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Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1987
FOR MORE than two decades, conflicts short of conventional war have threatened US interests around the world. This type of warfare, called low-intensity conflict, has spread so rapidly it now represents the most probable arena for the application of US military force in the foreseeable future. Even so, the US Air Force remains poorly postured institutionally, materially, and psychologically to effectively operate in low-intensity conflict.1
Although there are numerous reasons for this lack of capability, the overriding factor has been the Air Force's inability to fully comprehend the threat or to develop a clear set of priorities so it can respond to the threat with confidence.2 Since much has been written recently on the threat associated with low-intensity conflict, this article will propose a clear set of priorities for organizing, training, and equipping Air Force special operations forces (SOF) to effectively operate in low-intensity conflict. Although this article focuses on SOF as the appropriate vehicle to meet the challenges of low-intensity conflict, they are not the only answer, or necessarily the best answer in every scenario. Virtually all conventional weapon systems could be called on to prosecute the mission, depending on the situation. However, SOF do form the critical nucleus for low-intensity operations to which other aerospace forces are added or withdrawn as required by the mission. Likewise, the employment of SOF is not restricted to low-intensity conflict. SOF has a very important mission in mid- to high intensity theater warfare as well.
One of tile first priorities should be a restructuring of the current Air Force SOF organization to enhance its contribution to the overall effectiveness of the US Special Operations Command as well as the theater SOF commands. These changes should be focused in two areas: basic organizational structure and peacetime capabilities.
Numerous studies have pointed to shortfalls in Air Force SOF capabilities with accompanying recommendations to increase the force structure so the programmed SOF requirements of the other services can be supported.3 The best way to do that is to organize Air Force SOF into no fewer than four wings. Three of these wings should be assigned to specific geographic areas of responsibility, including wings in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The critical need for rapid deployment and employment of SOF dictates these forces be maintained within the theater if at all possible.4 Due to Latin America's proximity to the United States, that particular wing could be located in the United States. Personnel assigned to these wings should be completely familiar with the geography, weather, customs, and language of their areas. The fourth wing should be a combat crew training wing located in the United States. An organizational structure such as this would bring the Air Force in line with the Army and Navy organizational structures, thereby complementing them within the US Special Operations Command and theater SOF commands.
Each wing should he composed of three operational squadrons, three maintenance squadrons, and two specialized detachments. The operational squadrons would include two fixed-wing squadrons composed of MC-130s and AC-130s, or their replacements, and a rotary-wing squadron composed of either MH-53 Pave Low IIIs or MH-60G Pave Hawks. There are currently too few AC-130s to form more than the one squadron now located at the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW), Hurlburt Field, Florida. However, when the next generation of gunships is acquired, the quantities need to be large enough to fill squadrons in each of the other wings. The helicopters will be augmented by the CV-22 Osprey, the "tilt rotor" aircraft, when it comes on-line in the early 1990s. The three maintenance squadrons would be organized for rapid deployment and consist of an aircraft generation squadron, an equipment maintenance squadron, and a component repair squadron. Whenever any of the operational squadrons deploy, an aircraft maintenance unit--comprised of technicians from each of the three maintenance squadrons--would deploy with it to provide essential on-site maintenance. Two specialized detachments, a special operations combat control team and a special operations weather team, would provide the remaining essential support of each wing. While this wing organization is not new, it has proved very effective to date in the 1st SOW.
Next, Air Force SOF need to expand their peacetime, capabilities beyond the present,extremely restricted role to allow the Air Force to take a greater part in providing critical noncombat assistance to friendly third world countries. While the Army has traditionally done much in the areas of foreign internal defense (FID) and civic action, the Air Force has done little, with the possible exception of the air commandos in Vietnam during the early days of that conflict. Several recent studies have concluded that there is little or no capability in these areas due to a lack of clear guidance that has created confusion over Air Force-wide responsibilities for conducting FID civic action.
