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Published Airpower Journal - Summer 1989
The Role of Tactical Airlift in the Equation
ARE we fully prepared to prosecute a major war by effectively integrating combined (i.e., multinational) forces? We say we are. On the one hand, we regularly tally allied air, ground, and naval forces; we array these forces by sector and region for quick response; and we design command structures for integrated employment. On the other hand, some Americans regularly criticize certain NATO partners for devoting too little to their own defense, and the resolve of some allied leaders may vacillate from time to time. This question of readiness, therefore, is neither irrelevant nor off the wall. After all, in 1940 France capitulated in just 41 days even though their forces, combined with those of Great Britain, were equal to or exceeded those of Germany. However, if in nearly 40 years NATO has not achieved efficiency of purpose for combined operations and if political, economic, and military investments were for naught, we will individually and collectively deserve any of the consequences. I prefer to believe that we remember our experiences of World War II sufficiently well to perpetuate a viable alliance.
Still other people question whether we are fully prepared to prosecute a major war by effectively integrating US joint forces. This concern is easily raised in view of our past performances and the resulting military reform and reorganization. Again, history records that, aside from political resolve, France had neither planned nor trained for joint operations. It would be both useless and foolish to argue in favor of prereform practices. Under our Constitution, the Congress is chartered to raise forces, and it has opted to ensure jointness through reorganization. Recent developments are encouraging to advocates of joint operations: a new unified transportation command, a new unified special operations command, and a greater voice for theater commanders. A significant positive indicator was an open letter from Gen Robert D. Russ, commander of Tactical Air Command (COMTAC), to his commanders reiterating the tactical air force's (TAF) commitment to providing battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air support (CAS). and offensive counterair (OCA) for the Army. Essentially, General Russ stated, "We fly and fight to further the joint forces commanders' objectives. . . Everything that TACAIR does directly supports the airland battlefield. . . Our commitment to the 1946 agreement to support the Army remains chipped in granite."1This should be welcome news for those who are suspicious of COMTAC's acceptance of AirLand Battle as the core doctrine for large-scale conventional war. If these attitudes are genuine, the proof will be manifested through joint exercise scenarios that are free of interservice barriers and artificialities that have thus far served as excuses for improper employment or misuse of air power and for Army recalcitrance. Let's see if the National Training Center (NTC) begins to integrate air and ground forces properly.
As if these weighty concerns were not enough, what about integrating compositeforces in war? I use the term composite to mean the integrated use of multiple disciplines of one service (a narrower concept of combined and joint arms). Specifically, is the TAF trained and prepared to provide massive en route and objective area protection to intratheater tactical airlift that is directly supporting engaged ground forces? I think not. I, along with others, have written about the many laments of a frustrated tactical airlift community.2 Those writings identified five basic concerns of intratheater tactical airlift:
1. The Air Force and Army must recommit themselves to tactical airlift as an ingredient of air power that is essential to AirLand Battle.
2. The TAF must be trained and prepared to provide massive en route and objective area protection for tactical airlift that is directly supporting the AirLand Battle.
3. No master airlift plan should pay for the C-17 at the expense of intratheater airlift.
4. Tactical airlift must be provided minimum essential defensive systems for the envisioned electronic combat/electronic warfare (EC/EW) threat.
5. Deliberate, dedicated, long-range plans for a successor to the C-130 must be as vigorously pursued as those for any other weapon system.
Two documents address the first two concerns, albeit in broad terms: the Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) draft publication entitled Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD), 14 March 1988, and the Military Airlift Command (MAC)-TRADOC Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency (ACRA) draft publication entitled Joint Airlift for Combat Operations (JACO), 14 December 1987. It remains to be seen whether these documents' acknowledgment of the first two concerns will ever be incorporated into joint execution planning and exercise scenarios, thereby resulting in tactics development. As stated in a Soviet adage, "One of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine."
As regards the third concern, we should not be surprised if the theater commanders in (CINCs) inject themselves into any planned diminution of tactical airlift resources. We should expect the commander of European Command (CINCEUR) to be concerned about plans to draw down intratheater airlift assets. The CINC's requirements must be considered when the services develop or adjust force structure. That was the intent of congressionally directed reorganization (reform).
