Figure 1. Three-pole ends-ways-means concept in an energy context
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Published: 1 December 2009
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2009
In 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita severely affected the United States’ petroleum-refining capacity, causing gas prices to spike as high as five dollars per gallon. In an instant, Americans glimpsed a new future defined by constrained energy supplies; in reality, the global demand for energy is increasing faster than the supply.1 The summer of 2008 saw a repeat of this occurrence, driven not only by natural events but also by other forces as gas prices exceeded four dollars per gallon causing, among other things, a drastic drop in demand for sport utility vehicles.
China, India, and other countries are rapidly increasing their consumption while production from known oil fields is peaking (referred to as Hubbert’s Peak), a phenomenon predicted since the 1950s with varying degrees of accuracy.2 Furthermore, we are experiencing a decline in the discovery of new fields and the amount of oil associated with them. Although we do not know exactly when world oil production will begin to decrease, it will likely occur in the next 30 years although we will feel the effects before then due to greater demand.
Consequently, we should consider viewing energy in a strategic military context. Such a perspective must focus on the continued availability of energy supplies and on how and why the military uses energy. Taking this approach can then influence the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition and use of weapon systems.
To a large extent, energy dictates this country’s foreign policy interests and is critical to the nation’s prosperity, even as other countries complain that the United States has 5 percent of the world’s population but uses 22 percent of the world’s energy.3 Because of its outstanding properties with respect to storage, energy density, and ease of use, petroleum is a particularly useful and necessary commodity, especially to the United States. Peter Tertzakian, who identifies a strong, almost linear relationship between the United States’ gross domestic product and oil consumption, demonstrates how this relationship underwent a sharp change after the oil shock of 1979.4 Fairness aside, the nation’s well-being is tied directly to the availability and use of cheap, ubiquitous energy sources for transportation, food, defense, industry, and health.
Because energy is a vital national interest, the United States feels compelled to engage in places that have large oil reserves and/or the infrastructure to extract, transport, and process those reserves. As the demand for and availability of worldwide petroleum diverge, the nation will likely take an even greater interest in regions that contain oil reserves. Unfortunately, these areas are often places of unrest, instability, and oppression located in remote parts of the world. Despite the existence of various ways of ensuring the accessibility of energy resources, if the nation wishes to employ the military as an instrument of national policy to this end, the DOD must field forces that can quickly deploy thousands of miles, remain there for a long time, function with impunity, and dominate the battlespace.
Operating a predominantly petroleum-fueled force at such distances is expensive. Although it uses less than 2 percent of the nation’s overall oil consumption, the DOD remains the largest institutional user in the United States, accumulating an annual fuel bill of over $5 billion. Within the DOD, aviation accounts for over 70 percent of that figure, much of it related to mobility (e.g., airlift and air refueling) as opposed to combat forces.5 Although the DOD pays market rates for fuel, the real costs, which include the fuel’s price as well as transportation and infrastructure expenses, are considerably higher; in fact, some estimates indicate that the cost of transporting fuel, especially to a remote location, runs 10 to 100 times the market rate. A Defense Science Board study of 2001 mentioned $17.50 per gallon as the cost of fuel delivered by Air Force tankers worldwide, not the approximately one dollar per gallon that the DOD paid for fuel at that time. The cost of fuel for forward-deployed Army units was higher, in the range of hundreds of dollars per gallon.6 Although these figures include the cost of fuel itself, overhead, expenses associated with the vast delivery infrastructure, and fuel needed to run that infrastructure (e.g., tanker aircraft and trucks), increases in fuel prices clearly have a huge impact on the price of operating at the extended distances characteristic of today’s expeditionary forces.
