Published Airpower Journal - Winter 1993
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


Dr Steven Metz

IT IS EASY to assume that the end of the cold war changed only the key actors in global politics but left fundamental concepts and relationships intact. Such an assumption would mean that American national security professionals need only find ways to adapt old techniques to new circumstances--not an especially taxing procedure. But the truth is that the essence of military power is also changing, a fact that presents new intellectual challenges of dramatic proportions for security professionals and that demands creativity on a wide range of topics. None of these challenges is more complex than discovering an effective role for United States military power in multinational peacekeeping operations.

Although the US historically supported international peacekeeping and often paid a substantial portion of the costs, it accorded this task minimal strategic significance. Common wisdom held that neutrality was a prerequisite for peacekeeping. Since the US was seldom neutral, other nations were better suited to provide peacekeeping forces.

Furthermore, most of the recent international peacekeeping operations were under the control of the United Nations (UN), an organization that was decidedly hostile to the US by the 1970s.1 Indeed, the UN General Assembly and the US had such starkly divergent views of global security that there was little ground for consensus. From the American perspective, the UN jettisoned any veneer of neutrality through actions such as the General Assembly resolution of 10 November 1975, which claimed that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

By the 1980s, many Americans questioned the continued participation of the United States in the UN.2 Charles Krauthammer probably captured widespread feelings when he wrote, "On war and peace, whether in Afghanistan, Nicaragua or the Persian Gulf, the United Nations is irrelevant. . . . Dominated by its automatic Soviet bloc-Third World majority, the United Nations is one of the most important instruments of anti-Western diplomacy."3

As a result of this impasse, US success in peacekeeping came outside the UN, most notably with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai.4 In general, though, fiascoes such as the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon--combined with ideological bias and incompetence in the UN--led us to conclude that peacekeeping operations brought risks and costs out of proportion to the political payoffs. As a result, our national security strategy and military doctrine talked of peacekeeping, but we did not take it seriously.

Now the impasse is broken, and peacekeeping is--according to Laurence Martin--a "growth industry."5 In fact, the UN dispatched more forces since 1988 than it did in the previous 40 years combined.6 Blue-helmeted troops are on the ground in a dozen operations from El Salvador to Western Sahara to Cambodia. This frenzy of activity, which is a direct result of the end of the cold war, has strained the UN's capabilities. After their external support was cut off, many third world conflicts were resolved diplomatically with some form of UN involvement. The ability of the UN to monitor and implement diplomatic solutions, however, lagged far behind its skill at negotiating them.7

At the same time that UN peacekeeping underwent a renaissance, hostility toward US involvement in third world conflicts lessened. This phenomenon is due in part to a new American attitude. Specifically, after the demise of the Soviet Union, we no longer viewed regional conflict through the narrow, often paralyzing confines of the cold war. Today, many belligerents recognize that the US has no imperial ambitions and that no peacekeeping operation can succeed without American backing (if not direct participation). Thus, they now welcome our involvement instead of shunning it.

This confluence of trends provides strategic opportunities. According to Richard Connaughton, "The time for a new military strategy of peace for the world based on the UN in general and the Security Council in particular has never been more propitious."8 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has attempted to take advantage of this opportunity by constructing a framework for the resuscitation of the UN. In his widely praised report of June 1992 entitled An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, he wrote that "an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter."9 In the secretary-general's vision, the cold war was only an interregnum in the movement toward a system of global security that transcends the persistent violence of the traditional one. However, this movement requires not just an increase in the extent of traditional peacekeeping but totally new forms of UN activity.

