Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1994
DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THE AIRBORNE LASER
Pie in the Sky or Vision of Future
Theater Missile Defense?

The time will come, when thou shalt lift thine eyes
To watch a long-drawn battle in the skies,
While aged peasants, too amazed for words,
Stare at the flying fleets of wondrous birds.
--Thomas Gray, 1737

The development of Air Power in its broadest sense, and including the development of all means of combating missiles that travel through the air, whether fired or dropped, is the first essential to our survival in war.
--Viscount Hugh M. Trenchard, 1946

New ideas often meet with skepticism and sometimes ridicule. However, they also challenge us to reconsider preconceived notions and to question conventional wisdom. Although the airborne high energy laser (HEL) is not a new idea within the laser development community, it now demands renewed attention from the Air Force and the Department of Defense, insofar as the airborne laser (ABL) may just be an idea whose time has come.

In the days before powered flight, when balloons and dirigibles occupied the imagination and seemed to be the only way to sail aloft, people laughed at attempts to build heavier-than-air flying machines. In 1807 Robert Fulton's steamboat was considered a folly but later became one of the most successful modes of commercial transportation. Gen William ("Billy") Mitchell's early attempts to sink naval vessels by aerial bombing also were ridiculed. But he proved the critics wrong in July 1921 when he led the 1st Provisional Air Brigade in an air bombing exercise off the Atlantic coast and sank the battleship Ostfriesland. Finally, the first battle tanks were not very successful until technology matured and--perhaps even more importantly--until doctrine and tactics caught up sufficiently to make the tank truly effective.

In the early days of military aviation, bombs and aircraft were combined in the concept of long-range strategic bombing, and bitter debate broke out over its merits.¹ Interpretations of World War II events favor both sides of that debate, while questions linger over the effectiveness of the bombing. The true promise of aerial bombing in a conventional war seems to have been realized only recently--in the Gulf War. Never in the history of aerial warfare had the world witnessed in such graphic detail the effects of aerial bombardment, communicated by the almost instantaneous replay of these scenes on television. It was stunning testimony to advances in modern weapons technology.

The precise delivery of weapons, an important element of effective aerial bombing, was missing during Giulio Douhet's and Mitchell's day, although they foresaw its potential. The successes of the F-15E, F-117A, and A-10 in the Gulf War were due to the marriage of capable aerial platforms--featuring sensors and accurate navigation--with precision guided bombs and missiles. Early skepticism of long-range aerial bombardment has finally been laid to rest. Too bad it took so long. This seems to be a case of technology finally catching up with doctrine.

The combination of aerial platform, sensors, and the ultraprecision inherent in HEL weapons promises to extend the success of precision air-to-ground weapon delivery enjoyed in the Gulf War to future air-to-air engagements of all kinds. Aerial vehicles are generally highly stressed and vulnerable due to their construction from lightweight materials and the high performance continually demanded of them. The potential of a silent, very long range, speed-of-light weapon in the aerial warfare environment is staggering. ABL promises to make that potential a reality by providing defense against theater missiles such as Scuds, which caused a large share of casualties in the Gulf War and occupied a significant number of coalition air sorties.

Theater missile defense (TMD) is now at a stage similar to that of early aerial bombing. However, disagreements within and among the services over roles and missions in the theater battle arena are impeding TMD progress. What is the best way to kill theater ballistic missiles (TBM), and who should have that mission? This article will not settle that question but hopefully will stimulate discussion on the impact that HEL technology could have on future aerial warfare and the ways such a weapon might be employed, particularly as a solution to a daunting TMD challenge.

Further, technology and doctrine have not yet come together to make ABL a viable TMD weapon system. Technology alone cannot make ABLs work. Complex ABL technologies (e.g., uncooled optics, deformable mirrors, atmospheric compensation, and lightweight chemical laser devices) may be sufficiently mature today, but doctrine for aerial HEL warfare is virtually nonexistent. There is no base of experience for these weapons. If ABL is to become a successful weapon, the development of doctrine must progress apace with the evolution of technology.

