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Published: 1 December 2008
Air & Space
Power Journal - Winter 2008
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Les Doggrell*
It is thus an essential condition of strategic leadership that forces should be held in reserve according to the degree of strategic uncertainty.
-Carl von Clausewitz, On War
THE US SPACE community was alarmed by China's antisatellite (ASAT) test of 11 January 2007 but has made little practical response.1 By performing a public demonstration, China put the world on notice of its ability to hold spacecraft at risk. As many pundits note, the United States is critically dependent on space capabilities to fight future conflicts. Some industry analysts have speculated that the destruction on 22 February 2008 of a spacecraft identified in the press as USA 193 was intended to demonstrate a US ASAT capability, yet in a future conflict, destroying opposing spacecraft will not replace lost space capability.2 Given the relative dependence of the United States on space systems, what, if anything, should we do to prepare for future space operations under contested conditions? One possible solution calls for preparing to replace-or reconstitute-lost capability, at least to some extent.
Congress and senior defense officials have identified Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) as a means for responding to future threats to US space systems, but no one has articulated specifically what ORS will do. What elements of ORS would react to a counterspace threat? No one has published a clear description of ORS and what it does. Consideration of the guidance provided by Congress, and of the needs and technology available for a reconstitution capability, can identify, at least in outline, features and capabilities that ORS or any reconstitution approach would require in order to respond in a timely manner to a threat to our space capability.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has anticipated the development of counterspace forces. In 2001 former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld warned of a possible "space Pearl Harbor."3 The US Space Transportation Policy, issued in 2005, calls for the ability to "respond to unexpected loss or degradation of selected capabilities, and/or to provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities-to support national security requirements."4 The same policy establishes 2010 as a goal for demonstrating a responsive space capability:
Before 2010, the United States shall demonstrate an initial capability for operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security requirements. In that regard, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall:
a) Develop the requirements and concept of operations for launch vehicles, infrastructure, and spacecraft to provide operationally responsive access to and use of space to support national security, including the ability to provide critical space capabilities in the event of a failure of launch or on-orbit capabilities; and
b) Identify the key modifications to space launch, spacecraft, or ground operations capabilities that will be required to implement an operationally responsive space launch capability.5
Thus, policy direction to take action clearly exists.
In testimony before Congress in March 2007, Dr. Ronald Sega, executive agent for space and undersecretary of the Air Force at that time, identified ORS as the United States' activity to prepare for a threat to our space systems: "This ORS focus includes the ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute or augment existing constellations, or provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities."6 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England articulated this view in a memorandum of 2007 that established ORS as the initiative to meet the US Space Transportation Policy's goal. Despite this direction, the DOD has received continuing criticism for failing to define ORS accurately and succinctly. A recent report to Congress defined ORS broadly as "assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders' needs."7 However, this definition encompasses almost any imaginable military space capability. According to one commentator, "ORS has essentially been a loosely defined and directed series of space and rocket hardware procurements."8
The US Air Force has struggled to define ORS.9 Is it a launch system, a series of spacecraft, infrastructure improvement, an acquisition-reform effort, or all of these? What size and number of spacecraft with what capabilities are involved? What type of system do we need to respond to a military threat to US space capabilities? We have answered none of these questions with any certainty, but we must do so before we can field a solution. Congress provided some direction in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.10 However, no agency has published a reconstitution concept for ORS.
We can easily identify conceptual responses to threats to our space systems. China and Russia advocate eliminating the threat through a treaty banning space weapons.11 Weaning our defense establishment from its dependence on space systems might reduce the vulnerability. Establishment of passive and active defense of spacecraft could offer another alternative. Preparation for the reconstitution of space capability following the failure of other measures could represent a solution or part of a set of solutions to the loss, or threat of loss, of space capability. According to Dr. Sega, Mr. England, and Congress, ORS provides the means to reconstitute space capabilities, yet within even this limited scope, it is unclear exactly what ORS will do to perform this mission.
We could replace any lost national-security space capabilities by maintaining a complete backup inventory, holding these spacecraft in standby for responsive launch aboard an inventory of launch vehicles. The ORS mission-needs statement, signed by the chief of staff of the Air Force in 2001, documented the need for the launch component of this type of approach.12 An analysis of alternatives (AOA), completed in April 2005, examined a wide range of launch architectures for performing responsive space missions. It found that rapidly replacing lost intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as precision navigation and timing capabilities had a significant impact on the results of hypothetical future military campaigns.13 This finding depended upon an inventory of spacecraft designed for responsive launch. Based on the result of the AOA, the Air Force initiated an Affordable Responsive Spacelift project.