Unfortunately, the US military is not fully prepared to play an active role in the evolution of peacekeeping. Our post-cold-war national security and military strategies have not fully accommodated basic changes in the form and utility of military force, particularly in such rapidly changing areas as peacekeeping. Landmark documents such as the National Military Strategy of the United States of January 1992 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States of February 1993 barely mention such changes.10 Although joint doctrine, policy, and procedures are being developed, without a solid foundation in the wider framework of military strategy, they will have only a minimal effect on training and planning. This situation would leave us poorly prepared to face new security challenges. Put bluntly, there is a great need for serious study, intense debate, and sustained analysis on the role that the US can play in constructing a post-cold-war global security system in which multinational peacekeeping is an effective element of conflict resolution. This fact is especially true for the US Air Force since, by bringing unique capabilities to multinational operations, it can be a vital--perhaps essential--component of future success at peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping, Old
and New

The first step in crafting effective procedures, plans, and doctrine for the use of American aerospace power in peacekeeping operations is understanding the nature and associated problems of these operations. Although the type of peacekeeping described here is a recent phenomenon, the notion of inserting an outside, neutral force into a conflict to allow a cooling-down period, to facilitate negotiations, and to help assure adherence to a diplomatic settlement has been present throughout history. What is unique, however, is the ongoing institutionalization of the process under the aegis of the UN, as well as regional international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity and Organization of American States.

Collective security and the peaceful settlement of disputes were two of the primary functions of the UN from its inception. But the UN charter assumed that threats to security after World War II would take the traditional form of interstate aggression. The framers of the charter did not foresee that ideological struggle and the often-violent process of decolonization would dominate the postwar global security system. Thus, the charter did not mention peacekeeping as it later developed but assumed that a permanent military force created and manned by the great powers would keep the peace.11

The charter notion of international security quickly proved unrealistic, leaving the UN to seek innovative ways to perform its mandate. Peacekeeping was one of these innovations, and troops were first dispatched under the authority of the Security Council to the Middle East in 1948. Under the energetic and creative leadership of Dag Hammarskjold, UN secretary-general from 1953 to 1961, and others, such as Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and longtime UN official Brian Urquhart, peacekeeping developed into a useful (if limited) element of conflict resolution.12 In essence, traditional peacekeeping was a form of military activity "organized by the U.N. on an ad hoc basis to act as an interposition force following a cease-fire, but prior to any agreement resolving major issues in a dispute."13

UN peacekeeping operations followed a common pattern.14 The Security Council or the General Assembly created and established guidelines for a specific operation but exercised little actual direction over the operation. The secretary-general named the force commander, recruited the force from member nations, and wrote rules of engagement and procedures that were subject to approval by the Security Council or General Assembly. The commander then took command of a multinational force that almost always excluded American or Soviet troops and usually those from NATO or the Warsaw Pact.15 The peacekeepers operated with the consent of the parties to the conflict, attempted to remain rigidly neutral, and--since they were to act as observers, stabilizers, confidence builders, and buffers rather than as enforcers--carried only light arms. The force did not require or even seek military effectiveness.16 Clearly, the conditions under which traditional peacekeeping could succeed were limited.

The end of the cold war, however, provided the opportunity to expand the utility of multinational peacekeeping. The question is, How? Initially, it might seem logical to pass the peacekeeping mandate to some international organization or organizations other than the UN, but shortcomings of regional organizations are even greater than those of the UN.17 Similarly, the most militarily efficient solution--having the US act unilaterally as the agent of the UN--is politically infeasible. The answer, then, is strengthening the UN, but at present there is no clear consensus on the extent or nature of this process.

Some adaptations of the traditional model are being made "on the fly" as the UN responds to crises with intrusive, nontraditional activities, many of which involve US forces. For example, US Air Force F-15s and F-16s participated in enforcing the Bosnian "no-fly zone," and a reinforced infantry company from the Berlin Brigade was part of a preemptive deployment to Macedonia.18 Other actions have been considered, including UN monitoring of the border crossings between Serbia and Bosnia to prevent the military resupply of Bosnian Serb militias.19 The US has also encouraged the UN to send a multinational police force to Haiti to reestablish order and ease the transition to democracy. This UN peacekeeping force would be the first one inserted into a situation not involving civil or international war.20

Beyond these reactive steps, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has actively attempted to craft a conceptual and strategic foundation for post-cold-war peacekeeping. To expand the UN's capabilities beyond the traditional model, he called for a new category of UN forces to be called "peace-enforcement units."21 These trained volunteer troops would be more heavily armed than traditional peacekeepers and would be made available to the Security Council on a permanent basis by member states. Peace-enforcement units could intervene without the consent of the local parties when the Security Council approved and, by implication, could abandon neutrality when one party clearly posed the major threat to peace.22 In other words, these second-generation peacekeepers could be more intrusive and aggressive than traditional ones.