ABL technology is reaching maturity. Aircraft platforms now exist that can carry the necessary crews, fuels, and equipment constituting a laser weapon system with potentially high operational effectiveness. This means ABLs could be used in a variety of missions, including TBM kills at ranges of 400+ kilometers (km), counterair and anti-cruise-missile kills at 100+ km range, and defense of airborne high-value assets against air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles (SAM). They could also perform surveillance, command and control (C²), and battle management tasks yet maintain an effective self-defense capability. These missions could cover wide areas by capitalizing on the flexibility and responsiveness inherent to air power, while leveraging ABL's precision into a potent force multiplier for boost-phase missile intercepts. This vision of future ABL effectiveness is possible because of our investment in many years of HEL system development, including a significant amount of airborne HEL work in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Certainly, questions remain. How effective--and expensive--would such a weapon system be? Can it be built with the operational availability, reliability, and robustness needed in wartime? Would this specialized technology--new to the Air Force operational world--be maintainable and sustainable in the field? Would it take more decades of development, missteps, and refinement to realize the full potential of such weapons? Is it worth the added investment? We must find out, since the potential payoff is so high. If the technological and programmatic (i.e., cost and schedule) hurdles can be overcome, then what impact will HEL have on future aerial warfare?

The main parts of an airborne HEL system are the platform (airplane), the sensor system ("eyes"), the HEL device ("photon faucet"), and a pointing and tracking system ("beam control"). Of course, other ground and airborne assets are required to support such a system, but they are not the pacing technical challenge.

Many of these elements, in earlier forms, have already been demonstrated on an airborne platform. The first airborne HEL system was the Air Force's Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL), which flew its last laser test mission in 1983 (and now resides at the Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio). However, ALL was a laboratory--not a weapon system.² Scientists used it to learn about propagating lasers through an aircraft's turbulent boundary layer and through the intervening atmosphere to a target. With 1970s technology, ALL demonstrated half-megawatt-class laser power; tens-of-microradians jitter levels (unwanted motion due to aircraft vibration sources and atmospheric turbulence) of the intense laser beam; and accurate, safe beam control. In demonstrations of potential future applications, ALL successfully conducted laser beam tests using towed diagnostic targets, engaged and defeated AIM-9B air-to-air missiles, and shot down sea-skimming target drones simulating maritime cruise missiles.³

In spite of those dramatic successes, ALL was not suitable for fielding as a weapon system in 1983, nor is it a candidate for today's TBM mission. After all, it was a test bed--not a fully developed weapon system. Its long, 10.6-micron-wavelength gas dynamic laser, combined with limited optical component dimensions, led to poor laser beam propagation over distances greater than 10 km. Just as importantly, the system was not designed to be operated or maintained by a war fighter. However, it did give us a glimpse of the kind of devastating damage HELs could produce when operated from an airplane and coupled with the inherent flexibility and mobility of air power. The ALL system tracked and burned holes in high-speed aerial targets within seconds, causing them to lose control and crash. In short, this firepower was awesome! The experience gained from ALL now motivates many ABL proponents to press the case for these weapons for TMD.

In the time since the ALL flights, the elements of a conceptual airborne HEL weapon system have continued to evolve. Aircraft technology has steadily advanced to the point that wide-body aircraft such as the 747 series--incorporating sophisticated wing designs and newer, more powerful engines--can now lift heavy payloads to high altitudes for extended periods of time.

Sensors developed for the satellite community and for tactical applications are smaller, more sensitive, of higher resolution, and cheaper than ever before. It is possible to electro-optically detect and track missile plumes out to many hundreds of kilometers from a high-altitude airborne platform. Active and passive radar techniques can detect many kinds of moving airborne objects, including ballistic missiles, SAMs, aircraft, and cruise missiles.

Lasers have attained megawatt power levels in ground-based systems and hundreds of kilowatts in airborne experiments. Chemical oxygen-iodine lasers offer much improved beam shape, are scalable to very high powers, operate at benign temperatures and pressures, and are much safer than many other types of lasers. As with all lasers, though, one must exercise extreme care with the lethal photon beam output. Moreover, operating wavelengths for airborne applications have decreased--with an attendant reduction in required optical system size and weight--while still maintaining high overall system performance levels.

