DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
Published: 1 December 2008
Air & Space
Power Journal - Winter 2008
|
|
Col Jim Slife, USAF*
IN THE LAST two years, I've drafted a dozen performance reports and recommendations for officer promotion. That may seem like a reasonable number that ought not be too burdensome for one officer to handle, but I find it quite unsatisfactory. Why? Because I haven't been in a supervisory role in the last two years. I drafted each of these documents at the request of officers whose supervisors were unwilling to prepare the documents and required the officers being rated to put together their own reports and recommendations.
Self-evaluation (the practice of writing our own-or allowing or directing our subordinates to write their own-performance reports and promotion recommendations) is forbidden. The governing guidance is unambiguous: "Do not have the ratee write or draft any portion of his or her own performance report. . . . [Senior raters] will ensure no subordinate commander/supervisor asks, or allows, an officer to draft or prepare his or her own PRF [promotion recommendation form]. . . . No officer will be asked to draft or prepare his or her own PRF."1 Nevertheless, this practice seems to be growing in our Air Force.
For instance, several years ago, I served on a promotion board and took the opportunity to spend some time with the captains who participated as "board recorders." By virtue of their presence, they were obviously highly regarded in their own communities and seemed bright young officers. When we discussed this topic over dinner, all of them told me that in their short careers they had written every one of their own performance reports.
On another occasion, I asked a group of Air Force interns-captains identified as near the top of their peer group from a wide cross section of the Air Force-how often they had written their own reports. Almost unanimously, they indicated they had done so every time.
This anecdotal evidence suggests widespread behavior that undermines two of our institutional core values: "integrity first" and "service before self." Our Little Blue Book of Air Force core values tells us that responsibility is a fundamental part of integrity: "No person of integrity is irresponsible; a person of true integrity acknowledges his or her duties and acts accordingly."2 More recently, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, has defined "responsibility"-a component of the core value of integrity first-as follows: "Airmen acknowledge their duties and take responsibility for their own successes or failures. A person with integrity accepts the consequences of actions taken, never accepting or seeking undue credit for the accomplishments of others."3 Asking, expecting, or allowing our subordinates to draft their own performance reports simply doesn't square with our institutional concept of integrity because as raters, we are specifically prohibited from doing so and are charged with the responsibility of ensuring that our subordinates are not put in a position to write their own reports.
Further, when we ask our subordinates to write their own reports (or establish a culture in which they believe they have to), we undermine our core value of service before self. The Little Blue Book identifies "rule following" as a critical component of service before self: "To serve is to do one's duty, and our duties are most commonly expressed through rules. While it may be the case that professionals are expected to exercise judgment in the performance of their duties, good professionals understand that rules have a reason for being, and the default position must be to follow those rules unless there is a clear, operational reason for refusing to do so."4
Additionally, when we-as leaders-write our own reports, we are telling our subordinates that service before self is a great concept for them but that our careers are too valuable to risk trying it out on our own reports. This highlights "faith in the system," another component of service before self: "To lose faith in the system is to adopt the view that you know better than those above you in the chain of command what should or should not be done. In other words, to lose faith in the system is to place self before service. Leaders can be very influential in this regard: if a leader resists the temptation to doubt 'the system,' then subordinates may follow suit."5 Finally, AFDD 1-1 highlights the concept of duty as another component of service before self: "Airmen have a duty to fulfill the unit's mission. Service before self includes performing to the best of one's abilities the assigned responsibilities and tasks without worrying how a career will be affected. Professionals exercise judgment while performing their duties; they understand rules exist for good reason. They follow rules unless there is a clear operational or legal reason to refuse or deviate."6
In short, if our values are to have any lasting significance to us as an institution, we must demonstrate them in our actions. Leaders-and I use the term in its broadest possible sense, to include all Airmen-have a responsibility to do the right thing and insist that our actions are consistent with our values. We must do this to ensure that the Airmen following us will not have occasion to lose faith in the system. In the context of performance reporting and promotion recommendations, this means we must not ask or allow our subordinates to draft their own documents, and, as professional Airmen and leaders worth emulating, we mustn't do it ourselves.
In addition to the corrosive effect that engaging in this practice has on our values, there are powerful, pragmatic arguments against it from both supervisors' and subordinates' perspectives.