Although space systems are relatively short lived, the current on-orbit US capability represents decades of investment at a level of tens of billions of dollars per year. Building, much less maintaining, a complete replacement inventory, even if technically feasible, is well beyond reasonable expectations of increased defense expenditures. Such an investment in a contingency need becomes even less likely when compared to the necessity of recapitalizing existing defense systems.14
The growing inventory of commercial satellite capability is a potential source of capacity that we have used in conflict and that would likely see use in the future. One challenge to this approach includes the increasingly multinational character of the commercial space market. The impact of conflict on international consortiums would largely depend upon the specific parties and interests affected by the conflict. For example, the "neutrality" of commercial spacecraft would prove difficult to maintain if they were providing militarily essential services.
In the Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Congress effectively ended the Affordable Responsive Spacelift program by redirecting the president's budget and providing guidance that ORS is intended not as a complete "replacement" capability but as a small satellite based system:
It is the policy of the United States to demonstrate, acquire, and deploy an effective capability for operationally responsive space to support military users and operations from space, which shall consist of-
(1) responsive satellite payloads and busses built to common technical standards;
(2) low-cost space launch vehicles and supporting range operations that facilitate the timely launch and on-orbit operations of satellites;
(3) responsive command and control capabilities; and
(4) concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures that permit the use of responsive space assets for combat and military operations other than war.15
In the same act, Congress provided further guidance on the systems to be procured, establishing a $20 million goal for the purchase of a launch vehicle and a $40 million goal for the purchase of a spacecraft. Congress let the DOD determine the composition and structure of the ORS force.
By establishing cost goals, Congress has determined the type of ORS force structure it expects to be created. A rough rule of thumb for pricing spacecraft at $100,000 per kilogram would indicate that Congress intends ORS spacecraft mass to not exceed approximately 400 kilograms. Conveniently, this is about the size of the spacecraft that we could launch on a $20 million vehicle-and very close to the size and cost of the tactical-satellite class of spacecraft.16
Lt Col Ed Tomme has examined the ability of small spacecraft to perform military missions, noting the cost/performance trade-offs.17 These trade-offs are generally negative on small spacecraft, but Colonel Tomme does point out the ability of space systems to observe denied territory and provide strategic capabilities. It is important that we determine the minimum space capability required to support the joint force in conflict. Gen Kevin Chilton, commander of US Strategic Command, defined this level of performance as "good enough to win."18 As noted by Colonel Tomme, one small spacecraft provides very little capability, compared to the existing constellations of large spacecraft. Several authors have suggested various configurations of orbital constellations to provide persistent coverage.19 A reconstitution system would need to incorporate constellations of several small spacecraft to effect such coverage. Additionally, small, single-purpose spacecraft, by definition, would not serve multiple missions. Spacecraft orbits are carefully tailored for the mission envisioned and matched to the capability of the spacecraft. For example, multiple types, rather than a single type, of spacecraft would provide surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, and navigation capabilities. A minimal reconstitution capability would involve multiple constellations of different types of spacecraft. Each typical constellation, which would involve three to eight spacecraft per mission, would occupy orbits appropriate to the mission and capabilities.
An expressed ORS objective calls for providing greater capability in smaller, less expensive future projects and delivering these on shorter timelines. However, better, faster, and cheaper space systems have proven elusive. Even on accelerated timelines, we cannot currently produce small launch vehicles in less than 18 months. Spacecraft-fabrication timelines are even longer. An optimist might estimate two years to produce and test a small spacecraft. Although we can, and should, take steps to reduce these timelines, even optimistic projections of responsive fabrication times greatly exceed the likely warning and allowable recovery time to respond to a significant loss of our space capability. Providing meaningful capability within days to a few weeks of an attack is possible only if we have stockpiled the necessary spacecraft and launch vehicles. Given the reserves of bombs, boots, and beans maintained for future military contingencies, it should come as no surprise that a military space capability would require similar stockpiling.
