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Published Airpower Journal -
Spring 1991
THE FORCE MULTIPLIER OF THE 1990s
THE United States needs more force multipliers in this decade than ever before because of the decreasing size of our armed forces without a corresponding decrease in our worldwide commitments. The Air Force, for example, projects a cut in personnel from 608,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1986 to 470,000 in FY 1995--almost a quarter of its people!1 There is a corresponding decrease in its force structure, a fact applicable to its sister services as well. Yet the Air Force's (and the United States') worldwide commitment remains the same. Although we are withdrawing troops from some areas of the world, the commitment to our allies in those areas continues. Unexpected contingencies elsewhere may also require US forces to deploy to places where there are no troops. Witness our leadership of the multinational force in Saudi Arabia as a current example. How to do more with less? One answer is increasing our use of force multipliers.
Recognizing the need for force multipliers, our armed forces over the years developed a variety of aircraft. Examples include the Navy's EA-6B Prowler and the Air Force's F-4G Wild Weasel, which can suppress enemy air defenses so more of our bombers and fighters can get through to their targets. Another force-multiplying effort involves development of aircraft that find and track mobile targets on an increasingly fluid battlefield so we can destroy them more efficiently. Examples include our airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and the joint surveillance target attack radar system (]-STARS).
All these aircraft are manned, however, which makes them expensive and their loss less acceptable. The expense applies not only to buying, operating, upgrading, and maintaining these technically advanced aircraft but to aircrew training as well. The lives of the aircrews who fly the planes have no price tag, of course, and their survival is increasingly put at risk by ever more capable threats. Because these force-multiplying aircraft are so expensive in terms of people and machines, only a relative few are bought, and we cannot afford to lose many. As a result, we plan to use most manned airborne force multipliers in a standoff role behind friendly lines. This limits their coverage, thus denying our forces the full extent of their capabilities.
To ease the dual problems of small numbers and limited usage of current airborne force multipliers, fresh consideration needs to be given to unmanned systems. The idea is not to replace aircrews but to supplement them by letting unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) conduct those missions for which they are best suited.
UAVs are powered aerial vehicles that do not carry human operators. They use aerodynamic forces to provide air vehicle lift, and they are designed to carry nonlethal payloads for missions such as reconnaissance, command and control, and deception.2 (UAVs may also carry lethal payloads, but such configurations are considered standoff weapons and will not be addressed in detail.) UAVs are directed by a ground or airborne controller or are preprogrammed. UAVs only having the controller option are called remotely piloted vehicles (RPV). UAVs come in a variety of designs ranging from model airplanes to missiles to ball-shaped vehicles with helicopter blades. Sizes vary from a vehicle small enough to fit into a backpack to one with a longer wingspan than a Boeing 747. Investment in these-aerial vehicles for our armed forces is a good idea because of their successful combat performance, great versatility, and relatively low cost.
From a warrior's perspective, the best reason to have UAVs is their proven performance in combat. Israel learned true value of UAVs in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and used them with great success in the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee campaign. The Israeli strike against Syrian missile batteries in the Bekaa Valley provides several examples of effective UAV use in combat.
