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Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2008

A HOUSE DIVIDED

I don’t entirely agree with what Lt Gen David Deptula and Maj R. Greg Brown say in “A House Divided: The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance” (Summer 2008). Studying the world wars leads me to the conclusion that some intelligence sources are in fact strategic—namely, those based on cryptanalysis and electronic exploits. Breaking an adversary’s secret code cannot be compared to other forms of intelligence gathering. I think there still is a very good reason to think of communications intelligence as something special and strategic. Adversaries can detect radars, satellites, reconnaissance planes, scouts, and ships, but they tend to believe in their “unbreakable codes.” Eavesdropping on “secure” communications will always be the best source of intelligence, and special handling of such eavesdropping will always be required.

Mr. Frank Gerlach
Fellbach, Germany

EXPOSING THE INFORMATION
DOMAIN MYTH

In response to Maj Geoffrey Weiss’s article “Exposing the Information Domain Myth: A New Concept for Air Force and Information Operations Doctrine” (Spring 2008), I’d say that the author takes most of 14 pages (including endnotes) to tell us the blindingly obvious—that information is not a domain. We can operate within all of the other areas we accept as domains, including the ground (although we spend most of our time on it instead of in it), and these domains all include a physical element that we can touch. (Even our virtually constructed domain of cyberspace needs physical hardware to exist.) Information, on the other hand, is quite simply ideas. Although ideas can be stored and, to a degree, manipulated and controlled, we cannot operate within them, nor do they need any physical architecture (except what is already within us) in order to exist.

Having said that, I still appreciated the author’s effort to straighten the doctrinal construct to rectify the misconceptions he pointed out. However, if he truly intends to properly shift the paradigm that shapes how we view information, he might want to start with the name of the applicable doctrine document. He correctly points out that we attempt to affect information through operations intended initially to control it and ultimately to achieve the greater goals of information superiority or information supremacy. Like control of the air, space, cyberspace, ground, or sea domains, any type of force or operation may potentially affect or control information. Therefore, the doctrine document should be renamed Information Effects of Operations. If we are speaking about an Air Force doctrine document, we could use the term “Air Force operations.” If we are discussing joint doctrine, the term could be (perhaps superfluously) “joint operations.” Nevertheless, this could be the starting point for refocusing our efforts as we rewrite the doctrine to address this concern.

Jim Bemis
Laurel, Maryland

I found Major Weiss’s article very encouraging to read because it discusses information operations (IO) in doctrinal rather than programmatic or organizational terms. He proposes a slimmed-down version of the definition of IO in Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, as an essential component for a new Air Force way forward, but the real paradigm shift is his acknowledgment that “IO deals with effects” (emphasis in original, p. 56) and not the capabilities or means from outdated policies that seem to keep us tied in knots.

His proposed definition moves IO away from the current Department of Defense/ service overemphasis on IO’s physical dimension (computers, communication systems, networks, supporting infrastructure, etc.) and closer to both the informational and cognitive dimensions of JP 3-13 that actually influence the decision-making process. In fact, his definition mirrors concepts from the preeminent situational awareness (SA) researcher Dr. Mica Endsley and her graphical model of SA in dynamic decision making (available at http://www.satechnologies.com/Papers/pdf/SATheorychapter.pdf). An academic version of the famed observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, Dr. Endsley’s model of SA focuses on information flow and decision-maker perceptions of environmental information, rather than the physical systems themselves, to align overall SA and influence decision making.

What a novel approach: using the science of human factors (cognition and decision making) to advance IO doctrine aimed at creating cognitive and decision-making effects!

