Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1994
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Sun Tzu said nearly 2,500 years ago that "the acme of skill is not winning a hundred victories in a hundred battles but to subdue the armies of the enemy without fighting."1 It seems oxymoronic--to win a war without fighting. Despite that apparent contradiction, the professional warrior's goal to achieve Sun Tzu's objective has been constant. Recently the media has given considerable coverage to some "weapons" that make Sun Tzu's proposition seem somewhat more attainable. Sometimes they are referred to in the press as "nonlethal" or "low-lethal" weapons, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has adopted the term disabling systems for this class of weaponry. In November 1991, the Air Force vice chief of staff approved a position paper that stated, inter alia, that "the Air Force has an interest in pursuing the conceptual maturation and operational exploitation of disabling strategies and technologies, and should pursue a lead role in an integrated DOD systems' development effort."2 As the Air Force develops its force structure for the developing "new world order," it may be instructive at this time to understand what "disabling systems" are, why they are becoming more important, and why we need to further the doctrine, policy, and operational employment concepts for their use.
What Are Disabling Systems?
The Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Non-Lethal Strategy Group chose the term disabling weapon (system) to designate "any instrument which is intended to disable personnel and equipment while avoiding killing personnel or doing catastrophic physical damage to equipment." The Army has distributed a draft of an operations concept for disabling "measures" that defines disabling measures as a "collection of capabilities employed with the intent to disable human or materiel system capabilities."3 In other words, disabling measures are the strategic, operational, and tactical application of disabling systems (weapons) to achieve stated politico-military objectives, albeit with a complementary objective to preserve life and property.
Disabling systems are not new. We saw several examples of their use in Operation Desert Storm. The use of electromagnetic warfare against Iraqi radars and communication nodes sometimes obviated the need to destroy those assets. Coalition forces also employed a psychological operations campaign against Iraqi forces by dropping leaflets instead of bombs on enemy positions. The leaflets provided directions on how Iraqis could surrender to coalition forces. For surrendering Iraqis this proved less deadly than the cluster bombs they could have faced. Precision guided munitions (PGM) perhaps represent a class of disabling weapons, though they have the potential to kill and maim personnel and to destroy property. Yet, an intention behind the employment of PGMs is to lessen the collateral damage to innocent life and property.
If leaflet dropping, electronic warfare, and PGMs are not new, then what is? Many technologies are maturing that provide more tools for the disabling weapons kit. Advancements in such areas as electromagnetics (e.g., lasers, high-powered microwave systems, conductors); materials (e.g., adhesives, acids, lubricants); bioengineering; robotics; and other sciences are yielding instruments that can make war more "humane." Today F-4G "Wild Weasel" aircraft carry high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) that are used to impact and destroy enemy radars by detonation. Tomorrow perhaps a different platform might carry a pod housing a high-powered microwave system that would "fry" the enemy's electronics, rendering the system useless with less violence. Today cluster bombs might be used to stop a convoy in its tracks. Tomorrow a special caustic substance, safe for organic material, might be dispersed on the convoy's path to "melt" away the convoy's inorganic tires and treads. Today we conduct psychological operations, another disabling effort, with leaflets and loudspeakers. Tomorrow we may supplement leaflet dropping and sonic messages with holographic images and low-frequency generators to influence or disorient opposing forces.
Today the Air Force possesses and employs several disabling systems. Newer "weapons" in this class are being developed that can supplement those we have. Although the possession and use of disabling systems in the Air Force are not new, the appropriate incorporation of additional capabilities in this class will permit enhancement of a particular dimension of military operations. For that and perhaps more profound reasons, the dimension of "disabling warfare" (or "nonlethal warfare" as the more romantic would call it) is becoming more important.
Why Are Disabling Systems Becoming More Important?
Containment of a monolithic communist threat dominated US strategic and military strategies for most of the post-World War II era. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the US has adopted a regional focus for its national security strategy. This is largely due to the realization that the world is becoming more polycentric with the US as the lone remaining superpower. Some have argued that in such a polycentric world, US strategic doctrine should change and that it "must be based on the containment of barbarism [vice communism]."4 Despite that assertion, the US must continue to ensure its strategic nuclear deterrence capability. Yet, we also must continue to plan for US force employment at lower levels of conflict. The realities of a polycentric world mandate that the US (and the Air Force) be prepared to operate within those realities. We have probably seen the characteristics of those realities in operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm. These operations and many that we will conduct in the future will likely have the following characteristics:
• Be limited in objective and duration.
• Involve coalition warfare.
• Be aimed at restoring or ensuring regional stability.
• Take place in conflicts short of the threshold of general conventional war.