Months before the attack, Israeli UAVs "fingerprinted" Syrian surface-to-air radars by gathering the electronic frequencies of those radars and programming them into Israeli antiradiation missiles for use during an attack.3 When the attack came on 9 June, UAVs flew over the battlefield first, emitting dummy signals designed to make Syrian radar operators believe real Israeli aircraft were attacking. This tactic was effective in two ways. First, the Syrians launched most of their available surface-to-air missiles (SAM) against the UAVs. When the SAM batteries were in the midst of reloading, Israeli fighters attacked.4 Second, this deceptive tactic caused Syrian radars to actively track the UAVs, thus tipping off the Israelis to where the emitting radars were. Using the electronic frequency signatures gathered earlier, Israeli fighters carrying antiradiation missiles closed in and, along with artillery fire, destroyed the SAMs.5
The accuracy of the lethal artillery barrage was helped by UAVs performing a surveillance role. The flying vehicles transmitted real-time pictures of the Syrian SAM sites to Israeli commanders so they could assess the effectiveness of their artillery fire and adjust it accordingly.6 The Israeli Air Force also used UAVs in a surveillance role by positioning them over three major airfields deep within Syria to gather data on when and how many aircraft were taking off from Syrian airfields. This information was given immediately to the E-2C AWACS aircraft, which vectored Israeli fighters against the unfortunate Syrian MiGs.7 UAVs made matters worse for the MiGs by helping to jam Syrian ground control intercept (GCI) communications with their fighters. Highly dependent on GCI, the confused Syrian pilots literally did not know what to do.8 In yet another role, UAVs acted as laser designators for laser-guided weapons launched by fighters against the SAMs.9
UAVs in all these roles worked extremely well in a modern war against a determined enemy. The result? Seventeen of 19 sophisticated Syrian SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley were damaged or destroyed, and a large number of the Syrian fighters defending the SAMs were shot down or damaged. Israel had achieved complete air superiority in a single afternoon. Israeli defense minister Ariel Sharon called the raid the "turning point" of the campaign, as all Syrian and Palestinian Liberation Organization forces were now exposed to air attack.10
Granted, the Israelis had several advantages going for them, such as poor Syrian SAM and fighter tactics, poor use of camouflage and Israeli familiarity with the terrain.11 Americans may not have all of these advantages, but we can exploit the ones open to us, including the use of UAVs. Israel demonstrated that smartly used UAVs can certainly help a modern armed force achieve its objective. The ultimate test of combat proves it.
From a commander's perspective, the versatility offered by UAVs is tough to beat. Besides the many roles used by the Israelis, UAVs could play a future role in air base operability. They could help security police watch the base perimeter for evidence of intruders, thereby greatly increasing the surveillance area without the need to increase manpower. UAVs could also serve as detectors for the presence and strength of chemical agents in the air, thus informing the commander that countermeasures are necessary and how long they will be required. Poststrike reconnaissance would tell the commander what damage the airfield sustained, including the location of unexploded ordnance. UAVs could also perform electronic warfare before an attack in an effort to degrade it and serve as a communication relay platform for enhanced coordination of recovery efforts after the attack.12 Although air base operability is a possible future role for the Air Force, UAVs have already served in a variety of roles for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.
The Army uses the Pioneer UAV to watch mock battles as they occur at its National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California.13 The Pioneer system is serving as a test-bed to determine future operational requirements for UAVs. It provides near-real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, target spotting, and battle damage assessment within line of sight of the ground control station, day or night. The Pioneer, which looks like a crude model airplane, is launched from field positions or from ships. Its flight endurance is five hours, during which it can fly up to 13,000 feet, from 60 to 95 knots, and range out to 136 miles from its ground station. Flight operations require 20 people.14 Using the Pioneer, the mock battles observed at the NTC can be replayed for the participants via videotape to reinforce the lessons they learned in their training.15
Another test-bed UAV used by the Army in the reconnaissance role is the Pointer. The 82d Airborne Division has used Pointers to conduct surveillance of likely enemy avenues of approach during training exercises at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.16 The Pointer uses a fixed day television camera for real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment. It looks like a glider, is typically used by infantry companies and artillery forward observers, has a three-mile range and a one-hour flight duration, and can be carried in backpacks and operated by two people.17 Army commanders monitoring enemy avenues of approach liked the idea of seeing pictures of enemy tanks before engagements occurred, thus giving them warning time to adjust their forces accordingly. Pointers were also used to assess battle damage inflicted by the division's artillery. The 25th Infantry Division from Hawaii has used the Pointer in similar roles during combined exercises last year with our allies in Korea, Thailand, and Australia. In the future, the 82d Airborne plans to use the Pointer in a surveillance role for perimeter defense after parachuting into contingency areas.18 The Army in Panama (and the Marines in Lebanon) could have used these UAVs in the perimeter security role, especially to spot hostile mortar or artillery fire from surrounding buildings and hills. The Pointer is currently deployed with the 82d Airborne to Saudi Arabia.19
