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Published Airpower Journal - Fall 1987

Tactical Airlift

Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles, USAF, Retired

ONE WOULD think that by now there would be a consensus as to the application of the US Air Force tactical airlift discipline in support of the AirLand Battle doctrine and maneuver warfare, particularly if one considers what AirLand Battle and maneuver warfare imply or that the tenets of that doctrine are not in serious question. If a consensus exists, it is not readily apparent in budget perturbations, program documents, the Five Year Defense Plan, connectivity between joint and service doctrine, or joint training and exercising. Certainly, there resides a sense of illusoriness, and thus frustration, in the minds of the tactical airlift community. Col Paul L. Wilke's prize essay, "Tactical Airlift Tactics and Doctrine: More Carts, More Horses," in the May-June 1986 issue of Air University Review, is an excellent introduction and serves to focus on an obvious and worrisome link in the doctrinal chain.

Memoirs of our greatest twentieth century warriors are replete with recollections of career-long preoccupation with doctrine. Most lament that doctrine all too often has been developed during the course of hostilities, not the best of times to decide such issues. Fortunately, in the early 1980s, the Army formalized its concept for warfighting. Called "AirLand Battle doctrine," it represents the fundamental statement for warfare and is Outlined in Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This manual, which has since been revised to better describe the integration of sister services into the overall battle, also incorporates NATO recommendations for improved execution in both joint and combined operations. The Army's success on the battlefield will depend on its ability to fight in accordance with its four basic tenets: initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.

As Colonel Wilke points out, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Force, and AFM 2-4, Tactical Air Force Operations--Tactical Airlift, clearly, define what the Air Force responsibility is to be in support of the Army. Acknowledging a lack of definition as it would relate to a current threat assessment of the envisioned battlefield, I submit that this results from a continuing erosion in tangible advocacy for tactical airlift as an AirLand Battle-contributing discipline. Insufficiency of advocacy is, in my mind, the underlying reason why the tactical airlift community remains in a quandary and seems to be adrift for lack of specificity with regards to current and future weapon system capability and operational tactics.

Long before single management of all airlift, tactical airlift occupied the last rear seat on the bus. It certainly did not compete well with modernization priorities, which at the time were so imperative to the fighter forces. During that period, it also suffered major setbacks when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, intent on overselling the virtues of the c-5, launched conflicting signals by redefining intertheater and intratheater requirements. It can be readily understood under such circumstances why as the Air Force moved from acquiring first Curtiss, then Fairchild, and now Lockheed tactical airlift aircraft, that not one weapon system was designed to actually perform the full spectrum of its missions. And before anyone takes issue with that statement, let us just glance at the C-130—a truly great workhorse. As fine a machine as it is, there was never a thought for radar warning receivers or electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods or flare/chaff dispensers. It has a wet wing, and there is no internal system to ensure predictable "time of exit" for airdrop, still the only uncontrolled variable in the computed air-release point (CARP) system. (Opening delay, forward travel ballistics, and drift plot are indeed controllable.)

Furthermore, much is made over future inventories that include a stealth bomber, an advanced tactical fighter, strategic airlift's C-17, and a high-performance rotary-wing special operations weapon system. No advanced intratheater tactical airlift system is keeping pace, even though both the National Military Airlift Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in 1970 and the Heritage Foundation in its January 1986 "Backgrounder" paper urged development efforts for timely C-130 replacement. Of course, there have been a number of similar studies and recommendations from varying sources before and during this period, but these two are referenced to indicate 16 years of relative inattention and clear inaction.

Later, under single management, tactical airlift has not fared much better due to similar competing priorities. For a while it was largely due to the strategic-tactical dichotomy, or the "Big MAC--Little MAC" syndrome. As had previously been its experience in competing with fighter priorities, tactical airlift subsequently found itself unable to compete with strategic airlift's 66-million-ton/mile-per-day mandate, shrinking budgets, or increasing emphasis on special operations--each a compelling issue in its own right.

Notwithstanding tactical airlift's near-orphan status, Army, Air Force, and joint doctrines fully expect the Air Force to provide the tactical airlift response necessary for maintaining the initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization on which AirLand Battle success depends. I can well imagine that if and when a major land war erupts, the joint force commander (JFC) will spread established joint and service doctrine on his desk right alongside his execution plan. I can further visualize his land component commander (LCC) levying tactical airlift support requirements on the air component commander (ACC) to satisfy the fluidity and dynamics of a developing land war. It would be helpful to remember at this juncture that the ACC is not Headquarters Military Airlift Command (HQ MAC) or the theater commander of airlift forces (COM-ALF). Nor will there be much argument or time for scholastic dissertations. Even if the ACC demonstrates reluctance, perhaps prompted by COMALF concerns stemming from preconflict survivability questions, the JFC is the adjudicating authority. His game plan calls for Air Force support, and I suspect he will get it. War is still hell. Those who still remember a land war in Europe can recall boring in on hundreds of strategic or tactical objectives, absorbing remarkable tosses, but pressing in all the same. The two situations are not as dissimilar as one might wish. In all major conflicts, losses are seriously measured against requirements and objectives. Under current doctrine, the LCC has every right to expect the Air Force to provide sufficient tactical airlift assets at the place and time of need and with the precise integrity and interval across or into an objective area that supports the intended ground tactical circumstances.

