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Document created: 1 March 2008
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2008

CHINESE SERVICEMEN’S VIEWS OF USAF AIRMEN AND EDUCATION

I read Sr Col Wang Qigui’s section of the article “Chinese Servicemen’s Views of USAF Airmen and Education” (Winter 2007) with great interest to gain a perspective of what a communist political commissar thought about the American military system that operates without “political units or political officers” (p. 53). Colonel Wang essentially equated service chaplains, symbols of America, unit identification, military museums, and mottos with China’s “political education” (p. 53). However, readers should be aware that in communist military forces, political education is closer to propaganda, with which personnel must demonstrate familiarity in order to advance, and that political officers do much more than teach propaganda. Even today, communist political officers review and approve operational military orders at all levels of command. Note that Colonel Wang did not try to make this comparison with the American military.

Col Steve Schwalbe, USAF, Retired
Cheney, Washington

“Chinese Servicemen’s Views of USAF Airmen and Education” contains three good articles. The authors pretty much “got it.” I wonder, though, what these officers’ reports to their People’s Liberation Army Air Force superiors looked like and to what extent their internal reports were affected by politics. Nevertheless, I enjoyed the articles and would like to see more of the same from other foreign visitors.

Maj Michael Markovitch, USAF, Retired
Monterey, California

NASH IN NAJAF

I read with great interest Dr. Hank Brightman’s article “Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict” (Fall 2007). As the author admits, though, by concentrating on the potential for Pareto improvement between indigenous security forces and domestic insurgents, his analysis vastly oversimplifies the internal dynamics of the Iraqi domestic situation. An alternative game-theory scenario that he ignores is the potential for Pareto improvement between the Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi’a blocks that could result in greater cooperation between those interests and, therefore, improved stability. Using his same line of reasoning, one sees that the longer the multinational coalition maintains a security environment in Iraq, the more likely these three interest groups will communicate and cooperate, shifting from Pareto optimal (highest payoff for each group) to Pareto improved strategies resulting in Nash equilibrium. Game theory would seem to support a wide range of outcomes, depending on the analyst’s perspective and baseline assumptions. Public-diplomacy initiatives can be a valuable tool in the ongoing effort to boost the odds in favor of greater regional stability and a Pareto improved outcome more in line with our national interests.

Lt Col Peter W. Farney, USAF
Fort Meade, Maryland

THE HYPHENATED AIRMAN

In response to Lt Col Robert Poynor’s article “The ‘Hyphenated Airman’: Some Observations on Service Culture” (Fall 2007), I would say that the Air Force seems to be undergoing the same identity crisis found in some monopolistic corporate megabrands. These companies enjoy the resources brought by their massive success, which allow them to foray into new territories, but because they lack a significant opponent, these forays become increasingly unrelated to their original core identity. When a viable opponent arises, they find themselves bloated and lethargic, unable to compete against a more focused entity with clearer direction and purpose. Often, to save the company, good chief executive officers (CEO) must sell off parts of the company that cannot be brought directly into support of its main focus. They concentrate on “branding,” maintaining a clear image that their customers can associate with a specific task or purpose. Striving against this new opponent can galvanize the once disparate elements of the team and bring them together under a unified direction.

These same principles apply to government organizations. In fact, such organizations are much more susceptible to this bloating and lethargy because they so seldom face any real competition. The Air Force has enjoyed so many years of air superiority that it no longer pursues real airpower with the sense of purpose that it did 20 years ago. Having achieved its main goal, it does not feel the need to press onward, so it presses sideways. Future operations planners explore supporting systems, such as various technologies, as though they were ends in themselves. Being part of a supporting system that is treated as an end in itself is an especially ambiguous role for Airmen to fill and, I think, is the root cause of the tribalism and struggle for identity that Colonel Poynor discusses. It is only natural then, that the commander, Air Force forces struggles to maintain control of these separate entities under the joint force commander. Similarly, it should surprise no one that Airmen in supporting systems claim that members of the warrior class don’t understand them.

This problem might be best solved using the same technique that CEOs use in the private sector. The Air Force must recognize that it is no longer a single force. It is a conglomerate: an amalgam of forces operating under a single administration to exploit the advantages of centralized logistical and financial support. In order for the Air Force to regain its unity of command, there must be some negative consequence for pursuing research and operations that do not directly support a central mission, and that mission, as Colonel Poynor points out, cannot be defined by the existence of these disparate entities. If the various teams that make up the Air Force cannot be brought together in support of one central theme, then everyone involved would be better off if the tangential teams were severed.

CPT Morgan Knighton, USA
Fort Lewis, Washington

REVISITING LEADERSHIP IN
THE ARMED FORCES

Thanks for publishing Air Commodore Aslam Bazmi’s worthy treatise “Revisiting Leadership in the Armed Forces” (Fall 2007). It’s one of the best articles I’ve ever read! The air commodore captures in a few lines all the leadership lectures and books we have absorbed over the years. It should be required reading in all professional military education programs. Excellent work!

