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Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1987
THE PERSIAN GULF
THE SIX NATIONS on the west side of the Persian Gulf that are members of the loose alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) together possess approximately 40 percent of the world’s crude oil reserves, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia possessing the overwhelming majority of them. The Iran-Iraq war has shown that refineries, processing facilities, vulnerable to air attack. In addition to tankers in the gulf, oil facilities at Ras Tanura and Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia and a vast complex of key petrochemical, desalinization, and power facilities between Kuwait City and Mina ‘al Ahmadi in Kuwait are attractive targets of immense value.
Although individual members of the GCC have spent billions of dollars on defense and are beginning to work together on some matters, they are not yet able to defend themselves against the major regional powers--Iran and Iraq--nor, understandably, against Soviet might. If recent experience is any indicator, GCC air defenses are likely to be challenged periodically and the United States is likely to be involved in air defense assistance to the GCC. Several air defense scenarios could be considered.
Scenario one: Iran is unable to gain the upper hand in the stalemated Iran-Iraq war. Angry at Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over their continuing support for Iraq, Iran launches several air attacks against them. To anyone who has followed the Iran-Iraq war and its spillovers, this is not an unrealistic scenario. Iran bombed Kuwait in 1981 and had an air skirmish with Saudi Arabia in June 1984. In addition, both Iran and Iraq have made air attacks on Arab-owned tankers carrying oil from ports in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Scenario two (which is being acted out as this is written): United States, with some involvement of European allies, provides naval escort for tankers in the Gulf. Cooperative air defense by the US Navy, US Air Force, and some GCC countries is especially important in view of the mistaken Iraqi attack on the USS Stark and the threat of Iranian air attack in the "tanker war."
Scenario three: The Soviet Union invades Iran. In this scenario, US Central Command (USCENTCOM) forces are given basing rights in Gulf states. The United States conducts conventional air attacks on Soviet forces in Iran and provides logistics support to US troops attempting to slow the Soviet advance. Bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf states would be high-priority targets for Soviet air attacks.
The focus of this paper is GCC air defense capability, with emphasis on the somewhat neglected command, control, and communication (C3) elements. GCC capabilities and limitations will be characterized; US direct military assistance and s ecurity assistance goals, capabilities, and shortfalls identified; and the need for cooperative effort emphasized.
The concept of a Gulf security arrangement has existed since the early 1970s. Prompted by a number of events including the Iran-Iraq war, internal security problems, and possibly the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the six nations of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the GCC charter on 25 May 1981. The charter generally states that GCC objectives are coordination, integration, and interconnection between member states in all fields.1
The Need for Mutual Security
The GCC has social, economic, and political aims, as well as internal and external security concerns. Because security was high on the list, a GCC military committee was established later in 1981 to begin work on joint exercises, a joint military command, and cooperation in air defense. GCC wealth has purchased a wide range of weapons, many of them state-of-the-art. However, many of these expenditures appear to be in response to local rather than regional concerns. This is not surprising since each country has its own internal and external defense problems requiring a variety of forces that frequently must counterbalance each other in addition to countering external threats. All of the Gulf states are relatively new nations with political and military power distributed along tribal lines, which can hinder internal and international cooperation. The result is ineffective use of resources and redundant military effort that may not support regional defense goals.
GCC countries do not have a wealth of people. The aggregate GCC population is in the range of 12-15 million, and only about 50 percent of the population is literate.2
This is not a very large base for supporting national development efforts and simultaneously providing qualified personnel to operate increasingly large arsenals of sophisticated military equipment.
Two other factors exacerbate the population problem: the distrust between members of different Moslem sects and the protective attitude of Moslems toward females. Approximately 6 percent of the GCC population is Shi'a Moslem. (In Bahrain, Shi'ites constitute a numerical majority.) In nations ruled by Sunni Moslems, Shi'ites are usually not trusted with military positions or, at best, are given only subordinate roles. The female portion of the GCC population is not utilized in the military or in most of the civilian sector due to the prevailing Moslem protective attitude toward women. With such a small population to draw on and with the GCC's relatively recent entrance into the world of modern technology, the quantity of highly skilled military personnel is low.
