![Figure 1. Air Force doctrine today. (From “Doctrine Hierarchy,” Air Force Doctrine Center, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp? [accessed 5 December 2007].)](spr08_images/weiss1.jpg)
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Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2008
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Editorial Abstract: Within all military services, information remains mischaracterized as a “domain,” and all services have difficulty quantifying and establishing doctrine to exploit the war-fighting advantages of information. At least within the US Air Force, the author asserts that a poor doctrinal structure and inadequate definitions of information operations contribute to the problem. He proposes a completely new doctrinal framework, along with recognition of cyberspace as the true domain, in order to begin solving these challenges. |
The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.
—John Maynard Keynes
On 11 September 2001 (9/11), a small group of terrorists brought the most powerful nation on the earth to its knees and paralyzed much of the world. The US economy plunged into recession, the airline industry collapsed, and “soccer moms” rushed out to buy gas masks. The essence of this quintessential, asymmetric assault was not the use of aircraft as weapons or the horrific but nonetheless militarily insignificant results. Indeed, this was information warfare of the highest order. Years of planning, analysis of enemy psychology, assessment of physical vulnerabilities, training, operational security, and brutally efficient execution characterized this psychological operation. The terrorists did not seek to seize territory or defeat the US military; rather, they intended that 9/11 send messages to multiple audiences: to sympathizers (“We are powerful, join us”); to the United States (“We can hurt you; remove your troops from our soil and change your policies”); and to the world (“Interfere with our agenda at your own peril, for you will be next”). As in ages past, information operations (IO) use messages as weapons, and the enemy currently has the advantage.1
Using weapons is fundamental to the military. Even before 9/11, the US military had begun the process of understanding and harnessing the products of the information revolution taking place throughout the world—a revolution fueled primarily by the advent of the microcomputer and improvements in data-transmission technologies. Whereas in the past, military forces sought to control lines of communication on the physical battlefield—highways, sea-lanes, airfields, and railroads—at present, information itself is the lifeblood of technologically based forces, and its lines of communication often flow through a domain known as cyberspace.2 But not all aspects of IO are technically based; neither are they new to warfare. The martial use of psychological influence has existed since the first caveman frightened his enemy with a howl or distracted him with a tossed rock. Millennia ago, Sun Tzu famously proclaimed that all warfare is based upon deception.3 However, the recent explosion of information technology has piqued our interest in IO. Information has become a valuable resource, a commodity, and a military necessity. Defense and exploitation of this resource has compelled military and civilian leaders alike to act quickly to establish an IO doctrinal framework.
The US Air Force (USAF), as perhaps the most technologically centered branch of the armed services—having itself arisen from the achievement of controlled, powered flight—has relied upon the continuous advancement of scientific and technological innovation to remain the overwhelmingly effective fighting force it is today. Even so, rapid advances in information technology and its implications for warfare have obligated the USAF, like the rest of the military, to speed efforts to define and refine its own IO doctrine—to “weaponize” information. This has presented a challenge to doctrine writers as the USAF attempts to establish an effects-based approach to IO that is in concert with air and space power. Clearly the service must have doctrine that is well defined, expansive enough to accommodate the swiftness of change, and sufficiently flexible to assimilate future concepts and capabilities while still adequately treating timeless, nontechnical principles such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception (MILDEC). Current USAF doctrine, for IO in particular, has not met this challenge, partly due to the fact that a necessary and proper delay occurs between analysis of theory/lessons learned and the codification of doctrine—but also because we have not adequately adapted the current structure of the doctrine. Furthermore, shortcomings exist in the definition of IO—arising from a mischaracterization of information itself—that have led to difficulty in understanding and employing IO at all levels of war.
