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Published Airpower Journal -
Spring 1990
HISTORIANS are often challenged to justify their work, and it is at least arguable that many historical studies do not offer immediate application in our daily lives. But that does not make such studies useless; a well written historical narrative can be educational, and it may even be entertaining. For the professional military officer, however, some specially focused historical analyses will produce important insights not obtainable through any other channel. And there is no question that we need this information. That is because much of the military planning process involves predicting the future--something we do by surmising about what might be, based (in part) upon what has been. This process is not arcane. The truth is that we use insights derived from such analyses every day. Unfortunately, we do not always employ these insights in systematic ways. And equally important, we do not seek out more opportunities to turn them to our advantage.1
So how can military professionals put history to better use? First, we must recognize what history will not do. It most certainly will not repeat itself; every historical event is unique. Nor can history be used as a kind of Delphic oracle: it will not answer our questions--at least not directly. But if we study past events carefully, using thoughtful analogies and apt comparisons, then perhaps history can suggest what questions to ask of the present. Provided we exercise caution, the answers will help us anticipate the future.
The following analysis operates with that approach in mind. It examines the Allies' response to German V-1 flying bombs during World War II, and it asks what lessons might be learned from their experience.2 The answers suggest some perspectives in dealing with a new weapon that resembles the V-1 in many ways but poses a far more serious danger--the long-range cruise missile.3
The V-1 (vergeltungswaffe einsor "vengeance weapon number one") was an air-breathing flying bomb fielded by the Luftwaffe in 1944.4 Its mission was to bombard Allied urban areas--London, especially, but other cities as well--with a 1,870-pound, high-explosive warhead.5 German engineers designed the V-1 so that it could be built of readily available materials, including wood and mild steel, and many of its subassemblies could be made by unskilled laborers. However, these features were meant to reduce costs, not performance. For its time, the V-1 was quite fast, with a cruise speed of about 400 miles per hour. Early V-1 models had a range of about 150 miles; later improvements increased this to over 250 miles. Propulsion was by pulse jet, a form of ramjet with a shutter-controlled intake. Its cyclic operation produced a characteristic sound, leading British listeners to give the V-1 a more memorable name--they called it a buzz bomb. Since pulse jets require a high minimum airspeed to operate, most buzz bombs were launched from large, inclined catapults.6 After launch, the V-l's self-contained guidance system kept the vehicle on a preset course and altitude, and a simple, propeller-driven distance log directed the vehicle to enter a vertical dive upon completing the measured flight time.7
Given the crudeness of the technology, it should not be surprising that V-ls varied in their performance. In fact, about 20 percent of the missiles proved defective. Still, the overall result was quite acceptable. During the early stages of the assault on London, for example, V-ls had a mean impact point of about four to four and one-half miles from the center of the city.8
Launcher construction began on the French coast during the summer of 1943. The first seven sites were immense concrete bunkers, but the Germans also built many smaller, simpler facilities.9 These often consisted only of a launching ramp and assembly shops, and the Germans requisitioned farmhouses, barns, and outbuildings for V-1 sites wherever possible. This approach speeded installation, reduced costs, and helped mask the sites' locations. By December 1943 Allied photo interpreters had confirmed 88 "austere" V-1 sites, and they suspected about 50 more.10 Conscripted laborers finished half of the projected 150 sites before the Allies invaded Europe on 6 June 1944, and the Luftwaffe launched its first V-1 against London shortly before midnight on 12 June. The Germans soon became quite proficient, and on 22 July they launched their 5,000th missile.
The Germans had expected to launch 8,000 V-1s during September, but by that time all of the sites in France were captured. The brief lull led the Allies to conclude that the V-1 no longer presented a danger. They were mistaken. The Luftwaffe simply reworked the V-1 to increase its range and then built new sites in Holland. The bombardment resumed in October 1944 and continued through the winter, with the target list expanded to include the vital Belgian supply centers of Antwerp and Liege. Although dwindling component stocks gradually reduced the frequency of the attacks, the bombardment did not cease entirely until late April 1945.