To augment the flexibility and speed of peacekeeping operations, the secretary-general asked for improved training for UN police contingents and for prepositioned military supplies.23 Recognizing that all peacekeeping is grounded in diplomacy, Boutros-Ghali also emphasized peacemaking (bringing hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means) and peace building (identifying and strengthening support structures solidifying peace).24 In Boutros-Ghali's vision, the UN would transcend the limitations of traditional peacekeeping and develop the capability to play an effective role in a range of conflicts from relatively simple observer missions through the protection of safe havens to full-scale enforcement activities such as Operation Desert Storm.25 Most importantly, these actions could take place without the consent of the antagonists in a conflict. In this way, the vision of the charter would be realized half a century after its signing.

Other analysts have proposed even more radical expansions of peacekeeping. James Meachem, for example, supports creation of a brigade-size standing UN force to serve as a rapid-reaction element for crises that cannot wait for the building of a traditional peacekeeping force or to serve as the first echelon of a larger UN contingent.26 In an even more innovative vein, J. S. Bremner and J. M. Snell envisage a role for UN forces in new types of security threats, including environmental peacekeeping and international anticrime operations.27 This proposal is well in accord with Boutros-Ghali's holistic view of economic, social, and environmental problems as security threats coequal with military conflict.28 Given this trend, the UN may eventually consider other functions, such as the intrusive enforcement of a nuclear, biological, or chemical nonproliferation regime or the restoration of democratic governments.

Although official American policy has not been nearly this forward thinking, President George Bush did embrace Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace. In a speech to the UN, Bush called for multinational efforts in five key areas:

Clearly, the UN's role in peacekeeping is changing in a way congruent with US national interests. This trend has serious implications for the US military and particularly for the Air Force.

Air Force Missions

In order to succeed at the type of intrusive activities proposed by Boutros-Ghali, the UN must be able to perform, organize, or coordinate a range of military missions. According to a study by a group of US military officers, these missions range from simple assessments to joint and combined campaigns in major regional conflicts (table 1). These missions, in turn, require a range of military capabilities:

A. Intelligence
1. Indications and Warnings
2. Strategic Assessment
3. Tactical Intelligence
B. Integrated Military Command, Control, and Communications (C3)
1. Planning
2. Operations
3. Training and Simulation
4. In-Place Regional Command Structure
5. Area Specialization
6. Global Communications
7. Precision Locating
C. Aerospace Power
1. Aerospace Control
2. Precision Munitions Delivery
3. Survivable Deep Attack
4. Theater Missile Defense
D. Maritime Power/Sea Control
1. Countermine
2. Countersmuggling
3. Protection of Escorts/Sea Lines of Communications
4. Refugee Control
E. Forcible Entry
F. Strategic Mobility
1. Airlift
2. Sea Lift
G. Global Logistics Support
H. Land Combat Power
1. Light Infantry Force
2. Armored Force
3. Heliborne Force
I. Unconventional Warfare
J. Nation Building
1. Engineering
2. Civil Affairs
3. Psychological Operations30


Because many of these functions are far beyond the UN's current capabilities, the US--in view of its extra-UN global military commitments--should focus on those functions that other member states cannot provide. Specifically, aerospace power is just the sort of task that the US can provide quicker, more effectively, or more efficiently than other nations.

The central role of air power in preserving a UN-engineered peace is not new. As Eric Grove points out, "The Charter is explicit in considering air forces the most appropriate weapons of first resort against potential aggressors."31 Today the speed, power, and flexibility of aerospace power can be decisive, both as a deterrent and an actual counter to aggression. The UN desperately needs aerospace power but has none.

