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Document created: 1 June 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2008

Fifth Air Force

Ready for the Future

Maj Gen Larry D. James, USAF

On 11 August 2007, a pair of Russian Tu-95 bombers flew from eastern Russia, skirted the coast of Japan, turned south, and headed for Guam, where US forces were conducting Exercise Valiant Shield, which involved over 280 aircraft, 30 ships, and more than 20,000 service members. Although the Russian bombers never approached closer than 380 miles from Guam, this mission offered one more indication of the revitalization of the Russian military under Pres. Vladimir Putin. On 11 January 2007, China launched its first antisatellite weapon against one of its aging weather satellites, successfully destroying the spacecraft and demonstrating another building block in China’s capability to deploy asymmetric force. On 9 October 2006, North Korea detonated its first nuclear weapon, leading Japan’s prime minister to declare that the test was “unpardonable” and that the region was “entering a new, dangerous nuclear age.”¹

At the geographic and political nexus of all this activity stands Japan and its coalition partnership with the United States. Since 2002 our leaders have moved the relationship forward at a record pace. The US secretaries of state and defense and the Japanese ministers of foreign affairs and defense have constructed the Defense Policy Review Initiative, a joint plan to transform the alliance and infuse it with greater capabilities. As the air component in Japan, Fifth Air Force has been instrumental in each of these events and is now engaged in multiple initiatives that will strengthen our alliance, serve as a counterbalance to potential threats in the region, and posture us for a successful future.

The Neighborhood

Jim Leach, former chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, observed that “it is in Asia where the United States will face its largest geopolitical challenges in the years ahead.”² We have strong strategic interests in this region, home to 60 percent of the world’s population, 35 percent of US trade, and an average expenditure of 2.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on the military. Those interests will only become more important over time. The very real and present military capabilities of Communist countries in the region—North Korea and China in particular—and the rapid reinvigoration of Russian military capabilities drive home this point.

Recent Six Party efforts with North Korea have led to positive results toward the denuclearization of the peninsula. However, North Korea still maintains one of the largest standing armies in the world with almost one million personnel under arms. Abysmal economic conditions, outdated military equipment, and the lack of a modernization program leave that country in a weakened military position. However, these facts do not prevent the Korean People’s Army from posing a persistent, credible threat. Kim Jong Il’s “military first” policy puts North Korea’s few economic resources into maintaining a rapidly deployable force that can inflict tremendous damage in a short time. With numerous, long-range artillery pieces capable of targeting South Korean economic centers, one of the world’s most highly trained special operations forces, and multiple ballistic missile variants, North Korea still represents a threat to neighboring democratic nations. The North’s ballistic missile and nuclear tests in 2006 demonstrated this enduring danger.

North Korea’s launch of six short-range ballistic missiles and a No Dong missile in July 2006 reflected its maturing ballistic missile capabilities. Despite the fact that the No Dong launch was unsuccessful and that these launches posed little military threat directly to the United States, they displayed Kim Jong Il’s willingness to break his declared moratorium of 1999 on long-range missile tests. The future of North Korea’s ballistic missile technology resides within the development of its Taepo Dong-2, No Dong, and Musudan programs. The Taepo Dong-2 receives an abundance of attention, but the No Dong and Musudan missiles are easily capable of reaching Japan minutes after launch. The unsuccessful launch of the No Dong indicates that the program is still a work in progress, but the Musudan’s proven, Soviet-era technology represents advancement within the North’s ballistic missile programs. These developments, along with the nuclear test in October 2006, exhibited Kim Jong Il’s tenaciousness in pursuing his own agenda despite pressure from the international community.

North Korea’s ballistic missile programs and forward-deployed military presence constitute persistent threats to regional stability. However, China’s unclear goals concerning rapid military modernization represent another difficulty for US forces in the region. China’s leaders have stated their intentions and have allocated resources to pursue broad-based military transformation to enable joint operations that encompass forcewide professionalization; improved training; more robust, realistic joint exercises; and accelerated acquisition of modern weapons. For the moment, China’s military is focused on assuring the capability to prevent Taiwan’s independence and, if Beijing were to adopt such an approach, to compel the island to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. At the same time, China is laying the foundation for a force able to accomplish broader regional and global objectives. Analysts assess that it will take China until the end of this decade or later to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderately sized adversary. In building such a capability, China’s leaders stress asymmetric strategies to leverage their country’s advantages while exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of potential opponents. Strategists could view the antisatellite test of January 2007 in this context.