The Navy, inspired by Israel, has used the Pioneer UAV in a variety of roles for years. Israel's successful use of UAVs in Lebanon in 1982 "seem[s] to have convinced even the most skeptical US experts of the value of UAVs. US Navy experts who were previously reluctant to accept [Israeli UAV industry] presentations became eager to acquire the unmanned flying platforms."20 In the Persian Gulf during the last year of the Iran-Iraq War, Pioneers were used in a over-the-horizon-targeting (OTH-T) role to direct shore bombardment training by the USS Iowa's huge 16-inch guns. Using Pioneers as spotters, the ship's gunners recorded impressive hits. In one instance, gunners using the Pioneer were able to hit their target using only one-third as many shells as gunners without a UAV.21 Besides directing naval gunfire, the Pioneer was also used in an OTH-T role during Harpoon antiship missile training.22 Pioneer UAVs are currently deployed on three of four US Navy battleships, including the USS Wisconsin, now on duty in the Persian Gulf in response to the Kuwait crisis.23
The Navy has also used the Pioneer in the gulf in a ship-surveillance role around the clock.24 This capability was demonstrated in 1989 when the Navy conducted day and night operations with Pioneer. The results were impressive. "The system read ship names at 1500 feet altitude, and identified deck cargo."25 The commander of the Sixth Fleet, based in the Mediterranean, reported Pioneer performance as "flawless.... The remotely piloted vehicle has proven its capability and has added a new dimension to real time intelligence."26 As a result of this demonstrated capability, Pioneer is probably helping the Navy maintain its blockade of Iraq today.
The Marine Corps uses both Pointer and Pioneer UAV systems. The Pointer is currently deployed to Saudi Arabia with the First Marine Expeditionary Force from Twentynine Palms, California, and the Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marines use the Pointer primarily for over-the-hill reconnaissance and battle damage assessment for their artillery. Marine commanders also use it in a surveillance role to view the positions of their own troops prior to engagement and to monitor the ensuing mock battle.27 The Pioneer UAV is also currently deployed to Saudi Arabia with Marine RPV companies from Twentynine Palms and Camp Lejeune. In the United States, these units used the Pioneer to perform route-reconnaissance, artillery-adjustment, and close-air-support battle damage assessment roles.28 In the past year, Pioneers have successfully supported combined arms exercises, fire support coordination exercises, weapons and tactics instruction, and other activities. While at sea, the Pioneer has operated from an amphibious ship and a helicopter carricr.29
In addition to the vehicle's versatility, there are continuous improvements in UAV capability as the technology matures. For example, the tactical Searcher UAV from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) can carry a heavy (140-pound) payload for more than 24 hours as a result of a recent breakthrough in UAV wing design by adding Fowler flaps to increase lift.30 A joint French/German project, the Brevel UAV, incorporates a jam-resistant data link as well as stealth features that reduce the vehicle's radar and infrared signatures along with its noise level.31 Boeing recently completed flight-testing of its huge Condor UAV. The vehicle has a wider wingspan (200 feet) than a Boeing 747 and can operate above 65,000 feet for several davs.32 Maturing technologies in sensor payloads carried by UAVs also offer promising capabilities to military commanders in the future.
In addition to proven capability and versatility, the low cost of UAVs makes them the force multiplier of the 1990s. In this era of tight budgets, UAVs offer a wide variety of capabilities at relatively little expense. For example, the US Joint Project Office, (JPO) for UAVs is currently pursuing a "very low cost" close-range reconnaissance system. One of the vehicles currently being used as a test-bed for this class of UAV is the Pointer, at $10,000 per vehicle with payload. At the other extreme is the Condor UAV mentioned earlier. The Condor costs about $20 million without payload.33 But with its high altitude and long endurance, it is expected to have global reach, conducting missions ranging from military surveillance to drug enforcement. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) supports the flight-testing of the Condor in a military configuration. According to DARPA UAV program manager Bob Johnstone, many potential users look at the Condor "as a cheap satellite with a long dwell time."34 At $20 million (without payload), Condor would indeed be a cheap supplement to the amount of money now being spent on state-of-the-art satellite systems.