Given energy’s strategic importance to the prosperity and defense of the United States, it is useful to consider energy in relation to effectiveness and efficiency. In a sense, this is much like a strategic analysis of ends, ways, and means whereby “ends” represent what we need to achieve (i.e., effectiveness of a mission or task), “ways” describe how we realize those ends (i.e., efficiency in the use of resources), and “means” represent what we actually use to attain them (i.e., the energy expended). Thus, we can depict effectiveness, efficiency, and energy as competing “poles” wherein lies the system that the DOD must develop, field, and use (fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Three-pole ends-ways-means concept in an energy context |
For the acquisition, planning, and operational communities, this three-pole construct illustrates the inherent tensions that they must consider when developing and employing weapon systems. Rather than focus exclusively on one aspect of the problem (e.g., reducing energy expenditures, increasing efficiency, or improving effectiveness) to the exclusion of the other two aspects, we must pursue a balanced approach. For example, an attempt to design an aircraft only for maximum efficiency might produce something like the Gossamer Albatross, arguably one of the most efficient aircraft ever built, which flew across the English Channel using power generated by only one person. Applying such an approach to ground vehicles might yield a bicycle, a model of efficient ground transportation. However, these extremely energy-efficient vehicles have little military capability.
Warfare is an endeavor of absolutes, and the absolute requirement is mission effectiveness. Most combat systems dominate not because they are efficient energy users but because they are profligate energy users, giving them the speed, maneuverability, and power to prevail. Even though operating efficiently generally increases affordability, particularly in times of increasing energy costs, having the most efficient fighter aircraft or ground vehicle may allow us to get to the fight, but we may find ourselves outclassed upon arrival. Therefore, as the DOD addresses the issue of increased energy costs, it must confront the tensions between energy input, efficiency, and effectiveness and seek an optimum balance within those tensions for the mission or need at hand.
When the DOD acquires new weapon systems, it specifies requirements that capture the most important characteristics desired by the user. These requirements usually involve measures related to effectiveness (e.g., range, speed, protection, and payload) or sustainability (e.g., amount or level of needed maintenance) but often do not take efficiency into account, especially for combat systems. However, the latest DOD 5000-series guidance directs consideration of the fully burdened cost of energy in the development of new weapon systems, especially during trade-off analyses.7
But how should we define such efficiency-related requirements? The thermodynamic definition of efficiency is the amount of useful work produced by a system divided by the amount of energy utilized by that system.8 Unsurprisingly, however, the devil is in the details: exactly what constitutes the energy utilized by a system and the useful work it produces? For that matter, what is the system in the first place? In the case of a weapon system, is it the platform, the weapons carried on and fired by the platform, or the support systems, such as refueling vehicles? What if the system does not carry a weapon per se, thus demanding other measures of effectiveness?
Using energy efficiently while maintaining effectiveness poses a complicated question that bears directly on combat performance and the desired characteristics of weapon systems. Conceptually, we can consider energy by examining the trades among energy, effectiveness, and efficiency (see fig. 1). Energy is related to the effort required to carry out a task or mission (analogous to the energy input), effectiveness to the reason for executing that task (analogous to a system’s useful work), and efficiency to the endeavor’s “cost versus benefit.” Thermodynamic definitions illustrate this relationship (fig. 2). A low-efficiency system requires an inordinate amount of effort or energy to yield a given level of effectiveness. As the efficiency of a system increases, the effort or energy decreases, but eventually we face diminishing returns; that is, substantial increases in efficiency yield progressively smaller reductions in required energy. At this point, we must consider optimizing the system based on the cost of attaining such increases in efficiency versus the benefits of reducing the necessary energy; this may entail devising radically different ways of doing things.
Using an electrical power plant as an example, George Tsatsaronis and Antonio Valero discuss the importance of conducting a thermoeconomic analysis that systematically looks at all parts of a system, balancing energy, efficiency, effectiveness, and cost.9 Given thermoeconomics’ goal of meeting mission requirements while using energy efficiently, we should be able to apply these techniques to military systems.
When considering any system and its energy flows, we must define that system carefully and clearly. Weapons are complex machines composed of myriad parts. In fact, most weapon systems are actually systems of systems; true battlefield effectiveness demands that each system operate with other systems. For example, in today’s joint environment, combat aircraft attain maximum effectiveness when they operate with air-control aircraft, tankers, and ground forces. Therefore, as discussed above, we must be careful about increasing efficiency or reducing energy consumption without first considering the system of systems in question and its overall purpose in the larger operation.