In all, the Germans produced about 30,000 V-1s. They launched 10,492 flying bombs against England and about 8,000 against Continental targets. A total of 2,419 warheads exploded in the Central Defence Region, inflicting 92 percent of all English V-1 casualties. London's civilian losses included 6,184 dead and 17,981 injured, and its military casualties came to about 1,200 killed or wounded.11 But there were other effects as well. The V-1 bombardment forced British authorities to evacuate between 800,000 and 1.3 million Londoners to outlying areas, and falling warheads destroyed 23,000 buildings and houses.12 Missile-inflicted casualties on the Continent--mostly in the Antwerp area--totaled 14,758, although only 211 V-ls hit the central port areas. Afterwards, the Allies acknowledged that the V-1 was a tactical success. It was also a very cost-effective weapon:
From a strictly dollar point of view, the V-1 cost the Germans less to build and to operate than it cost the Allies in damage and defense. A wartime British study [concluded that] using the German costs as unity . . . it cost the defenders 1.46 for damage and loss of production, 1.88 for the bombing, .30 for fighter interception, and .16 for static defenses, for a total ratio of 3.80:1 [in favor of the Germans .]13
The buzz bomb exacted a heavy price, but it could have been much higher. Of the 8,500 or so V-ls that crossed the English Channel, the British detected 7,488 (88 percent) and destroyed 3,957 (52.8 percent of those identified). The defense was poorly coordinated at first, but Prime Minister Winston Churchill intervened personally, and the Allies soon developed an effective strategy.14 This effort--code-named Operation Crossbow--continued the bombing offensive that began in 1943 and reinforced it with a multilayered defense network.
Offensive Measures
The Allies knew of the V-1 through agent reports, reconnaissance photos, and intercepted radio transmissions well before it posed a direct threat to Britain.15 They mounted massive bombing attacks against the hardened facilities in France while construction was still under way, and they also targeted each of the smaller austere sites immediately upon discovery.16 All agreed that bombing was the only offensive measure available until ground troops could capture the launchers, but there were differing views on the effectiveness of the bombing effort. Even the best way to go about it was a matter of dispute.
Long since weary of bombing, English city dwellers put their political leadership under intense pressure to stop the V-ls by every means possible.17 The British War Cabinet called for direct strikes on the launch sites, even though this diverted efforts away from other important targets. But Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur ("Bomber") Harris, head of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command, and Maj Gen Jimmy Doolittle, commander of the US Eighth Air Force, disagreed. Both leaders wanted to attack the V-l's sources of supply: the central stockpiles that fed the launchers and the factories that created the stockpiles. Tactical air force units continued to pound the launch sites, but Harris and Doolittle won the argument for putting their heavy bombers to better use. Between 2 and 9 August 1944, the Allies dropped 15,000 tons of ordnance on German support facilities. Losses were heavy--1,412 airmen and 197 planes--but thereafter the V-1 launch rates dropped by half.18 The "heavies" continued their attacks afterwards but on a lower priority basis; by late summer, most of the work was being done by tactical air force fighter-bombers based in France.
Defensive Measures
Unlike the manned bombers in the blitz of 1940-41, V-ls could be launched at all hours and in every kind of weather. The Allies responded with a layered defense net and with measures intended to reduce the target areas' vulnerabilities as much as possible. One risk-reducing measure was to reevacuate all nonessential civilians, particularly the women and children who had returned to the English target areas after the blitz subsided in 1942.
Another measure was made possible by the successes of MI5, Britain's secret counterintelligence organization. MI5 had "turned" virtually every German espionage agent in the British isles by late 1939, and it manipulated German intelligence-gathering efforts in Britain throughout the rest of the war. This affected the V-1 campaign because the Germans largely relied upon their agents to report V-1 impact points.19 By feeding false data to German intelligence agencies through these controlled sources, MI5 made it appear that the V-ls were overshooting London. The launch crews shortened their missiles' flight times to correct for this "error," consequently shifting the mean impact point away from the center of the city.