In addition to price, versatility also makes UAVs more cost-effective than manned aircraft. In the midst of uncertainty over future force structures, versatility is the key. For example, the Defense Department proposed canceling the successor to the Air Force's specialized air defense suppression fighter in its FY 1991 budget. Termination of the F-4G Wild Weasel follow-on program was due to affordability concerns. "Air Force officials have concluded that the service cannot afford dedicated platforms in the tight budget environment."35 Cheaper, more versatile UAVs fit better into today's smaller budgets. In addition, the technology developed for military UAVs has many civilian applications. For example, the Canada Electrical Association is evaluating an Israeli UAV with a dedicated payload for monitoring high-voltage power lines.36 Israel even received a letter from a nature preservation organization in Africa asking about using UAVs to counter the activities of ivory poachers.37Survivability also makes UAVs more cost-effective. Due to their small size, UAVs usually have a diminished radar cross section, infrared signature, and noise level than most manned aircraft. In fact, the Pointer uses a virtually silent electric motor.38 This reduced presence should translate to lower attrition and overall cost. For example, it costs more than $1 million just to train a pilot.39 Neither the pilot nor the airplane is easily replaced during a war. Israel is an example of a country that cannot afford much attrition. "The expense of modern aircraft and the value of trained pilots are so great that the Israelis have substituted unmanned vehicles for many hazardous missions."40 Maj Gen Avihu Bin Nun, Israeli Air Force commander, recognizes the important role of UAVs, and says he currently has a shortage of them.41
Despite the many capabilities of today's UAVS, there are limitations to overcome. Current concerns are UAV survivability, data-link technology, and the extensive manpower training necessary for the program.
UAV survivability is a double-edged sword. Although the reduced radar cross section, low infrared signature, and reduced noise level are strengths of UAVs as noted earlier, they are not invulnerable. For example, most UAVs are relatively slow compared to manned jets. Jets depend on speed to reduce their exposure time to hostile fire. UAVs, on the other hand, use a slower speed to increase their endurance for more time on station, where they loiter over a hostile area to pass information back to friendly forces. Also, due to their line-of-sight guidance, UAVs do not hide behind terrain to shield themselves from enemy fire while performing their mission like airplanes. Once damaged by enemy fire, current UAVs lack redundant onboard systems like aircraft. Finally, as operational experience and publicity for UAVs grow, potential enemies will step up efforts to counter them.42
Maturing UAV technology is helping to correct these shortcomings. Efforts continue on making UAVs even harder to detect through signature reduction. Multispectral sensors are also being developed to effectively operate UAVs in bad weather, thus making them harder to detect and kill. Other improvements include increased range for the sensors so the vehicles can stay further back from threats, changed flight profiles so the vehicles become more unpredictable and thus harder to hit, and the use of countermeasures against the guidance of enemy air defense weapons.43
Another concern of UAVs is current data-link technology. It limits UAV range and flexibility, as mentioned previously in the terrain-masking example. The line-of-sight guidance limitation may be resolved in the future, however, by using a relay UAV that is within sight of the gathering UAV to pass collected information back to friendly forces. Current data links are also susceptible to jamming, and reduction of this vulnerability drives up the cost of UAVs.44 Nevertheless, technologies such as millimeter-wave data links, laser communications, and ultrawide-band data links will reduce the probability of detecting, much less jamming, future links.45
Finally, current manpower and training requirements for UAVs is an area that needs to be reduced. The situation is improving, however. For example, operating an air-launched UAV unit in Southeast Asia in 1974 required 94 people to sustain a sortie rate of two per day. The same sortie rate for a ground-launched version of the new US medium-range UAV, due to become operational in 1995, requires only 16 people. The goal in the foreseeable future is to get it under 10 people.46 Smaller, simpler UAV systems like the Pointer require only two people. Manpower requirements will also fall as automated maintenance aids reduce the need for trained maintenance technicians in the field. Training requirements will be reduced as planned technology improvements provide "smart" training systems.47 For example, training to operate the Pioneer UAV currently takes 26 weeks. In the foreseeable future, training will be reduced to just a few weeks.48 Again, simpler systems like the Pointer have been operated by two untrained Marines in 30 minutes after taking it from the backpack and reading the instructions.49