Total GCC military forces number approximately 137,000 compared to Iran's 555,000 and Iraq's 642,000.3 It is difficult to give an exact numerical breakdown of air defense forces that could be the first line of defense for the GCC. Some GCC air defense units serve in land forces and some in air forces, and in Saudi Arabia there is also a separate military service for air defense missile forces. A generous estimate (which includes all GCC airforce personnel) is 28,000 men. These forces are generally in an uphill struggle to operate and maintain the equipment they have now. The hill becomes steeper as the military buildup continues. The need air defense cooperation among the relatively weak GCC states seems self-evident.
Cooperation in the GCC cannot be taken for granted, although several heads of individual states are related. Saudi Arabia, under its first king, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, once ruled most of the GCC states. It is no secret that the Saudis aspire to leadership of the GCC; however, the other GCC members tend to be skeptical of Saudi motives and naturally have their own national sovereignty concerns, pride, and goals to consider. Some are leery of linkage with the United States because of its close ties with their avowed enemy, Israel, and because of its record of inconsistent policy and action in the Middle East. Close GCC association with the United States could draw the ire of more radical Arab states and Iran. The GCC as a defense alliance is in a precarious position--its members not entirely trusting each other and yet needing to be drawn together for mutual support. They are unable to defend against the large regional powers and therefore want to have US assistance in a pinch, but they do not want a close relationship in the meantime because that could in itself cause a crisis.
Whether the other GCC nations wish to admit it or not, the Saudis are the mainstay of any GCC- air defense effort by virtue of wealth, political ties, population, military equipment, and geography. The GCC, in turn, has little alternative than to look to the United States for air defense assistance if the situation gets beyond the alliance's limited capability.
In October 1981, Iranian aircraft bombed Kuwait. In early 1984, Iran and Iraq began attacking ships in the Persian Gulf, some of which carried oil loaded in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Also in 1984, the Saudis successfully defended against an Iranian F-4 attacking Saudi Arabia. In November 1986, Iranian F-4s reportedly attacked a French operated oil platform 30 miles from the UAE.
In three of these four situations, the GCC countries involved were unable to defend against attack. A number of factors contributed to air defense impotence, including the lack of long-range early warning, limited response time, limited communication, and lack of coordination between member countries. In the fourth situation, a small attack was thwarted by the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), but not without key help from the US E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and US ground C 3 equipment deployed to Saudi Arabia in 1980 at Saudi request. Although the Saudis made their own air defense decisions and flew the interceptors that shot down an Iranian F-4, the US operated C3 equipment probably made the difference between being the shooter and being shot.
The GCC has recognized its need for effective air defense. Since 1984, Saudi Arabia alone has made deals worth approximately $12 billion to buy AWACS, air defense missiles, and two ground command and control systems.4 Major suppliers of air defense equipment to GCC countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR (to Kuwait). The diversity of sellers and equipment is in itself a barrier to interoperability and efficient joint use. Table I shows the variety of air defense equipment in use or planned.
Individual air defense capabilities vary between Gulf states with Saudi Arabia being best equipped. Surface-to-air missiles provide responsive close-in protection at lower operational cost than fighter-interceptors but do not have the latter's range or flexibility. The longest-range missile in the GCC inventory is the Hawk (an estimated 22 batteries, which is complemented by numerous medium-range Rapier, Shahine, Crotale, and SA-8) and short-range (RBS-70, Stinger, and SA-7) missiles.
Fighter-interceptors provide long-range defense and are normally very responsive if kept at high states of alert or on an airborne patrol. GCC nations have approximately 240 fighters, of which one-third are frontline F-15 and Mirage 2000 interceptors.5 But other aircraft--the F-5, Mirage Fl, and jaguar--are significantly less capable in an air defense role. Together, GCC missiles and aircraft are moderately capable of air defense in depth if they can be put to timely use and coordinated by effective C3 C3capability in the GCC has generally lagged behind other air defense equipment. In recent years Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have begun to narrow the gap by making large expenditures on new C3 systems. All six GCC countries have taken actions to improve their radar detection capability with both surface-base systems and, in some cases, are considering airborne systems such as aerostats (balloon-borne radar systems) or fixed-wing platforms. For example, Saudi Arabia, in a joint venture with a US company, has developed and tested an aerostat radar platform called the low-altitude surveillance system. Initiatives to obtain better radar detection and integrated command and control equipment will play a critical role in GCC air defense capabilities. Air defense forces without effective C3 are like a football team without a coach; individual talents notwithstanding, there will be no one to coordinate the team effort.