The defense measures took time to become fully effective. By late June 1944, however, the Allies had the outline of a workable system, and they continually strengthened it during the remainder of the summer. This integrated network included an excellent detection and control system, high-speed interceptors, radar-directed guns firing proximity-fuzed shells, and barrage balloons.
Detection, Tracking, and Force Control. The defenders could usually detect incoming V-ls by radar. The more difficult task was making best use of the available force (e.g., deciding whether to scramble on warning or maintain standing patrols, determining which fighters should be vectored for intercept and which held in reserve, minimizing the number of fighters allocated per missile, and coordinating fighters and antiaircraft artillery [AAA] so that they did not interfere with each other's efforts). In the end, the system of raid reporting and aircraft control developed for V-1 defense was more elaborate than the one that had worked so well against German bombers during the blitz of 1940-4l.20 Two methods of fighter control were employed.
The first method, called "running commentary," was used primarily to control fighters operating over England; it required two radar stations and two Royal Observer Corps stations.21 Each station provided a controller who advised patrolling fighters of the incoming missile's course and position. Pilots devised their own intercept vectors. Thus, they ran the risk that several aircraft might chase one bogey, but the method worked well overall, especially with additional ground input for final interception (e.g., radio guidance from ground observers in visual contact, marker gunfire, special flares ["snowflakes"], or searchlights).
The second method, called "close control," was used by fighters patrolling over the English Channel. Radar controllers vectored the pilots on intercept courses with the incoming V-1s. The close control method allocated fighters more efficiently than did running commentary, but it had several drawbacks. The V-ls crossed the narrow channel very quickly--in perhaps as little as four or five minutes--and did not stay on radar for very much longer. This cut reaction time to a minimum. It also meant that the defenders had to commit a larger number of aircraft for the same degree of barrier coverage: they had to travel further to get there, and they had to keep enough fuel in reserve to make sure they got back. And there was another unforeseen difficulty imposed upon close control immediately after D-day: air traffic over the channel became much heavier. This increased the controllers' identification work load, thereby reducing the reaction time still further.
Interceptors. Fighter interception was not particularly effective during the first few days of the campaign. The RAV Fighter Command's squadrons had been trained to attack Luftwaffe bombers flying at lower speeds and higher altitudes, and it took time to devise more appropriate tactics and become proficient in their use. The problem was difficult. Minimal warning times and the V-l's high speed combined to make interception an unlikely proposition for all but the fastest fighters. (Once a V-1 crossed the channel, the defenders had only about six minutes to bring it down.) The British initially assigned 12 fighter squadrons to the campaign, but many other units tried to engage the speedy missiles on a catch-as-catch-can basis. This only confused the controllers and antiaircraft gunners alike, and many defending aircraft were damaged or shot down by mistake. Within a few days the Allies had limited the effort to their best fighter types, and as the summer wore on, they continually assigned additional units to buzz-bomb defense. By mid-August, 21 Allied squadrons were committed exclusively to V-1 interception, and two more assisted as required. Even so, successful interceptions were not easy. Radar could direct the fighters to the vicinity, but the rest of the work was on visual terms. The buzz bomb's small size and camouflage paint made it difficult to see from above in daylight, especially in the summer haze. The pulse jet's exhaust flame was easily spotted at night, but it tended to appear to the eye as a point of light at an uncertain distance. Even if the sky were clear and moonlit, the V-l's narrow wingspan gave few depth-perception cues for effective gunnery. Moreover, the short reaction time forced the RAF Fighter Command to maintain standing patrols, and fatigue quickly became an additional factor. Many pilots seldom left their aircraft between first light and dusk, although few complained of boredom.