The beam control subsystem is one of the most challenging elements of the HEL system. Developments over the years have focused on reducing beam jitter, maintaining beam shape, precisely pointing the beam within incredibly small angular tolerances, and keeping a stable target track long enough for HEL to burn a hole in a critical spot on the target. Today, systems often achieve submicroradian jitter levels, which is like saying at a distance of 200 miles, the beam will jump around no more than the width of a basketball! Uncooled mirrors have played an important role in reducing HEL beam jitter. Many formerly liquid-cooled mirrors can now be left uncooled, due to the excellent and durable coatings routinely applied to them. This improvement translates into lower weight, along with much less vibration induced into mirror surfaces by the flow of water or other coolants. The other extremely significant development in recent years is our ability to compensate for the effects of turbulence in the atmosphere, which degrade the beam as it travels to the target. This "adaptive optics" technology, recently declassified for the astronomer community, has been demonstrated at Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, and at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory Firepond facility in Massachusetts. It is an enabling technology that will sustain the very long range performance of laser weapons.⁴

A confluence of recent events and developments has rekindled intense interest in the ABL weapon. What was lacking in 1983 besides the right technology for the ALL demonstrations was a mission and the support of a user. The mission was thrust into the spotlight by the Gulf War and the terror produced by Scud attacks, while Air Combat Command (ACC) later provided the all-important user support. This series of events led to the start of the ABL project in 1992. Defense against Scuds and other types of TBMs is now a high priority.⁵ For example, ACC is developing ABL requirement thresholds and objectives, and Phillips Laboratory's ABL System Program Office at Kirtland AFB has prepared initial technical requirements for ABL.⁶

What is ABL? Notionally, it will be a large, wide-body aircraft modified to carry a laser weapon system payload to high altitudes (above 40,000 feet) and will be able to spend a significant time on station, battle ready. With data from onboard and off-board sensors, it will detect, track, and engage boosting TBMs at long ranges (i.e., hundreds of kilometers).

ABL will be capable of autonomous operation, particularly in the early stages of a theater conflict when C² may well be handed down to lower execution levels. Cockpit and mission crew members will work together to position ABL in a flight pattern that provides the best protection for troops and equipment entering the theater or for civilian population centers. Onboard surveillance sensors, operating in a 360-degree sweep about the aircraft, will be capable of detecting a variety of air vehicles. Coordination with ground-, ship-, and aircraft-based radars will complete the air picture. Previously established rules of engagement will allow the ABL mission commander to react to and engage threats.

Laser fuels carried by ABL will sustain engagements of more than 20 targets, depending on target type/hardness, range to target, atmospheric conditions, aircraft altitude, and other factors. These fuels will be thermally and chemically managed to maintain their potency and to minimize weight. When combined in the laser device, they will produce multimegawatt power looking for a place to go. The beam control system must take all that energy and direct it to the right place--namely, a target.

If the laser beam were simply pointed toward the target, just as one points a flashlight, the beam would easily wander off its intended target because of aircraft vibration and atmospheric-induced jitter. The beam would spread out and become diffuse due to atmospheric turbulence and likely would not inflict sufficient damage on the target missile. These technical challenges must be overcome for ABL to work. Current research and development efforts indicate that solutions are close at hand.

Mirrors are key to beam control. First, jitter is suppressed by using precision, inertially stabilized references for the laser beam, similar to aligning the whole system to something immobile--such as a star. Fast-steering mirrors, which move even faster than most vibration sources, are then used to correct for vibration-induced motion of the beam. Another class of mirror is used to correct the phase (path length) distortions of the beam, whether caused by the laser device itself or by the turbulence in the atmosphere. This so-called deformable mirror changes its shape in response to computer commands. Wave-front sensors and computer phase-reconstruction algorithms, coupled to deformable mirrors, now routinely take the twinkle out of stars for astronomers.⁷ We know they work from the ground to space; we must now be sure they work from airplanes to missiles.