CMSgt James A. Morrow, USAF, Retired
Beavercreek, Ohio

I just finished Air Commodore Bazmi’s fine article. As I read it, I kept thinking to myself how much it reminded me of an Air Force officer I know who personifies many of the attributes that Air Commodore Bazmi describes. Thank you for encouraging good leaders with such candid, principled, and smart information.

Kathryn A. Drake
Papillion, Nebraska

A RESCUE FORCE FOR THE WORLD:
AN AUTHOR REPLIES

After reading Lt Col John Taylor’s comment (Ricochets and Replies, Winter 2007) about our article “A Rescue Force for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of the Long War” (Fall 2007), I agree that there is no doubt that all combat search and rescue (CSAR) weapon systems are under significant and sustained operations-tempo pressure. That being said, our article does not make an all-or-nothing proposition—we can wade in if we’re not ready to dive in. For example, rescue can begin doing the following things today:

•Stop talking about engagement events that CSAR has supported as one-time operations that were brief diversions from the  “real job.”   Connect the dots for people up and down the chain of command to draw a compelling picture of the strategic significance of those engagement events.

•Begin learning about the organizations and processes that are relevant to the operating concept that our article describes. There is much to learn about joint task force organization, combatant commander (COCOM) staffs, interagency coordination, and nongovernmental organizations.

•Arrange to put the right people onto COCOM and joint staffs. Doing so will benefit CSAR’s traditional role as well as the one described in the article. Writing CSAR’s capabilities into theater security cooperation plans will be a good use of time as the Air Force waits for CSAR’s taskings to abate somewhat.

•Begin defining the professional-development career path that rescue’s special breed of “long warriors” must walk. For example, does your wing have a foreign-language program? Do you plan to conduct any Lightning Bolt exercises this year? If so, why not do them somewhere in the US Southern Command area of responsibility instead of the Avon Park range in Florida? Are irregular-warfare doctrine and reports from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center on your professional reading list? From a pure CSAR point of view, those things may not appear directly relevant to your daily work, but now they are.

•Let special operations forces (SOF) be SOF. Spend what little extra training time you have doing what you do best, not trying to become something that you are not. We must still address the growing feeling that the CSAR community has forgotten its basic purpose—that it has “lost its soul.” Our mission is noble, challenging, and chock-full of strategic relevance, so go after it.

Getting from a concept to an actionable plan will take time and effort. Most of all, though, it will take commitment to the basic notion that neither the Air Force nor rescue need be irrelevant in the ideological struggle that defines the global war on terror. If units are too busy right now to join that struggle, then take advantage of opportunities to be ready when the time is right.

We must realize that without a validated concept, one cannot define a requirement. Our article informally introduced the concept and set the stage for more detailed thinking about capabilities, implementation, and requirements.

Lt Col Marc C. DiPaolo, USAFR
Fort Belvoir, Virginia

A RESCUE FORCE FOR THE WORLD

Not to denigrate the article “A Rescue Force for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of the Long War” by Lt Col Marc DiPaolo and others (Fall 2007), but is the Air Force trying to reinvent the wheel? Anyone who visits the Air Force archives and reads the mission reports for the HH-43 Huskie helicopter that the Air Rescue Service (later the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service [ARRS]) flew from 1959 to 1975 would find that those units fulfilled most of the missions that Colonel DiPaolo and his coauthors discuss in their article.

A good example is a description of the civic-action program conducted from January to March 1969 by Detachment 3, 38th ARRS, 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, based at Ubon Royal Thai AFB, Thailand. According to the History of the 38th Rescue and Recovery Squadron, 1 Jan 1969–31 Mar 1969, prepared by Maj James L. Wissert, Detachment 3 flew nine civic-action medical airlifts that quarter in support of Operation Medic-Lift. Working in conjunction with the base civil-­action officer, Detachment 3 airlifted medical teams and Thai public-health officials to nearby villages where doctors and nurses saw approximately 200 to 300 patients and where dentists extracted an average of 50 teeth per visit. The Thai people were very interested in the HH-43 that went by the call sign Pedro. Immediately after the helos landed, Pedro aircrews would pass out photos of the HH-43 to the excited and curious children who surrounded them.

Not only did the venerable Huskie perform combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions in enemy territory without an in-flight refueling capability and either with or without protective rescue combat air patrols, but also its crews wrote the original procedures for CSAR. During the Vietnam War, the HH-43 completed more combat rescues—1,893—than either the HH-3 or HH-53 helicopters. At one time, there were 100 HH-43 detachments worldwide, with aircraft based in the United States, Canada, Greenland, Europe, Turkey, Libya, the Azores, Ethiopia, New Guinea (on a temporary-duty basis), Japan, Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, Guam, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Prior to deploying to Southeast Asia, in the two-year period beginning 31 January 1962, HH-43 crews saved 262 military and civilian lives and assisted 1,473 other persons. Many of these people were rescued from precarious situations and would undoubtedly have died without the help of the HH-43. In addition, Huskies scrambled 12,613 times to assist aircraft in trouble. Local base-rescue detachments worldwide helped rescue foreign nationals and participated in civic-action programs, medical evacuations, and, in the United States, the Military Assistance to Safety in Traffic program. During its 16 years of operational service, the HH-43 Huskie rescued more people than all other types of helicopters, a record that still stands.