Where do our armed forces get the UAVs they need? They get them through the Defense Department's UAV Joint Project Office, now in its fourth year within Naval Air Systems Command. The JPO reports to a joint-service executive committee and is responsible for acquiring UAVs for the services in four requirements categories: close range, short range, medium range, and endurance.50
Close-range systems will serve lower-level tactical units and small ships, giving them the capability to investigate local area activities. The Pointer and other UAV systems (including foreign competitors) are currently being evaluated for this role to better understand user requirements. Close-range systems must be able to launch and recover from land or ships, have an endurance of one to six hours, and display information in real time. Missions include day and night reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, electronic warfare, and chemical agent detection. Delivery of production systems starts in the mid-1990s.51
Short-range systems will have ranges of over 100 miles and be able to launch and recover from land or ships. They will have an endurance of eight to 12 hours and provide near-real-time information. Missions include many of the close-range missions plus a command-and-control role.52 A short-range system for the Army and Marine Corps is under development by two competitive teams: Israel Aircraft Industries/TRW and McDonnell Douglas/Developmental Sciences Corporation. A winner will be selected early next year. Both services require about 50 short-range systems, which include 400 air vehicles. Two-thirds of the systems will go to the Army, with the rest to the Marine Corps.53
A medium-range system will augment manned aircraft conducting day and night prestrike and poststrike reconnaissance for operations against heavily defended targets and will augment manned airplanes in this role. It will also be used for target acquisition and electronic warfare. This system will have a 400-mile range and a two-hour endurance, and it will provide both near-real-time and recorded information. It will also be capable of being air-launched.54 The medium-range system is being developed by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical for the US Navy and Air Force and is due to become operational in 1995. Approximately 500 medium-range systems will be bought.55
The Endurance UAV responds to a broad range of needs characterized by greater range, longer flight times, and higher altitudes than other categories of UAVs. Due to its size (the Condor is in this class), the Endurance UAV will launch and recover from land only, remain on station for 24 hours, and relay near-real-time information. Its range is classified, and its missions will include many of those of the other UAV categories plus special operations. If approved and funded, production could start in 1997.56
Funding for the UAV program is controlled by Congress, where interoperability and commonality are the key buzzwords in winning approval for Defense Department UAV plans. While the relationship between Congress and the Pentagon over UAVs is "positive," House Appropriations Committee staffer Robert Davis believes that unmanned systems may lack support from the services during the current budget squeeze.57 Robert Fitch, a House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence staffer, states that "there is sincere interest and support for UAVs in the Congress."58 However, staffer Kirk McConnell of the Senate Armed Services Committee believes that "if there is no [overall] Pentagon support, there is little Congress can do" to deploy UAVs.59
While UAV support at the Pentagon is improving, there is still some reluctance to trade a known capability for a projected capability, according to Air Force Maj Kenneth Thurman at the UAV JPO. Spending millions of precious dollars for an unknown capability that has not been tested in combat would be akin to taking a leap of faith.60 However, three factors may overcome this hesitation in the future. First is a positive experience with UAVs by our troops in the field, especially in contingency areas such as the Middle East. Second is a maturing UAV technology that increases the UAV's survivability, capability, and deployability through reduced requirements for manpower. Third is an employment concept that takes maximum advantage of the strengths of unmanned systems.
To take maximum advantage of UAVs versus manned systems, the former should especially be used during the first critical days of a conflict. That is when air defenses are most numerous and aircrews most vulnerable to these defenses because of inexperience in combat. High losses of UAVs are much more acceptable than those of aircrews and their airplanes. In fact, in the Israeli experience, UAV losses are very low.
