THE ARMY’S “ORGANIC”
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AND AIRPOWER TRENDS 2010

I believe that the Air Force needs to accelerate its efforts in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). In particular, I think it should develop UAS delivery of air cargo to forward bases in Afghanistan—for two compelling reasons. First, as noted in Maj Travis Burdine’s article “The Army’s ‘Organic’ Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (Summer 2009), “Improvised explosive devices (IED) have killed more ground soldiers than any other threat—over 60 percent of the total” (p. 95). No IED can destroy an unmanned aircraft. Second, as mentioned in “Airpower Trends 2010” (Summer 2009) by retired Air Force colonel John Jogerst, “We have solutions in hand to get unmanned systems from takeoff to a destination—more than enough capability for straightforward missions like cargo delivery. No technical reason prevents us from deploying an unmanned tactical cargo air bridge by 2010” (p. 106).

In Afghanistan, we bring most material by air to Bagram Airfield. From there it is distributed to smaller airfields by C-130s. However, a C-130 can’t land at a small forward base, so we use trucks, which are painfully vulnerable to IEDs. If the Air Force developed a short takeoff and landing (STOL) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), such as an unmanned version of the Pilatus Porter, it could get supplies to most of the smaller forward bases. A ­Pilatus Porter (and there are many other STOLs) can take off and land in fewer than 600 feet—as demonstrated by Air America during its operations in Laos when it regularly supplied the Hmong via rough 600-foot strips on ridgelines instead of using trucks subject to ambush.

If the Air Force were clever, it could be like FedEx: pack the material for the ultimate destination. In other words, a C-17 brings in 100,000 pounds from Europe to Bagram. It off-loads a smaller amount (say 20,000 pounds) to a C-130 that goes to a regional airstrip that supports 10 forward bases. The C-130’s payload is split into 10 packages of 2,000 pounds that are shipped to each of these bases by UAV STOLs. The original packing is based on each base’s unique needs and doesn’t need repacking. Of course, there will be last-minute needs, but if this system satisfied 90 percent of the requirements, it could be quite efficient.

Our current stable of UASs (e.g., Predator, Reaper, etc.) is optimized for long endurance. What we need for a short-range cargo UAS is a craft with a high lift wing, rugged landing gear, and not necessarily a long range. The German Fieseler Storch of World War II, which had a high lift wing because of its slats and flaps, could land in 60 feet. That’s the kind of design thinking we need: take the cargo the last tactical mile. (No one in the world seems to want to put a UAV together with STOL tech­nology, but it is such an obvious payoff. The Army is looking at using an unmanned version of a Cessna Caravan for unmanned air-cargo resupply [see “Airpower Trends 2010,” p. 106]. That aircraft won’t make the last tactical mile although it will get closer than a C-130.)

One of the principal arguments against resupply by air instead of by truck is cost. Certainly no aircraft is ever going to be as cheap as a truck, but I don’t think that is the expense the American public looks at. What concerns them is the lives of American soldiers. Although cargo UASs will not eliminate every IED death, those aircraft will definitely reduce them.

Each UAS strike against terrorists in Pakistan demonstrates the power of airpower. Every destruction of a resupply truck by means of an IED demonstrates the power of terrorists. If cargo UAV STOLs were used for resupply, we could extend our power and lessen the enemy’s.

William Thayer
San Diego, California

DEFENSE OF US SPACE ASSETS

Capt Adam Frey’s article “Defense of US Space Assets: A Legal Perspective” (ASPJ-English, Winter 2008; ASPJ-Chinese, Summer 2009) is certainly insightful. In particular, it ends with a suggestion that the United States should “maintain not only the ultimate strategic high ground but also the moral one” (p. 81), which reflects sound reasoning and wisdom. However, under the section entitled “China’s Test and Its Legal Ramifications,” the author claims that “China’s recent ASAT test offers an example of another type of attack: the ‘kinetic energy weapon’ ” (p. 78), a statement with which I disagree. The United States and USSR began the development and testing of kinetic energy weapons; China, some 20 years behind, only followed their lead. A search of the Internet, for example, will reveal accounts of such incidents as the US shoot-down of a satellite in 1985 with a Vought ASM-135 ASAT from an F-15.

Liu Xing
Nanjing, China

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Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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