The US Air Force can support UN operations in a number of areas:


What would it take for the US military, especially the Air Force, to provide more effective support for UN military actions? It would not require any radical force structure changes above those already planned because the crisis-response and contingency forces called for in the new national military strategy--in conjunction with the planning and intelligence resources of the unified commands--would suffice.32 Although the inherent flexibility of composite wings would make them especially useful, the unique nature of the new UN operations should persuade senior leaders to consider the formation of a dedicated unit in the US military for this type of activity. In addition, the Air Force should advocate and pursue change in three key areas.


Above all else, the Air Force must take peacekeeping seriously by valuing the preservation of peace as much as victory in the traditional sense. The military services must give peacekeeping its fair share of resources in terms of intellectual energy, talent, and training time--something that can happen only when the attitudes of senior leaders change.

Such a change in attitude does not imply abandoning the war-fighter ethos that the American military worked so hard to create and sustain. But the fact remains that peacekeeping and war fighting have fundamental differences, including divergent objectives. Further, peacekeeping occurs in the fuzzy area between war and peace, where military force is directly subordinate to diplomatic efforts. The traditional American approach to conflict, however, draws a rigid distinction between peace and war and can be dysfunctional in the area of low-intensity conflict or--to use the more current phrase--military operations short of war (including peacekeeping). Approaching all conflict as war can be dangerously counterproductive. We must, therefore, recognize the limitations on the appropriateness of the war-fighter ethos lest we find ourselves in a situation in which our own attitudes erode opportunities to forestall war.

Peacekeeping requires a unique form of leadership, especially by junior and noncommissioned officers.33 They must understand that there is a time and a place for war fighting--and a point at which a war fighter's attitude must dominate, even in peacekeeping. Service cultures and systems for the cultivation of leaders must find a way to make leaders understand this fragile and rapidly changing relationship.

Training and Education

Because attitudes and service cultures germinate in the service educational systems, all levels of professional military education (PME) should include the fundamentals of peacekeeping, including the distinction between peacekeeping and war fighting.34 Further, PME should look for instructors from nations with extensive involvement in peacekeeping operations. Canadians, for example, have wide experience in traditional UN peacekeeping, and the broad similarities in the Canadian and US militaries would make for a logical relationship between the two, once Americans accept the notion that they are the students and not the teachers.

Peacekeeping operations require that planners and field commanders acquire extensive cultural and political sensitivity--traits that must be acquired far in advance of deployment. A combination of civilian and military educational institutions must provide courses in these areas. For example, basic and intermediate PME (e.g., Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, respectively) can provide a basic foundation that must be augmented by more detailed regional studies at civilian universities or the Air War College. These institutions should offer courses in ethnicity, history, and cultural factors, which must in turn be augmented by staff and unit exercises involving joint, interagency, and combined operations in support of the UN. The Air Force should also consider establishment of a formal peacekeeping institute such as the one at the US Army War College.

Doctrine and Planning Procedures

We have joint doctrine for US military involvement in peacekeeping operations, but it focuses on traditional, first-generation activity. Joint Pub 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations" (revised final draft), for example, defines peacekeeping as "operations, conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties, designed to maintain a negotiated truce and help promote conditions that support the diplomatic efforts to establish a long-term peace in areas of conflict."35

Similarly, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, notes that "the single most important requirement of a peacekeeping operation is consent to the operation by all the parties in the dispute," a sentiment echoed in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.36 Obviously, US doctrine has not captured the sense of radical change in the notion of peacekeeping and needs refinement in order to retain relevance in the world of more aggressive and intrusive UN actions. This observation is particularly true for the portions of the doctrine that deal with the air component.

The US should assist in the development of UN doctrine, staff, and planning procedures for multinational peacekeeping operations. Currently, no such doctrine exists; instead, the UN has a combination of case-by-case rules of engagement and a "protodoctrine" compiled by a private organization that supports UN activity.37 Likewise, the UN's ability to plan and direct a military operation is limited. Although articles 46 and 47 of the charter established a Military Staff Committee composed of the military chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council acting through day-to-day representatives,38 the cold war stalemate destroyed the effectiveness of this construct, so most planning was ad hoc (and inefficient).