Nobody Cares about Our Careers
As Much As We Do
Although this statement may be true, that doesn't necessarily mean that we are the ones best able to document our performance. Left to our own devices, most of us would write about things that seem most significant to us, which are not, as a general rule, the things most significant to the usual audience for these documents (some type of central selection board). Our supervisors, on the other hand, are in a position to communicate the kinds of information a board needs to determine our potential. Let them do so.
Having Subordinates Draft Their Own Reports
Is Good Writing Practice for Them
For the reason highlighted above, doing so will actually amount to negative training. When writing about ourselves, many of us focus on accomplishments rather than the assessments that boards find more useful. If we truly desire to provide subordinates some practice, we should consider allowing them to become supervisors in their own right. In this manner, they can gain experience in writing reports, and the supervisor can help them learn to write well without inserting his or her own performance (a matter of some emotional attachment) into the learning process.
I Have Too Many Reports to Write
Them All Myself
This points to a span-of-control issue, perhaps indicating that the organization is not properly structured. We often extol "flat" organizations for their many virtues, but an ample body of practical military experience suggests that one person has difficulty adequately and directly supervising more than three to six immediate subordinates.7 Nevertheless, if a supervisor wishes to retain authority for writing a substantial number of performance reports, then he or she must also accept the responsibilities that accompany that authority-one of which is writing the reports. With an expansive span of control, the supervisor generally needs more robust staff support. Part of the staff's effort-usually the responsibility of executive officers or a director of staff-should focus on drafting performance and promotion documents for the boss. Alternatively, subordinate supervisors in the chain of command may reasonably be asked to draft these documents. For example, a group or squadron commander might draft a major's PRF for the wing commander's consideration.
My Boss Is a Terrible Writer-A Report
by Him Would Ruin My Career
Even if this is true, the subordinate should still recognize that one of the responsibilities of the rater's rater is to provide a backstop for this type of shortfall. We have to trust the system-it's part of service before self. In this case, the system is personified in the supervisory chain's leaders; we must trust them to do their jobs. Furthermore, ratees must understand-and no one likes hearing this-that receiving a performance report they consider less than positive does not necessarily mean that the rater doesn't care or lacks the writing skills to produce a better report. Raters have the institutional responsibility to make the best look like the best, the worst look like the worst, and everyone else look okay. Doing so requires moral courage and frank feedback along the way. Failing to do so punishes the excellent in order to reward the mediocre. Many times, the natural result of receiving a mediocre report with no corresponding feedback is an attempt to write one's own performance report next time around. Supervisors must not allow this to develop-no one should be surprised by his or her performance report. Honest and direct feedback is critical to building trust in our system.
My Boss Is Extremely Busy-I'm Just Helping Out
Typically offered in defense of supervisors who are senior officers, this justification is not compelling because those officers generally have staffs to help them fulfill their duties, including the documentation of performance. Senior officers-despite their pressing schedules-remain responsible for that task. Whether they choose to write the reports from scratch or ask their staff to gather inputs and prepare a first draft for their review is a matter of personal preference.
My Boss Is from Another Service and Doesn't
Know How to Write an Air Force Report
Every non-Air Force organization has a designated "Air Force advisor" to assist non-Air Force supervisors in preparing Air Force performance reports and in understanding our performance-reporting system.8 Anyone in doubt about the ratee's, rater's, or advisor's responsibilities in the joint environment should seek out the designated Air Force advisor and ask. Members of the other services generally don't write their own performance reports and often walk away from interactions with the Air Force somewhat puzzled by our propensity to write our own reports-and to ask our subordinates to do the same.
Other compelling reasons exist for not engaging in this unhealthy practice.
Self-Evaluation Often Results in a
Lack of Useful Bullets
When we provide our bosses with a completed performance report-even under the fatuous guise of providing "inputs"-we generally provide only a completed report without any further inputs or substantiating data. If our supervisors seriously put effort into improving the product, they are often left removing "fluff" and finding nothing with which to replace it. So they expand an existing bullet into more fluff, essentially leaving the quality of the report unchanged. By not providing an extensive menu of accomplishments with detailed results from which our leaders can choose, we essentially constrain their ability to write the best report possible.
It Reduces the Supervisor's
Ownership of the Report
When our supervisors receive a completed report, they tend to believe (1) that it is the best set of inputs we can possibly provide (after all, it is our report, right?) and (2) that we would be satisfied were the report filed substantially as written. This takes a tremendous burden-that of ownership-off supervisors' shoulders. We feel this ownership most acutely when we write about our best people because we want to take care of them the best way we can. However, knowing they'd be satisfied with the report lifts the burden, and the final product isn't as good as it might have been.