China’s central doctrine emphasizes fighting a local war under modern, high-technology conditions. This type of war is limited in political objectives and geographic scope; highly lethal and destructive; short in duration; information and resource intensive; highly mobile; and jointly executed. Moreover, it possesses total battlespace awareness. To manage a war effectively under these conditions, China’s defense now stresses projecting forces, gaining the initiative for a decisive first battle, and conducting joint-service campaigns.

Until recently, China’s rise as an international player has overshadowed the gradual resurgence of Russia on the international stage. Recent statements from President Putin and principal military leaders concerning US ambitions for ballistic missile defense and the resumption of Cold War bomber patrols give cause to pay more attention to Russia than we have in the recent past. Russia’s growing exports from the world’s largest natural gas reserves and its place as the world’s second-largest oil producer have fueled its recent military resurgence. In 2006 Russia’s real GDP grew by 6.7 percent, marking the country’s seventh consecutive year of economic expansion. Although its dependence on energy exports has created a vulnerability to fluctuations in the price of energy, energy exports in 2005 represented 20 percent of the country’s GDP and 60 percent of its export revenues.

As mentioned above, prior to President Putin’s announcement on 17 August 2007 of Russian bombers returning to Cold War levels, two Tu-95s flew toward Guam, flexing an arm of Russia’s nuclear triad. Subsequent to Putin’s remarks, activity along old Cold War patrolling routes has increased to levels not observed in 15 years. Multiple press reports concerning scrambles by the United Kingdom and Norway against Russian flights suggest that Russia is directing its attention not only to the United States but to the West in general. The Russians have records of filing flight plans and posting notices to airmen, but the resumption of patrols is a clear sign that they want to be taken seriously and have the economic, military, and political means to reinforce their actions.

Although North Korea, China, and Russia pose military challenges that require constant vigilance, we cannot forget the rest of the “neighborhood.” The threat of violent extremism within the Pacific is focused in Southeast Asia and centered on the threat from al-Qaeda-influenced groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah. Threats within Japan, though extremely rare, do exist in such forms as Aum Shinrikyo, now known as Aleph, responsible for the sarin gas attack in 1995. These and many more groups require relentless observation for the next asymmetric threat to US interests.

Not all such threats come in the form of terrorist organizations. For example, the Strait of Malacca, with its narrow, 500-mile-long passageway, creates a perfect location for piracy. Even though the strait is of immense strategic and economic importance, handling up to one-quarter of the world’s sea trade and one-quarter of all oil trade, piracy has presented a continuous threat to transiting ships. In 2004 the navies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore began increasing their patrols in an effort to help reduce piracy, but the fact remains that the strait is an extremely important choke point for the entire Western Pacific, requiring vigilance by our forward-deployed forces in the region.

Forward Presence

Given the strategic importance and challenges of the Asia region, it is absolutely essential to forward-deploy forces there. Representative Leach also noted that “maintaining a robust overseas military presence has historically been a key element of the United States national security policy in the Asia-Pacific.” This forward presence promotes regional stability and “has been maintained by successive United States Administrations, all of which have emphasized the linkage between our network of alliances and friendships to a regional environment in Asia conducive to confidence in economic growth.”³ Fifth Air Force and our alliance with the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) embody that military forward presence in Asia. Fifth Air Force has the closest US Air Force (USAF) base to Russia (Misawa Air Base [AB]) and one of the closest USAF bases to China (Kadena AB). Our coalition operations with the JASDF send a clear message every day that US forward presence is robust, ready, and prepared to meet current and future challenges in the region. This strong partnership stems from over 50 years of bilateral operations and long-term relationships. Enduring presence in Japan has been key to the development of this association.