An examination of the vast body of writings on the subject of IO reveals near-universal agreement on two points. First, IO is an extremely significant aspect of national security and, by extension, military operations: we must use it to our advantage. Second, the United States cannot seem to get IO right, whether in doctrine, training, definition, employment, leadership, or some combination of these. The IO cognoscenti have prescribed a formidable array of procedural remedies or exhortations to “just do it,” but these have treated only symptoms—not the root problem. None have recommended a fundamental shift in definitions, characterization, and doctrinal architecture. Often the solution to an intractable problem requires a return to first principles, an examination and reformulation of basic beliefs, a system “reboot.” To make IO the weapon it needs to be, the USAF must lead the way and establish IO doctrine built correctly from the ground up.
Doctrine can arise from theory, lessons learned, or a study of exercises and experiments. Good doctrine is designed to be understandable and useful in the real world, at the level of warfare for which it is written. Doctrine can prove especially critical in areas that may be least intuitive: IO, for example. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, defines air and space doctrine as “a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting principles, and terminology that describes and guides the proper use of air and space forces in military operations.”4 Because doctrine influences the way the USAF organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces, it represents a significant factor not only in the way the service fights but also in terms of the requirements, planning, programming, and budgeting process.
The USAF writes basic, operational, and tactical doctrine. The principles of basic doctrine, which reflect the service’s most fundamental and enduring beliefs or “elemental properties,” rarely change. Operational doctrine, which “describes more detailed organization of air and space forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to military actions,” changes infrequently as well, but more often than basic doctrine since we derive insight from new technologies or lessons learned.5 AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, serves as an example. By contrast, tactical doctrine entails frequent updates with routine innovation in tactics, techniques, and procedures. AFDD 1 plainly and properly states that “it must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete.”6 Because its users own Air Force doctrine, each Airman must know it, look after it, and help fix it when required. Currently, the USAF publishes basic and operational doctrine in a series of documents arranged hierarchically and organized according to logical functional areas. This doctrinal structure embodies the architectural framework within which doctrine lives, changes, and grows (fig. 1).
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Figure 1. Air Force doctrine today. (From “Doctrine Hierarchy,” Air
Force Doctrine Center,
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp? [accessed 5 December 2007].)
The USAF arranges doctrine in a classification hierarchy to facilitate its understanding and use, organizing doctrinal categories from general to specific in a series grouped according to function and similarity. Subcategories, though stemming from the same parent category, reflect fundamental differences that distinguish them from each other. For example, AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, and AFDD 2-1.4, Countersea Operations—both encompassed by AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare—differ in terms of target type. To maintain clarity, all doctrine must be logical and adhere to these basic principles.
In general, this logically arranged USAF doctrine contains an impressive, time-tested body of wisdom and practical guidance. USAF operational doctrine extends from basic doctrine and begins with the parent category (AFDD 2, Operations and Organization). Within AFDD 2 one finds the fundamental, “domain,” or core volumes of Air Force operations doctrine: AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare; AFDD 2-2, Space Operations; and AFDD 2-5, Information Operations. Although USAF “living” doctrine has expanded over the years, no significant change has occurred in the overall structure of the doctrine itself—a situation that presents problems when the USAF attempts to “fit” IO and the emerging domain of cyberspace into its body of doctrine.
If we are to accept air forces as a military weapon, our first inclination is to fit it into the established theories and practices of warfare, with as little disruption as possible. Certainly this takes the least mental effort, and is therefore most inviting. But such an application is not necessarily most efficient.
—Air Corps Tactical School, 1935
This epigraph illustrates how airpower itself suffered from the general tendency to force new concepts into old, familiar paradigms. Substitution of the word information for air forces yields much the same condition that exists today with respect to IO. This irony was not apparent to the USAF as it embarked on the task of codifying information-warfare lessons and principles into doctrine shortly after the first Gulf War. In 1995 the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force released Cornerstones of Information Warfare, the service’s first official publication on the subject.7 (Since then, the term information operations has replaced information warfare.) Though not doctrine, this document influenced all later IO publications. The USAF first published IO doctrine in 1998 with the release of AFDD 2-5. In the eyes of the doctrine writers, this original attempt contained a number of conceptual faults, prompting the appearance of a substantially revised edition in 2005.8 Ironically, the first edition did a better job of acknowledging the fundamental and universal nature of IO but awkwardly applied the doctrinal template of air warfare to IO principles, giving rise to such dissonant terminology as “offensive” and “defensive counter information.”9 Regrettably, both efforts have fallen short in articulating IO properly, but that is due to underlying problems with the characterization of information itself.
