DISTRIBUTION
A:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1991
START II
EVERY US president has advocated effective nuclear arms control since the use of a nuclear weapon by the United States against Japan in 1945.1 Although the chance of nuclear war between the superpowers is low today, even the possibility of such a war is still the world's greatest concern. In 1985 President Ronald Regan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.2" President George Bush has echoed his concern and commitment arms control:
We want an agreement that allows us to coexist with the Soviet Union in an atmosphere of mutual trust, security and understanding. If we fail in our efforts to reach an arms reduction agreement today, we will be back at the negotiating table tomorrow and the day after that, for as long as it takes.3
On 31 July 1991, the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers signed the initial Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty. With that round of negotiations complete, it is time to consider a framework for future START discussions. The task of constructing an effective and enduring arms control agreement is founded on a basic goal. That goal is to increase our nation's security by limiting and reducing the military threat of potential adversaries. Arms control is not in conflict with, or a substitute for, military preparedness. Arms control seeks to complement military preparedness by increasing security at lower levels and creating more stable conditions.4 Therefore, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nuclear nations must design agreements to constrain and manage nuclear weapon confrontations.
Arms control will continue as a key element in US security strategy for the foreseeable future. Ultimately, the challenge for the United States is not only to work for a more secure world through effective arms control agreements, but to advance with caution lest we proceed to make our country and world more insecure.
A framework for effective future START negotiations originates from the president defining US national security interests and then deriving national security objectives. He also provides the national security strategy or ways to reach those objectives, arms control being one way to help secure US interests.5 For effective arms control agreements, arms control objectives and subsequently START II objectives are required to give clear US direction for negotiations. Paralleling this structure, the military leadership forms national military objectives and strategy to guide military participation in arms control agreement development.6 If the START II framework is established and direction is well defined at each level, the nation should attain its security objectives and national interests.
The 1990 edition of the National Security of the United States notes that our first national security interest is the "survival of the US as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure." Simply, we seek to "protect the safety of the nation, its citizens, and its way of life."7 National security objectives are focused on protecting this interest.
Following are some key national security objectives applicable to arms control:
National security strategy integrates different instruments of power to attain our national security objectives. It provides the general ways the nation will obtain its objectives and protect its interests. Because arms control is only one way of attaining the security objectives of--the United States and its allies.9 It is therefore a strategy--not an end in itself. Through arms control, our nation aspires to reduce military threats to US interests, to inject greater predictability into military relationships, and to channel force postures in more stabilizing directions.10
National military objectives directly applicable to the arms control framework are as follows:
I believe that clear and definitive arms control objectives have been a missing link in US efforts to attain national security objectives. There must be clear and definitive arms control objectives for the Air Force and other agencies to effectively develop coordinated and coherent objectives and initiatives within specific negotiations. These objectives incorporate guidance for all arms control negotiations. I believe that US arms control objectives should be as follows:
The United States desires arms control agreements that ensure our security by reducing the risk of war. We must design agreements to maintain military balance and to improve the predictability of potential adversaries. Even if the desired military balance is established, agreements are of little value if not verifiable. The United States must obtain sufficient verification to ensure effective agreements that lead to greater stability and diminish the risk of war. However, these agreements must protect our capability to pursue technology necessary to protect our global interests. Technology is also one of the key means to attain the objective of decreasing our reliance on nuclear weapons for the security of our nation.
Since our security is based on allied partnership, arms control agreements must protect the security of our allies. Consultation with our allies in negotiations will enhance the combined security effort against potential adversaries. We should also seek to extend understanding and cooperation to our potential adversaries. By doing so, we reduce fear of aggression and decrease the likelihood of miscalculation.12
Arms control agreements should also enhance the international position of' the United States as a world leader. From its position as a world leader, the United States can influence the international environment to increase its security. Finally, arms control agreements should contribute to stemming the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the systems necessary for their delivery. The more nations that possess weapons of mass destruction and the capability to deliver them, the higher the risk that these weapons will be used.
START II objectives are another key link in the framework needed to develop an effective strategic nuclear arms agreement. Some potential START II objectives include:
The prime objective for START II is to increase crisis stability. The United States and the USSR still maintain the concept of mutual deterrence-seeking to deter each other from nuclear attack through their ability to inflict an unacceptable level of damage even after receiving a massive attack. Crisis stability is the condition achieved between adversaries by reducing a nation's pressure and incentive for using its strategic nuclear weapons due to fear the weapons would be lost before they could be used.13 If mutual deterrence persists, even in a crisis, the strategic relationship is "stable." During a crisis, real or perceived vulnerability of a nation's nuclear forces might be an incentive to attack.14 Therefore, negotiators should direct their labor toward increasing crisis stability as the main objective in the arms control process.