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Figure 2. Relationship among effort (energy), effectiveness, and efficiency |
Consequently, recognizing that weapon systems use energy to produce an effect or fulfill a mission, we should first define that mission or effect and then seek an optimal solution in terms of the expenditure of energy.10 Doing so allows us to ascertain the best alignment among effect, efficiency, and energy.
Techniques of thermoeconomic analysis formerly applied to power plant design have now found an application in aircraft design. David J. Moorhouse has used this approach to optimize designs for reconnaissance and transport aircraft, thereby enhancing both efficiency and mission effectiveness.11 The Gossamer Albatross’s focus on extreme efficiency to the detriment of military utility still offers important lessons that we see applied in long-endurance systems such as the Global Hawk and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Vulture program.12 Again, we must first define the system, assess its performance requirements (i.e., the desired effectiveness), develop a means of relating those needs to the energy flows, and then optimize for maximum efficiency or minimum energy necessary to obtain the desired effect.13
Since every added feature that seeks to increase efficiency has a cost associated with it, we must determine whether that feature is worth the expense—typically expressed in terms of procurement or acquisition cost, but the price of energy also figures in.14 In some cases, a degree of inefficiency may be preferable when the cost of maximizing efficiency while maintaining effectiveness proves too high.
For instance, only a tiny fraction of the energy used by automotive systems actually fulfills the purpose for which the energy is intended (i.e., turning the wheels, thereby propelling the occupants). In the average American car, only about 15 percent of the energy going into the tank as gasoline actually moves the car’s occupants, and two main factors drive that fuel consumption: the load placed on the power train by the vehicle and its subsystems, and the efficiency of the power train itself.15 In a different analysis, Amory Lovins and others show that approximately 85 percent of a light vehicle’s fuel energy is lost as heat and noise, and that only between 10 and 15 percent actually reaches the wheels to move the vehicle and its occupants. Furthermore, most of that energy goes toward moving the heavy vehicle, and only the barest fraction, about 1 percent, actually moves the occupants themselves.16
In some cases, attaining both efficiency and effectiveness is possible. For example, some power-train designs handle not the peak load but the average or cruise load (for a typical car, only about 10 percent of the engine’s full potential at highway speeds) and include augmenter systems to provide peak power for acceleration.17 Indeed, hybrid automobiles use a small gas engine for cruise speeds, augmented by an electric motor for acceleration. The aircraft-oriented analogy to the hybrid propulsion system is embodied in new engine concepts such as the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) system, which can radically alter its design cycle to shift from high-power, low-efficiency, turbojet-like operation to lower-power, high-efficiency, turbofan-like operation. By varying its configuration as it operates, ADVENT offers the promise of engines having as much as 25 percent greater fuel efficiency or 30 percent greater takeoff thrust, enabling either extended range/loiter or higher dash speeds.18 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Air Force are pursuing new concepts such as the Blended Wing Body aircraft that may offer up to 30 percent more efficiency than conventional aircraft; these new platforms will be capable of carrying a similar payload, thus retaining effectiveness at transporting cargo.19
The centrality of weight to the use of energy in moving systems is a key point. Because of its relatively small load at cruising speed, a lighter vehicle yields major fuel savings.20 Reducing weight by a certain proportion initiates a ripple effect through the vehicle amounting to several times that proportion in reduced energy consumption to move that load.21
Traditionally, a military requirement for high speed and agility calls for a lightweight system with reduced protection in lieu of using heavy armor or an inordinate amount of energy to move the system. But how would maintaining the same level of protection at reduced weight affect the relationship between effectiveness and efficiency? By reducing weight, we decrease the amount of energy necessary to move the system. Reducing weight by a sufficient amount without sacrificing protection permits the use of drastically different types of motive power—perhaps fuel-cell-powered electric motors instead of gas turbines. The smaller energy requirement then ripples through the entire force; that is, the less energy required for primary mission vehicles, the less fuel transported in secondary support vehicles, which use energy themselves.