The key to Fifth Air Force’s presence is the frontline air bases spanning Japan from north to south. In the north, Misawa AB is home to the 35th Fighter Wing, with two squadrons equipped with the most modern Block 50 F-16 variant and dedicated to the suppression of enemy air defenses. Misawa is the only bilateral, joint-service base in the Western Pacific, sharing space with the JASDF’s 3d Air Wing and Northern Air Defense Command, as well as the US Navy’s Information Operations Command.

In the center of Japan, just outside Tokyo, lies Yokota AB, home of the 374th Airlift Wing and the 36th Airlift Squadron—the only forward-based tactical airlift squadron in the Pacific. The wing maintains C-130 mission-ready aircrews to conduct tactical and theater airlift, special operations, aeromedical evacuation, search and rescue, repatriation, and humanitarian-relief missions across the Pacific. In addition, the 374th has C-12s and UH-1s for operational-support airlift and serves as the key airlift hub for the Western Pacific, supporting multiple downrange locations in both peacetime operations and contingencies.

Wrapping up Fifth Air Force’s bases is Kadena AB, in Okinawa, part of the Ryukyu Islands, strategically located for all of the potential major contingency scenarios in the Pacific theater. Kadena hosts the 18th Wing, the largest combat wing in the USAF. With F-15 fighters, KC-135 refuelers, E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and HH-60G Pave Hawk rescue helicopters, the 18th provides unmatched combat presence and capability in the Western Pacific. This strong USAF presence in Japan gives the United States critical access throughout the region, sends a clear message of our strategic interests there, and provides operating locations that we can quickly reinforce should the need arise.

Bilateral Operations
and Training

Working together continuously with our JASDF counterparts is critical to the development of integrated operational capabilities. Fifth Air Force; Detachment 1, Thirteenth Air Force; and the JASDF have developed a robust exercise schedule to improve our capabilities and identify areas for improvement. Several examples highlight this trend. In July 2007, the JASDF deployed a squadron of F-2s from Misawa AB to Andersen AB, Guam, for Exercise Cope North 07-2—the first deployment of Japanese F-2 fighters outside Japan and the first time the JASDF has dropped live ordnance with this aircraft. Japanese F-2s, E-2C airborne early warning aircraft, and USAF F‑16CJ fighters flew 303 sorties exercising dissimilar air combat training, surface-attack training, and large-force employment. This live-ordnance training for the JASDF is critical for its future Joint Direct Attack Munition program. The numerous activities and support requirements necessary to execute Cope North provided many bilateral-engagement opportunities. A JASDF maintenance squadron provided needed equipment and personnel to remove and repair an F-16CJ ejection seat while deployed to Guam. The 36th Wing’s maintenance group on Andersen AFB assisted the JASDF in repairing an auxiliary power unit. JASDF and USAF flying squadrons alternated mission commanders during the large-force employment and conducted bilateral mission-coordination briefings/debriefings for each mission.

Additional bilateral-training exercises include Keen Sword and Yama Sakura, the former a live-fly air defense exercise sponsored by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which spanned 1,500 miles of airspace from Okinawa to Hokkaido. Keen Sword included fighter and support units/aircraft from the JASDF, USAF, US Navy, and US Marine Corps. Additionally, under this exercise’s umbrella, several “supporting exercises” took place, including noncombatant-evacuation operations, search and rescue, and ballistic missile defense. Yama Sakura, a Japan Ground Self Defense Force and US Army exercise, focused on the defense of Japan. Both Keen Sword and Yama Sakura were vital tools for enhancing bilateral cooperation/interoperability and proved critical to defending Japan and maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Another tremendous success, the Aviation Training Relocation (ATR) Program, was originally mandated under the Security Consultative Committee with the intent to utilize Japanese air bases for US training and a particular focus on reducing training impacts on Okinawa across all the services. Aircraft from Okinawa bases would deploy to other JASDF bases throughout Japan, such as Komatsu, Hyakuri, and Tsuiki and conduct training there. Fifth Air Force units executed multiple ATR events in 2007 and plan to expand the program in 2008 and beyond. The program has provided numerous benefits for both US and JASDF forces. On the US side, it affords the opportunity to deploy in country, train with different weapon systems and capabilities, and see JASDF bases that we have not recently visited. ATR site surveys have allowed for more accurate assessments of capabilities as well as potential shortfalls of JASDF bases. The fact that planners now have more realistic planning data improves the plan’s quality. In addition, these surveys have yielded increased staff inter­operability and coordination on maintenance and logistic support to USAF and JASDF aircraft. Dormant and rarely exercised international agreements and acquisition cross-servicing agreements are being updated to support this ATR initiative. For the JASDF, the program offers the chance for a base assessment by US forces and increases the number of bilateral-training venues; it also continues the operational-integration efforts critical to both forces.