A second and closely related objective is to reduce the incentive for a strategic nuclear first strike. START II negotiation efforts should strengthen and make the concept of mutual deterrence more effective. Instituting procedures in the agreement that discourage either side from attacking will decrease the probability that a strategic nuclear war will be initiated.
A third objective of START II is to ensure equitable strategic nuclear arms capability. Fear and mistrust have caused the United States and the USSR to attempt to acquire a favorable military advantage. One element of this objective is to increase force balance stability in START II. Force balance stability occurs when potential adversaries can maintain the military capability needed to preserve mutual deterrence and a stable strategic nuclear arms relationship.15 For example, if a side breaks out of the START II treaty, the opposing side must have a force posture capable of effectively responding or restructuring to deter the new threat. Another element of this objective is improving predictability of an adversary's military capability. START II initiatives need to channel strategic nuclear arms competition in a manner that constrains the threat. Limiting each side's military options diminishes the uncertainty of the threat and the actions of a side to gain an unacceptable military advantage in strategic nuclear arms.
A fourth objective of START II is to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads consistent with enhancing stability.16 I believe that START II, as its name implies, should seek further reductions in nuclear offensive arms. Specifically, the numerical ceiling on warheads should be reduced. Reductions in nuclear warheads will safeguard stability and enhance the nation's security. However, as we move to reduce arms, we must proceed with caution since reducing nuclear arms to extremely low levels is destabilizing and is a detriment to our security as well as the security of the rest of the world. Reducing nuclear weapon levels "too low" threatens US ability to maintain crisis stability and force balance.
Building on the initial START treaty, START II should include sufficient verification procedures to ensure compliance with treaty provisions. Political differences and mutual distrust between the United States and the USSR demand sufficient and effective verification procedures. Even though there are warming, relations between the superpowers, the United States should not let its hard down and allow an imbalance in military capability. A verifiable START II agreement adds to the trust of the nations and to stability with each other regarding their strategic nuclear arsenals.
A sixth START II objective should be to protect options to develop and deploy US technologies. Future agreements have the potential of capturing and limiting technology for modernization of both nuclear and conventional forces. Reduced nuclear force levels will put a premium on a modernized, balanced triad with the flexibility and survivability to maintain mutual deterrence. Within the constraints to promote predictability, and force balance stability, technology must be safeguarded to modernize aging strategic nuclear forces and strengthen conventional capability.
START II should seek a stable mix of strategic nuclear offensive and strategic defensive systems.17 In the defense and space talks, the United States has proposed a more stable and secure basis for deterrence in the future through a cooperative transition to a balanced strategic posture including strategic defenses.18 Likewise, START II must address this issue to reduce strategic nuclear offensive weapons to an appropriate and stabilizing level consistent with strategic defense development.
In START II, the significance of further reductions requires the United States to enhance multilateral consultations with other nuclear nations. As the USSR and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear forces, the strategic nuclear capabilities of other nations become more threatening and potentially destabilizing. Progress in START II will be closely tied to these nations' thoughts, ideas, and agreements regarding their strategic nuclear arms capabilities. Also, establishing close consultations with other nuclear nations in START II will provide, a basic structure for formally including these nations in follow-on negotiations.
Finally, the United States should foster a closer relationship between the United States and the USSR through more openness/transparency of our militaries. Prudent and more frequent contact with our adversary through START II activities will improve our mutual understanding. Ultimately, transparency of our militaries will lead to better cooperation, less tension, and less chance of miscalculation of intent in both peacetime and crisis.19
From a comprehensive and coherent START II framework, the United States can effectively formulate negotiation initiatives for START II to realize its objectives and protect its security interests. Many of the initiatives suggested below are applicable for reaching multiple objectives. However, in some cases, we must make careful trade-offs between initiatives for objectives that may be counter to other objectives. The following proposals from the START II framework are not all-inclusive but serve as examples of initiatives that proceed from guidance that is carefully linked together.