Two potential star players on the GCC C3 team are the Saudi AWACS (Peace Sentinel) and the Peace Shield programs. The five Saudi AWACS delivered between June 1986 and March 1987 give in principle, the same air surveillance umbrella that the US AWACS has provided for seven years. In fact, AWACS is so complex to operate and maintain that Saudi Arabia will most likely be dependent on US contractor support for the life of AWACS.6
Clearly, AWACS capability is needed by the Saudis and the GCC. With it, a potential hostile attacker can be detected and traced over 200 miles. The Persian Gulf is not much of a barrier to air attack. Simple calculations show that a bomb-laden F-4 could travel at low level from Bushehr, Iran, to Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, in about 17 minutes. With AWACS, this raid can be detected almost immediately, giving defenders time to launch fighters and to activate missile defenses. Without an airborne radar capability, warning time is cut to about five minutes at best.
The Peace Shield program complements the Saudi AWACS program. Peace Shield, an RSAF C3 system, will be a network of command centers, ground radars, and communication sites strategically placed throughout Saudi Arabia. The system will take inputs from any ground radar site, and AWACS, displaying them in each regional air defense facility as well as the command operations center for Saudi air defense decision making and management.
Conceived in the early 1980s, the Peace Shield program was not begun until 1985 and will not be completed until the early 1990s. The guiding force behind Peace Shield has been Prince Fahad bin Abdullah, former RSAF director of air operations and now deputy minister of defense and president of civil aviation. Prince Fahad is a visionary who saw Peace Shield as a means to three ends: first, to link RSAF forces together in one system; second, to integrate the air defenses of other Saudi armed forces into one national system; and third, to serve as the underlying structure for a regional air defense network. Whether the other Saudi forces will cooperate and whether the GCC nations will agree to link with Peace Shield remains to be seen. Obtaining cooperation is a difficult but not impossible task.
A list of GCC C3 problems should include at a minimum those associated with manning, segregated command and control, barriers to sharing information, identification, and proliferation of incompatible equipment.
The critical AWACS support issue is probably crewmembers. US contractors can maintain AWACS in peacetime, but US contractor personnel are prohibited by US law from flying on combat missions. In addition, a US congressional prohibition on members from other nations operating Saudi AWACS prevents the Saudis from obtaining outside help from the third-country sources.7
The 17-position AWACS crew is difficult for technically developed nations to fill. In addition to four flight-crew positions, there are 13 mission-crew positions that all require moderate to high-technical sophistication. Limited manpower, aggravated by demands of the private sector, and other competing military systems (such as the Tornado and ground command and control systems) are likely to plague the Saudi AWACS for its lifetime. Other GCC states are no better off than Saudi Arabia and will have similar problems with new systems.
The First Two Cs: Command and Control
Another problem area for GCC air defense is old manual command and control systems that use 1950s technology, that are generally not computerized, and that depend on manpower-intensive devices such as grease-pencil plotting boards to display information. No GCC member has a system that automatically integrates all the air defense information available within a country. Some systems use a mixture of manual and digital information; some are completely manual. Manual methods are not inherently bad, just too slow for modern air defense. As indicated above, at least three GCC countries have embarked on new command and control programs, but in some cases they will not be complete for years.
One other aspect of this problem is that individual command and control systems cannot quickly pass information back and forth between countries. This is an absolute necessity for a truly integrated and responsive defense effort on the part of the CCC. Pooling information will become more important as the amount of data and the capability of sensors increase. This ability to share information is called interoperability. The interoperability concept has been slow to develop in the GCC. There are recent indications that the idea is taking root. For example, the UAE reportedly refused delivery of the first French Mirage 2000 fighters because they did not meet UAE specifications for interoperable communication with other GCC fighters and did not have the capability to fire US missiles.8
The Third C: Communication of Information
Saudi AWACS information could be of use to other GCC countries. An AWACS flying to protect the northeastern portion of Saudi Arabia could also provide valuable information to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. However, the US Congress placed limits on the use and transfer of Saudi AWACS information as one of the conditions of the AWACS sale. The terms state that the information from Saudi AWACS will not be shared with any other country except by mutual US-Saudi agreements.9
It seems possible that mutual agreement could he reached on sharing Saudi AWACS information with GCC countries. An air defense information link was reportedly established in 1984 between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for the transfer of US AWACS data. 10 This sort of arrangement could serve as the prototype for sharing on a limited basis. Since Saudi AWACS cannot cover the entire GCC defense area simultaneously, its information would not be of use or interest to all members.