In his provocative and imaginative book Red Storm Rising, Tom Clancy, knowingly or not, incorporated all four tenets in his exciting dramatization of the AirLand Battle and maneuver warfare. Initiative passed between adversaries at times. Depth was alternately achieved and denied, as was agility (maneuver). Synchronization often was blown as much by the winds of war as by deliberate planning. But the author left to the reader's thought processes the logistic struggles in the deep and immediate rear area of the flowing lines of battle. It is fairly certain that sustainment was, and would be, as dependent on responsive air as on ground lines of communication (GLOC).

There are those who argue that since the actual capability of tactical airlift is more than just in question, doctrine should be changed. Others, as pointed out by Colonel Wilke, are devoting inordinate time to tactics and training designed to increase survivability but without due regard to the doctrinal commitment. Either position should be disquieting to the principal beneficiary, the Army. Yet the Army probably has contributed as much to this dilemma as has the absence of devoted Air Force advocacy.

Within the Army there is a whole generation of line officers who have little regard for or knowledge of proper use of tactical air, whether fighters or tactical airlift. Joint exercises are already fraught with enough artificialities such as vertical and horizontal airspace restrictions, time compressibility, environmental constraints, decreasing reservation space, and exercise scenarios primarily dependent on core-unit (Army) training objectives. To make matters worse, the Army prepositions all that it can, relies on surface movement, and has not shown the inclination to learn the intricacies of coordinating, requesting, competing for, and deconflicting finite tactical air assets. Even accepting that major exercise artificialities are a fact of life and either cannot or will not materially change, the primary user of tactical air is not only denying optimum realism of training for both the Army and Air Force participants but is institutionalizing a growing belief that ground forces can go it alone and is unintentionally withholding its strong advocacy for tactical airlift in this case. Perhaps they remember their last strong support for the Air Force's advanced medium STOL (short take-off and landing) transport (AMST) and "CX" strategic airlift initiatives. Maybe Army confidence in jointness is not as high as it should be. Ironically, its own AirLand Battle doctrine, which says otherwise, will suffer the consequences.

It is not the purpose of this paper to dart down interconnected corridors in search of weight, cube, or volume. But it is appropriate to remind ourselves that jointness is truly nonnegotiable for two reasons, The first is one of law. Under its constitutional authority, the Congress has made it reasonably clear that a condition for preserving separate services vice a uniservice is the expectation for an intelligent, cost-effective economy of joint effort (and all that that entails). It has been parochial service intransigence that has brought "military reform" once again to national attention. The second reason for the nonnegotiability of jointness is to avoid the wartime tragedy that results from preconflict interservice rivalries and competition for missions, roles, and funds at the expense of and detriment to deliberate planning.

So, we all have contributed to the plight in which tactical airlifters find themselves. However, tactical airlifters will not solve the problem by suggesting the doctrinal statement of responsibility go away nor, through frustration, by developing tactics that ignore doctrine. Instead, the essential first step must be a renewed commitment by both the Air Force and Army as strong advocates of this discipline. Please note that I am careful not to insert the C-17 into the equation. Whether the C-17 becomes a reality or not, the rather "untidy"--the original "cigarette-and-puke-for-breakfast"- -intratheater tactical airlift job in and around the forward line of own troops (FLOT) will remain one for the C-130s and allied equivalents. A very fluid, elongated FLOT of hundreds of miles requires daily short-notice reaction when shoring up combat forces flowing with the tide of battle, answering the dictates of either offensive or defensive maneuver. The aforementioned basic tenets remain initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization. Only infrequently will "brigade airdrop" or insertion by C-141s or C-17s be a player and then will be unlikely if in the rather awesome and lethal electronic combat environment of a high-threat battlefield.

Once serious Air Force and Army advocacy for tactical airlift has been reestablished, the rapid acceleration of follow-on initiatives is fundamental to any meaningful mending of the tactical airlift discipline. All C-130 models must be retrofitted quickly with off-the-shelf, existing radar warning receivers, ECM pods and chaff, and flare dispensers. Without reasonable prospects for a near-term replacement for the C-130, we must go with what we have and upgrade its capabilities. There is nothing particularly new in such a concept. We do it all the time; so do the Soviets.

