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Published: 1 March 2009
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2009


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Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.

The Air Base Network Serving French
and Coalition Operations in Afghanistan

1st Lt Mickaël Aubout, French Air Force*

The requirement for an air base infrastructure near military theaters of operation remains a constant that applies equally to operations in Afghanistan. The air base remains an indispensable tool for the sustained and continuous application of airpower due to its capacities to support and project both force and power. Therefore, the air bases serving operations in Afghanistan constitute the backbone of aerial actions undertaken in that theater.

Ever since the first air raids launched against al-Qaeda and Taliban troops on 7 October 2001, American aircraft have had to deal with the absence of air bases close to the Afghan theater. The majority of the first aerial bombardment missions staged from American bases in the Middle East, the island of Diego Garcia, and US Navy aircraft carriers. Aircrews, therefore, were obliged to air-refuel several times and make round-trips of more than 5,000 kilometers in order to operate from the nearest bases. Subsequently, allied ground-force engagements also necessitated air bases located closer to the theater. Additionally, ground troops, upon deployment in Afghanistan, needed resupply and, especially, close air support (CAS). Negligible aerial opposition from the enemy allowed allied air forces to focus on CAS; bombardment; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Over seven years later, this situation still prevails.

Currently, military aircraft engaged in Afghanistan operate from four main air bases located in Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar, and Mazare-Sharif. These bases constitute the principal staging sites for coalition attack aircraft. Built by the Soviets during the 1980s, these sites have become the primary ports of entry for both personnel and materiel, regularly welcoming tactical transport aircraft shuttling between bases located in neighboring countries. Situated on the “front line,” they constitute merely the last links in a chain or network of air bases.

Constitution and Evolution
of the Air Base Network

An assortment of air bases cannot truly be considered a network unless it shares one or more common objectives. The need to deploy airpower to strategically situated bases is nothing new for France, a country with a long heritage of overseas aerial interventions. For example, since prior to World War II, the French Air Force has projected airpower far beyond its borders to conduct counterinsurgency operations in support of French national policy. In the present case, the network of air bases serving operations in Afghanistan shares a common goal—the support of ongoing operations in the Afghan theater.

The months following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 witnessed the formation of a large international coalition. Traditional Middle Eastern allies, as well as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) who fulfilled Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington, assured the United States of their support, effective 12 September 2001.1 Additionally, several Central Asian countries joined the coalition in various degrees. Countries such as Russia, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan authorized overflight of their territory, while Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan offered to accommodate aircraft.2

The first countries to receive American combat aircraft included Pakistan, notably at a base in Jacobabad, and Uzbekistan, at Karshi-Khanabad Air Base. During October 2001, these bases were used for aerial reconnaissance and strike missions against the Taliban. At the end of that same year, Washington and Paris engaged in discussions with Dushanbe and Bishkek concerning the deployment of aircraft to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively. A few months later, in Operation Hercules, the first French Mirage 2000D and C-135 aircraft landed at Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan, along with American F-18s and F-15s. Manas, which hosted Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, and Spanish aircraft, became one of the principal allied bases, occupying a major position within the network of Central Asian air bases.3 Possessing a runway approximately 4,500 meters long, it can accommodate the landing of heavy aircraft bringing in supplies that tactical airlift aircraft subsequently deliver to sites in Afghanistan. Thus it literally serves as the resupply hub for forces in Afghanistan.

In 2002, following the advance of coalition troops in Afghanistan, the air base network would henceforth include sites in Afghanistan, and its features would continue to evolve. First, aerial assets were transferred in order to bring them closer to the theater of operations, with the Americans assigning F-15s, F-16s, and AV-8Bs to Bagram Air Base. France transferred its Mirage 2000Ds to Dushanbe, leaving its C‑135s at Manas. Meanwhile, following American criticisms of the Uzbek government after the massacres in Andijan, the Uzbeks asked the Americans to withdraw from their country.4 Six months later, in November 2005, Karshi-Khanabad Air Base was evacuated.

Despite their great importance, one cannot consider the air bases located close to the Afghan theater the only network elements that permit operations in Afghanistan. One must also take into account the bases located in Europe—the origin of the logistical flows into the region. For example, the vast majority of the supplies delivered to Manas come from the US base at Ramstein in Germany. For France, Istres Air Base fulfills this role. Due to its privileged geographic location near the Mediterranean, Istres has long served France as a power-projection platform and gateway to Africa and Asia.5

The Network as a System

Schematically, this air base network can be depicted as a grouping of concentric circles (see fig.). Within these circles, each base has its own function and accommodates specific aerial means. The first (innermost) circle corresponds to the air bases situated in Afghan territory and within the countries along the edge of the theater of operations (Tajikistan and Pakistan). This circle lies at the heart of combat and enables a robust reaction capability by minimizing the time between requests for air support and the takeoff of fighter-bombers. These bases also maximize the endurance of on-call CAS patrols. The bases of the first circle serve the primary purposes of dispatching fighter-bombers and receiving supplies. The second circle, encompassing bases that deliver supplies to the first circle, includes departure points for airlift aircraft operating in Afghanistan. Manas is a notable case in point. The third circle includes the airfield infrastructure from which depart the principal logistical flows that feed the Central Asian bases. Each circle corresponds to a group of bases characterized by specific missions.

Figure. Air base network
Figure. Air base network

Ultimately, when faced with an elusive enemy, one can easily understand that endurance and speed of response constitute measures of effectiveness for aerial forces. These qualities are reinforced by the proximity of infrastructure capable of accommodating and launching aircraft. The transfers of French Air Force Rafale aircraft to Dushanbe and of Mirage 2000 and Mirage F1 aircraft to Kandahar in March 2007 gave the coalition a supplementary strike force located closer to the combat zone.

Within the framework of operations taking place far from our home country, Afghanistan has been a proving ground for projecting force and power in an allied and international context. Since the vast majority of the bases are multinational and under NATO authority, all assigned forces must receive training in allied procedures. French aviators, through their mastery of NATO procedures, bring their support to two distinct, yet complementary, operations. They can intervene in support of the International Security Assistance Force while fulfilling American requests in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.6 Finally, beyond the necessity to possess a network of efficient air bases, the Afghan example illustrates how air bases serve as a foundation of airpower.

*The author is chief of research at the French Air Force’s Center for Strategic Aerospace Studies, Paris, France.

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Notes

1. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking . . . such action as it deems necessary.” “The North Atlantic Treaty: Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 November 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.

2. Overflight applies under certain conditions since some countries, such as Russia, authorized only humanitarian flights.

3. In October 2002, a detachment of Dutch, Norwegian, and Danish F-16s deployed to Manas. The Spanish participated with a detachment of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.

4. On 13 May 2005, troops of the Uzbek Interior Ministry and National Security Service fired into a crowd of protesters in Andijan, Uzbekistan, killing an unknown number of people.

5. In a similar sense, the French presence in N’Djamena, Chad, during the colonial period gave the French Air Force access to French territories along the Indian Ocean (notably Madagascar) via air bases located in French territories in North Africa.

6. The International Security Assistance Force, under NATO command since August 2003, exists under a United Nations mandate.


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University


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