When used, UAVs should generally perform missions characterized by the three Ds: dull, dirty, and dangerous. Dull means long-endurance missions which, in the future, could continue for several days. Dirty means jobs such as detecting chemical agents and their intensity; certainly a good manned mission to avoid if possible. Dangerous missions for unmanned vehicles are numerous and growing.61 Two that come to mind, however, are reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines and suppression of enemy air defenses.
UAVs could also be used in politically sensitive areas. Our Navy's experience over Lebanon in 1983 and the Air Force's experience over Libya in 1986 argue for giving future US presidents the option of using unmanned operations to accomplish limited objectives in the third world. When political statements need to be made in the future, UAVs can help make them. This will reduce or eliminate the risk of losing our military personnel to some third-world dictator for use as hostages or for propaganda against the United States. This is just the sort of option UAVs will make viable in the future.
How will this option occur? By integrating nonlethal UAVs in support roles with lethal UAVs. Nonlethal UAVs would launch first and "prepare" the route and target area for attack, while lethal UAVs would deliver the blow. As mentioned earlier, lethal UAVs are generally considered standoff weapons. An example is the air-launched Tacit Rainbow missile being developed for use by the Air Force. An unmanned weapon system that would pack much more punch, however, would be an unmanned aircraft loaded with bombs and flown by a controller straight into the target.
Lt Corndr Robert Norris, an operations officer for an F/A-18 squadron at the Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California, explains this concept using old A-7s as the platform. Instead of retiring hundreds of A-7 Corsair IIs, he argues we should modify them to perform in unmanned "suicide" attack roles. He cites the use of Japanese manned suicide planes in World War II, the Kamikaze, as "easily the most effective single weapon ever employed against US naval forces."62 This was due to the ability of the Kamikaze aircraft to successfully penetrate the teeth of enemy air defenses with devastating results. Unmanned A-7s could be launched from aircraft carriers, remotely piloted to targets, and provide the hard-kill potential of 30,000 pounds of aircraft and high-explosive munitions. Unused A-7s could potentially be recovered back on the carrier for future use.63 The idea of completely unmanned operations in certain contingencies may seem strange now, but it will become a viable option in the future as UAV technology matures and we become more comfortable with their use. The way to do this is to start incorporating UAVs into daily training on a widespread basis. This requires our armed forces to start buying more UAVs now.
What call we do to fit more UAVs into the tight defense budgets of the 1990s? First, educate members of our armed forces on UAV capabilities and their cost-effectiveness. Remember, the idea is not to replace aircrews but to augment them by performing missions that are uniquely suited to unmanned systems. Second, the rank and file of the services should apply their knowledge of UAVs so they are included in planning and conducting routine training and exercises. Where UAVs are unavailable, the need for them should be documented and sent up through channels to ensure our senior leaders are aware of this need. Finally, our senior leadership should take these documented needs and seriously consider them when making crucial force structure decisions to enhance our combat capability.
In summary, US armed forces will shrink in the 1990s, but the commitment to our friends around the world will not. Doing more with less has never been more timely, and this is where force multipliers come in. UAVs are especially suitable in this role for the 1990s due to their combat success, versatility, and cost-effectiveness.
UAVs still have their limitations, but these problems are being worked and should be overcome in the future. Although the services are starting to get a UAV program flying, more Pentagon support is needed to take full advantage of the potential capabilities these systems offer. More support should be forthcoming if an employment concept maximizing the strengths of unmanned systems is used. This concept envisions using UAVs at the start of a conflict to fly missions that are characterized as dull, dirty, and dangerous.
As we become more comfortable using UAVs, unmanned strike operations should be offered as a viable option to future US presidents for contingency operations in politically sensitive areas. Our armed forces need UAVs, and we as service members can help ensure that we get them.
The bottom line is that we need to increase the combat capability of US armed forces at a price we can afford. UAVs help us do just that.
Notes
1. Lee Ewing, "Welch: Deeper Cuts Would Increase Ousters," Air Force Times, 28 May 1990, 4.
2. Joint Project Office, Department of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, 16 February 1990, 2.
3. Matthew M. Hurley, "The Bekaa Valley Air Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?" Airpower Journal 3, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 64.