Both the Air Force Research Laboratory and Naval Research Laboratory are working on technologies to reduce the need to stockpile spacecraft and still meet a responsive timeline, with the goal of assembling a spacecraft within six days.20 To do so, however, either the government or a contractor must maintain an inventory of preengineered and prequalified components. We must still bear the cost of keeping this inventory and required personnel on standby to perform the assembly. The success of the rapid assembly and low-inventory business model, as illustrated by Dell computers, relies on high volume. We need a trade-off study to evaluate the use of fully assembled spacecraft at the launch site versus the use of a centralized small-satellite depot that would contain spacecraft in various states of assembly. But the costs of inventory would be significant. Likewise, a common, modular, or plug-and-play spacecraft bus would reduce the nonrecurring and recurring expense of small spacecraft and could prove helpful in meeting the $40 million spacecraft goal. Even assuming the success of these efforts, we would still need an inventory of busses and payloads to meet likely wartime needs.
An alternative approach involves stockpiling the spacecraft on orbit in advance of need. The on-orbit reserve, built in peacetime, could provide capability continuously. This approach is particularly useful if the United States receives strategic warning of an impending or likely conflict; however, given China's ASAT threat, on-orbit stockpiling may do little more than provide additional targets. Detailed evaluation of the threat and potential-response timelines are central to considering the trade-off between launch-on-schedule and launch-on-demand strategies. A future opponent is not likely to provide two years of strategic warning, and the United States may not be sufficiently prescient to take advantage of the warning it does receive.
Like all military capabilities, stockpiling responsive space hardware alone will not be sufficient to ensure its readiness for future need. An end-to-end capability to perform a reconstitution mission will require facilities such as launchpads; storage, assembly, and integration structures; on-orbit command and control; and telemetry systems integrated into the tasking and dissemination infrastructure as well as their associated facilities.
Once on orbit, we will need to fly reconstitution spacecraft. Two opposing operating concepts exist, and an optimum solution will likely draw from both. To operate seamlessly in the augmentation role or as a replacement for a lost or damaged spacecraft from an established constellation, reconstitution spacecraft could be operated by mission-focused command and control structures and operations teams now in place. This concept maximizes the use of the existing operations infrastructure and minimizes disruption from the users' perspective. Alternatively, rapid-response reconstitution spacecraft could be operated by facilities dedicated specifically to that purpose. This concept is most applicable if the various reconstitution spacecraft are built with a common bus and operations concept. For example, a reconstitution communications spacecraft must integrate into the existing or remaining communications, command, and control infrastructure. However, a small spacecraft capable of performing the reconstitution mission is not likely to use the same command and telemetry structure as the spacecraft it replaces, thus requiring some dedicated functionality. Significant research in spacecraft autonomy now under way suggests that enhanced autonomy may relieve the challenges presented by rapidly launching multiple constellations of spacecraft. Additionally, such autonomy could aid in freeing operators from the telemetry-monitoring function, allowing them to focus on commanding the spacecraft to respond to threat actions and optimizing payloads and orbits in response to changing needs.
More important than hardware, a reconstitution system will require people to operate it. These personnel, whether military, civilian, or contractor, will need to train and practice their wartime tasks before executing them in earnest. Additionally, they should use such a system in their own training exercises since we cannot reasonably expect all of these interactions to occur in wartime without extensive peacetime practice. Military professionals know from experience that, in combat, they can rely only on well-trained troops familiar with their weapon systems.
Though not unusual for a military function, maintaining a full staff in peacetime to respond to a wartime surge requirement would prove expensive for a responsive space concept, regardless of whether it involved contractor or military personnel. The need for a small peacetime cadre and the ability to surge in time of crisis to perform a responsive reconstitution mission could align well with either Reserve or National Guard missions. Unlike the US ballistic missile force, space reconstitution would not likely find itself responding to a "bolt from the blue" attack. Before developing a staffing plan, we should further analyze the cost trade-offs of meeting different response times.
Providing a reliable reconstitution capability will require recurring, end-to-end demonstrations. These training or exercise launches of responsive spacecraft could coincide with major military exercises. In addition to building up a wartime reserve of hardware, ORS or any other serious reconstitution effort would need to provide continuous production of spacecraft and launch vehicles to support training and exercises. We could also utilize these capabilities to augment the on-orbit inventory for lesser contingencies. In addition to allowing the crews and users to train with their weapon systems, continuous use and production would help keep the inventory up to date.
