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Published Airpower Journal - Summer 1987
IN THE early hours of an April morning in 1986, fighter-bombers of the US Air Force, streaking from their bases in the United Kingdom, reaffirmed an idea espoused by Gen Billy Mitchell almost 60 years earlier: bombs dropped from aircraft can take out specific targets. The results in the 1920s and in 1986 were the same, but the circumstances and hardware changed considerably.
Technology has taken us from clearweather, by-guess-and-by-golly, to all-weather, day-or-night, pinpoint-accuracy bombing, providing the destructive force of a 500-pound bomb or an area weapon meets your definition of pinpoint. Technology also allowed us the latitude to expand exponentially the means used to fight. We fly great distances at great speeds and deliver tons of ordnance with an efficiency that Billy Mitchell would not have dreamed of, although what is now reality is certainly an extension of his dream. In the end, we accomplish what he did with biplanes at 120 knots: we destroy a target. This is air power, and the essence of air power's strength is the ability to destroy an enemy's physical means to resist by destroying selected targets.
Air power also provides the flexibility to achieve objectives that range from the limited to the broad. The achievement of a broad objective, however, is really an amalgam of limited objectives. Putting bombs on target is therefore closely allied with the choice of targets and tactical planning, which in turn are based on the scope of objectives chosen and on the decision to employ armed force. In the limited sense, if we say that air power in a certain instance, we should mean that the bombs did not hit the target. An example is the Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam. When F-105 aircraft could not destroy the bridge in the mid-1960s, it could be said that, in the limited sense, air power failed and that when the bridge fell in 1972, air power succeeded. If the question is asked why the bridge was struck at all, we most look not to air power but to the broader objectives and into the political decision to employ armed force.
In light of the rapid development of air power and its embodiment as the answer to all problems of surface-bound conflict, it is not surprising that distinctions have been blurred and that tactical air has been held accountable for glaring deficiencies in related but separate areas. Amid the euphoric atmosphere associated with going in one generation from World War I surplus aircraft to jet bombers, the idea of air power's omnipotence crept in. "We can go anywhere and do anything" became the commonly accepted opinion. If the destruction of Libyan targets says anything, it echoes that sentiment, but it does so in total disregard of all other factors influencing air power's effective use. Moreover, omnipotence has a political corollary that uses "influence" in the place of "destroy." This corollary says that by influencing A, B will be influenced and C will be influenced by B. This may be simply stated as the Billiard Effect.
The Billiard Effect avoids clear-cut objectives on which the effective use of tactical air power is based. It is as if a surgeon were asked to "influence" a ruptured appendix. With both surgery and air power, you either take it out or you do not, and it either needs to come out or it does not. In Libya, for example, a broad objective for the use of tactical air could have been the destruction of Mu'ammar Qadhafi's abilities to harass. US naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra. To assign to air power sweeping responsibilities outside the realm of destruction of targets, such as changing Qadhafi's mind about supporting terrorism or creating sufficient internal turmoil to cause his overthrow, is a fallacy. These, or similar reasons, illustrate the greatest significance of the Billiard Effect, which is to drive the round, practical uses of air power straight into the square hole of conjecture.
The theory was tested in World War II and Korea but really came into its own during the Vietnam conflict. In World War II, the German Blitz of London and the Allied bombing of Berlin were directed at hearts and minds. They were the wrong tools for the psychological job, and they missed the objective. As long as weapons could be manufactured and shipped to the troops, the war continued; however, with the advent of better and faster aircraft carrying bigger payloads, the lesson of the London Blitz lay lost in the rubble. In Vietnam, the targets, the theater of operations, and the surges and pauses were supposed to influence the behavior of the aggressor, with air power as the cue ball. Of course, this experiment in behavior modification played hell with fundamentals. Intangibles, such as surprise and selective targeting of appropriate military objectives which had the potential to render the enemy defenseless--were cast ruthlessly aside. In the end, the United States withdrew amid mumblings of "Where did we go wrong?" In some circles, the answer was that air power failed, disregarding the fact that the crews put the bombs on target and those targets were destroyed. Under the Billiard Effect, arrogant assumptions had pushed pragmatic application of air power out of the picture. It became apparent that the fundamentals had been disregarded when the results of applied tactical air in the jet age did not meet expectations.