It Feels Slimy (or Ought to, at Least)
When we write our own reports, we should wonder what the boss (and "the system") really thinks of us. When something good happens to us, we should wonder if it occurred because the system worked properly or because we short-circuited it in trying to "take care of ourselves." As the old saying goes, "There is no pillow so soft as a clean conscience."
Commanders and supervisors can take a number of practical steps to curtail this unhealthy practice.
Make Expectations Clear in Commanders'
Calls or Organizational Meetings
There is no substitute for the involvement of leadership in solving a problem like self-evaluation. Simply expecting people to comply with the necessary instructions is not enough. Leaders need to make explicit their expectations for the organization and provide a climate in which subordinates can voice their concerns when they see disconnects between espoused values and the ones practiced.
Establish Manageable Spans of Control
The Air Force's Military Personnel Data System can provide commanders and supervisors with lists of ratees, raters, and report close-out dates that they can sort by any of the fields. A quick look at the system's report, sorted by rater, will show which ones have excessive spans of control, enabling leaders to adjust the supervisory chain accordingly. In some cases, commanders intentionally establish excessive spans of control at their level because they want their subordinates rated by their own commander (e.g., the squadron commander rates 15 officers so that all 15 can have the group commander as their additional rater). Although this may be desirable, the squadron commander (in this instance) retains the burden for ensuring that subordinates are not asked to draft their own reports.
Establish Management Systems That Force
Feedback and Performance-Report Inputs
throughout the Rating Period
One mechanism that has enjoyed some success involves quarterly goal-setting and feedback sessions during which raters provide structured performance feedback and compare the subordinate's performance to the goals agreed upon during the previous quarter. Subordinates come to the conversation with proposed goals for the next quarter and accomplishments for the previous one (retained for reporting purposes at the end of the rating period). The Army uses an Officer Evaluation Report Support Form to formalize not only performance expectations and objectives for the rating period, but also performance-report inputs to the rater.9 A similar mechanism, either developed by the unit or standardized across the Air Force, could be easily implemented.
Regrettably, many supervisors still expect their subordinates to write their own reports. In this situation, subordinates can consider several options.
Push Back
Oftentimes, when the boss asks for inputs, we assume that means "on-the-form-with-all-the-flowery-language." Perhaps just taking the boss literally is the right answer. When asked for inputs, we do just that, keeping in mind that the ones which quantify results, highlight impact, and provide some context are the most valuable. For example, "raised fully-mission-capable rates to 82 percent" means nothing unless we know that those rates were 52 percent previously. We all want the best possible report, but the most effective way to influence the process entails making sure the boss has all the data we can possibly provide-it's hard to write a good report with empty inputs. In those cases in which a supervisor asks a subordinate to "provide a draft," he or she will often back off without any hard feelings when the response is, "Boss, how about I just provide you detailed inputs? I don't let the folks working for me write their own, and I think I'd have a hard time explaining why it's okay for me to do it but not for them."
Ask Someone Else to Write It
Although many bosses will back off, some won't. One contemporary of mine made an eloquent pitch for why he shouldn't draft his own PRF and offered his boss several pages of solid inputs, only to be told, "I said 'draft your PRF.' " In cases like this, subordinates should not hesitate to ask a trusted peer or mentor to draft a performance report or promotion recommendation. Our guidance does not say that the rater must draft his comments-only that the ratee may not. However, two circumstances demand caution. First, before submitting the report, subordinates should not edit the peer's or mentor's draft, and they should state explicitly that they are providing an unaltered draft prepared by someone else. Second, they should include a separate set of accomplishments to the rater along with the draft, giving him or her additional material with which to work. Regardless of who drafts the report, raters at all levels have sole responsibility for the content to which they affix their signatures.
As a Last Resort, Report It
Air Force instructions are clear on the practice of writing one's own performance report or promotion recommendation. A supervisor who insists that we do so (or intimates that the quality of our report will suffer if we don't) acts illegally, and this constitutes grounds for a valid conversation with the chain of command-our boss's boss. As a last resort, we can always file a complaint with the inspector general. Certainly, most of us would prefer to handle issues such as this without resorting to a formal complaint, but it beats the alternative of compromising our personal integrity as well as that of our institutional systems.
Aside from "don't do it" and "don't ask subordinates to do it," there are several practical recommendations to consider.
