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Document created: 1 June 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2008
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Col August G. “Greg” Jannarone, USAF, Retired
MSgt Charles G. “Chuck” Doig, USAF, Retired*
We read with some interest Lt Col Kenneth Beebe’s “Reply to ‘Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?’ ” (Winter 2007). We generally concur with his commentary; however, we wish to address the following passages:
When it comes to influence operations, I think we need to ask ourselves if it makes sense to have a separate “influence” career field in the Air Force. . . . Since the Air Force’s primary PSYOP [psychological operations] role involves disseminating the Army’s PSYOP products, the authors’ prescription makes this individual essentially a deception planner. . . . This doesn’t require a career force so much as it requires dedicated planners whom the Air Force can train and educate in influence yet still capitalize on their prior experiences.
. . . What concerns me, however, is that our Air Force leadership really hasn’t decided what to do with IO [information operations]. It appears to me that the creation of Air Force Cyber Command represents the beginning of the end for IO in our service (31–32).
We offer some additional points for discussion and consideration in answer to the rhetorical question he proposes regarding a “separate” influence career field for the Air Force, the implication that the Air Force’s “primary” PSYOP role is exclusively dissemination, and his concerns for IO and Air Force Cyber Command.
We agree that an Air Force specialty code (AFSC) for influence operations is unnecessary. In fact, in all practical senses (e.g., the time needed to train in multiple operational disciplines, the required educational background and assignment experience, and the logistics and personnel-management challenges of a career force), creating an influence operations AFSC is all but impossible. However, we believe that a good argument can be made for a special-duty AFSC for PSYOP. Why?
The Air Force currently uses special experience identifiers (SEI) to distinguish IO-trained personnel and has an officer SEI for PSYOP. The Air Staff is already working on an enlisted PSYOP SEI. However, the Air Force does not manage AFSCs by SEI and rarely codes unit manning documents with the necessary SEIs (especially true for PSYOP). Therefore, individuals assigned to positions requiring PSYOP training and expertise often do not receive the necessary training prior to their assignment to the position. This also makes it difficult to track individuals who already have the necessary background and assign them to positions requiring PSYOP training and expertise. A special-duty AFSC would alleviate these issues. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as service doctrine and policies, identify PSYOP as an operational discipline; furthermore, current Air Force IO doctrine describes it as one of several influence-operations disciplines.1
Joint doctrine and Department of Defense (DOD) directives require the Air Force (along with the other military departments and services) to do the following:
(1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and planning skills.
(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute PSYOP actions and dedicated PSYOP forces and equipment.
(3) Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to the particular Service.
(4) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to the Commander, USSOCOM [US Special Operations Command]) to combatant commanders for service in foreign countries.
(5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets that are trained, equipped, and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP.
(6) Incorporate PSYOP instruction into Service training and education programs.2
Establishment of a special-duty AFSC for PSYOP would enable the Air Force to better meet its DOD-directed PSYOP responsibilities. Further, it would allow the accession of trained and experienced Air Force officers and noncommissioned officers at the mid- to senior-grade levels from AFSCs that readily lend themselves to training and application of PSYOP (e.g., AFSC 61SB—Behavioral Scientist or AFSC 16F—Foreign Area Officer). This way the Air Force can bring in the proper mix of professionals at the correct grade level, leave them in the special duty for one or two tours (so they don’t kill their careers), and send them back to their original AFSC with a much broader perspective of PSYOP and IO. It would also enable Air Force personnel to receive more robust PSYOP training (most likely through the US Army) than is currently available.
We agree with Colonel Beebe that planning (and, we would add, targeting) skills are as vital to a PSYOP professional as they are to a deception professional. In fact, the Air Force possesses considerable military occupational strength at all levels of planning, from tactical through strategic. Beginning with a planner, social scientist, targeteer, or experienced aviator provides the basis for building a competent PSYOP professional.
In the Air Force, if a function has no AFSC, program element code, or organizational basis (flight, squadron, group, or even a detachment), it has no real programmatic existence. PSYOP currently lacks all of these things, and the lack of a special-duty AFSC is both a cause and consequence of this situation.
We disagree with Colonel Beebe’s characterization of dissemination as the primary Air Force PSYOP mission. Certainly dissemination is the traditional or legacy role most closely associated with the Air Force—one in which the Air Force is clearly most comfortable—but we argue that the idea of PSYOP is vastly greater than delivery, dissemination, or broadcasts; in fact, these are merely the “mechanisms” used to conduct planned actions for intended psychological effects. The central idea involves conducting psychological actions that apply cognitive (and often social and organizational) influence effects on the perceptions, reasoning, and decision making of a specific adversary actor, other human being, or group of interest.
In fact, the Air Force can generate an enormous range of psychologically significant actions from air, space, and cyberspace domains—most of which can be planned and assessed in advance if PSYOP planning develops appropriate measures of effectiveness. Even the Army recognizes the inherent psychological effects of airpower and the psychological impact of all kinetic military operations. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30 / Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-40.6, Psychological Operations, discusses and defines a psychological operations action (PSYACT) as “an action conducted by non-PSYOP personnel, that is planned primarily to affect the behavior of a TA [target audience].”3 Accordingly, when PSYACTs are planned in support of an existing PSYOP program, the Army requires synchronous integration and execution of each PSYACT with its own products (e.g., leaflets and broadcasts).
At the end of his commentary, Colonel Beebe voices his concern that “our Air Force leadership really hasn’t decided what to do with IO” (p. 32). We share his concern, and, at a more focused level, we voice the same concern regarding PSYOP and influence operations. Yet, in our opinion, there is no choice involved. The Air Force must do PSYOP. The decisions are how much, how well, and with what degree of professionalism and joint integration. We would also argue that these same points hold true for all of IO, and, unlike Colonel Beebe, we believe that the creation of an Air Force Cyber Command—assuming that our service correctly defines and adequately resources its missions and roles (especially influence operations and PSYOP)—may finally mark the beginning of full-spectrum IO within the Air Force and not the beginning of the end.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Lackland AFB, Texas
*Greg Jannarone, who served 27 years in the Air Force and in joint special operations, is currently director of Air University’s Behavioral Influences Analysis Center and an assistant professor at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Chuck Doig, who served 21 years in the Air Force as a targeteer, weaponeer, and psychological operations planner, is currently a contractor supporting the Air Force Information Operations Center at Lackland AFB, Texas.
Notes
1. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.05D, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 2006, 8 November 2007; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies Short of War (U), 26 July 1984; Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 5 September 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_ pubs/jp3_ 53.pdf; JP 3‑13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_ pubs/jp3_13.pdf; and Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations,11 January 2005, https://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/ AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.
2. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, II-6. The JP cites DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations.
3. Army FM 3-05.30 / MCRP 3-40.6, Psychological Operations, 15 April 2005, Glossary-16, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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