While the US military has a demonstrated capacity to dominate a situation with its technological supremacy and computer software, it has not yet mastered modern Information Warfare, where the most important software exists—between the ears of the local population.
—Frank G. Hoffman
Only a few documents trumpet our mastery of IO, but a myriad proclaim the opposite. According to Lt Col Charles Hardy of the US Army War College, “most senior military commanders . . . consistently state ‘we are losing the Information Operations fight.’” He also notes that “it is universally accepted that the United States Armed Forces . . . do not apply this element of national power effectively.”10 As an influence-operations program manager in Headquarters USAF (A3), this author witnessed numerous instances of confusion and deficiencies in understanding IO, from tactical to strategic levels. Unsure about what to do with operational-planning billets funded to perform IO, commanders used them for other functions or left them empty. Automated programming and budgeting capabilities as well as assessment tools proved ill suited to accommodate nontechnical influence capabilities, causing difficulties in justifying appropriate funding levels for these programs. In coordination sessions, representatives from the so-called core capabilities of IO—electronic warfare operations, influence operations, and network warfare operations—shared no common frame of reference in terms of operational integration, organization, manpower, training, procurement, or funding. Other than their status as “declared” brethren within IO, little similarity existed between the disciplines. In that regard, Maj Thomas Kardos of the US Army Command and General Staff College describes IO doctrine as “ill founded” and “mistakenly” drawing from too narrow a range of features.11 Similarly, in his assessment of IO in Iraq, Maj Norman Emery of the US Army laments that US forces’ inability to use IO has hampered efforts to quell the insurgency there and has given the enemy an information advantage.12
We cannot get IO doctrine right because we mistakenly identify information as a domain, the latter defined by a standard dictionary as “a field or sphere of activity or influence.” Nor do we find an acceptable definition of informationthat makes it a domain, the former term defined as something told (i.e., knowledge or data). Information is a resource, a weapon of war and peace. Bullets, bombs, tanks, and pilots are not domains, but they are important aspects of war fighting—as is information, which may take many forms. In its tangible form, information exists and travels in physical space—in its electronic form, it does so in cyberspace. It also exists within the subjective realm of the human mind. Thus, rather than constituting a domain, information resides in and moves across domains. Before we can create the intellectual framework required for the proper understanding and doctrinal classification of IO as well as develop the concept of a legitimate cyberspace domain, we must realize that no single information domain or “environment” exists. IO really involves using information to generate effects that, like information itself, apply to all domains. Once we acknowledge that information is not a domain and is not bounded by a particular domain, then by definition we cannot classify IO in a manner analogous to domain-based doctrine (i.e., air warfare and space operations); neither can we define it within them.
From the first recognition of the power of information in modern war, a conscious effort emerged to establish it as a domain—a designation that ultimately led the USAF to juxtapose IO with air warfare and space operations, the subjects of the other domain doctrine documents.13 Dr. George Stein of the US Air War College first articulated many of the principles fundamental to IO today, including the notion of an “information environment” or “realm.”14 With this concept in mind, USAF doctrine writers established the subcategory IO for the domain of information. Though meant to highlight the importance of information alongside the air and space operational domains, this arrangement does not withstand honest intellectual analysis and ultimately has negative implications for understanding and applying IO.