Introspection is a curious state of mind that, in the case of the post-Vietnam US Air Force, led to a fever pitch of hardware development accompanied shortly thereafter by a renewal of realistic training methods. Previous shortcomings were seen as the lack of sufficient destructive power, accuracy, and tactics. The answer was to move smartly to increase the means to destroy targets. None of this was bad in and of itself. The raid on Libya clearly showed how effective improved weaponry, well-trained crews, and superb tactics could be. Hopefully, the raid on Libya also signals a turn away from the Billiard Effect and back toward realistic, specific objectives. When national intentions are indistinct, the piecemeal use of aircraft in one brief strike should not be held culpable for what would amount to a failure to set distinct limited or broad objectives. Air power should not be held accountable for a failure of policy.
The US Air Force may also share some of the blame for distorting the appropriate applications of tactical air. Under any circumstances, we "can do." Blowing your own horn is fine for morale, but it leads to gross distortions when John Q. Public comes to accept boast and a positive "can do" attitude as fact. It surprises him greatly when a stick of 500-pound bombs, dropped on a military target in an urban environment in a "surgical" strike, damages surrounding buildings and kills people on a nearby street. He begins to think that he does not want any of those "surgeons" putting a pacemaker in his chest. He is also astounded that one bombing mission does not accomplish impossible goals.
Modern tactical air power can take out a target. If that target is a bridge, the span will surely drop; if it is a building, then those that are still among the living after the walls fall down need to look for a new place to work. What the destruction of a bridge or a building cannot do is to precisely influence how the leaders or the people of any society view the world or their relation to it. This bleak thought in turn leads to the assessment that limited application of tactical air power is therefore useless. That is not so, but its limits must be realized. There are times when it is in the national interest to kill enemy soldiers, destroy a munitions factory, or accomplish other limited goals. Air power can do these things very effectively. Cases in point are the Israeli strike against the Iraqi reactor or any of the strikes against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) camps. These were conducted in the national interest, without expectations of a dramatic victory. Although successful, the purposes were limited and the results were limited. If you want more complete results, the broad objective must be clear and the means must match the desired outcome.
Air power is an application of force and shares that broad definition with land and sea power. The use of any of these is subject to similar limitation. For example, witness the Soviet reactions to unrest in Hungary in 1956 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Those rebellions were crushed because the means and tactical applications used were more than enough to accomplish the specific goal. Contrast this with Soviet actions in Afghanistan, where the goal is less distinct and the force is therefore insufficient or misapplied.
Anything short of destroying the means to wage war cannot guarantee that the war will not continue. There are no shortcuts around this elementary fact. Evidence suggests that knowing the right targets to hit but not hitting them does not awaken the sleeping lamb of reason in a determined foe, quiet world opinion, or set the stage for letting bygones be bygones. And more to the point, it is not the purpose of air power to do anything of these. There is not doubt that air power can and does play a decisive role in warfare, yet the scope is narrow and practical. For this reason, there is a place for land, air, and sea forces, as well as politics.
To understand the basic purpose of air power is to realize that it is not omnipotent, nor is it an influence. It is, purely and simply, a means to knock down the bridge.
Madrid, Spain
Contributor
Lt Col William P. Stroud III (USAFA; MPA, University of Oklahoma) is chief, Diplomatic Clearance Branch, JUSMG MAAG, Madrid, Spain. He is a master navigator and has served as a flight commander in an F-4 squadron and as a bombardment navigator instructor in FB-111s. Assignments have been in Vietnam, Spain, Germany, and at HQ USAFE. Colonel Stroud is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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