence data of what we have hit only tells us where repeat attacks might be needed; it tells us little about the true effectiveness of an air pressure attack.
While contextual differences are important in determining the validity of any analysis, the circumstances that separate the Korean War in 1952 and the "New World Order" of today do not change the fundamental problems of an air pressure strategy. Whether the bombing of an electrical power plant is done with three F-117s or 300 F-84s, the result in terms of the actual attack will likely be the same; only the manner of application is different. The impact of this pressure type of bombing on a nation or its leaders--in other words, the true effectiveness of this strategy--remains exceedingly difficult to gauge. When this problem is combined with the tenacity of nations under air attack, the difficulty of using air power alone to compel a nation to accept political demands is clear. The prudent air planner will be aware of these pitfalls before advocating any future air pressure strategy designed to achieve a result on its own.
Notes
1. Some examples of this approach are in George Kenney and Michael J. Dugan, "Operation Balkan Storm: Here's a Plan," New York Times, 30 November 1992; and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's comments in John T. Correll, "Tinkering with Deadly Force" (editorial), Air Force Magazine 76, no. 1 (January 1993): 2.
2. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 109.
3. Otto P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign in Korea," Air University Quarterly Review 6, no. 3 (Fall 1953): 18, 22.
4. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961; rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 441.
5. Historical Division, Headquarters Far East Air Forces, "FEAF Operations Policy, Mid-1952: An Addendum to the FEAF Histories for that Year," March 1955, 2.
6. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 441-42.
7. Col R. L. Randolph and Lt Col B. I. Mayo, "The Application of FEAF Effort in Korea," staff study for deputy for operations, FEAF, 12 April 1952, 1.
8. Richard P. Hallion, "Naval Air Operations in Korea," Air Power History 40, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 36.
9. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 478.
10. Randolph and Mayo, 8.
11. Ibid., 11.
12. Ibid., 9; Weyland, 22; "FEAF Operations Policy," 3.
13. Randolph and Mayo, 15.
14. AU Quarterly Review Staff Study, "The Attack on Electric Power in North Korea: A Target System Is Studied, Analyzed, and Destroyed," Air University Quarterly Review 6, no. 2 (Summer 1953): 13.
15. History, Far East Air Forces, 1 January 1952-30 June 1952, vol. 1, 41.
16. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta, Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 81.
17. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War) (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 30 September 1945), 14.
18. "Attack on Electric Power," 14; Futrell, USAF in Korea, 480-81.
19. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 483-88; Hallion, 38.
20. Headquarters Far Eastern Air Forces, "FEAF Report on the Korean War" (draft), 15 February 1954, book 3, sec. 13, 7-8; and Robert Frank Futrell, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1952-27 July 1953, USAF Historical Study 127 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1956), 33.
21. "FEAF Report on the Korean War"; Futrell, USAF in Korea, 483-88.
22. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 516-17.
23. Rosemary Foot, A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 146-47.
24. Futrell, USAF Operations, 1 July 1952-27 July 1953, 33.
25. Headquarters FEAF, Deputy for Intelligence, FEAF Intelligence Roundup and Operational Summary, 24-30 January 1953, no. 126, 22; Futrell, 488.
26. Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1971), 135-36; Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1954), 73.
27. Foot, 130-38.
28. For more on this problem in the context of strategic bombing in World War II, see Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
29. David MacIsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976), 161-62.
30. "FEAF Operations Policy," 4.
31. Weyland, 23.
32. For the impact of bombing on morale in World War II and the difference between a change in morale and a change in behavior, see Irving L. Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), 145-49, 151-52.
33. Foot, 181.
34. Edward C. Keffer, "President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the End of the Korean War," Diplomatic History 10, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 278-89.
35. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), 238-45. See also Foot, 163-83, 214; Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 104-6.
36. Futrell, USAF in Korea, 688.
Lt Col Thomas E. Griffith, Jr. (USAFA; MA, University of Alabama), is currently studying for his doctoral degree in military history at the University of North Carolina. He has flown the F-4 at Osan AB, Korea; Ramstein AB, Germany; and Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina. While at Seymour Johnson, he was selected as part of the initial cadre for the conversion to the F-15E. He deployed for Operation Desert Shield and was shot down on his third combat mission during Desert Storm. Colonel Griffith is a graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies and a distingquished graduate of Air Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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