Current doctrine often presents IO as something the USAF does along with air and space operations; in fact, those operations often produceIO effects. The doctrine encourages war fighters to perceive a domain-based IO concept, but the ephemeral information domain defies intuitive grasp. Instead, by presenting IO separately from air and space, we give practitioners the mistaken impression that IO is “added in” or occurs “alongside” the other types of operations. Air and space operations are separate elements from IO (fig. 2). AFDD 2-5 also explains that IO is “integral to all Air Force operations and may support, or be supported by, air and space operations.”15
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Figure 2. AFDD 2-5’s relationship with IO and air/space operations. (Adapted from AFDD 2-5,
Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 7, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_
Page_HTML/Doctrine_ Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.)
Though true, this idea of mutual support and integration leaves out the fact that air and space operations can actually be IO (a point recognized clearly by early airpower theorists such as Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, who asserted that the psychological effects of airpower on the enemy could prove decisive in war). Such diagrams and definitions leave the reader of doctrine with the impression that only network warfare operations, electronic warfare operations, and influence operations constitute IO. This is also incorrect. Properly understood, information and IO span domains. Many air and space activities can be planned for informational effects, whether in terms of psychology, information itself, or information systems.
Although it may take a monumental effort to eradicate the concept of the information domain, such a step is necessary to obtain a more accurate conceptualization of IO. References to the domain or environment of information have become ubiquitous. Even the 2007 edition of AFDD 2 states that “information is an environment in which some aspects of warfare can also be conducted,” going on to specifically designate information as a domain, like air and space.16 As daunting as the prospect of repudiating the information-domain paradigm may seem, the recent designation by the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force of cyberspace as an official domain and its inclusion in the USAF mission statement provide the intellectual way ahead to make the change.17 Doctrine writers must recognize cyberspace as the true domain for the types of information associated with the information technological revolution.
After defining information properly and thus intellectually unshackling ourselves, we may more closely examine the definition and composition of IO itself. AFDD 2-5 defines IO as “the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”18 By virtue of its narrowness, this description causes some problems. For example, under this definition, a strike mission to neutralize a fiber-optic relay station is not IO even though the effect it seeks to create entails disruption of adversarial decision making. A special operations forces team that captures and interrogates an enemy commander has seriously disrupted enemy decision making and added to friendly intelligence (refined information). Should not that be IO? Perhaps the perception that IO definitions were too broad motivated doctrine writers to define IO in this manner. Likely, they reasoned that more narrowly defining IO in terms of “nonkinetic” capabilities would facilitate understanding and application of IO as well as provide doctrinal treatment at long last for electronic warfare operations, network warfare operations, and influence operations. However, as currently defined, IO appears to be more of an orphanage for nonkinetic capabilities than a rational grouping based on true similarity. This “forced cohabitation” of concepts is not trivial since it fosters misconceptions about the nature of IO and places undue emphasis on capabilities rather than effects.
Fundamentally, IO deals with effects—not capabilities or means. Therefore, many USAF capabilities that produce information effects are IO. This does not mean that everything is IO, but it does mean that we need a better, intuitive definition for IO that recognizes its broad nature and impact, not limited to a domain. IO fits squarely within the doctrinal concept of the effects-based approach to operations, which states that USAF operations focus upon objectives—not platforms, weapons, or methods.19 For example, a planner may decide to use a bomb, a computer virus, or PSYOP to disable an enemy radar system, so long as the effect remains the same. Other than the fact that these subcategories of IO do not specifically require the release of kinetic bombs and bullets, they are very different. One would be hard pressed to come up with an example of an actual IO plan that consisted only of some combination of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and/or network warfare operations. More often, IO looks like any other operation—only the timing and/or means are tailored to achieve an IO effect. This accounts for the ongoing debate about whether a B-52 strike on an air defense command facility constitutes IO or air warfare. Intuition and logic say it must be both, but current doctrine suggests otherwise.
The association of IO with specific capabilities versus effects presents a challenge for commanders who want to employ IO but are often unsure about how to combine influence operations, electronic warfare operations, or network warfare operations. Commanders and Airmen can easily overlook the IO aspects inherent in traditional applications of air and space power and may adopt a recipe approach to IO—a little electronic warfare operations here, a smidgen of network warfare operations there, and a dollop of influence operations just for good measure. In practice, because of its separate treatment from traditional, kinetic activities within air and space operations, IO tends to become marginalized, a situation that negatively affects budgeting, training, manpower, and employment.