As the defenders became more experienced, they found that the best tactic was to approach the missile from above and astern in a long, shallow dive. They usually opened fire at about 300 yards but were careful not to close to less than 150 yards because of the turbulence of the pulse jet's exhaust and the lethal radius of the V-l's large warhead. Buzz bombs were reportedly several times more difficult to kill than piloted aircraft at the same range, in part because they were smaller and had fewer critical components, but also because the V-l's fuselage was a simple metal cylinder tapered to a point at both ends.This shape tended to deflect projectiles fired from a beam-end aspect. At first, pilots averaged about 500 rounds per kill; this dropped to 150 later in the summer.22 Much more famous, of course, was the tactic of simply flying alongside and tipping the vehicle with a wingtip. This tumbled the V-1's gyroscopic autopilot, and the missile went out of control.
By every analysis, aircraft interception became very effective. Even though they were sometimes grounded by bad weather, the fighters accounted for 1,846 of the 3,957 missiles destroyed--almost 47 percent.23 Many pilots achieved multiple kills, with RAF Squadron Leader Joseph Berry leading the list at 61 and one-third, including seven in one day on two occasions. Sadly, Berry was mistakenly killed by Allied antiaircraft fire on 1 October 1944.24
Antiaircraft Artillery. AAA was the second line of defense against the V-1, accounting for 1,878 missiles--just over 47 percent of those destroyed. The British began planning AAA requirements for V-1 defense as early as January 1944, and they expected to install 400 heavy and 346 light guns south of London. Unfortunately, their efforts were soon found wanting for several reasons. To begin with, the attacking missiles were far more numerous than the defenders expected; they had overestimated the bombers' ability to knock out the launching sites. The Allies also underestimated the AAA needs of the invasion force; as a result, only half of the guns the plan had demanded were actually in place at the start of the campaign. Further, the defense planners also presumed that the V-ls would approach London at an altitude of 6,000 to 8,000 feet. As chance would have it, the V-ls flew much lower--2,500 feet on average--and this zone fell between the respective altitudes at which British light and heavy guns were most effective.25 Finally, to make matters worse, the initial plan was not well thought-out. It stationed the guns close to London and put their fire-control radars below the terrain line to avoid an anticipated German countermeasures effort. This had the double disadvantage of reducing the gunners' tracking times and allowing the damaged V-ls to fall within the target areas. These errors were soon corrected, but the most serious problem remained unresolved: how to coordinate the fighter and AAA efforts.
In the beginning of the campaign, fighters roamed at will, and AAA batteries were required to cease fire if the fighters came within range. This allowed the fighters to work very effectively (as of 13 July, 883 of the 1,192 kills had been achieved by aircraft), but it severely hampered the gunners. In mid-July the British decided to move most of the guns to the coast and establish "gun belts," where aircraft operated at their own risk below 8,000 feet. A large number of bed-down sites for the mobile guns, called "mattresses," were pre-stocked with ammunition, electric power generators, and other necessities. This .greatly increased the flexibility of the AAA defense network. The number of guns was also continually increased, so that by late summer the AAA batteries included almost 600 heavy-caliber and over 1,400 light-caliber weapons, including some installed on platforms built out over the Thames estuary.26 The British installed the latest fire-control equipment, including centimeter-band, gun-laying radar sets, and they also obtained large quantities of proximity fuzes from the United States. The net effect was a major improvement in AAA lethality. On the nights of 27-28 August, for example, 90 of 97 V-ls were shot down, and only four hit London.
Barrage Balloons. As a last resort, the British suspended steel cables from barrage balloons in the most likely approach corridors. This effort was the least effective response, in that the defenders had to maintain over 2,000 balloon stations that brought down only about 230 missiles. But it was a relatively inexpensive defense to mount, was clearly visible to the public, and occasionally worked. This effort was often hampered by shortages of hydrogen gas and rubber sheets, and 630 balloons were lost to lightning and high winds. Still, there is evidence that the Germans took the balloons seriously: some of the downed missiles had cable cutters built into their wings.
This analysis began with the premise that historical studies--if carefully defined and properly limited--could help us evaluate current trends and thereby suggest future prospects. Remember that the past will not predict future events. Within these boundaries, however, such studies may be very useful. Indeed, what else can provide us with a body of real-world experience beyond the limited perspective of the immediate present?