Therefore, building lighter systems is desirable and strategically advantageous, perhaps using synthetic materials such as carbon fiber that offer potentially drastic weight reductions and accompanying energy savings. Indeed, the push toward lighter mechanized systems such as the Future Combat System could greatly reduce fuel consumption while maintaining mission-adequate mobility and protection. In the aviation domain, advanced lightweight materials, appropriately engineered into aircraft structures, not only are key to new concepts such as the above-mentioned Blended Wing Body but also may offer great improvements in conventional aircraft designs.
Addressing the three-pole energy-efficiency-effectiveness issue in the development of weapon systems presents a complicated problem; except in the most basic cases, the sheer number of variables defies analytical approaches. However, by taking full advantage of modeling and simulation, developers can “war-game” energy cost/availability and its effect on military operations. The DOD can develop new energy-related metrics and assess their effect on combat performance, much as the Army has used modeling and simulation to assess the impact of switching from its legacy heavy force to the lighter, more mobile Future Combat System. This would allow the use of thermoeconomic analysis on a broad scale.22
Without formal requirements, we could argue that embarking on these efforts wastes time and money, and that resources are better spent on addressing “real,” more near-term, problems. Though perhaps not a near-term issue, energy has become increasingly important and will become more constrained in the future. Therefore, we should assess the effect of changes in the energy universe now, with or without identified user requirements. The results of such investigations can then inform the development of formal requirements when the user is ready to define them.
In the war-fighting arena, the balance between efficiency and effectiveness must tilt toward effectiveness. An efficiency-based solution that may work on a stateside garrison base may not work for an overseas or expeditionary base, particularly one in a combat zone. In combat systems, efficiency is a secondary consideration; effectiveness, based on mission requirements, must remain the ultimate goal.
Today’s systems as well as those now in development will be in service for 30 years or more. Figure 3 shows Hubbert’s Peak overlaid with acquisition timelines for three of the DOD’s most expensive weapon systems, all of them almost completely designed and in test or early production; advanced lightweighting or power-system technologies may not be viable options for them. Given the massive investment already made in these systems, any DOD energy strategy must accommodate them or risk marginalizing that investment and further delaying needed combat capability.
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Figure 3. Hubbert’s Peak overlaid with typical life-cycle milestones from current acquisition programs. (From “Air Force Proposes Initial Joint Strike Fighter Locations,” US Federal News Service, 4 October 2006; Douglas Barrie, “Lightning Strike,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 165, no. 20 [20 November 2006]: 44; “Future Combat Systems Restructuring: A Balancing Act,” US Federal News Service, 8 February 2007; and “Program Schedule,” http://peoships.crane.navy.mil/DDG1000/images/scheduleIV_lg.jpg [accessed 21 August 2009].) |
In these cases, we must assure access to petroleum-like fuels, perhaps via Fischer-Tropsch processing of biomass or coal.23 We might conceive of DOD fuel plants operated as government-owned, contractor-operated facilities, wherein the DOD essentially supplies itself with its own fuel, much as it does with ammunition from Army plants or depots for refurbishing aircraft and tanks. However, because this would likely become extremely expensive, a better approach might involve subsidizing a domestic capacity normally tapped for civilian use but available for critical military needs.
In other cases, simulators may reduce training-related fuel consumption. For example, unmanned systems offer ways to attain mission effectiveness without the need to train operators in situ. Many unmanned systems such as the Global Hawk are not even directly controlled by the operator, who instead assigns tasks via a system interface; the aircraft then executes those tasks more or less autonomously. For other unmanned systems, operators use synthetic vision as a way of interfacing with them. In either case, the operator cannot tell if the system is real or simulated. Thus, operators can undergo realistic training without becoming airborne.
We also employ simulators to reach unprecedented levels of training fidelity for manned systems. The Air Force, which uses them to reduce training hours on aircraft, has progressed to the point where it can net together simulators from widely separated bases in a distributed mission-training system.24 In fact, not only do these measures save fuel but also they permit training otherwise available only at great cost and effort because of the difficulty in bringing assets together in one location. Most likely, however, these sophisticated systems are best suited for training on large, complex weapon systems netted together. For operations requiring judgment, skill, and face-to-face interaction in difficult environmental conditions, such as counterinsurgency or special operations, simulators may prove less useful. Fortunately, many of those operations and their accompanying training are much less fuel intensive than large force-on-force engagements.