Another key disparity between the stated core capabilities of IO involves the technical versus nontechnical. Many military professionals would be surprised to learn that IO actually is not a product of the revolution in information technology! The coincidence of IO as a term with technical advancement in information technology has led to the specious conclusion that they are one and the same. But IO does not necessarily concern itself with computers and disk drives. PSYOP and MILDEC, for example, can rely upon very low-tech methods yet remain effective.
The constituent elements of IO differ in more ways than their technological basis. Influence operations consist of operations security, MILDEC, PSYOP, public affairs, counterintelligence, and counterpropaganda. “Subjective” in nature (i.e., they target the human mind as well as the perceptions and decision making of the enemy or a population), these operations employ varied means in any medium. In contrast, electronic warfare operations—based on exploiting electromagnetic technology for combat effects—are “objective” in nature, employing specific technical means to generate effects in any domain, whether air, space, or cyberspace. However, simply being nonkinetic does not equate to information, and electronic warfare operations share little in common with influence operations. Finally, network warfare operations are quite different from influence operations and electronic warfare operations. Though technologically centered, they more narrowly focus upon computer systems and networks. In application, network warfare operations differ significantly from influence operations or electronic warfare operations, bearing little resemblance to traditional air and space operations and functioning squarely in the realm of cyberspace.
The incompatibility among IO elements as currently defined indicates that something is clearly amiss. Beginning with the information domain myth and extending throughout the capabilities of IO and into the emerging domain of cyberspace, the evidence points directly to a pressing need for a remedy. But what form should the cure take?
Sometimes the solutions will require acknowledgement of past mistakes, and acceptance of insights for which none of our learning has prepared us.
—Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser
The solution to these doctrinal challenges lies not within the content per se but in the doctrine’s definitions and construction. The framework of USAF operations doctrine needs an overhaul to add flexibility, logically place capabilities, and allow for future doctrinal growth. Toward those ends, this article makes the following specific recommendations: (1) eliminate the concept of information as a domain, redefine IO, and establish it as a fundamental, effects-based approach to the operations concept under AFDD 2; (2) define and institute two broad subcategories of operations doctrine known as objective and subjective operations to create doctrinal “space” for treatment of all conceivable types of operations, especially influence operations; and (3) create a new operational-domain category within AFDD 2 known as cyberspace operations.
Until we define IO properly, no one will recognize its full power. Information is not a domain, and IO is more than a laundry list of nonkinetic capabilities. It involves the generation of combat effects created by objective or subjective operations within the air, space, or cyberspace domains. Therefore, the following serves as a proper definition for USAF IO: the integrated employment of Air Force capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary information, information systems, perceptions, and/or decision making while protecting our own. This definition adds the word information and recognizes that information systems also affect perceptions and all decision making. This definition and placement offer a key benefit by ending the confusion and debate over what constitutes IO. A bomber can execute a doctrinally sound strategic-attack mission that generates IO effects. Special operations forces can perform foreign internal defense and IO at the same time. Some people may argue that this definition is too broad and not prescriptive enough. On the contrary, IO is a broad concept; artificially defining it more explicitly constitutes a disservice to everyone who uses it. In recognition of its broad applicability, IO should move doctrinally “above” the domain-based categories as a direct adjunct to AFDD 2. Given the status of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as an essential aspect of IO with ties to all three domains, it should be a subcategory of IO (fig. 3).
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Figure 3. Operational doctrine, information operations, and objective and subjective categories
This new definition will facilitate IO planning and employment. Commanders will still appoint an individual to supervise an IO planning cell; however, the IO team will not be restricted to an arbitrary set of disciplines. Instead, its members will identify the effects and outcomes that IO can produce, and through coordination and integration with every element of the effort—proceeding from strategy to task—they will apportion the forces and define the tasks required to carry out the commander’s intent.