Tying all this together is a fire control system with human beings in control. Crew coordination will still be as important as ever when the battle starts and hostile missiles and aircraft fill the air. The mission crew will use decision support systems to cope with a complex air picture and select which targets to engage, all the while trying to stay alive themselves.

The technology is indeed sophisticated and fascinating. But we stand the risk of becoming too fascinated with the technology and not immersed enough in the war-fighting doctrine required to support the use of that technology.

Need for ABL Doctrine

As is often the case, technology has outpaced the development of doctrine for ABL. Frequently, it takes time and battlefield experience to fully appreciate the capabilities of a new system and to appreciate additional ways of exploiting those capabilities. Wartime effectiveness is reduced when doctrine outpaces technology, as was the case with aerial bombing for many years. Unfortunately, a weapon system developed in a doctrinal void also may fall far short of the effectiveness it might otherwise enjoy early in its application. It is time to think about warfare doctrine for ABL.

This article makes no attempt to rewrite Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, or to define tenets of basic, operational, or tactical doctrine.⁸ Nor does it enter the debate over whether doctrine should be defined as fundamental, environmental, or organizational.⁹ Some readers will see parallels with the development of space doctrine and all its attendant controversy.¹⁰ Some will look at the ABL weapon as merely an extension of other conventional weapons (i.e., as very fast, long-range missiles). Indeed, some current Air Force modeling and simulation efforts simplify an ABL weapon by using existing missile models and making them fly extremely fast. But thinking of a photon as a fast missile can lead to constricted thinking about ABL doctrine. Some initial thoughts to encourage ABL doctrine development by more astute "doctrinaires" should be considered.

The key to air power is flexibility, which can be defined as the ability to rapidly reconfigure forces for the tasks at hand, deploy those forces quickly, position them to greatest advantage, concentrate individually weak elements into superior masses (even if only for short periods of time), and redirect their goals in real time. ABLs, by virtue of being airborne, are potentially very flexible forces. Yet, this attribute could be lost if they are not specifically designed to exploit flexibility (i.e., to deploy very quickly, stand alert, be efficiently maintained and supported, be serviced [turned] quickly in the theater of battle, and be tightly woven into the theater C² architecture). ABL aircraft must retain an effective maneuvering capability in spite of high operating weights and altitudes. The platforms must operate over great distances and for long periods of time, which means they must be air refuelable and should accommodate augmented aircrews and provide rest facilities on board. ABLs must be ready to take up battle stations immediately upon arrival in a theater and must be able to fight their way into a theater, if necessary.

Given the fact that ABL systems must maintain flexibility, what else can be said? Concerning doctrine and technology, Air Force historian Dr Richard P. Hallion writes that

doctrine must function in the present, be appropriate for the near-future, possess flexibility and adaptability to meet changing conditions, and be rooted in the past, in military history and experience. It must reflect the complete climate in which it is framed, a climate including existing political and economic realities. (Emphasis in original)¹¹

Since there are no bases of operational experience, lessons learned, or "rooting in the past" for HEL weapons, one must build upon other proven lessons of air power application, just as space doctrine now builds on proven principles of employment.¹² One might argue that the classical principles of air power are more appropriate for offensive than for defensive operations. However, ACC's current emphasis on "active defense" (i.e., pushing the defensive theater missile fight back over to the enemy's territory) mandates consideration of a more active/offensive role for "defensive" elements like ABL. Thus, the same principles may apply equally well to active defense in the TMD arena and could be used as a surrogate experience base for ABL.

Although the notion seems contradictory, a defensive system such as ABL could play a vital role in the offensive against the enemy's theater missile forces. ABL's wide-area coverage could be used to force enemy launch points into smaller and smaller zones to make missiles more vulnerable to attack. Precision tracking and target identification by ABL could backtrack missile launch points for immediate counterforce attacks. The laser weapon in a counterair and counter-SAM mode of operation could potentially support offensive strike packages. Indeed, the psychological impact of an effective long-range laser weapon, "silent but deadly," could itself be wielded as a weapon.