The sharing of air defense information, whether by data or voice, must be done rapidly and by secure means. Integration of air defenses depends on integration of communication and secure devices. A popular misconception about modern secure devices is that if a device falls into unfriendly hands, the entire system is compromised. In fact, today's secure devices are about as useful as bookends without the material or device that puts the encrypting code in them. Thus, a loan of one country's secure devices, or better yet, a GCC common device, could be used on CCC business with a GCC key. Under this concept, each country could also have its own unique set of keys that would permit national secure communications unmonitored by anyone else.
Identification--Who is the Enemy?
A well-integrated command and control network helps to solve a notoriously difficult problem for any alliance--that of determining friend from foe. With six different types of GCC interceptor aircraft, numerous missile systems, and often more than one agency with an air defense role in each country, it is difficult to keep from shooting down as many allied aircraft as the enemy does. Ideally, common GCC identification equipment would solve this problem. US experience in other alliances indicates that obtaining agreement and common equipment is easier said than done. Alternatively, if each GCC country can keep track of its own aircraft and has the capability to rapidly exchange this information with other GCC members through interoperable C3 systems, fratricide can be reduced.
Proliferation and Incompatibility
The diversity of air defense suppliers and equipment obtained without an air defense master plan has resulted in an interoperability nightmare. Nine different surface-to-air missiles, six air defense aircraft, and C3 systems from at least three different countries greatly complicate attempts to work together--although such diversity complicates the problem for attackers. The reasonable goals of obtaining lower prices through competition and avoiding dependence on one supplier may not seem as important when the time comes to defend together.
The situation is not hopeless. On the positive side, an overall GCC air defense planning effort has started. GCC defense sectors have been laid out, basic procedures discussed, and modest joint air defense exercises conducted. Principles of commonality, interoperability, and joint operations are at least in the military lexicon of most GCC countries. Advisers associated with the GCC have indicated that the GCC has solicited a contractor study of air defense facilities. This study or others like it could he the basis of a GCC air defense master plan.
With this broad overview of the equipment and some of the limitations of individual (and by extension, GCC) assets, let us turn to the second part of the potential coalition air defense force--the United States.
The 1980 Carter Doctrine states that the Persian Gulf was an area vital to US interests and that the United States would militarily intervene there if necessary. A US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was formed as a means to implement the doctrine. Largely a paper force at first and initially without plans or means to get to the region, the RDF was a target of much criticism. The RDF became the basis for the US Central Command, which now has responsibility for the Persian Gulf area and is severely hampered by not having any in-place forces.11
Some Political Realities
Although the United States continues to seek bases on the Arabian Peninsula, it is unlikely to achieve success even in relatively closely aligned nations like Oman.12 It appears that there is little chance that a sizable US force would ever be based in a GCC state in peacetime. The GCC nations simply do not want large standing US forces in the area. Even after requesting US escorts for tankers. Kuwait and other GCC countries are limiting military cooperation to areas specifically related to that mission. 13 The United States should accommodate to that fact. This is not to say that the United States would never be asked to send direct-assistance forces to the region, in which case basing rights would then be granted.14 An over-the-horizon US presence appears to suit the GCC, although this places the United States at a severe disadvantage in coming to the GCC's aid in a timely manner.
The United States has demonstrated its willingness to come to the aid of the Gulf nations should they need and request it. It has sent fighter and radar air defense forces to the Gulf a number of times in the past and quite likely will have to deploy them in the future. For example, US AWACS have been in Saudi Arabia for seven years. It is less likely that the United States would be called on to deploy the entire USCENTCOM force. Although massive troop deployments are less probable, the consequence of failure to operate effectively is much greater.