The United States' primary focus in START II should be to increase crisis stability. Increased crisis stability can be attained through several initiatives. First, protecting the triad is a high priority since the concept complicates an adversary's attack and defense planning and protects survivability if a portion of our nuclear forces are negated by such factors as weapon systems deficiencies and technological breakthroughs. Weakening a portion of the triad decreases the chance of survivability and increases the pressure to launch weapon systems in a crisis before they are lost. Second, arms control initiatives should protect and advocate mobility of strategic nuclear arms. Mobility increases weapon system survivability and reduces the fear of losing one's ability to retaliate. The United States should preserve and advance the deployment of nuclear arms in mobile basing options such as submarines, bombers, and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
Another means of promoting crisis stability is to reduce the concentration of warheads. Concentration of warheads on ICBMs and submarines makes these delivery vehicles valuable and tempting targets to eliminate in a crisis before they can be used. Thus, downloading reentry vehicles from ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) will reduce warhead concentration, as would eliminating, the number of SLBMs per submarine. A related initiative is to prohibit new testing and development of multiple warhead systems.
Crisis stability can also be enhanced through strategic defenses. Deployment of limited ballistic defenses will ensure survivability of a minimum retaliatory force while keeping intact the concept of mutual deterrence. Limited defenses will reduce Soviet fears of a US incentive for a first strike during a crisis and provide the United States with a system that can expand to counter a Soviet breakout. During a crisis with a third-world nuclear nation that has ballistic missiles, the defenses could aid in the deterrence and escalation control of a conflict.20 Widespread and effective strategic defenses are potentially destabilizing. The other side may fear its adversary is building a first-strike capability by deploying, a widespread system and may deem a first strike necessary before the defenses are in place to render the adversary's offensive weapons ineffective. In addition. a widespread deployment of these defensive systems may result in treaty breakout or attempts to find a counter to the defenses in order to maintain mutual deterrence.21
START II initiatives should also promote slow-flying weapon systems. These systems enhance crisis stability because they do not threaten a first strike that may eliminate a retaliatory response. Therefore, I advocate incentives such as the bomber weapon-counting rules to encourage emphasis in areas that increase stability.22 Also, I advocate other initiatives such as banning short-time-of-flight (STOF) systems--for example, the capability of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to launch near an adversary's shore--to ensure available tactical warning or reaction time for the system under attack. STOF systems are destabilizing because they encourage strategies such as launch on warning by an adversary to protect key deterrent systems.
A key ingredient to a START II treaty is the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, but not at the expense of stability with the USSR and third-world nuclear nations. The United States must remember that we conduct arms control negotiations to improve our national security. There is a level of weapons at which continued reductions destabilize and undermine our national security. Prior to embarking on START II, we must first determine what deters aggression by the Soviet Union and other potential nuclear nations. The United States and its allies cannot assume that its current deterrence strategy and targeting of adversaries will remain the same in the new strategic environment. This crucial reassessment of deterrence will provide the basis for determining force levels and capabilities that the United States must protect in START II. Failure to maintain the right level of weapons to hold at risk those targets deemed necessary for destruction, increases the risk of war.
In addition to the inability to hold critical targets at risk, low nuclear weapon levels threaten the US ability to maintain crisis stability and force balance. Extremely low numbers of forces constitute an easier target for a preemptive attack. Also, low force levels make the reward for cheating greater since even a small number of concealed forces would have a large impact on the balance. Similarly, extremely low force levels would be more vulnerable to technological breakthroughs and weapon system deficiencies or breakdowns.23 In light of the political reality to quickly establish a START II level of weapons before the suggested reassessment of deterrence can be accomplished. I believe the appropriate level of accountable weapons ranges from 4,000 to 5,000 weapons. This range represents a substantial reduction from the. initial START treaty, yet ensures that we have sufficient weapons for deterrence. In addition, estimates by prominent national security authorities and initial analyses indicate that this range of weapons is an appropriate level.
To ensure that the United States maintains equitable strategic nuclear capability, we should pursue initiatives to help prelude an unacceptable force balance advantage. One initiative is to resist significant reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV). Allowing a significant number of SNDVs while reducing warheads helps maintain proper force balance by reducing target value and increasing the number of warheads needed to destroy SNDVs. Also, since procuring the delivery system is the long-lead item in responding to an expanded threat, the United States should retain as many SNDVs as economically possible by downloading weapons to provide a response to a Soviet nuclear weapon breakout. For example, downloading SLBMs and ICBMs and keeping the maximum number of launchers will increase stability, yet allow a relatively short-term means of restoring capability if needed.
Although difficult, the United States should continue to seek verifiable measures to promote essential congruence in as many measures of merit areas as possible. For example, the US should continue to pursue congruence in ICBM and SLBM throw weight. In addition, we should advocate prohibition of testing new generations of ICBM and SLBM systems with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) systems. This initiative will help restrict breakout in the number of weapons and increase military predictability.