By joining with the Army in a cooperative approach in these areas, everyone benefits. The host country gains valuable expertise in the form of instructors and advisers. That expertise pays off as host country air forces are trained in basic combat tactics and advised in the employment of air power in low-intensity conflict operations. Add a vigorous foreign military sales program--which, depending on a country’s specific needs, could include helicopters, light tactical transports, gunships, reconnaissance platforms, and close-air-support aircraft--and the United States can do much to assist the host government in winning the conflict. Additionally, Air Force medics and civil engineering personnel can work beside their Army counterparts in civic actions designed to improve the quality of life in the host country and to win the support of the people. In wars fought for the hearts and minds of the people, that support may go a long way in defeating an insurgency.
The Air Force benefits by advising the host government in low-intensity conflict operations, thereby providing Air Force personnel with valuable experience in applying doctrine to real-world situations. Actual experience in what works and does not work in that environment would provide the crucial feedback needed to revise and update US operational doctrine. More important, the Air Force builds a corps of personnel who have observed low-intensity conflict first hand and could apply that experience in combat should the need ever arise.
Air Force SOF personnel, following appropriate training, could begin this vital work in minimal time and at very little cost. One proposal would involve designating a position in all appropriate military assistance advisory groups (MAAGS) for SOF personnel. This use of an already existing organization would result in only small costs and in the necessary infrastructure being put in place. A second proposal would be to attach SOF personnel to military training teams (MTTs), which provide training to other nations under the international military education and training program.5
These proposals for restructuring Air Force SOF would do much to improve their capabilities and to enhance their contribution to the effectiveness of the US Special Operations Command as well as the theater SOF commands. An organization that complements the sister services promotes integration and coordination. Expanded peacetime capabilities also provide tangible and intangible benefits to host countries, the Air Force, and the United States. Once these organizational issues are resolved, one needs to look at training.
SOF training priorities need to change with the organizational restructuring and focus on both operational and functional training. Operational training has traditionally been very good; however, problems have arisen recently in two key areas. The first involves initial mission qualification. Under the current program, most of this qualification training takes place in operational units. Since these units are heavily involved with operational and exercise missions, students must compete for equipment and for instructors. This has resulted in a training program, for example, which takes two or three times longer to initially qualify aircrew members than it should.6 This deficiency could easily be rectified by removing mission qualification training from the operational units and placing it under the combat crew training wing discussed above.
The other, and more significant, problem area relates to the limited amount of joint training that can be accomplished due to the small numbers of SOF aircraft and their current locations. As such, SOF components from the sister services may not be as comfortable working with the Air Force as they should be. Likewise, the Air Force may not be as comfortable working with SOF components from the other services, However, the very nature of special operations requires that units who fight together train together. The success of the mission depends on it.7 Two examples support this contention.
During preparations for the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp near Hanoi in 1970, absolutely nothing was left to chance. The plan called for nearly four weeks of training prior to employment. During this period, the aircrews flew a total of 1,017 hours in 368 sorties to hone their skills. The three elements of the ground assault force practiced their attack no less than 175 times before the raid. Each element had an alternative plan of action and was cross-trained in the missions of the other two elements. Even the pilot who had to crash-land his helicopter in the center of the prison compound practiced his mission at least 31 times.8 The team members knew each other and trained well together, and when the time came, the mission was executed flawlessly. (Poor intelligence rather than poor planning, training, or execution led to the failure to recover any prisoners.) Contrast the Son Tay raid preparation, particularly the training, with the debacle of the Iran rescue attempt.
The Iran rescue attempt has been the subject of intense review and criticism. Many would agree the mission was doomed from the beginning for a number of reasons, one of which was inadequate training. Richard A. Gabriel, author of Military Incompetence, writes:
The rescue force did not train together as a complete unit. Instead, each component trained separately, at dispersed training centers, some at their home bases. Moreover, each component trained under the direction of its own commander and its own service officers, so that, in the end, none of the componentswas ever evaluated by officers front the other services.9
There was not even one final exercise that brought all the separate components together. Although some of the components did train together, the first time the entire rescue force worked together wasduring actual mission execution. Unfortunately, they discovered too late that each component had its own way of doing things--its own standard operating procedures. Additionally, many of the problems that hampered the mission probably would have surfaced during combined training exercises and could have been addressed long before employment. Failing to train together definitely contributed to the failure of the Iran rescue attempt.