Given these political realities, it is appropriate to briefly discuss the air defense forces that might provide direct assistance to the region, then turn to the indirect efforts through the security assistance program.
Direct Assistance
As a subset of the overall USCENTCOM military package, air defense forces share the same problems that plague the entire over-the-horizon effort --distance, time, firepower, and sustainability. For ease of discussion, USCENTCOM air defense forces can be placed in two categories: quick-reaction forces for contingencies and forces for major confrontation with the Soviet Union. (Supporting and sustaining forces, although very important, will not be discussed.)
Quick-reaction forces are generally air forces such as a small number of F-15 fighters and AWACS. Personnel could also be deployed to act as liaison with host-nation forces and might be used to augment some air defense units. Similar forces have been used in past contingencies. The 1980 AWACS deployment to Saudi Arabia is an example of this kind of package without fighters. The advantages of this type of force are that it is easy to send, can respond and deploy within hours, and provides a quick show of US resolve. On the negative side, these forces are relatively light in terms of equipment and are not self-sustaining for long periods. Quick-reaction forces can fill gaps in existing radar coverage, increase air interceptor effectiveness, and thus improve air defense capability.
The air defense portion of the "major confrontation" package includes greater numbers of the quick-reaction forces, a full-blown air defense system complete with tactical command and control equipment, plus the full range of US air defense missiles and guns (such as Hawk, Chaparral, and Stinger). An obvious US goal should be that of combining its air defense capability with that of the GCC to protect vital Gulf areas and US forces from attack. US equipment and personnel could fill gaps in GCC capability, strengthen defenses, and at some points tie the US and GCC air defense system together.
US "confrontation" forces provide much greater capability for air defense, but they require a great deal of transportation and time to arrive in theater. The distance from the United States to Saudi Arabia is roughly 7,000 miles by air (16 hours) and 9,000-12,000 miles by sea (20-30 days).
The following example will demonstrate the magnitude, of USCENTCOM's transportation problem. Hawk is a key part of the US missile defenses. Air deployment of one Hawk battalion requires about 215 C-141 equivalents.15 The total airlift on any given day is 400 C-141equivalents.16 However, it is unlikely that the total US airlift capacity would be available to USCENTCOM due to other high-priority commitments, staging, and geographic factors. A lesser number, in the range of 250-300, may be more realistic.
From USCENTCOM's point of view, air defense should have a high priority for deployment so that operating bases can be protected, but a single Hawk battalion uses a day's worth of airlift. The need to support air forces and to get ground troops into Iran quickly could preempt deployment of air defense weapons. Equipment that does not shoot (like the US Air Force's tactical command and control system) and that is airlift intensive (roughly 49 C-141 equivalents for one control and reporting post) could miss the war because it will arrive by ship weeks later.
In summation, massive US defensive firepower will not arrive in the region quickly. Command and control equipment, other than airborne systems like AWACS, will lag behind direct-combat systems due to movement priority. This transportation bottleneck is what makes US support for organic GCC air defense capability so important because GCC forces and equipment will already be in place on day one of any conflict. One avenue through which the United States can support the GCC and its own interests indirectly is the security assistance program.
Security Assistance
In his 1985 State of the Union Message, President Reagan said, "Dollar for dollar, our security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget."17 It has long been the goal of the US security assistance program to build an indigenous capability for defense that could reduce or obviate the need for direct US involvement. More recent policy pronouncements state that specific US goals in the region include strengthening Saudi and Moderate nations' forces with equipment that is interoperable with US equipment.18
There are many barriers to US security assistance efforts. Among these barriers are arms restrictions, emphasis on management rather than capability, special interest groups, and the country receiving the assistance.
There are numerous restrictions on the type of equipment and technology we can sell to another country, and the process of approval and release is too complex to deal with here. Some restrictions protect the US "technological edge," but sometimes they get in the way of common sense. For example, the point-to-point data links used in Hawk command and control equipment (the TSQ-73) were not deemed releasable. Thus, TSQ-73s in the GCC inventory cannot "talk" with equipment that USCENTCOM may deploy into the area. In addition, TS-Q73 link capability differs between GCC states.