The consideration of effectiveness, energy, and efficiency for non-war-fighting systems, such as the ones on bases in the continental United States, offers a different set of options for systems designers. In these situations, efficiency can play a larger role. For example, DOD bases, which generally purchase their electricity from local utilities and use organic sources only in emergencies for critical needs (e.g., medical or air traffic control), have begun making changes. The Air Force is using “green” energy sources such as wind power to provide electricity to western bases.25 As the cost of energy increases, DOD installation managers can enhance the efficiency of new buildings and incorporate distributed energy production, for example, by making use of roof-mounted solar panels. The DOD could have its own version of the California Solar Initiative, which commits that state to incorporating photovoltaic systems on a million roofs over the next decade. The initiative could result in enough renewable electricity to offset California’s need for five new conventional power stations.26 Finally, the DOD can retrofit older buildings with energy-efficiency measures. The department’s share of the stimulus program includes new technologies for increasing efficiencies—for instance, by using electric vehicles, thus reducing consumption on stateside and overseas bases, and by improving the efficiency of jet engines.27
With regard to transportation, most installations operate a fleet of gasoline- or diesel-powered vehicles, many of which travel only a few miles a day and never leave the base. We could address energy efficiency and petroleum dependence by converting these fleets to alternative energy sources such as flex fuel and electricity, thus reducing energy requirements without sacrificing effectiveness. This is happening now at many bases that use what are essentially heavy-duty golf carts for applications which required a gas-powered pickup truck only a few years ago.
In both the infrastructure and transportation arenas, an opportunity exists for synergy between the civil/commercial and military sectors of the US economy. As Lt Col Michael Hornitschek points out, the DOD has often served as a catalyst for change.28 Even as it saves taxpayer funds and becomes a market by itself, the military can serve as a proving ground for the commercial marketplace. Then, as the commercial market develops, the DOD can capitalize on the economies of scale to meet its needs for energy-efficient non-war-fighting systems. Such approaches must have the support of policy changes that require accounting for true energy costs instead of hiding them during planning, programming, and budgeting.29
Reducing our dependence on foreign oil can have beneficial strategic and economic effects. It would diminish the Middle East’s strategic importance by making the United States less reliant on that troubled part of the world. It would also reduce friction points with countries such as China, with whom the United States will face increasing competition for energy sources. Finally, it would reduce the likelihood that countries controlling those sources could dictate events and conditions to the United States. Clearly a long-term issue, energy will have a major effect on where, when, and with what the DOD fights.
However, the issue is not simply about reducing our use of energy and increasing our efficiency. Because of the high stakes that accompany military operations, we must focus first on effectiveness, thus creating a tension between efficiency on the one hand and effectiveness on the other and necessitating approaches that seek an optimum solution appropriate for the mission at hand. We must balance the ends we seek, the ways we attain them, and the means we use. In tomorrow’s energy-constrained world, we can do this only by taking a systems-level perspective that attempts to strike a true strategic balance among effectiveness, efficiency, and energy.
Notes
1. Adam E. Sieminski, “World Energy Futures,” in Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, ed. Jan H. Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 21–22, 24, 48. See also “Introduction,” 2–3.
2. Guy Caruso, “When Will World Oil Production Peak?” (presentation at the 10th Annual Asia Oil and Gas Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 13 June 2005).
3. “World Primary Energy Consumption (Btu), 1980–2006,” US Energy Information Agency, 13 July 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1.xls (accessed 22 April 2007); and “World Population, 1980–2006,” US Energy Information Agency, 6 October 2006, http://www.eia.doe
.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableb1.xls (accessed 22 April 2007).
4. Peter Tertzakian, A Thousand Barrels a Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy Dependent World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 105.
5. Lt Col Michael Hornitschek, War without Oil: A Catalyst for True Transformation, Occasional Paper no. 56 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, February 2006), 20, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cst/csat56.pdf (accessed 31 July 2009).