Another initiative to enhance equitable nuclear capability and promote slow response weapon systems such as the bomber is to limit strategic air defenses. Although opposition from the Soviets is expected, the initiative is consistent with the need to balance strategic capabilities to allow mutual deterrence. Also, essential equivalence could be enhanced by imposing verifiable limits on all nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs used for spares, test assets, and other purposes.
The question of restricting, limiting, and reducing the nuclear forces of other nations--the United Kingdom, France, China, India, and others--will continue in START II as a major issue. Progress in this area is important for progress in other START II areas. For example, as the United States and the USSR attempt to further reduce their nuclear forces, the numbers and types of weapons developed and deployed by other nuclear nations have significant impact on the security of the superpowers. Therefore, negotiations should incorporate multilateral discussions and consultations to enhance treaty progress and form a structure for strategic nuclear arms negotiations after START II. A multilateral agreement to cap smaller nuclear powers must be developed if superpower nuclear forces are reduced to a level that the security of the superpowers is threatened by a smaller nuclear power or combination of nuclear nations.
Verification procedures from the initial START treaty must be continued and strengthened. A primary means of strengthening verification procedures and resolving differences is through the participation of a neutral country, potentially through the auspices of the United Nations. In addition to verification regimes administered by the parties of the treaty, the neutral country could serve as an independent inspector and a member of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Committee (JCIC). We can also enhance START II verification procedures by verifying all nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained as spares, tests assets, and for other uses.
As in initial START treaty negotiations, the Soviets may try to limit US technology applications through START II. The United States must protect technologies to modernize its nuclear forces and offset potential Soviet military advances. In addition, agreements regarding nuclear systems must not foreclose promising areas where technology can be successfully used in conventional areas. In this regard, the design of new weapon systems must include verification measures to discriminate strictly conventional weapon systems from nuclear ones. A difficult balance must be struck between protecting technology development and maintaining essential force capability.
START II negotiations present a forum that the United States and the USSR should use to enhance understanding and cooperation. We should advocate confidence-building measures that include professional military education exchange officers, participation in exercises, roundtable discussions of nuclear issues, liaison offices at key locations, and US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representative exchanges. Gaining and sharing information with a potential nuclear adversary will enhance military predictability and reduce the fear of aggressive intent and the likelihood of miscalculation in the nuclear arena.
Arms control negotiations will continue to hold a prominent place in our attempt to enhance our nation's security by reducing the risk of nuclear war. With the initial START treaty now signed, the framework outlined in this paper provides a coherent roadmap to initiate and develop an effective START II treaty. It links various levels of national guidance to ensure that the United States establishes a consistent and logical path for helping attain our nation's fundamental goal of preserving the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation.
Notes
1. Arms Control and National Security: An Introduction (Washington, D.C.: The Arms Control Association, 1989), 19--37.
2. Ibid., 6.
3. Ibid., 35.
4. Ibid., 10.
5. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1990), 15.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy Document, FY 92--97, Washington, D.C., September 1989. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
7. Bush. 1--2.
8. Ibid., 2
9. Ibid., 15.
10. Department of Defense, Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1992--1997, appendix A, "The Chairman's National Military Strategy," August 1989, 5. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
11. Ibid., 2.
12. Bush, 19.
13. National Security Research, "Stability, War Avoidance, and Strategic Weapons," USAF/ACSC Contract: ICBM Modernization Issues, March 1990 (amended June 1990), 2--3.
14. Arms Control and National Security, 11.
15. Briefing, Lt Col Richard Layman, Strategy Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (AF/XOXWS), subject: [Deterrence], August 1990.
16. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Future Enhancing Strategic Stability (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs, June 1990).
17. Department of Defense, Strategic Modernization Issues, Washington D.C., July 1990, 19.
18. Baker Spring, "Four Key Questions Facing SDI," in Critical Issues--SDI at the Turning Point: Readying Strategic Defenses for the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Kim R. Holmes and Baker Spring (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1990), 10.
19 .Joint Statement on Future Negotiations.
20. Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and U.S. Military Strategy," in Holmes and Spring, 13--17.
21. David A. Ochmanek and Edward L. Warner III, Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 67--69.
22. Issues Brief, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, subject: Nuclear and Space Talks: U.S. and Soviet Proposals (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs), 22 January 1990.
23. Ochmanek and Warner, 61--62.
Contributor
Lt Col Elwood C. Tircuit (BS, Louisiana State University; MEd, South Dakota State University) is an international political/military affairs officer, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C. His assignments have included duties in arms control and as a missile operations squadron commander. Colonel Tircuit is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
[ Back Issues | Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]