In the interagency review process--usually involving the Department of Defense, the State Department, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and others--the emphasis seems to be on getting the sale through Congress, arranging funding, documenting arrangements, and selling up management plans. Those are important, but they detract from efforts that should be devoted to ensuring that the equipment is what the buyer wants and can use and that it is compatible with US equipment. Nowhere in the US security assistance system does there appear to be an advocate for operational effectiveness. It is possible that US management of security assistance programs suffers from many of the same ills that plague the DOD procurement system.
Special interest groups can adversely affect security assistance. This is especially true in Middle Eastern matters. Lobbying against a sale often slows down or blocks the approval process, thus absorbing much of the time and effort of US agencies and complicating our foreign policy. A classic case is the Saudi AWACS sale proposed to Congress in 1981. Between the time of the formal Saudi request for an AWACS/F-15 air defense package on 26 March 1981 and its approval oil 28 October 1981, interagency groups met 42 times to resolve problems and coordinate efforts and strategy.19 After a rather bloody fight, the sale was approved in the Senate by a narrow 52-48 margin. The threat of another such battle over the delivery of AWACS in 1986 caused much concern and generated an inordinate amount of work to avoid a repeat of 1981.
The receiving nation itself is at times a barrier to successful security assistance efforts. Frequently nations want the most advanced equipment whether or not they can afford it or can absorb it into their military forces. GCC countries are no exception. Cost is usually not the anchor consideration, but getting the most sophisticated US weapons is. Weapons sales become barometers of the political climate.
A related barrier is competition within the receiving nation’s military structure. For example, there are four command and control centers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, one for each military service. Each of these command centers is linked with elements of its particular service. Especially in the area of air defense are some information lines needlessly duplicated. Given service rivalries, it is unlikely that the command centers exchange much information with each other.
The Record
Given the above and other barriers to security assistance, how well has the United States achieved its stated security assistance goals? The Hawk situation has already been mentioned. Technical workarounds to the Hawk problem are possible, but if not developed, tested, and procured, they will not be available for the next contingency.
US AWACS shares a fair degree of equipment commonality with Saudi AWACS. A more important feature is that US and Saudi AWACS can communicate, with proper coordination, on the same data Iink.20 This also means that Saudi AWACS can work with appropriately equipped US Navy ships. US forces will also he able to exchange information with the Saudi Peace Shield C3 system in the future.
The Peace Shield system, a foreign military sales acquisition, could provide the backbone of a GCC C3 network. The US Air Force manages the program for the RSAF. The Peace Shield program has the potential to integrate the entire Saudi air defense system and to facilitate exchange of information between GCC nations.
A Note on the Role of Our European Allies
Early air defense assistance to Saudi Arabia was done in cooperation with the British. For around $400 million, the British provided fighters and radars while the United States provided Hawk missiles and communications equipment. The system was established in 1965.21 Since that time there is no evidence of overt security assistance cooperation between the United States and Britain or any other ally. This is very unfortunate and shortsighted because the United States and Europe have convergent interests in preserving the flow of oil from the area. US and European forces separately escorting ships in the Gulf may serve to reemphasize to the Europeans the need for interoperability and cooperation.
The GCC has a fairly good inventory of air defense weapons, but C3, has fallen behind other modernization efforts. Also, the proliferation of equipment has had a negative effect on interoperability because procurement actions and upgrades have been made piecemeal. C3 upgrades, along with planned air defense force modernization, will ultimately improve GCC capability for self-defense against small attacks and give these nations some capability to hold out until assistance arrives. Because of distance and time factors, US assistance may not be quite as rapid as all concerned would wish. It is therefore critically important for the GCC to integrate its air defenses to increase their effectiveness. Concurrently, it is incumbent on the United States and its European allies to help the GCC by overcoming security assistance barriers.
Problems of a political nature, as well as technical barriers, stand in the way of a GCC-wide integrated system. Political problems will require internal solutions. The technical problems may be solved by a master air defense plan, driven by interoperability goals, and with provisions for US military forces to tie in, when necessary, for coalition air defense.
NOTES
1. For an excellent discussion of GCC origins, structure, and related issues, see Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1985), chap. 14; J. E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 185-224; and R. Hrair Dekmajian, "Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf," Middle East Annual (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co., 1984), 83-106.