Today, many experts argue (without reaching a consensus) that the UN needs doctrine, rational planning procedures, and a trained staff to provide clear, strategic guidance that the peacekeeping force commander and his staff can translate into mission statements.39 Marrack I. Goulding, former UN under secretary-general in charge of peacekeeping, feels that the creation of a "war room" for operational planning would distract from the essentially diplomatic nature of UN missions.40 As a compromise, the US, Great Britain, France, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries added military advisers to their UN missions to aid in planning--a halfway step at best. A more systematic plan calls for (1) a US-sponsored multinational UN military school to train planners, (2) the formation of a strategic plans and policy cell at UN headquarters led by a flag officer, and (3) establishment of a high-tech UN communications unit by the US.41

In addition, the US should refine its own methods for planning peacekeeping operations. As John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra point out, a model exists in our planning procedures for counterinsurgency,42 a form of conflict--like peacekeeping--characterized by political and psychological factors and by severe limits on the use of military force. Hence, American doctrine and planning procedures for counterinsurgency could be adapted to peacekeeping.43

The US must refine several other elements of planning if it is to provide more effective support to UN peacekeeping. For example, we need better methods for establishing air exclusion zones or air quarantines. Key issues would include nondestructive methods for suppressing hostile air movement, appropriate steps for suppression of air defenses, and techniques for identification friend or foe (IFF) and the identification of military and nonmilitary air traffic in the peacekeeping environment. US planners must also consider the impact of peacekeeping operations on the budget and on personnel rotation and assignment during the ongoing force drawdown. Peacekeeping operations will usually not require large numbers of US forces but may require a protracted US presence. Finally, US intelligence capabilities can be of great utility to UN peacekeeping, but our services and intelligence agencies must develop guidelines for intelligence sanitation and procedures for dissemination prior to an operation.

Obstacles to Success

Without a doubt, the US has both the human and material resources that are necessary for the Air Force to assume a more active and effective role in support of UN peacekeeping. Shortcomings in doctrine, training, and--most importantly--attitude can be transcended, but only if the national command authorities unambiguously commit the nation to greater effectiveness in peacekeeping. Currently, it is impossible to tell how serious we are about peacekeeping. On the one hand, Bush's speech to the UN--cited earlier--and numerous other policy statements linked peacekeeping with the US national interest.44 The former president's valedictory national security strategy called for renewed American efforts to improve the effectiveness of the UN in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.45 Similarly, the Clinton administration expressed support for a strengthened UN along the lines suggested by Boutros-Ghali. During Senate confirmation hearings, Clinton's UN representative, Madeleine K. Albright, said, "President Clinton has spoken about the importance of creating a [UN] rapid deployment force, or a force that would be available to deal with problems."46

In line with its general strategy of moving from the unilateral to the multilateral application of force, the Clinton administration in June 1993 made public a plan that would dramatically enlarge the role of US military personnel in UN peacekeeping.47 A draft policy review document known as PRD-13 advocated US involvement in planning and implementing peacekeeping operations whenever US interests justified such involvement rather than whenever the US could make a unique contribution. This policy would constitute an endorsement of many of the ideas espoused by Boutros-Ghali in his report on An Agenda for Peace.48

On the other hand, actual policy indicates that obstacles may still outweigh imperatives. For good reasons, the US remains deeply suspicious of the UN's ability to control and direct military activity, just as many other nations complain of amateurism in UN peacekeeping operations.49 But American resistance is more serious than that of other nations, given our power to augment the UN's effectiveness. This fact is reflected in the debate between opponents and proponents of strengthening the UN. During discussions of an expanded peacekeeping presence in Bosnia, for example, the Clinton administration insisted on NATO control.50 When he was unable to engineer a consensus among our European allies, the president turned toward old-fashioned unilateralism.51 Similarly, the UN's assumption of command of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia caused congressional and public unease, as was the case with the deployment to Macedonia, despite the fact that both commanders were from NATO nations (Turkey and Denmark, respectively).52 Only after extensive debate during the Clinton administration's review of the US role in UN peacekeeping did American military leaders drop their traditional insistence that US forces always be kept under US command.53