The second recommendation entails creating categories of operational doctrine designated as objective operations and subjective operations (see fig. 3). Our dictionary defines objective as “having to do with a known or perceived object as distinguished from something existing only in the mind.” Many air, space, and even cyberspace operations are objective in nature—that is, we conduct them in the physical world against physical targets. This author defines objective operations as the subset of all operations conducted to achieve primary effects in the physical world and/or against objects perceived or known, as opposed to operations designed to influence the human mind. In contrast, our dictionary defines subjective as “of, affected by, or produced by the mind.” We conduct subjective operations across all physical domains to achieve cognitive effects. This author defines such operations as the subset of all operations conducted to achieve primary effects in the cognitive domain and to influence the perceptions, emotions, and/or reasoning of a human target or targets.
Creation of these classifications necessarily recognizes that military operations in the physical and cognitive domains differ sufficiently to warrant separate treatment. The objective operations/subjective operations doctrinal construct establishes a comprehensive doctrinal framework and creates an architecture in which the former constituent IO capabilities can find their proper place. More significantly, it elevates subjective operations from deep within the doctrinal hierarchy; divorces them from the objective, techno-centric disciplines of electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations; and imbues them with the visibility needed for appropriate understanding. We have not readily understood the importance of subjective operations to warfare in the technological age, but now more than ever, with direct combat against an identifiable enemy an increasingly difficult proposition, the ability to influence adversaries and communicate truthfully to friends and allies has become essential. Indeed, AFDD 2 sagaciously states that “there is a psychological component to almost every set of effects and this component is often among the most important in terms of achieving objectives, especially at the operational and strategic levels” (emphasis in original).20
Figure 4 illustrates the proposed structure of a doctrinal category of subjective operations. Influence operations and a new subcategory—strategic communications—become the key elements of subjective operations. Influence operations are simplified to two main elements—MILDEC, which targets the mind of an individual decision maker, and PSYOP, which targets an adversary populace or group. Influence operations do not necessarily depend upon specialized hardware or advanced technology. But they do depend upon the ability of the influence operations planner—aided by accurate intelligence and human-factors analysis—to get into the mind of the target(s) and creatively produce operations that result in the desired effect (normally an action or inaction). The other currently defined capabilities of influence operations—operations security, counterintelligence, public affairs, and counterpropaganda—are logically redistributed. Operations security falls within the parent IO category since it applies across all operations and domains. Counterintelligence appears within intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as a natural counterpoint to intelligence. Counterpropaganda comes under the parent category of subjective operations because it can be conducted by PSYOP and public affairs, for example. Public affairs becomes the cornerstone of strategic communications. Like MILDEC and PSYOP, public affairs also targets the mind—but with truthful, credible information. Though AFDD 2-5 lists public affairs as an element of influence operations, the USAF public affairs community has understandably disassociated itself from “influence” and has created an Office of Strategic Communications, which merges public affairs with multimedia operations such as videography, photography, and broadcasting. Maj Gen Erwin Lessel III, former director of this office, notes that strategic communications depend upon truthfulness to establish credibility with all audiences, stressing that “there is a difference between wanting to inform people or influence them, and there are appropriate ways to do both.”21 Thus, the subcategories of public affairs and multimedia operations become the fundamental elements of the strategic communications category. This framework is more consistent with the requirement to maintain appropriate separation between influence in the form of MILDEC and PSYOP and to inform through strategic communications. These changes result in a doctrinal category of subjective operations that is complete and complementary to objective operations.