2. James A. bill, "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," Foreign Affairs 63, no. 1 (Fall 1984): 120; and Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1986, 10th ed., (Washington, D.C.: Perth Corporation, 1986), 51, 418, 561, 608, 636, 766.
3. The Military Balance, 1984-1985 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), 59-72. The GCC’s estimate is higher 160,000 men--as cited in the Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1984, A-4.
4. DMS Market Intelligence Reports Middle East/Africa (Greenwich, conn.: Defense Marketing Services, 1985), 4,5, 26.
5. The Military Balance, 1984,1985, 59, 65, 68, 69, 72.
6. Testimony of the under secretary of defense for policy, in House Committee on foreign Affairs, proposed Sale of Airborne Warning and control System and F-15 Enhancements to Saudi Arabia, Report 97-268, 97th cong., 1st sess., 1981.
7. James K. Gordon, "Debate Expected Over Plan to Sell Missiles to Saudi Arabia," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3 March 1986, 26; and Bernard Gwertzman, "Accords Pave Way for Saudi Control of AWACS Planes ," New York Times, 15 June 1986, 1.
8. Giovanni de Briganti, "Emirates Refuse Mirage Deliveries," Defense News 2, no. 1 (5 January 1987): 21. There may have been other factors that contributed to the refusal such as manpower and training problems.
9. Gordon, 28.
10. DMS Market Intelligence Reports Middle East/Africa, Kuwait II, 7.
11. Although frequently used for effect, this statement is not entirely correct. USCENTCOM has forces in the region; four or five US Navy ships of the Middle East Force operating from Bahrain, and the four AWACS and ground C3 support in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. There were nine ships in the Middle East Force in August 1987, according to Loren Jenkins, "Gulf Harbors Doubts about Naval build-up," Washington Post, 16 August 1987, A23.
12. The sultan of Oman has stated that his country will stick by the 1980 agreement allowing US access to military installations and authority to store military equipment in Oman, but he has declared that US bases in Oman would never be agreed upon. Statement in the Boston Globe, "Oman holds moderate, independent course in sultan’s hands," 10 January 1987, 3.
13. David B. Ottaway, "Arab Cooperation with US Grows," Washington Post, 21 July 1987, A1.
14. The GCC views denial of US basing rights as a means of reducing the likelihood of superpower involvement in the region. For the GCC to make open admission of intent to request US intervention in the Gulf could make things difficult for them with the less-moderate Islamic states. More likely are remarks of the type make by the Kuwaiti ambassador that leaders of the GCC "hope to see the region free from military operations and big powers rivalry." Quote in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Middle East and Africa), 31 October 1986; FBIS-MEA-86-211, vol. 5, C3. Individual GCC nations such as Oman might independently request US intervention but a GCC consensus, except in extremis, seems highly unlikely.
15. Discussion with Third Army air defense personnel on 12 November 1986.
16. Developing Cooperative Forces in the Third World, 14-15 March 1985 conference, Rand Report N-2325-USDF (Santa Monica, Calif.; Rand Corp.), 250. Note: 400 C-141 equivalents include the C-5 aircraft, also available for airlift.
17. US Foreign Policy: The Reagan Imprint (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1986), 6.
18. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and Southwestern Affairs Richard W. Murphy, in Department of State Bulletin 86, no. 21111 (June 1986): 70-73.
19. Peace Sentinel (Saudi AWACS) program working paper, undated.
20. Many people in the DOD fought hard to get the US data link (called TADIL-A) released for use in Saudi AWACS. Their ultimate success was a major step toward interoperability and coalition air defense.
21. Safran, 97, 109.
Lt Col (Col selectee) Ronald C. Smith (AB, Princeton University; MS, University of Southern California) is chief, NATO Command and Control Branch, Europe/NATO Plans and Policy, Headquarters USAF. He has served in operational air defense units in the United States, Vietnam, and West Germany and has advised the Royal Saudi military in Saudi Arabia. Colonel Smith participated in testand evaluation of the airborne warning and control system, was a program element monitor and contingency planner in the Pentagon, served as chief of Air Defense Plans for US Central Command Air Forces, and recently was a senior fellow in national security at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Armed Forces Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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