The long-range cruise missile (CM) is a good candidate for historical analysis. Certainly, the CM represents a dramatic improvement over the V-1 in performance capabilities, but both weapons share an obvious and distinctly similar design concept: they seek to achieve strategic success by overwhelming the enemy's defenses with relatively inexpensive, "disposable" vehicles. This similarity encourages the military historian to make some general observations about CM defense problems.
CM Defense Will Be Very Expensive
The defensive effort that the V-1 imposed on the Allies was substantially more expensive than the Germans' effort to develop and deploy the missile. Granted, this exchange ratio included unique circumstances, but since then we have learned much more about the construction of a defense net against air-breathing vehicles. In the 1950s the United States and Canada created the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), a fully integrated bi-national system consisting of an elaborate net of radar stations extending above the Arctic Circle, a force of 65 fighter-interceptor squadrons, standing patrols of early-warning aircraft and ships watching over millions of square miles, hundreds of surface-to-air missile (SAM) and AAA batteries, and a Ground Observer Corps with 350,000 volunteer members. That effort cost over half a billion pre-1957 dollars.27 The CM defense network must be far more capable--thus, far more costly--if it is to deter or if it is to protect us adequately should deterrence fail.
But CM Defense Is Crucial
The V-1 was a primitive weapon, but it imposed a heavy burden upon the Allies. The CMs of the future will be able to do what the V-1 program attempted but failed to accomplish for lack of sophisticated technology: they will supplant the long-range, penetrating bomber for the purpose of attacking fixed targets. Moreover, their deployment in large numbers--and their inevitable adoption by third world combatants--will present a threat that we are not presently equipped to counteract.
Consider the range of problems that CMs will pose. Their small electromagnetic signatures will make them difficult to detect, and as CM guidance computers become more sophisticated, they will approach the operational flexibility of piloted aircraft. CMs will demonstrate increasing autonomy, including the ability to loiter, to exercise a limited degree of judgment in target selection, to detect and evade enemy forces, and perhaps even to respond to a change of mission or recall.28 CMs can be launched from covert and unconventional platforms; this would make them particularly difficult to eliminate by preemptive strike. They are also attractive for economic reasons. Specifically, they can be stockpiled more cheaply than manned systems, and they will force an opponent to spend enormous sums on defensive, rather than offensive, measures.29 Finally, the successful deployment of a ballistic missile defense system can only encourage CM development. Why? Because a space-oriented defense network won't eliminate long-range strategic bombardment as a military technique. Rivals will simply look for something else to replace readily detected and vulnerable rocket boosters and reentry vehicles. Air-breathing missiles are the most effective alternative.
For all of these reasons, CMs could very well become the long-range strategic weapon of choice by the end of the century. An efficient defense is imperative.
Effective Planning Is Essential
Although it may seem self-evident, the V-1 experience underscores the importance of thoughtful advance planning. The Allies knew that the V-1 was being developed at least 18 months before the first, warheads fell on London, and their intelligence "data base" grew rapidly after the winter of 1943-44. Nevertheless, they did not anticipate the magnitude of the threat, and as a result they substantially underestimated the resources required to deal with it. Further, their initial response was not efficient or well coordinated, and correcting it entailed significant risk and effort. Shifting the gun batteries to the English coast, for example, disrupted the defense net for a week. It also required moving 23,000 men and 60,000 tons of equipment and supplies, and diverted trucks and fuel from the support effort for the Normandy invasion--a significant cost at a critical time. Tomorrow's defenders will have even less latitude, and only an effective defense in place can hope to deter a would-be aggressor. Moreover, given that we cannot specifically anticipate how this threat may develop, we must emphasize flexibility and adaptability in our preparations. More pilots and planes will clearly be necessary,30 but strategies for "doing it smarter" must lie at the heart of any effective CM defense plan; high-tech approaches may not provide the entire solution."