The Air Staff, Headquarters MAC, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard are all addressing the need for defensive systems, the fourth concern. We are evaluating a number of off-the-shelf defensive systems. Existing technical problems appear to be manageable, and it is highly probable that electronic defensive equipment will be operational on tactical airlift aircraft in the near term.
At this stage, the fifth concern--a successor to the C-1 30--is no more than a twinkle in the eye. Maintaining the sincere resolve necessary to obtain this aircraft can be difficult in the face of shrinking defense budgets. It takes commitment of a high order to see a B-1, B-2, advanced tactical fighter (ATF), or C-17 reach fruition, and this proposal demands no less determination. Certainly, proponents of AirLand Battle should be strong advocates of this initiative.
But this paper principally addresses the first two concerns, without which the other three serve as Band-Aids. A hypothetical scenario involving AirLand Battle and maneuver warfare will best illustrate our purpose. The setting is Europe (whether or not base-case execution ever occurs), with a forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and forward line of own troops (FLOT) stretching some 1,000 to 1,500 miles from the southern region to northern flank extremes. Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO forces are arrayed from one end to the other.
One of the players on this stage, the Soviet Union, has indicated that it will attack our rear echelons prior to the first engagement of forward deployed forces. Before any border assault, KGR agents in the West would be ordered to assassinate key political and military figures. The Soviets would also insert Spetsnaz teams deep into the West to eliminate command and control facilities, disrupt lines of communications, and create as much confusion and panic as possible. These forces arc specially organized and trained to destroy missile storage sites, communications and resupply lines, and air base facilities (the two latter targets are especially important to our scenario). Each Soviet frontal army contains a Spetsnaz brigade consisting of 900 to 1,200 troops that can break off into as many as 135 separate groups.
Once frontal forces are engaged, Soviet doctrine calls for air assault units to attack our second echelon. These WP forces are basically heliborne air cavalry units designed to attack tactical targets and bases that are 30 to 60 miles in front of WP main forces but to the near rear of our own main forces. Still another force that will threaten the NATO rear is the operational maneuver group (OMG), a highly mobile, division-sized force organic to first-echelon formations, whose sole function is to exploit any gaps created at the front by the first-echelon forces. Once the OMG has penetrated, it can create havoc operating 30 to 300 miles to our rear.
If all of these concepts are implemented throughout the length and breadth of an elongated FEBA, and since there is such a low density of in-place NATO forces, how will we respond? We certainly cannot allow WP armies to pour through a ruptured FEBA/FLOT. That is their AirLand Battle plan and maneuver strategy. Ours is to hold back the thundering herd, attack the enemy rear echelons, and stack them up before they can be brought to bear at the front. How do we identify and simplify the possible courses of action for our ground forces that directly affect joint and composite response by the Air Force, particularly intratheater tactical airlift? Well, with all the challenges in store for our armies, they might hold their ground, withdraw, or advance.
Let's say that they hold. Such an intense action expends mountains of materiel and incurs heavy casualties. Wherever this occurs, thoughout the entire theater, the engaged frontal forces must be sustained, resupplied, and reinforced. Our forces plan to use an inordinate Army network of transportation equipment, road-rail-water lines of communications, and rotary-wing aircraft. Under the best or worst of conditions, these logistical accomplishments become turning points of battles, campaigns, and, indeed, wars. The victor performs minor and major logistical miracles by the hour every day. However, if the WP is even partially successful, its forces will be to our rear, disrupting command and control, landlines of communications, air bases, and supply depots. So, if we are to hold very long, we will sorely need the versatility, range, and capacity of intratheater tactical airlift daily all up and down that 1,000- to 1,500- mile front.
What if the army cannot hold but must withdraw and reposition to fight again? It not only expends and attrits as in the first case but also withdraws-leaving goods of war behind for sound tactical reasons-and must traverse and occupy territory that has been disrupted by enemy actions in our rear area. No matter the difficulty of the task, to become a viable fighting force once again, the army must be resupplied and sustained. Consequently, air lines of communications (ALOCS) and tactical airlift are again part of the total equation.
Hopefully, the advantage somewhere along the FEBA is ours, and our forces advance. We break through and attack the enemy's rear echelon. Initially, we expend and attrit and then must move forward quickly and with purpose. Such a maneuver may very well require our forces to travel lighter for speed and leave stores and equipment behind. Since the enemy does not intend to leave lines of communications intact for our advance, we again need tactical airlift to provide resupply, reinforcement, and sustainment.