4. David E. Clary, "EW In the Bekaa Valley; A New Look," Journal of Electronic Defense, June 1990, 38.
5. Hurley. 64.
6. Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill and Wang. 1984), 205.
7. Ibid., 99.
8. Clary, 39.
9. Hurley, 64.
10. Gabriel, 97-98.
11. Hurley, 66, 68.
12. Briefing, Joint Project Office, DOD UAV Master Plan,29.
13. Lt Col Charles Mortensen, DOD UAV Joint Project Office, interview with author, 20 September 1990.
14. DOD UAV Master Plan, 26.
15. Lt Col Charles Mortensen. DOD UAV Joint Project Office, interview with author, 12 September 1990.
16. Mal Thomas Hydoc, DOD UAV Joint Project Office, interview with author, 12 and 19 September 1990.
17. DOD UAV Master Plan, 28.
18. Hydock interview, 12 September 1990.
19. Ibid.
20. Arie Egozi, "Unmanned Eyes," Flight International, 26 August 1989, 38.
21. Mortensen interview, 12 September 1990.
22. Mortensen interview, 20 September 1990.
23. Mortensen interview, 12 September 1990.
24. Mortensen interview, 20 September 1990.
25. Executive summary, DOD UAV Master Plan.
26. Ibid.
27. Hydock interview, 19 September 1990.
28. Mortensen interview, 20 September 1990.
29. Executive summary, DOD UAV Master Plan..
30. Simon Elliott, "New Wing Gives IAI's Searcher UAV 24-Hour Endurance," Flight International, 31 January-6 February 1990, 15.
31. Brian Wanstall and Hill Sweetman, "Unmanned Aircraft Fit Tight Budgets," Intervia, April 1990, 317.
32. Brock W. Henderson, "Boeing Condor Raises UAV Performance Levels," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 23 April 1990, 36, 38.
33. Ibid., 36.
34. Ibid.
35. Patricia A. Gilmartin, "USAF Wild Weasel Plans Hinge on Force Structure Changes," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 March 1990, 21.
36. Patricia A. Gilmartin. "Canada Tests Israeli RPV for Power Line Monitoring," Flight International, 21 October 1989, 14.
37. Egozi, 38.
38. Wanstall and Sweetman, 321.
39. Jeffrey P. Rhodes, "Aerospace World," Air Force Magazine, June 1990, 25.
40. Thomas P. Burke, Israeli Mastiff Mk III Mini-RPV System (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 27 January 1986), ix.
41. Peter Allen-Frost, "Keeping a Balance in Israeli Skies," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 October 1989, 862.
42. Maj Ken Thurman, DOD UAV Joint Project Office, interview with author, 4 September 1990.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Briefing, DOD UAV Master Plan, 27.
46. Thurman interview, 4 September 1990.
47. Briefing, DOD UAV Master Plan, 27.
48. Thurman interview, 4 September 1990.
49. Hydock interview. 19 September 1990.
50. Wanstall and Sweetman, 321.
51. DOD UAV Master Plan, 7, 9.
52. Ibid.
53. Maj Ken Thurman. DOD UAV Joint Project Office, interview with author, 5 October 1990.
54. DOD UAV Master Plan, 7, 9.
55. Wanstall and Sweetman, 319.
56. DOD UAV Master Plan, 7, 9.
57. Joseph A. Lovece, "Joint UAV Program Office Pushes to Meet Its Charter," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1989, 4-1.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Thurman interview, 4 September 1990.
61. Ibid.
62. Robert E. Norris, "The A-7: Cradle to Grave," US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1990, 89.
63. Ibid., 89, 91.
Capt Brian P. Tice (BA, College of Saint Thomas; MS, Defense Intelligence College) is chief, Intelligence Analysis Branch, CHECKMATE Division, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. He has been a wing intelligence officer, an indications and warning officer, and an intelligence analyst/briefer. Captain Tice is a graduate of Squadron Officer School..
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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