Existing space architecture faces a continuing problem with the inability to modernize. Once launched, spacecraft hardware can seldom be modified.21 Turning over the inventory of small, responsive spacecraft by consuming them in training, exercises, and contingency response would enable the incorporation of new, improved technology into replacement spacecraft. Additionally, ongoing production would allow for continued support of the industrial base that produces the spacecraft. The viability of long-term reconstitution capability depends upon maintenance of its underlying technology and industrial base. Obviously, any strategy that projects a one-time production run will not support a continuing industrial base.
A viable concept of reconstitution, even one with very modest goals for the amount of restored capability, will not be cheap. Assuming that we could procure spacecraft and launch vehicles that assure a "good enough to win" level of performance at costs near the goals stated by Congress (a large assumption), creating an inventory of multiple constellations of small spacecraft will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Supplying and maintaining personnel and facilities to support these systems will add considerably to the cost. Finally, peacetime training and the replacement of consumed assets represent additional expense. Producing space systems in larger quantities will significantly reduce the unit costs of these systems.22 Granted, we can expect some reduction; however, in terms of the total system level, costs will remain significant.
As Colonel Tomme and LTC Bob Guerriero note in their articles examining tactical satellites, the key question is not whether we can build such a system but whether we should.23 We can answer that question only by comparing the magnitude and likelihood of the threat to the cost and effectiveness of alternative concepts. Practitioners of military operations analysis are adept at performing AOA. One central question for any AOA entails the cost-effectiveness of proposed approaches. Because this type of analysis is a statutory requirement before initiation of a major defense program, it should begin as soon as possible. The potential for "paralysis by analysis" exists but is counterbalanced by the cost of analysis compared to that of performing on-orbit experiments to determine what capability is "good enough to win."
The reliance of US forces on space capabilities creates an asymmetry between the stakes and power calculations of potential adversary nations that are considering counterspace operations. An effective reconstitution capability, demonstrated in peacetime, could deter adversaries from contemplating such action. Comparing the value and cost of a space-reconstitution capability should fully reflect the importance of a system capable of deterring this type of attack. We need to weigh this consideration carefully against the immediate needs of the war fighter.
Joint doctrine has included reconstitution of space forces as a defined mission since 2002.24 Yet, despite the Chinese test of 2007, the United States has no more capability today than it did in 2002. Inventorying a complete replacement for our on-orbit space capability is financially unrealistic. Congress and the president have issued directions to build a small, responsive, satellite-based reconstitution system. We should immediately perform an analysis to determine the cost-effectiveness of such a system, the priority of missions, and the necessary system capabilities. Funding to support the fielding of an inventory of spacecraft, launch vehicles, and infrastructure should follow rapidly. If ORS is the program to meet this need, as directed by Dr. Sega, Mr. England, and Congress, then we should focus ORS developments toward this end and not dilute them through lack of focus.
Former secretary Rumsfeld used the example of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to describe a possible future event. The analogy has appropriate features. The United States has long considered space a sanctuary, investing heavily over decades to develop a set of preeminent capabilities. On 7 December 1941, it "discovered" not only that battleships were suddenly vulnerable to air attack but also that those ships were no longer a key determinant of national power. For the United States, the question is not whether future opponents will develop counterspace systems but how ready it will be to respond.
Peterson AFB, Colorado
©The Aerospace Corporation*The author is a senior project leader with The Aerospace Corporation, supporting Headquarters Air Force Space Command's Directorate of Requirements, Peterson AFB, Colorado.
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Notes
1. Craig Covault, "Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon," Aviation Week, 17 January 2007, http://www.aviationweek
.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml.
2. Jeffrey Kluger, "Was a Satellite Shootdown Necessary?" Time, 20 February 2008, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1714811,00.html; and Greg Miller, "Missile's Bull's-Eye on Satellite Echoes Far, Experts Say," Los Angeles Times, 22 February 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-satellite 22feb22,0,4969568.story.
3. Jean-Michel Stoullig, "Rumsfeld Commission Warns against 'Space Pearl Harbor,' " Space Daily, 11 January 2001, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html.
4. "U.S. Space Transportation Policy Fact Sheet, 6 January 2005," SpaceRef.com, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=15010.
5. Ibid.
6. House, Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Subject: National Security Space Posture, Statement of Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Undersecretary of the Air Force, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 23 March 2007, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat 032307/Sega_Testimony032307.pdf.