Across the board, these training opportunities have produced clear improvements in our operational capabilities. The ability to learn from each other, synchronize our operations, and build key relationships will continue to pay dividends and lay the foundation for success well into the future.

Command, Control, and
Information Sharing

In this modern age of real-time communication, networked operations, and massive data sharing, it is absolutely essential that strong command, control, and communications exist between the USAF and JASDF. We are moving forward in these areas on multiple fronts. The Japanese Air Defense Ground Environment represents a key improvement. This new system will provide not only the same air-track data as currently received but also the capability for Air Defense Command to transmit data regarding ballistic missile defense.

Additionally, we are putting in place two communications capabilities for bilateral engagement. The first—a dual-path, digital voice system for flight operations in the northern Sea of Japan—is scheduled in three phases throughout 2008. The second system will provide critical communications for “first responders” in the event of a natural disaster or contingency by connecting all service components and Japanese first responders with dedicated, shared frequencies for land-based mobile radios. This project is in its initial stages of coordination and engineering.

The heart of our bilateral air and missile defense operations—the Bilateral Air Operations Coordination System—features operational-level coordination between the USAF and JASDF in carrying out the roles and missions of the joint force air component commander, area air defense commander, and airspace control authority. The system deconflicts and integrates processes and products associated with the air and space operations center (AOC) weapon system for safe and effective operations. The JASDF and Thirteenth Air Force staffs are colocated at Yokota in a bilateral air component coordination element (BACCE) to execute the close and detailed bilateral coordination necessary when operating under unilateral and parallel lines of command and control. In 2010 the JASDF Air Defense Command will construct a new headquarters building at Yokota that will include a dedicated bilateral contingency facility for the BACCE, allowing constant, side-by-side operations and greatly improving coordination and training. Additionally, the JASDF is considering the acquisition of a theater battle-management system that will significantly enhance bilateral planning and coordination.

Overall, the integration of USAF/JASDF command, control, and information sharing has made noticeable progress in the last few years. The hardware, links, and processes now in place allow near-real-time situational awareness, reachback to Thirteenth Air Force’s AOC in Hawaii, and strong coordination capabilities among the USAF, JASDF, and US Forces Japan. The planned improvements will continue that trend, ensuring that the right capabilities are in place to meet future challenges.

Ready for the Future

Throughout the decades, Fifth Air Force—which celebrated its 66th birthday on 20 September 2007—has led the charge in the Pacific, from World War II to Korea to Vietnam to the Cold War and, finally, to today’s strategic operations. The men and women of Fifth Air Force are engaged every day with our Japanese allies, improving capabilities, integrating our forces, and maintaining a clear and visible presence in the region. As we look to the future, Fifth Air Force will continue to set the standard for bilateral engagement with one of America’s closest allies. In this vital strategic region, it will remain an enduring presence for decades to come, ensuring that the interests of the United States and Japan are addressed and well protected.

Notes

1. “North Korea Claims Nuclear Test,” BBC News, 9 October 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/
6032525.stm.

2. House, America and Asia in a Changing World: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, 109th Cong., 2d sess., 21 September 2006, 3, http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ archives/109/29971.pdf.

3. House, U.S. Security Policy in Asia and the Pacific: Restructuring America’s Forward Deployment: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 2003, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa88000.000/ hfa88000_0.HTM.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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