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Figure 4. Structure of subjective operations
Figure 5 illustrates the structure of the objective operations category. These operations consist of all operational categories and their supporting functions (e.g., combat support and weather operations) that function in physical domains against objective target sets (e.g., destroying a bridge, protecting a network, launching a satellite, transporting troops, etc.). As a cosmetic change, air warfare is renamed air operations for the sake of consistency. As an objective operation that spans domains, electronic warfare operations assume an appropriate position alongside the domain categories under objective operations. This designation eliminates the arbitrary placement of these operations as an IO core capability and establishes the doctrinal flexibility to accommodate future doctrine on directed energy.22 At the same time, proper treatment of network warfare operations requires implementation of the final recommendation—creation of a domain-based operational category of cyberspace operations.
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Figure 5. Structure of objective operations
Creation of the doctrinal classification of cyberspace operations represents a significant and necessary part of this proposal (see fig. 5). In 2005 the secretary and chief of staff of the Air Force redefined the service’s mission as “deliver[ing] sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the secretary decreed that “defending and fighting in the Cyber Domain is absolutely critical to maintain operations in Ground, Sea, Air and Space.”23 This author defines cyberspace operations as the employment of Air Force capabilities to defend and exploit electromagnetic information processing, storage, and transmission systems for military effect. Computers and networks are the gateways for cyberspace, so network warfare operations logically belong within cyberspace operations. Network warfare operations establish cyber dominance, just as air and space operations establish air and space dominance.
In the final analysis, this proposal amounts to nothing if the end results do not translate into positive, meaningful effects for the war fighter. Figure 6 illustrates how each operational concept relates to the overall operation, maximizes its own unique capabilities, and integrates them to produce synergistic effects across the full spectrum of operations. The principle resembles that of the joint force—each service specializes along functional lines to build maximum power and then integrates that power into the joint force.
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Figure 6. Operational model for integrated effects
IO is that subset of all operations that generate information effects or use information as a tool to realize objectives. All the elements of IO are visible and present in this model, thus allowing for proper focus and emphasis on each critical piece and discouraging the tendency to paint IO with a broad brush as a monolithic concept—a practice that has watered down its efficacy by marginalizing its constituent elements. With the focus on effects and the elimination of artificial associations, planners are free to combine capabilities in the most efficient manner, resulting in synergy and economy of force.
Without question, the implications of these recommendations extend beyond IO and USAF doctrine. In order for this proposal to have any enduring effect, adoption and standardization will have to take place within the entire government and military community, including the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and sister services. Even then, we would need a great deal of intellectual effort to flesh out the new IO doctrine and set up conceptual foundations for objective operations, subjective operations, and cyberspace operations. Although it is never too late to get the doctrine right, the sooner we do so, the better. Every day that passes brings further ossification to a body of IO doctrine that remains confusing and ineffective to the war fighter.
The information domain myth and current doctrinal treatment of IO have led to uncertainty about what IO is and its relationship to the other elements of operations. Logical analysis reveals IO as a broader, more fundamental concept than we currently acknowledge. The solution to this quandary starts with refutation of the idea of information as a domain, which enables us to redefine IO and establish it as a more fundamental component of operations doctrine—a key supporting function to all operations rather than another domain-based category such as air, space, or cyberspace operations. Furthermore, the institution of a broader doctrinal architecture—as represented by the parent categories of subjective and objective operations—creates the room within doctrine to establish visibility and promote development of traditional operational concepts as well as those that target the cognitive domain. Instead of an information environment, we can speak of the subjective environment, and everyone will understand that the effects and objectives are cognitive and perceptual. Implementation will naturally lead to improvements in funding, organizing, training, and equipping our forces to produce war-winning results. Lastly, creating a cyberspace domain puts the finishing touch on a long-overdue doctrinal renovation that should stand the test of time. By reforming doctrine in this manner, war fighters of the future will better understand IO and IO-related doctrine, creating a more efficient and effective force across the entire spectrum of warfare. Our forces will have the knowledge and tools to turn the tide on our adversaries and, hopefully, give critics of IO much less to write about.