6. Richard H. Truly and Alvin L. Alm, Report of the Defense Science Board on More Capable Warfighting through Reduced Fuel Burden (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 2001), ES-3, 16–18, http://handle
.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA392666 (accessed 31 July 2009).
7. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 2008, 59, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002p.pdf (accessed 31 July 2009).
8. H. C. Van Ness, Understanding Thermodynamics (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), 35–36.
9. George Tsatsaronis and Antonio Valero, “Thermodynamics Meets Economics,” Mechanical Engineering, August 1989, 84–86.
10. David J. Moorhouse, “Proposed System-Level Multidisciplinary Analysis Technique Based on Exergy Methods,” Journal of Aircraft 40, no. 1 (January–February 2003): 11–12.
11. Ibid.
12. “DARPA’s Vulture: What Goes Up, Needn’t Come Down,” Defense Industry Daily, 26 August 2008, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/DARPAs
-Vulture-What-Goes-Up-Neednt-Come-Down-04852 (accessed 29 June 2009).
13. David M. Paulus Jr. and Richard A. Gagglioli, “Rational Objective Functions for Vehicles,” Journal of Aircraft 40, no. 1 (January–February 2003): 27.
14. Moorhouse, “Proposed System-Level Multidisciplinary Analysis,” 14.
15. Marc Ross, “Fuel Efficiency and the Physics of Automobiles,” Contemporary Physics 38, no. 6 (1997): 363, 388.
16. Amory B. Lovins et al., Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profits, Jobs, and Security (Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute, 2004), 46, http://www.oilendgame.com (accessed 3 August 2009).
17. Ibid., 47.
18. Jeffrey M. Stricker, “Efficient/Adaptive Cycle Engines” (presentation at the USAF Energy Forum, Crystal City, VA, 8 March 2007).
19. Leifur T. Leifsson and William H. Mason, “The Blended Wing Body Aircraft” (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, [2005]), http://www.aoe.vt.edu/research/groups/bwb/papers/TheBWBAircraft.pdf (accessed 29 June 2009).
20. Ross, “Fuel Efficiency,” 382–83.
21. Lovins et al., Winning the Oil Endgame, 52.
22. Tsatsaronis and Valero, “Thermodynamics Meets Economics,” 84.
23. “Alternative and Advanced Fuels: Fischer-Tropsch Diesel,” US Department of Energy, http://www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/fuels/emerging_diesel
.html (accessed 18 September 2008).
24. Geoff Fein, “Synthetic Training Enables U.S., Coalition Forces to Play in Virtual Missions,” Defense Daily International, 14 April 2006, 1.
25. “Partner Profile: U.S. Air Force,” Green Power Partnership, US Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/partners/partners/usairforce.htm (accessed 19 May 2006).
26. Richard Chapo, “Governor Schwarzenegger Turns California to Solar Roof Systems,” Ezine Articles, http://ezinearticles.com/?Governor-Schwarzenegger
-Turns-California-to-Solar-Roof-Systems&id=130953 (accessed 10 June 2006).
27. Tim Kauffman, “Stimulus Funds Boost Efforts to Reduce Fuel Consumption,” Federal Times 45, no. 5 (30 March 2009): 17.
28. Hornitschek, War without Oil, 5, 73.
29. Kip P. Nygren, Darrell D. Massie, and Paul J. Kern, “Army Energy Strategy for the End of Cheap Oil” (paper delivered at the 25th Army Science Conference, Orlando, FL, 29 November 2006), 5–6, http://www.globaloilwatch.com/reports/Army.pdf (accessed 3 August 2009).
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Col John B. Wissler, USAF, (University of Maryland; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology; PhD, California Institute of Technology; Master of Strategic Studies, US Army War College) is deputy director of engineering, Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He has served in a variety of research, development, and acquisition positions, including tours in the Air Force Research Laboratory (where he commanded the Hanscom and Wright Research Sites), Air Staff, Air War College, and US Air Force Academy. He has written numerous articles and papers on aeronautics, lasers, and engineering management. Colonel Wissler is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the Army War College. |
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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