Although these two examples relate to missions that allowed at least some time in advance to train, the United States may not enjoy that luxury in the future. To avoid the problems associated with inadequate training, it is essential for service components who will fight together to train together. Restructuring Air Force SOF as outlined above will permit Air Force units to train with sister service units who share geographic areas of responsibility. Training together in order to fight well together must be the paramount consideration in operational training.
Establishing a sound functional training program is more difficult but, for noncombat operations, just as important. This training can be subdivided into regional training and foreign assistance training. Regional training simply orients personnel assigned to overseas units to the region of the world in which they will be operating, and it includes geopolitical, customs, and language instruction.10 Initial training should be provided in the United States prior to transfer overseas with continuation training provided by the unit. An individual assigned to the wing responsible for Latin America, for example, would be trained in the geography, politics, and customs of the various Latin American countries and would learn to speak either Spanish or Portuguese.
Foreign assistance training prepares individuals for service as members of MTTs or MAAGS. Training would build on the base established during regional training and would include more specific information on the host country's political situation, military capabilities, and the nature of the threat. Regional and foreign assistance training prepares SOF personnel for these challenging assignments, enabling them to be more effective in the politico-military environment in which they are expected to work.
Perhaps the most neglected aspect of Air Force SOF is equipment. To resolve this pressing problem, SOF priorities should focus on two areas: roles and missions, and weapon system design and acquisition. The area of roles and missions has long been a problem between the services, and special operations is no exception. Historically, the Air Force has provided both fixed-wing and rotary-wing support to the SOF community. Today this support is provided by the AC130, MC-130, and MH-53, Although the Air Force is the obvious service to provide fixed-wing support, responsibility for the rotary-wing mission is not so easily established.
Five years ago, the Air Force and Army chiefs of staff agreed to transfer the special operations rotary-wing mission to the Army. Despite this initiative, no such transfer has taken place. Rather, the Congress has directed the Air Force to enhance its SOF helicopter capability by modifying all of its H-53s to Pave Low III configuration (precision navigation, radar, and enhanced communications equipment). While the Air Force has been complying with the congressional directive, the Army has begun modifying UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters in preparation for assuming the SOF rotary-wing mission as outlined in the joint SOF initiative. Unless this issue is resolved one way or the other, valuable resources could be wasted in unnecessary modifications and duplication of effort.
Add to this already confused situation the Air Force's acquisition of the CV-22 "tilt-rotor" aircraft with SOF-unique equipment such as extended-range fuel tanks, electronic countermeasure equipment, and multi-mode radar. The Air Force plans to use these aircraft for long-range exfiltration of special operations forces and to augment the MC-130 in the SOF infiltration and resupply missions. While the Air Force is buying 55 "SOF-configured" CV-22 aircraft, the Army intends to buy 231 "basic" UV-22 models.11 Will history repeat itself? Will the same SOF roles and missions argument for the V-22 surface as wasthecase with the rotary-wing SOF mission? The issue has come full circle without an adequate answer. Weapon system development and acquisition is another critical area in need of attention. Traditionally, the SOF community has taken a backseat in this important arena. Under both the Tactical Air Command and the Military Airlift Command, SOF enhancement has been neglected, not because of any lack of interest on the part of the commands but because of money. As each command competes for dollars in the budgetary process, it never gets enough to meet all its requirements, forcing the command to order its programs by priority. Naturally, programs such as the advanced tactical fighter and the C-17 are considered more important because they represent the "bread and butter" of each command. As a result, SOF have been equipped with "borrowed" airframes modified to meet the requirements of the SOF mission. Today, SOF operate a handful of converted cargo airplanes and rescue helicopters rather than weapon systems designed specifically to operate in low-intensity conflict.