Regardless of the circumstances, the Army's organic capability, or the relative condition of landlines of communications, engaged ground forces will depend heavily upon Air Force intratheater tactical airlift and ALOCs. All the while, the TAF is equally pressed in battle, providing OCA, BAI, and CAS in direct support of the joint forces commander's overall strategic and tactical objectives. Never the less, tactical needs en route, high/low combat air patrol (CAP) and must have a semibenign objective area for airland or airdrop operations, to deliver intact precious reinforcement and resupply, survive, and repeat its essential function.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Air Force, and Army do indeed recognize that ALOCs are indispensable. JCS publications, joint and service doctrine, and designed operational capability (DOC) statements acknowledge the necessity of tactical airlift. Thus, certain persistent mind-sets are all the more vexing: that airlifters had best train in themselves in single ship, terrain masking, jinking and juking to avoid threats and show up when propitious; that integral formations of airlift aircraft are not required; that the popular use of A-10s for en route CAP is effective; that acquiring enough electronic defensive capabilities can offset deficits in composite strike packages.
The truth is that resupply and reinforcement airlift operations will frequently call for mass deliveries at specified coordinates during critical time windows, satisfying rates of acceptance dictated solely by ground tactical considerations. Ingress and egress corridors must allow target acquisition, thus requiring en route, fast flier fighter protection (not A-10s). The objective area must be softened up and reasonably permissive for tactical airlift operations. Self-contained, rearview plastic bubbles and electronic countermeasures do contribute to survivability but are not in themselves panaceas.
The Marine Corps is a suitable example of a composite force. Everything about their four divisions and four air wings relates directly to the combat Marine, the "jar head." Their doctrine writers, their developers of manuals and training, their exercise managers, their budgeteers, their acquisitors, their combat support and combat service support people are all devoted to directing their efforts to the point of conflict.
For example, when the Marines execute their equivalent of the AirLand Battle, combat troops are put ashore or deeper inland by amphibious vehicles or helicopters. They are then sustained and reinforced by air-land-rail-water lines of communications. The primary rotary-winged air support is in turn supported by organic KC-130 tankers, and both are protected by dedicated air power. Sea-based firepower, artillery, and armor are augmented by dedicated BAI and CAS. Missile warning systems, radar warning receivers, and chaff/flare dispensers on the Marines' main airlift and tanker craft provide additional self protection, but the Marines fully understand and intend that their organic fighter force provides primary protection to their airlifters and tankers. The Marines are a composite fighting force! We might argue the wisdom of allowing the Marines to maintain a semiautonomous doctrine, but high marks must be awarded their compositeness.
Rather than directing the air component commander to execute these unique composite operations for which his tactical air forces are untrained, it would be most wise for MAC and TAC to aggressively create meaningful training opportunities that develop, pretest, and validate effective tactics. Since COMTAC has stepped up to the TAF's recommitment to the Army, can CINCMAC be far behind? That would take care of jointness, but what of TAC's and MAC's composite responsibilities to one another? Excellent opportunities for joint and/or composite employment exist through Red Flag, Green Flag, Air Warrior I (NTC), and select JCS-sponsored field-training exercises but not without firm commitment and exercise redesign.
Combined . . . Joint . . . Composite. Careful study of modern principles of war would reinforce the essence of training and preparedness in these three types of combat operations. Yet, intratheater tactical airlift has not been afforded full integration with its combined, joint, and composite partners. That one oversight might very well adversely tip the scale when attempting to hold, withdraw, or advance.
Notes
1. AFRP 190-1. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders. April 1988, 1-2.
2. See Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles. "Tactical Airlift," Air Power Journal. Fall 1987. 41-47; Col Paul L. Wilke, "Tactical Airlift Tactics and Doctrine: More Carts, More Horses," Air University Review, May-June 1986, 21-27; and Maj Ronald G. Boston, "Doctrine by Default: The Historical Origins of Tactical Airlift," Air University Review, May-June 1983, 64-75.
Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles, Sr., USAF, Retired (Texas A&M, University of Houston, University of Southern California), is a command pilot with over 8,000 flying hours spanning 38 years. His assignments included chief of operations, C-130 combat crew training school; director of operations, Headquarters Air Force Reserve; and wing commander. General Knowles is a previous contributor to the Airpower Journal.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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