ABL would be capable of exchanging air picture information with the Air Force's airborne warning and control system (AWACS), the Navy's airborne early warning/ground environment integration segment (AEGIS), and the Army's area and point defense systems. It would also be able to operate in a cooperative mode with other ABLs, assigning target priorities and fields of fire where their coverages overlap. Positive human-in-the-loop control, laser engagement floors, and safe corridors would have to be established to assure proper target identification and to avoid fratricide.

ABL would be designed to operate somewhat autonomously in early stages of the theater conflict, when ground-based C² assets may not yet be in place. Yet, ABL may be the best platform from which to direct the active TMD battle during the early stages and could play an important role in centralizing control for airborne kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) missile interceptors, if they are part of TMD architecture.¹³

Seize the Initiative

This principle can be interpreted in temporal terms: getting inside the enemy's short-launch and missile-flight time lines and keeping control of the tempo of battle. Speed-of-light transit of lethal laser energy means that ABL could meet many of the TBM-reaction time lines, perhaps uniquely.

ABLs would be capable of maintaining constant, round-the-clock surveillance; launch detection; and engagements of single and multiple missile boosters and could rapidly retarget from one missile to the next. Precision, even beyond that achieved by smart bombs or missiles, would allow application of lethal force at the desired point of vulnerability. Careful application of laser fluency and real-time kill assessment would allow termination of track/kill after only the necessary amount of energy has been delivered to the target, thereby conserving resources and extending the number of targets engaged. Based on threat assessments, ABLs would be deployed to effective orbit locations, with deep laser-fuel magazines and with high operational availability. Resupply, replenishment of fuels and crew, maintenance, and aircraft turn procedures must be incorporated into the conceptual design of the system in order to maintain that high availability.

Maintain Sufficient Reserves

The ABL fleet would have to be sized to provide sufficient coverage in the expected theaters of battle and to sustain sufficient maintenance and attrition reserves. Required numbers of aircraft must be determined through careful analysis since total program cost is a direct function of the ABL fleet size.

In keeping with Dr Hallion's comment that doctrine "must reflect . . . existing political and economic realities," the changing political and economic environments in which we live must be accommodated in the transition of ABL technology to an operational weapon system. The budgetary environment at present is not good for boost-phase intercept, and ABL must survive the current decrease in available funding for new systems. If it does survive in the near term, ABL may have the chance to demonstrate its payback in economy. ABL has significant potential for lower cost per kill, insofar as each shot expends only laser fuel and the hardware itself stays put. ABL also has the potential to save money in the design and employment of other TMD tiers, since it would reduce the missile-load threat presented to post-boost-phase, defensive systems. Ongoing studies of concept design and analyses of cost- and operational effectiveness are addressing these issues.

Politics are more difficult to fathom. Summarizing the limits likely to be imposed by Congress and the public on military action, Phillip Meilinger writes,

1. We will seldom [use] conventional . . . ground troops. Instead, we will use special operations forces. . . .

2. The draft will not be reintroduced. . . .

3. There will be great pressure to extract [troops] quickly. The American public is monumentally impatient with long wars and has a low threshold of pain regarding casualty figures. . . .

4. If we apply air power in lieu of ground forces, we must do it with precision and minimal collateral damage. . . .

5. Civilian leaders will maintain extremely close control over military operations. . . . Given the high stakes involved with world opinion and the sensitivity of political relations, the perceived need for such tight civilian control will not diminish.¹⁴

Some implications of these constraints for ABL are as follows:

1. The value of ABL's ultraprecision will increase in the future.

2. Returning the responsibility for collateral damage to the aggressor will be possible with boost-phase intercepts by lasers, which do not launch residual (friendly) hardware over--or leave it on--enemy territory.

3. ABL can remain outside the political boundaries of a hostile nation, not overtly provoking but posing an instant response to an outbreak of hostilities (or a TBM launch). Lack of--or delay in receiving--border crossing authority is not a factor in the face of a launch. Required levels of civilian control can be maintained.

Finally, considering the international political environment, a difficult problem is what to do about TBMs carrying chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Certainly, it is desirable to keep them from being launched in the first place. What will it take to do that? Are we willing to threaten to use and then actually use the same kinds of nasty weapons that a Saddam Hussein might launch? Would our threat to employ such weapons be credible in tomorrow's world? These questions delve into the possible role of ABLs in providing deterrence to the use of TBMs, a subject clearly beyond the scope of this article yet an interesting topic for future discussion.