[Feedback? Email the Editor ]
Notes
1. Here, the term messages refers not to specifics such as e-mail, radio signals, or memoranda but to the general idea of any information transmission/reception by any means. For example, a carrier strike force sends a “message” because it creates perceptions in those observing it. The message is the information conveyed by the action or inaction of forces under our control and can include deception and psychological operations.
2. Many definitions of cyberspace exist, but perhaps the best is also the simplest and least constraining. Appropriately enough, one can find this term defined in an online dictionary as the “realm of electronic communication.” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cyberspace. Perhaps a better definition would be “the domain in which information moves or resides while in electromagnetic form.” Examples of cyberspace include fiber-optic transmission lines, wireless signals, magnetic or optical storage devices, or computer chips.
3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66.
4. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, ix, https://www.doctrine .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf.
5. Ibid., 7.
6. Ibid., 3.
7. Cornerstones of Information Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1995), http://www.c4i.org/ cornerstones.html; see also Maj James L. Griffith, “United States Air Force Information Operations Doctrine: Is It Relevant?” (thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 49.
8. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, [i] (“Summary of Revisions”), https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdc privateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.
9. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 5 August 1998, v, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2_ 5.pdf (accessed 30 August 2006).
10. Lt Col Charles K. Hardy, “Information Operations as an Element of National Power: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Why the United States Can’t Get It Right,” strategy research project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2005), 1, http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil126.pdf.
11. Maj Thomas J. Kardos, “Information Superiority: Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea” (thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 5.
12. Maj Norman Emery, “Information Operations in Iraq,” Military Review 84, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 11, http://calldp. leavenworth. army.mil/eng_mr/2006080808030243/2004/03_May_Jun/04_emery.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=WSOMSUNSXHEQ&CQ_QH=124697&CQDC=5&CQ_PDF_HIGHLIGHT=YES&CQ_CUR_ DOCUMENT=9.
13. Generally attributed to the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, ca. 1991.
14. Griffith, “United States Air Force Information Operations Doctrine,” 47–48.
15. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1.
16. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April 2007, 21, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_ HTML/Doctrine_Docs/AFDD2.pdf.
17. SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Cyber Summit Begins at Pentagon Nov. 16,” Air Force Print News, 15 November 2006, http://www. af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123032005 (accessed 17 November 2006).
18. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1.
19. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 13.
20. Ibid., 90.
21. SSgt Julie Weckerlein, “Strategic Communication Applies to Every Airman,” Air Force Print News, 20 September 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123027426 (accessed 17 November 2006).
22. For example, directed-energy weapons may operate and cause effects in air or space and from air or space; therefore, electronic warfare operations must not be a subcategory under air or space operations. They must remain separate. By placing electronic warfare operations outside the other domain-based doctrine categories, we are free to include doctrine on their use in any domain.
23. Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Gen T. Michael Moseley, “SECAF/CSAF Letter to Airmen: Mission Statement,” 7 December 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=192; and Michael W. Wynne, “Cyberspace as a Domain in Which the Air Force Flies and Fights” (remarks to the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration Conference, Crystal City, VA, 2 November 2006), http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=283 (accessed 17 November 2006).
Contributor
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Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss (BS in Aerospace Engineering, University of Virginia; MAS [Master of Aeronautical Science], Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; MMS [Master of Military Studies], Marine Corps University) is a student at the School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, Virginia. He previously served as an executive assistant to the assistant vice-chief of staff and as an influence-operations program manager on the Air Staff in the Pentagon. Major Weiss has also held a number of group and squadron assignments, including senior director at the Southeast Air Defense Sector, Tyndall AFB, Florida; chief, Standardization and Evaluations, 932nd Air Control Squadron, 85th Group, Keflavik, Iceland; and chief, Current Operations, and flight commander, 966th Airborne Air Control Squadron, 552nd Air Control Wing, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. In addition, he was the wing’s chief surveillance evaluator for two years. A graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Major Weiss is a senior air-battle manager with over 1,800 hours in the E-3 Sentry (AWACS) and 140 combat-support hours in Southwest Asia. |
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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