In general, enthusiasm for expanded UN peacekeeping follows the traditional liberal/conservative split in American politics, with liberals far more supportive of the process than are conservatives. Laurence Martin, writing in the influential journal The National Interest, expresses the unease of many people on the political Right:

As more usual than not in political matters, the purposes are admirable, even compelling. There are, however, increasing grounds for concern about the practicality, prudence, and even morality of the means which some enthusiasts want to adopt. Cautionary notes need to be sounded, not least because bureaucratic euphoria, coupled with empire building, increasingly tempts the UN establishment.54

Because of these mixed signals, efforts on the part of the Department of Defense and the military services to refine strategy, doctrine, training, education, or force structure have been slow in coming. Senior leaders, faced with the crushing complexity of retaining military prowess during dramatic downsizing of the American military, have been extremely cautious in assuming new tasks that would entail additional demands for personnel, money, and time. As a result, our mistrust of the UN's capability is self-fulfilling: because we mistrust it, we do not take it seriously; and because we do not take it seriously, it stands little chance of improvement.

If this confusion ends and if our national security leaders do decide that more effective US support for UN peacekeeping is a worthy element of our strategy, then aerospace power will be a vital component of our contribution. No other nation can match the speed and efficiency of aerospace power that the US could contribute to UN efforts. Thus, the Air Force should at least begin preparing for the changes in attitude, doctrine, organization, and training that such a contribution would require once our strategy becomes clear.


1. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), especially 95-255; and Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Phenomenon and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), 79-108.

2. The Heritage Foundation provided the most sophisticated and persistent critique of the UN. See, for example, Burton Yale Pines, ed., A World without a U.N. (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984).

3. Charles Krauthammer, "The U.N. Corrupt Impostor," Washington Post, 27 September 1985, A25.

4. See Mala Tabory, The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai: Organization, Structure, and Function (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986).

5. Laurence Martin, "Peacekeeping as a Growth Industry," The National Interest 32 (Summer 1993): 3-11.

6. Paul Lewis, "U.N.'s Top Troop Official Sees No Need for War Room," New York Times, 27 December 1992, 12.

7. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second General Multinational Operations," Washington Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 116.

8. Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War (London: Routledge, 1992), 72.

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992).

10. For example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States recommends that responsibility for support to UN peacekeeping be given to a to-be-created expanded Atlantic Command (page III-5), and the National Military Strategy of the United States mentions in passing that the National Security Strategy of the United States lists strengthening international institutions like the UN as a national objective. The section on collective security focuses solely on Desert Storm-style coalitions operating under the auspices of the UN but led by the US (pages 8-9). Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1993); idem, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1992); and George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: White House, January 1993).

11. Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference, Headline Series no. 292 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 9. Germane elements of the charter are chapter 6, which deals with the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and chapter 7, which deals with collective security.

12. Lewis, 12; and A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 140.

13. Paul F. Diehl, "Institutional Alternative to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 209.

14. Patrick J. Garrity, "The U.N. and Peacekeeping," in Pines, 139-40.

15. Canada and Poland were exceptions.

16. Mackinlay and Chopra, 113.

17. Diehl, 209-10.

18. John Pomfret, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Balkans," Washington Post, 6 July 1993, A1, A11.

19. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Near Accord on Plan to Watch Serbian Frontier," New York Times, 13 May 1993, A1, A6. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic later reneged on his promise to allow international border observers. Craig R. Whitney, "Belgrade Reneges on Verification of Ban on Arming Bosnian Serbs," New York Times, 26 May 1993, A1, A6.

20. Howard W. French, "U.S. to Push for a U.N. Police Force of 500 for Haiti," New York Times, 10 May 1993, A3. In late May, the Haitian military government rejected the plan. Idem, "Leaders in Haiti Spurn Police Plan," New York Times, 25 May 1993, A4.

21. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The 38th Floor: An Agenda for Peace," UN Chronicle, September 1992, 2-3.

22. Boutros-Ghali did not discuss this form of enforcement in An Agenda for Peace. He did mention it in the article "The 38th Floor." Detailed analysis is found in United Nations Association of the United States, Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century (New York: United Nations Association of the United States, 1992).

23. The secretary-general was not specific on the nature of these stocks or the military advantages of prepositioning for the UN.

24. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 11.

25. Mackinlay and Chopra, 117.

26. James Meachem, "From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: United Nations Faces a Changing Role," International Defense Review, March 1992, 218.

27. J. S. Bremner and J. M. Snell, "The Changing Face of Peacekeeping," Canadian Defense Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1992): 6-11.

28. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Setting a New Agenda for the United Nations," Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 (Winter 1993): 290-91.

29. George Bush, "The United Nations: Forging a Genuine Global Community," US Department of State Dispatch, 28 September 1992, 721-24.

30. Martha Bills et al., Options for U.S. Military Support to the United Nations (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 1992), 13.

31. Eric Grove, "UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 173. For a detailed plan for the use of aerial surveillance in support of UN operations, see Michael Krepon and Jeffrey P. Tracey, "Open Skies and UN Peace-Keeping," Survival 32, no. 3 (May/June 1990): 251-63.

32. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States, 21-23.

33. For an excellent explanation of the attitudes required for peacekeeping, see International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon, 1984), 373ff.

34. This process is under way. The National War College, for example, offers an optional advanced study course on peacekeeping, and individual lessons have been devoted to it at schools such as the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Air War College.

35. Joint Pub 3-07.3, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations," revised final draft, 10 August 1992.

36. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War, November 1992, IV-I; and AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 59.

37. See International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook.

38. Grove, 175.

39. Bills et al., 21; Mackinlay and Chopra, 121-24; and Norton and Weiss, 29.

40. Lewis, "U.N.'s Top Troop Official," 12. The current under secretary-general for peacekeeping is Kofi Annan.

41. Bills et al., 22-23.

42. Mackinlay and Chopra, 119.

43. For example, candidates for adaptation include Joint Pub 3.07 and Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 1 December 1990. See also Steven Metz, "Counterinsurgent Campaign Planning," Parameters 19, no. 3 (September 1989): 60-68.

44. See also John R. Bolton, "UN Peace-Keeping Efforts to Promote Security and Stability," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 30 March 1992, 245.

45. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, 7, 19.

46. Quoted in Paul Lewis, "Peacekeeper to Peacemaker: U.N. Confronting New Roles," New York Times, 25 January 1993, A10.

47. R. Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston, "U.S. Plans Wider Role in U.N. Peace Keeping," Washington Post, 18 June 1993, A1.

48. Ibid.

49. Richard Bernstein, "Sniping Is Growing at U.N.'s Weakness as a Peacekeeper," New York Times, 21 June 1993, A1. For a detailed analysis of the UN's problems, see Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," Survival 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 3-30.

50. Michael R. Gordon, "20,000 U.S. Troops May Go to Bosnia, NATO Admiral Says," New York Times, 4 May 1993, A1, A6.

51. Steven A. Holmes, "U.S. May Attack Serbs Even without NATO," New York Times, 2 August 1993, A3.

52. "A Big Second Step in Somalia" (editorial), New York Times, 4 May 1993, A14.

53. Smith and Preston, A1.

54. Martin, 3.


Steven Metz (BA and MA, University of South Carolina; PhD, Johns Hopkins University) is an associate research professor of national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Immediately preceding this assignment, Dr Metz was an associate professor in the Department of Regional and Warfare Studies, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has also served on the faculty at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and at the US Army Command and General Staff College. His articles on International politics, military strategy, and national security affairs have appeared in several journals, including Airpower Journal. Dr Metz is the author of Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace (1993).


The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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