Conclusion

ABL boost-phase intercept meets the requirements for effective TBM defense and offers the potential for high operational effectiveness. ABL is perhaps the only viable candidate for the boost-phase job. Further concept definition, system design analysis, and continuing research should answer many of the questions about technology and cost by 1997. A working operational prototype could be built by the year 2000.

These and other doctrinal inputs must be factored into ABL operational requirements and, ultimately, into system technical requirements. A timely discussion of ABL doctrine will complement the evolution of this impressive technology.

1. See Edward Meade Earle, ed., Military Strategy (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983), 47-61.

2. For a description of the early ALL program, see Maj Thomas J. Dyble, "Peace through Light: The Airborne Laser Laboratory," Student Report 83-0615 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, February 1983).

3. The author was a beam-control-system crew member on the ALL from 1982 to 1983 and a test director for turret aero-optics experiments in 1984. A complete history of the ALL program is being assembled by the Phillips Laboratory historian at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico.

4. For an excellent introduction to the principles of adaptive optics, see MIT Lincoln Laboratory Journal 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992).

5. "The FY 92-97 Defense Planning Guidance, 24 Jan 90, and the FY 91 Appropriations Conference Committee Report, H. Rep. 101-938, Title IV, 24 Oct 90, directed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and Department of Defense (DoD) to commit resources to TMD programs and accelerate research and development for systems to be fielded as soon as technologically and fiscally feasible. To expedite TMD efforts, the Warner-Nunn amendment, FY 92 Defense Appropriation Bill, required an improved capability by the mid-1990s. The National Defense Act for FY 93 consolidated all theater defense projects under a DoD-wide Theater Missile Defense Initiative (TMDI), assigned by the Secretary of Defense, and transferred the management of several technology programs from SDIO to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)." Program Management Plan for the Theater Missile Defense Program within Theater Air Defense (Los Angeles AFB, Calif.: Space and Missile Systems Center, 5 December 1993), 1.

6. "Airborne Laser Technical Requirements Document" (U) (Kirtland AFB, N.Mex.: Phillips Laboratory, June 1993). (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

7. C. A. Primmerman et al., "Compensation of Atmospheric Optical Distortions Using a Synthetic Beacon," Nature 353 (12 September 1991): 141; and R. Q. Fugate et al., "Measurement of Atmospheric Wavefront Using Scattered Light from a Laser Guide Star," Nature 353 (12 September 1991): 144.

8. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 16 March 1984, v-vi.

9. Lt Col Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine," Air University Review 33, no. 2 (January-February 1982): 43.

10. Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt Col John G. Tockston, "Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine," Airpower Journal 2, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 54-68.

11. Dr Richard P. Hallion, "Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective," Airpower Journal 1, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 26.

12. Capt James R. Wolf discusses AFM 2-25, Space Operations, in "Toward Operational-Level Doctrine for Space: A Progress Report," Airpower Journal 5, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 39.

13. KKVs are also proposed as weapons to combat TBMs, although the current technology only supports intercepts high in the atmosphere, after the threat booster burns out and the warhead is on a ballistic path toward its target. Extremely stressing time lines for the KKVs' flyout and intercept may ultimately limit their application to the postboost, ascent phase of TBMs. Even so, they may prove complementary to the ABL in the TMD arena. Studies are in progress (e.g., by Phillips Laboratory/XP) that examine the potential for synergy between the ABL and KKV concepts.

14. Lt Col Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Air Force in the Twenty-first Century: Challenge and Response," Airpower Journal 4, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 40.

Contributor

Lt Col Stephen A. Coulombe (BSEE, MEE, Cornell University; MBA, Boston University) is chief, Airborne Laser Test and Integration, Phillips Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. He has previously served as exchange officer with canadian Defence Headquarters and the German Flight Test Center; chief engineer with a classified flight test program; and test director with the Airborne Laser Laboratory. Colonel Coulombe is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Canadian Forces Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

[ Back Issues | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]