As this multipolar, polycentric world develops, the US and its allies may find deterrence more difficult to enforce in a regionally focused security environment. Strategic nuclear or conventional destructive deterrence may not prevent situations like those in the Persian Gulf or in the former Yugoslavia. As Miguel Walsh puts it, "Threatening to throw sophisticated capabilities into lower-level contingency situations may have just the opposite effect--that of rendering such means incredible, unbelievable, at least in terms of employment."5 This would create a dilemma for the West: if present US and allied arsenals, and their implied threat of use, carry no weight with an adversary, how do we protect our national interests if they are threatened by an adversary who, on paper, appears militarily weaker than we? The Western sense of morality and the growing access to near-instantaneous information may be contributing factors to this dilemma. The bombing of the camouflaged Al Firdos command bunker during Desert Storm and the errant impact of a Tomahawk cruise missile into Baghdad's Al Rashid Hotel two years later during an attack on Iraq's Zaafaraniyah industrial complex raised concerns around the world over the regrettable deaths of civilians in these incidents. In another Desert Storm incident, Saddam Hussein directed his forces to place military equipment he wished to preserve for future use near religious buildings. Fearing damage to the holy places--and the rupturing of allied-Arab relations--coalition forces did not attack these "protected" forces. Such incidents may forebode the constraints US and allied forces will face in future operations. As a result, we may have to further increase our emphasis on limiting collateral damage and casualties, perhaps to the point-near-zero tolerance. Proportionate response and deliberate damage limitation--two important principles of the international law of war--are becoming more important as technology apparently increases capabilities. Ironically, it will be the law-abiding nations of the polycentric world who must be careful how they apply force to avoid being held hostage to their own sense of law and morality.
What Are the Policy and Doctrinal Impacts of Disabling Systems?
Disabling systems represent another evolution in warfare, not a revolution. Though the cold war is over, deterrence remains a cornerstone of our national defense strategy. Doctrines and capabilities we possess today should not be discarded cavalierly. Yet, we must be objective in assessing our current capabilities in determining which ones will serve us well tomorrow. Consequently, US national security thinking is moving away from scenarios dominated by strategic nuclear confrontations to an era where the flexible response doctrine is becoming more flexible. Though this process may be complicated by the downsizing of our forces, we can help the process by establishing coherent policy and doctrine.
One policy implication may be derived from the military success of Desert Shield and Desert Storm: traditional, lethal weaponry and disabling systems are not necessarily stand-alone systems. During Desert Storm, combinations of disabling systems and lethal weaponry were used synergistically to achieve military objectives. It would be foolish to think that one can supplant the other. Still, that does not imply that there may be no situations in which one class of weapons could be used exclusively.
The US also can adopt a policy that dispels the notion that the adoption of disabling systems into our arsenal implies weakness or a lack of will to use more lethal weaponry when necessary. Making weapons more "humane" should not mean we would be more freewheeling with the application of American military power either. The US will continue to take seriously its obligations as a superpower and the leadership role that comes with that position. Yet, the addition of another class of weaponry into the arsenal to make war less bloody and less destructive does not necessarily mean we should be more willing to become the world's policeman.
Technology sometimes forces a change in a military's doctrine. Although the US Air Force updated Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basis Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, in March 1992, we should revisit that doctrine to decide if it adequately addresses the potential doctrinal changes that disabling systems might bring. For example, paragraph 2-3b of AFM 1-1, vol. 1, states, "Weapons should be selected based on their ability to influence an adversary's capability and will," and paragraph 2-3c states, "Precision weaponry requires precise intelligence and effective command and control." Both paragraphs have importance for disabling systems. Some systems in this class may not have the effect of influencing an adversary's capability and will and therefore should bear serious consideration before proceeding to production and deployment. Some disabling systems are not precise in the terms of the precision guided munitions used during Desert Storm. Yet, these systems still require precise intelligence and effective command and control to be employed effectively in a military operation.
Finally, as we consider the policy and doctrinal impacts of assimilating disabling systems into the inventory, we should review Carl von Clausewitz's words:
If the enemy is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make. The hardships must not of course be merely transient--at least not in appearance. Otherwise the enemy would not give in but would wait for things to improve.6
Despite what some may think, disabling systems do not represent a panacea for curing the horrors normally associated with the conduct of war. Nor does the incorporation of disabling systems into our armed forces represent a ratification of the strategy of gradual response, a strategy that failed miserably in Vietnam. Imposing our will on the enemy is still the objective. Disabling systems merely represent another tool that military strategists can use to reach that end. Hopefully, that end can be achieved as Sun Tzu envisioned it--"without fighting."
Notes
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 77.
2. Headquarters USAF, Special Technical Plans Division, "Position Paper on the Air Force Role in Development of Disabling Systems/Strategy," 13 September 1991, 4.
3. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-XX, "Operations Concept for Disabling Measures," draft, 4 September 1992, 3.
4. Janet Morris and Chris Morris, Creating an Office of Nonlethality: A New Paradigm for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: US Global Strategy Council, 1992), 1.
5. Miguel Walsh, "New Technology, War and International Law" (Washington, D.C: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 14 June 1991), 5.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
Maj Roger C. Hunter (BS, University of Georgia; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) is a member of the Operational Issues Group, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF. Previous assignments include space operations crew commander, staff officer at Headquarters Air Force Space Command, and action officer at Headquarters Air Force Space Division. Major Hunter is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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