Given these issues, what can the US Special Operations Command do to correct the deficiencies and enhance SOF air assets in the future? First, regarding the roles and missions issue, the Air Force should continue to keep the long-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions. This includes the long-range, rotary-wing mission. The Air Force already has the aircrew and maintenance expertise to accomplish the mission with the sophisticated SOF unique equipment on its MH-53 Pave Low III helicopters. With the acquisition of 33 more MH-53s in the short term and 55 CV22s in the early 1990s, it will also have the necessary resources.12
For the Army to develop an aircrew and maintenance capability to perform the long-range mission while discarding the Air Force assets and personnel experience would be foolish. The Army should assume responsibility for the short-range infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions. It has the assets to meet virtually any requirement of this nature due to its large number of helicopters with diverse configurations. The same principle would hold true for the new CV-22 Ospreys. The Air Force should employ its CV-22s for the long-range missions, where the SOF-unique equipment greatly improves the probability of success. The Army would use its basic utility version for the short-range missions where the SOF-unique equipment would not be as important to mission success. The key is to integrateboth Army andAir Force assetsunder an air component commander if necessary to accomplish the mission.
Second, while the CV-22 will be a versatile and exciting replacement for helicopters in the mid-1990s, a replacement for the aging C-130 needs to be developed. Since the US Special Operations Command has been given budgetary and research, development, and acquisition authority,13 the SOF community may be able to acquire a follow-on aircraft designed specifically to meet the needs of low-intensity conflict, Three recent studies proposed various aircraft for that purpose.
The commander in chief of the US Southern Command has identified requirements for a light transport aircraft to support US forces in Latin America. These requirements include:
These specifications translate roughly into a follow-on to the C-7 Caribou, a light twin-engine transport. Since the C-7 left the inventory, the C-130 has been used to fill the gap; however, the size, airspeed, and heavy footprint of the C-130 prevent it from operating in the same environment as the C-7 even though the need stiff exists.
Jerome W. Klingaman, in an article titled "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," proposes "using modern design formulas and industrial manufacturing techniques to produce a light-armed surveillance aircraft (LASA) for conflicts below the level of general war. "15 Klingaman suggests that this aircraft be designed with performance parameters similar to the 0-1D and that it be armed with two forward- firing guns as well as 2.75-inch, high-velocity rockets. In addition to armed surveillance, he advocates the LASA be employed in missions such as reconnaissance, forward air control, convoy escort, and perimeter defense.16
Another source outlining requirements for SOF aircraft is the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Report, issued by the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, which includes the findings of an exhaustive review of this country's SOF capabilities across the board. The report identifies fixed-wing aircraft requirements in four areas. First, the report calls for a light tactical transport similar to the type proposed by US Southern Command. This aircraft should be simple, rugged, reliable, and able to support flare drop and psychological operations in addition to the transport role.17
Second, the report identifies the needfora light armed surveillance aircraft similar to the type proposed by Klingaman, but slightly more sophisticated. This aircraft should include an imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, be capable of short-field operations. and be indistinguishable from other similar aircraft.18
Third, the report suggests the need to develop and produce a follow-on, side-firing gunship to replace the AC-130. The gunship provides an appropriate level of firepower for counterinsurgency operations and limits collateral damage because of its high degree of accuracy. Like the light tactical transport, the gunship should be simple, rugged, and reliable.19
Finally, the report Supports the need for a forward air control platform. It proposes using modified single-engine, propeller-driven trainers for the mission of locatingguerrilla forces and directing air strikes or air-mobile assaults on the target.20
Each of these proposals is good as far as it goes, but it would be unrealistic to suggest that the US Special Operations Command design and acquire a separate aircraft for each of these missions. Rather, the command should pursue a two-pronged approach to this issue. The command should seek a single airframe, which fulfills the light tactical transport requirements, to replace the C-130 in the US SOF inventory. Then, a portion of these airframes should be modified to accomplish the reconnaissance and surveillance missions, including IMINT and SIGINT capabilities, while remaining externally indistinguishable. Another portion of these same airframes could be modified to support the side-firing gunship mission. So, one airframe designed to meet the demanding requirements of low intensity conflict could support intratheater airlift, surveillance/reconnaissance, and gunship missions.