Characterize the Problem
One colonel's claim that we have an institutional problem does not necessarily make it so. Perhaps it would be helpful to include a few questions on the next Air Force institutional climate survey to characterize the extent of this corrosive practice and the reasons for its pervasiveness-if it is, in fact, widespread. Additionally, commanders at every level can add questions about this practice to their unit climate assessments to determine the extent of the practice within their own organizations.
Implement Optional "360-Degree Feedback"
Many senior officers and chief master sergeants have an opportunity to participate in leadership-development programs at various civilian institutions during which they receive 360-degree feedback as part of the curricula. In such systems, members (and, often, their supervisors) get an anonymous glimpse into how peers and subordinates perceive their behaviors and performance. All Airmen deserve these insights in order to improve. Although implementing 360-degree feedback into the formal performance-reporting system might prove problematic, making it an optional part of the process would enable supervisors to judge the effect of their behaviors. Establishing the information-technology mechanisms to enable such a process, though not trivial, would be neither difficult nor expensive. In fact the Army has an optional 360-degree-feedback mechanism in place for all soldiers.10
Guard against Institutional "Mixed Messages"
Even though a number of sources explicitly forbid self-evaluation on performance reports and promotion recommendations, no such prohibition exists regarding writing oneself a nomination for awards or decorations. Nevertheless, leaders have an obligation to ensure that our recognition systems do not rely on self-identification-not only because such actions belie the inherent responsibilities of leadership, but also because of the mixed message it sends when we expect our subordinates to self-identify for recognition programs. Though not explicitly prohibited, these expectations serve to undermine our values-self-identification for awards and decorations lies at odds with the very definition of "service before self." However, mixed messages such as "don't write your own officer performance report but do write your own award" occur in other places as well. For example, the current Airmen Development Plan contains the following unfortunate admonition to Airmen who provide comments to their development team: " 'Suggested Comments' for your Rater/Reviewing Official are optional, but highly recommended."11 Asking our Airmen to self-assess on behalf of their supervisors sends them mixed messages about what our values look like in action. However, we can cite a great number of success stories in this regard. For instance, the Air Force's new performance report and feedback forms support both our institutional values as well as the concepts outlined in this article. Assessment-based, as well as short and to the point, the forms provide for feedback at the end of the rating period and at midterm. In short, the new processes and forms remove several of the former opportunities for sending mixed messages to our Airmen. We need only implement the processes as designed.
As leaders, we have an institutional obligation to prevent disconnects between our espoused values and our values in action, evidenced by practices such as allowing, encouraging, or participating in self-evaluation. As an institution, we have spoken about what our values are. As always, however, the challenge lies in each one of us getting up every day and conscientiously making sure that our own values are in consonance with our institutional ones and that our own actions support what we say we stand for. We are an Air Force full of Airmen who deserve the best leadership our nation can provide. Remaining true to our values establishes the foundation of the leadership that we all-from the newest Airman to our most senior officers-have a right to expect, both up and down the chain of command.
*The author currently serves as director of the Emerging Capabilities Division in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
Arlington, Virginia
[Feedback? Email the Editor ]
Notes
1. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems, 15 April 2005, 20 (par. 3.2.1.4), 103 (par. 8.1.4.1.3), 107 (par. 8.2.3.1.2), http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI36-2406.pdf.
2. United States Air Force Core Values: "The Little Blue Book," 1 January 1997, http://www.usafa.af.mil/core-value/cv-mastr.html. Though dated, this handbook contains valuable discussion about the meaning of the core values as well as insight into what they meant when first articulated.
3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 18 February 2006, 5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1_1.pdf.
4. United States Air Force Core Values.
5. Ibid.
6. AFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 6.
7. See, for example, Gen Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London: Edward Arnold & Company, 1921), 229; see also John S. Brown, "Spans of Control," Army 56, no. 8 (August 2006): 78-79.
8. AFI 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems, 40 (par. 3.10), 109 (par. 8.2.8).
9. Department of the Army Form 67-9-1, Officer Evaluation Report Support Form, March 2006. The Army performance-feedback form is also instructive. See Department of the Army Form 67-9-1A, Developmental Support Form, March 2006. Both forms are available at "Official Department of the Army Forms," http://www.army.mil/usapa/eforms/eforms_1.html (accessed 20 December 2007).
10. See "The Army Benchworks," https://www.benchworks.army.mil.
11. See "Airmen Development Plan (ADP)," http://ask.afpc.randolph.af.mil/fdtoolkit/default.asp?prods1=1&prods2=244&prods3=2859.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
[ Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]