7. Plan for Operationally Responsive Space: A Report to Congressional Defense Committees (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 April 2007), 2, http://www.responsive space.com/ors/reference/ORS_Plan.pdf.
8. Dwayne A. Day, "How to Tell Your ORS from a Hole in the Ground," Space Review, 31 December 2007, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1027/1. See also James R. Wertz, "It's Time to Get Our ORS in Gear," Space Review, 7 January 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1032/1; and Dwayne A. Day "Some ORS for ORS," Space Review, 28 January 2008, http://www.thespace review.com/article/1048/1.
9. See Les Doggrell, "Operationally Responsive Space: A Vision for the Future of Military Space," Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 42-49, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf.
10. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, HR 5122, 109th Cong., 2d sess., Title 9, sec. 913, "Operationally Responsive Space," 273-76, http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/h5122.pdf.
11. Michael Krepon, "Russia and China Propose a Treaty Banning Space Weapons, While the Pentagon Plans an ASAT Test," Henry L. Stimson Center, 14 February 2008, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=568.
12. "Mission Need Statement AFSPC [Air Force Space Command] 001-01, for Operationally Responsive Spacelift" (Peterson AFB, CO: Headquarters AFSPC/DRS, 30 October 2001), http://www.responsivespace.com/ors/reference/ORS_MNS_Final.pdf. Gen John P. Jumper signed the statement on 20 December 2001. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated it in April 2002.
13. Despite completion of the Operationally Responsive Spacelift Analysis of Alternatives in 2005, AFSPC has not released it. Congress's removal of funding for Affordable Responsive Spacelift from the president's budget for fiscal year 2007 made the analysis moot.
14. An alternative concept entails building and launching additional capacity before it is needed, but the economic and military utility of swarming the enemy with potential targets in advance of need is highly questionable.
15. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 273.
16. Mike Hurley et al., "A TacSat Update and the ORS/JWS [Joint Warfighting Space] Standard Bus" (presentation to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics [AIAA] Third Responsive Space Conference, 26 April 2005), http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS3%5CSESSION%20PAPERS%5CSESSION%201%5C1006-HURLEY%5C1006C.pdf.
17. Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, "The Myth of the Tactical Satellite," Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 89-100, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf. See also Edward B. Tomme, "Tactical Satellites: It's Not 'Can We?' but 'Should We?'" Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 30-33, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/sum07.pdf.
18. Quoted in Capt Catie Hague, "Space Experts Meet to Address Warfighter Needs," Air Force Link, 4 September 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123066738.
19. Lt Col Scott C. Larrimore, "Partially Continuous Earth Coverage from a Responsive Space Constellation" (presentation at the Fifth Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, 23-26 April 2007), http://www.responsive space.com/Papers/RS5/SESSION%20PAPERS/SESSION %202/2001_LARRIMORE/2001P.PDF. See also Brian L. Kantsiper, Patrick A. Stadter, and Pamela L. Stewart, "ORS HEO [High Earth Orbit] Constellations for Continuous Availability" (presentation at the Fifth Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, 23-26 April 2007), http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS5/SESSION%20 PAPERS/SESSION%202/2004_KANTSIPER/2004P.PDF.
20. Jeffrey L. Janicik, "Implementing Standard Microsatellites for Responsive Space" (presentation at the AIAA-Los Angeles Section / SSTC 2003-0000, First Responsive Space Conference, Redondo Beach, CA, 1-3 April 2003), http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS1/SESSION4/JANICIK/4003P.pdf; and Andrew D. Williams and Scott E. Palo, "Issues and Implications of the Thermal Control Systems on the 'Six Day Spacecraft' " (presentation at the Fourth Responsive Space Conference, Los Angeles, 24-27 April 2006), http://www.responsive space.com/Papers/RS4/Papers/RS4_6001P_Williams.pdf.
21. Despite demonstrations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Orbital Express and the Hubble mission, the practical capability to provide on-orbit maintenance is not well developed.
22. See the then-titled Office of Force Transformation, "Operationally Responsive Space: A New and Complementary Business Model" (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Summer 2004), http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_382_J2850-Space%20Response(12).pdf.
23. LTC Bob Guerriero, "Tactical Satellites: The Rest of the Story," Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 27-29, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/sum07.pdf.
24. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, IV-10, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. See also Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations, 27 November 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2.pdf. A draft revision of JP 3-14 incorporates a brief description of ORS in an appendix.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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