Next, the command should pursue Klingaman’s proposal for developing the LASA for export to friendly third world countries, where it could be used in conjunction with export versions of the light tactical transport and gunship in counterinsurgency operations. Troop infiltration and exfiltration missions could continue to be performed by helicopter. Together, these aircraft could provide friendly countries with a formidable set of tools for counterinsurgency operations.
Much has been done lately to improve this country's SOF capability, but much more remains to be done. The military must overcome the institutional myopia that causes it to focus almost exclusively on the high-risk/low-probability levels of mid- to high-intensity conflict to the exclusion of the low-risk/high-probability level of low-intensity conflict. This nation must be prepared to fightacross the spectrum of conflict where and when US interests are challenged. Equally important is the need to enhance US capability to advise and train third world countries in counterinsurgency operations while providing the necessary military equipment for them to win the fight.
The SOF community in this country has the opportunity to meet these challenges head-on--to do more to enhance US preparedness and security at the low end of the conflict spectrum than ever before. The time for action is at hand. Failure to address the crucial issues in organizing, training, and equipping Air Force SOF can bear grave consequences. Secretary of State George Shultz says that to shrink from this task means "the world's future will be determined by others-most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to everything we believe in."21 What will the final outcome be?
Notes
1. Department of the Army. Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Report, vol. 1, Analytical Review of Low-Intensity Conflict, Fort Monroe, Va.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1986, 1-9.
2. Ibid., 1-11.
3. Department of the Air Force, USAF Special Operations Forces Master Plan (U), Washington, D.C.:n.p.. 1983, 5-1. (SECRET--information extracted is unclassified.)
4. Ibid., B-1-5.
5. Robert L. Brenci, USAF Special Operations: The Forgotten Force (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1983),49-50.
6. Department of the Air Force, Report of the Panel on Enhancement of Special Operations Forces (U), Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1985, 153. (SECRET-Information extracted is unclassified.)
7.Master Plan, 4-8.
8. Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 47. 49-50.
9. Ibid., 107.
10. Harold K. Johnston and Michael G. Slattery, Policy, Strategy and Special Operations (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983), 19, (SECRET--Information extracted is unclassified.)
11. Jeffrey P. Rhodes, "The Amazing Osprey," Air Force Magazine, January 1987, 83.
12. Department of the Air Force, The Air Force Issues Book. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1986, 6-13.
13. Senate and House, Compromise on Special Operations Forces, S.R. 2453 and H.R. 5109, 99tii Cong., 2d sess., 1986, 3.
14. Department of the Army, Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Report, vol. 2, Low-Intensity Conflict Issues and Recommendations (U), Ft. Monroe., Va.: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1986, B11-4. Hereafter cited as LIC Issues. (SECRET/NOFORN-Information extracted is unclassified.)
15. Jerome W. Klingaman, "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, ed. David J. Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 123.
16. Ibid., 130-32.
17. LIC Issues, B9-5, B9-6.
18. Ibid., B9-6, B9-7.
19. Ibid., B9-7.
20. Ibid., B9-7, B9-8.
21. George Shultz, "Low-intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," Proceedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1986), 12.
Maj Kenneth M. Page (USAFA; MS, Renselaer Polytechnic Institute) is aide-de-camp to the commander in chief, US Special Operations Command, MacDill, AFB, Florida. A senior pilot with more than 1,500 flying hours, he has held numerous flying and staff positions at Detachment 18, 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, and the 1550th Combat Crew Training Wing, inclulding chief of standardization and evaluation, wing executive oficer, maintenance supervisor, and officer in charge of job control. Major Page has also served an Air Staff Training (Program) tour as a congressional affairs and resource planner and an air operations staff officer in Plans and Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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