CM Defense Must Receive
Coordinated Support
The Allies failed to successfully coordinate their forces at first, thereby allowing some V-ls to get through that could otherwise have been destroyed. Their failure also contributed to the tragic loss of Allied pilots and planes to "friendly" AAA fire, and this in turn reduced the defenders' ability to deal with incoming V-1s. Even so, the Allies were fortunate. They only had to mesh the efforts of airmen and gunners who spoke the same language, and they already had a well-integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence apparatus. Their units were abundantly supplied and well equipped, and they had long since been united in an all-out wartime effort. Further, they had to defend only a limited number of targets in a relatively small area against attacks coming in predictable directions from known launching grounds. In contrast, CMs could be launched simultaneously against many US and allied targets from a variety of platforms operating in very different environments. Preparing an adequate defense will require a large and continuing investment at the expense of other important needs. Shrinking manpower pools and the ever-rising costs of high technology will make this even more difficult.32 Perhaps the net effect of these trends will force us to adopt a kind of triage defense, in which we have to prioritize our efforts in favor of certain locations or kinds of targets--and abandon others to less-certain outcomes. Considerable political consequence will undoubtedly attend such choices. Nevertheless, we must answer the CM threat, and doing so will require a sustained, major, multiservice and transnational commitment if we hope to achieve success.33 Both the V-1 and NORAD experiences show that such a commitment can be achieved when the stakes are high enough. Subordinating the narrow interest is the single most difficult task.
CMs Will Be Difficult
to "Find and Fix"
The Allies quickly learned that the buzz bomb was not easy to locate, but the CM will pose a much greater challenge. Unlike the immobile V-1 launch sites in France and Holland, CM carriers will be constantly on the move, and they will encompass a variety of forms, including aircraft, ships, submarines, and trucks. This flexibility means that targets can be attacked from many points of the compass, in flight patterns that will be difficult to anticipate. Even if we know the general direction of approach, detection wilt still be a problem. Although space-based, synthetic-aperture radar constellations and other exotic defense systems offer great promise, these technologies will not be fielded soon.34 Moreover, they will have to be integrated with appropriate tactics at the squadron level--down where "the rubber meets the ramp."
Even after they are detected, CMs will still be hard to bring down. Defending aircraft have a significant speed advantage over CMs at present, but that will probably become less pronounced in the future, thereby limiting the number of useful tactical solutions. The greatly reduced radar and thermal signatures of small, "stealthy" CMs will make target acquisition much more challenging, especially for defending missile seekers. The latter will always be severely constrained by weight, antenna size, power supply, and other limiting factors. This is not to say that the problem is insoluble. Recent studies suggest that bundling different sensors together and interpreting their combined signals with artificial-intelligence techniques could be very effective.35
CMs May Not Be Defenseless
Finally, we should address the common assumption that CMs may be hard to locate but, once found, are "most on the table" for modern interceptors. That may not be so. Allied airmen developed a healthy respect for the buzz bomb because its exploding warhead could easily bring an overeager pilot to grief. Even at the normal kill distance of between 150 and 300 yards, the fireball often generated enough energy to damage the attacking aircraft, and a closing stern chase forced the interceptor to fly through the exploding missile's debris. A CM carrying a nuclear weapon poses a much greater threat, and we should not assume that it will stay "safed" when fired upon.36 In fact, deliberately programming a CM to detonate if attacked may benefit the aggressor in several ways.
First, if it is attacked, the CM will probably not be able to complete the intended primary mission. Should that occur, the aggressor could logically be expected to pursue a useful alternative mission--the destruction of the attacking interceptor. This tactic would be particularly attractive if the size of the interceptor force were limited, and it could even form the basis for a deliberate strategy. In such a scenario, the primary goal of the aggressor's first salvo would be to eliminate the defending interceptor force, thereby turning the defender's cities into naked hostages facing a follow-on attack.