MSgt Stephen Mock, USAF, Retired
Libby, Montana

DEFINING INFORMATION
OPERATIONS FORCES

In their article “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?” (Summer 2007), Maj Timothy Franz and his coauthors correctly identify the Air Force’s lack of an information operations (IO) career field as a factor that limits “the potency and maturity” of both network warfare and influence-operations forces (pp. 57, 58, 60). Indeed, at the IO commanders’ conference hosted by Air Combat Command in April 2007, one commander after another identified an “inability to retain expertise and advance careers” as a problem that severely limits the Air Force’s IO capability. However, establishing a career field is only one of the numerous challenges facing the Air Force’s emerging IO capability.

The Air Force must also organize intelligently to integrate full-spectrum air, space, and cyberspace options into a combatant commander’s campaign. Momentum continues to build behind Air Force Cyber Command; however, the vehicle by which our joint force air component commanders command and control all aspects of airpower is the numbered air forces’ air and space operations centers (AOC). In order for the Air Force to become a true air, space, and cyberspace force, Cyber Command’s development must be accompanied by a concurrent effort to prepare our AOCs to command and control cyberpower.

Additionally, the Air Force must systematically train its entire force, not just IO or cyberwarriors, on IO. Only a full-court press, including flag and theater exercises, Air Force Weapons School, Air Force specialty code–awarding courses, and courses taught in all developmental-education programs, will successfully infuse IO into the Air Force’s culture.

Finally, the launching of Cyber Command must not exclude the continued maturation of the Air Force’s influence-operations capabilities such as psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security, counterintelligence, public affairs operations, and counterpropaganda. An inclination towards technology may predispose our corporate culture to focus on dominating the cyberdomain, but, ultimately, all warfare—especially the current ideological struggle—is won in the cognitive battlespace.

Although IO is an emerging endeavor, we can build upon experienced resources. Both the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command and the Air Force IO Center have conducted a variety of research projects and have collected numerous lessons learned. The Army’s 1st IO Command has quickly become a center of excellence, and the electronic warfare, space, MILDEC, and PSYOP communities are already well established.

Information is a fundamental aspect of national power, and IO is crucial throughout the spectrum of conflict. Our Air Force faces critical choices about organizing, training, and employing IO. These choices will determine whether we truly intend to be an Air, Space, and Cyberspace force.

Maj Brian J. Tyler, USAF
Ramstein AB, Germany

One need only read “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?” to come to the rapid conclusion that these capabilities of information operations (IO) are cats and dogs living together. Let’s get the doctrine right by taking the following steps.

First, divide all operations into “objective” and “subjective” categories. Objective operations are those conducted primarily in the physical domains of air, space, and cyberspace to create physical effects. Subjective operations, which target the cognitive domain to influence perceptions and decision making, include strategic communication, psychological operations, and military deception. Second, eliminate the fictitious “information domain” and create a doctrinal category of cyberspace operations. Third, recognize that IO is neither kinetic nor nonkinetic but the synthesis of operations designed to influence an adversary’s decision making. If we take these steps, we won’t have the unpalatable task of trying to create an “IO career force” but can create a career force that understands IO intuitively at all levels of war.

Maj Geoffrey Weiss, USAF
US Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia

THE AIR FORCE’S MISSING DOCTRINE

In his interesting and enjoyable article “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency” (Spring 2006), Maj Kenneth Beebe seeks to explain the need to draft a suitable counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine to guide the US Air Force to victory in future battles. In doing so, he highlights the limitations of the previously available doctrine on that topic and, based on lessons learned in previous conflicts, proposes a doctrine that is essential to COIN warfare.

In my opinion, this article points out a major problem that the Air Force has faced for many years; on this subject, Dennis Drew’s article “U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion” in the Journal of Military History (October 1998) constitutes an indispensable reference. I also congratulate the US Air Force for the publication of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare, on 1 August 2007. Major Beebe’s article needed to be published so that Air and Space Power Journal readers would be fully informed about the critiques, discussions, and analyses that preceded this important new Air Force doctrine document.

As far as Major Beebe’s article is concerned, it is worth emphasizing that it covers the subject quite well, clearly poses the problem, and offers a title consistent with the contents.

Dr. Wautabouna Ouattara
Abidjan, Ivory Coast

Editor’s Note: Dr. Ouattara read the French version of the article, available at http://www.airpower .maxwell.af. mil/apjinternational/apj-f/2007/hiv07/beebe.html. Major Beebe has been promoted to lieutenant colonel since his article first appeared.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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