Next, we must keep the C-130H production line open and replace the older models as quickly as fiscally prudent. All the while, we must rethink current intentions to draw down tactical airlift. Any further diminution only serves to exacerbate the situation. There is every reason to believe a serious shortfall has existed a long time. holding the line where we are and upgrading and modernizing the fleet will not satisfy present shortfall, but it is a wise and cost-effective expedient.

All of the above should begin to tip the scales in the right direction, but there are, two more matters that must not be overlooked or the issue will stall out and new frustrations. The same doctrine, that commits the Air Force to bore into a hostile objective area, as previously described, makes abundantly clear that such operations will--repeat, will--require a high degree of control of the air and massive tactical air support, both battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and close air support (CAS). Colonel Wilke made this abundantly clear in his essay. Up to now we have outlined things the "big" Air Force and Army must do. Now enter stage left, the tactical air forces (TAF)--that is, committed F-15, F-16, F-4, A-7, A-10, EF-111, and WEASEL resources. It is a fair assumption that TAF does not spend much time thinking, planning, and, more importantly, training those people to provide en route and objective-area protection, specifically in support of intratheater airlift. Joint exercises, as previously stated, do not purposefully incorporate such operations in their scenarios. Air Force Red/Maple Flag and composite force training (CFT) exercises do not formalize such requirements. True, many units gin-up such opportunities in CFTs because they realize the need; but even then, en route escort and objective-area protection lack institutional development and guidance. And, of course, several more layers of artificialities overlay the operations. Ironically, the mechanism already exists that would allow the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to pull the players together.

As a matter of fact, MAC's Airlift Concepts and Requirement Agency (MAC/ACRA), a joint agency of TRADOC, must be given appropriate credit for publishing a MAC-TRADOC "Qualitative Intratheater Airlift Requirement Study" as recently as 30 November 1935. That study accurately reaffirms joint and service doctrine, provides a basis for the requirement for tactical airlift, and defines both prerequisites and inhibitions for successful response. Obviously, then, neither Colonel Wilke nor this author is reinventing wheels or disturbing graveyards of the ancient past. The MAC-TRADOC study indeed addresses tactical airlift in terms of the AirLand Battle. There is not, however, a discernible roadmap towards fruition. Instead, there is a sense that the corporate community knows what should and would be done if only there were not so many other priorities. We have all learned that studies do not always find their way down the "yellow brick road." Maybe there is no Oz, but we sorely need an institutional wizard.

Both the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and MAC's, Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency are legitimate institutional participating partners of TRADOC. If we introduce the TAF's responsibilities and capabilities into the formal training environments, that part of the doctrine will come alive. At the very least, we should wargame the proposition in a Blue Flag exercise dedicated to determining attrition factors with and without "a high degree of control of the air and massive tactical air support." I should think the Army would be vitally interested in such an evaluation.

Though not near term in value, the last ingredient towards permanency would be definite development efforts by the Air Force for a timely replacement for the C-130--a dedicated follow-on intratheater airlift weapon system. Such an aircraft must not be gold-plated but should be specifically designed for the envisioned battlefield. The weapon system will mean as much to the Army as to the Air Force. Given their vested interest in theater airlift, it is logical to expect strong Army support for such an aircraft.

IN CONCLUSION, all-party advocacy is the cornerstone for recovery. Off-the-shelf electronic countermeasures/electronic warfare upgrade of the current C-130 fleet, concurrent with continued "H-model" modernization, and discontinuance of tactical airlift drawdown are all essential and doable, even in a Gramm-Rudman era, providing tactical airlift is not conveniently perceived to be an impediment to other programs, The TAF must accept and vigorously pursue their role in support of this doctrinal requirement. And finally, a follow-on intratheater airlifter is an imperative.

In the absence of real solutions, the Army can rightfully remain suspicious of Air Force intent, the Air Force can question the doctrine, and the tactical airlift community, in its frustration, will go on jinking and juking, content with "every man for himself,"
Then one day it will be SURPRISE! SURPRISE! Bore in, gentlemen.

Contributor

Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles, Sr., USAF, Retired (BS, University of Houston; MS, University of Southern California), is director of operational plans, Headquarters Air Force Reserve, Robins AFB, Georgia. He served 38 years with pertinent assignments that included chief of flight operations, 705th Combat Crew Training School, Ellington AFB, Texas; director of operations at Selfridge AFB, Michigan, and Robins AFB, Georgia; vice commander at Rickenbacker AFB, Ohio; and commander at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, and Dobbins AFB, Georgia. General Knowles was a command pilot, instructor, and an operations officer.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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