Second, the prospect of attacking nuclear-weapon-carrying CMs fitted with "deadman switches" would certainly encourage caution. Firing short-range missiles at an armed quarter-megaton bomb could be the beginning of a real adventure. This possibility must surely put even the most determined pilot in a difficult position.37 The too-cautious will hesitate and risk all that failure implies, while the too-aggressive will rush in to attack, thereby losing their aircraft and their lives. Even if it remains only an unconscious question, the effect of this quandary might give the CM just enough advantage to escape. Technical and tactical countermeasures can help, but only a well-balanced mixture of dedication, judgment, and second-nature flying will successfully overcome such a weapon. Like all other skills, those traits can only be ingrained through constant training and practice.
The V-1 was a cost-effective weapon to begin with, but the Allies' mistakes magnified its impact. They failed to anticipate the scope of the threat, and they suffered an agonizing period of false starts and confusion before fashioning a successful response. Fortunately, time and resources were on their side, and they prevailed. The V-1 took lives and destroyed property, but it could not change the outcome of World War II. The cruise missile poses a much greater threat than the V-1, but it too can be countered if we and our allies undertake sufficient preparations. The most serious problem we face, however, is one of perception, not technique.
Many Americans believe that an attack upon their homeland is unthinkable--a conclusion supported by 40 years of nuclear standoff between roughly equal superpowers. And we have spent our resources according to that consensus. We are willing to fund research for the Strategic Defense Initiative, but in the meantime we will defend only very limited portions of our airspace with a more handful of fighter-interceptor squadrons. We do not see a clear need to spend enormous sums in yet another arena against an opponent who already seems sufficiently deterred. The world is changing, however, and the old, familiar, stable balance of power appears to be breaking up. We face new threats from new directions--including messianic theocracies that may not subscribe to the self-restraining, "rational-man" theory of deterrence. In the past, we have vigorously opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Today, we also oppose the diffusion of sophisticated missile technologies for the same reason: the world is already a sufficiently dangerous place.38
Our desire to limit access to advanced military hardware is understandable, but the reality is that we cannot succeed indefinitely. Thus far, the United States and the Soviet Union are the only nations that have fielded sophisticated, long-range CMs, and neither has announced any willingness to make them available to anyone else. Nor has the current climate of relaxed tensions encouraged any sense of urgency in publicly addressing this issue. But is silence prudent? Experience suggests that CMs will enter the international marketplace sooner or later, just as medium-range ballistic missiles are beginning to enter it today. Analysis also suggests that nuclear weapons may be becoming militarily irrelevant, thereby underscoring the urgency of the CM problem. Multikiloton warhead yields are not necessary, provided that the delivery vehicle is extremely accurate and that the target is vulnerable and important-an increasing likelihood in complex, industrial societies.39
Like the Allies in 1942, we can still consider this problem in relatively abstract terms. For now, we deem it sufficient to maintain only a nominal defense against air attack because we are unable to envision its occurrence. But what about tomorrow? When shall we begin to prepare?
Notes
Their idea was to form a magnetic loop employing existing railway lines, suitably interconnected, all the way around London--a circumference of about 60 miles. This loop would be energized with a hefty current to make it a giant magnetic deflector. They worked out a system which would have required something like 1,000 amps D.C. . . . The power requirement for the system would have been on the order of 20 to 30 megawatts, which would have meant dedicating quite a large (commercial) power station for this purpose. The system was very seriously considered, and design work began on some of the necessary equipment.
Alfred Price, The History of U.S. Electronic Warfare, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Association of Old Crows, 1984), 241.
Second, consider their effect upon potential victims. The immediate result of a successful, CM-delivered, high-explosive attack upon an industrilized nation's nuclear power plants, for example, would include an extended power blackout affecting thousands of square miles. The lon-term results could include severe, lasting economic disruptions. What political leverage accrues to the aggressor who can threaten "one, two, three . . . many Chernobyls?"
Capt George W. Cully (BA, Old Dominion University; JD, University of Virginia School of Law) is Chief, Inquiries Division, US Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has been a staff historian at the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico; a circuit trial counsel in the US Air Force 1st Judicial Circuit; and an area defense counsel at Dover AFB, Delware.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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