LCDR Grayson Morgan, USN
Offutt AFB, Nebraska

A LOOK DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

Maj Bryan D. Watson’s “A Look down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of Military Culture” (Spring 2008) is a great article, but I think it’s rather misleading and ignores the real history regarding what the author calls our “growing domestic role” (p. 94). Federal troops were used for domestic operations more than 200 times between 1795 and 1995, and the intent is to use them only in exceptional cases. Many may remember their use during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. I was surprised that Major Watson’s article did not even refer to the National Response Plan (superseded on 22 March 2008 by the National Response Framework). As officials struggle to revise guidance, the intent of the guidance remains the same: to help all levels of government prepare to respond to any type of incident. The American people want us to be prepared to help. Don’t forget that we need to win their “hearts and minds” too. Posse comitatus only forbids using federal troops without authorization from the president or Congress, originally because county sheriffs were abusing the privilege of using those troops, which distracted them from their federal mission. In addition, posse comitatus applies only to law enforcement, not humanitarian missions or other military roles. These important points were left out of Major Watson’s article. Aside from law enforcement, we’d do well to follow the example of Lt Col Hap Arnold’s response to the 1933 earthquake in Long Beach, California, that claimed 112 lives. Rather than making quake victims wait for the nearest unit, whose commanding officer was unavailable, Arnold mobilized the Airmen at March Field to provide immediate relief. The National Response Framework won’t cover every situation, nor is that the intent. Nothing can replace sound professional judgment and common sense. We need not be paralyzed by antiquated legislation. Flexibility is the key to effective federal response.

Capt Rick Rutowicz, USAF
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida

LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP

Anyone who has taken the time to read “Lorenz on Leadership” (Summer 2005) and “Lorenz on Leadership: Part 2” (Spring 2008) is already following General Lorenz’s first principle: knowledge is power. That, of course, is the underlying premise for all educational endeavors. But knowledge is also the segue to his second core principle, “understand the mission.” Obviously, someone who does not understand the mission is not going to be an effective leader, but this principle has a corollary that everyone who has ever served knows—namely, that leaders must ensure that subordinates understand the mission as well. Collective knowledge is collective power.

Most Air and Space Power Journal readers, regardless of rank, have experienced the staff meeting that begins with, “We have been tasked to do X, no later than 10 days from now.” As the groans and moans subside and the discussion turns to devising a plan and delegating tasks, it is all too easy for those in charge—the leaders—to fail to ensure that their subordinates “understand the mission.”

If we think about what General Lorenz is teaching us—his mission-accomplishment principles (i.e., think “out of the box” when necessary, accomplish the mission with the resources at hand, never give up, and always “do the right thing”)—then we must by necessity revert to his principle of “understand the mission.” How can any of us “lead” if we cannot or do not make the effort to ensure that our subordinates understand the mission? Simply saying, “General Smith directed us to do this” may be the truth, but it will not eliminate the quizzical looks of those who are being tasked to do something that they may or may not understand. However, there will be some occasions when detailed explanations are inappropriate due to security considerations or other factors. Knowing where to draw the line is the challenge of leadership. Applying General Lorenz’s principles to the task at hand—regardless of its size, complexity, or uniqueness—can undoubtedly help all of us make the decisions that our rank or position requires us to make. And sometimes a reminder by a general officer is just what we need.

Lt Col Donald G. Rehkopf Jr., USAFR
Rochester, New York

TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-CHAUVINIST

I find Dr. David Mets’s reasoning and conclusions in “True Confessions of an Ex-Chauvinist: Fodder for Your Professional Reading on Women and the Military” (Fall 2007) very enlightening. While I and other students attended Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1992, we discussed in our seminar the issue of women in combat, and I recall that I was the only one defending the position in favor of women. My point of view was based on the fact that the combat aircraft that I flew for 10 years had been tested and accredited by a woman—Jacqueline Auriol from France. If a product like the Mirage III emerged from the experienced hands of this woman, undoubtedly our arguments against women in combat would have no support.

Col Raul A. Federico, Argentine Air Force
Buenos Aires, Argentina

TRUE CONFESSIONS OF AN EX-
CHAUVINIST: THE AUTHOR RESPONDS

Thank you for your kind remarks about my article. Certainly your experience at Air Command and Staff College was not unique. Probably, the vast majority of males in the American military then and before opposed women in combat. It is one of the glories of democracy, I think, that notwithstanding their personal feelings, the ones in the Air Force loyally adhered to the tradition established by Gen George Washington that the military must forever be subordinate to the will of the civilian leadership in the Congress and the executive branch.

Dr. David R. Mets
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

NASH IN NAJAF:
THE AUTHOR RESPONDS

I really appreciate Lt Col Peter Farney’s feedback (“Ricochets and Replies,” Spring 2008) on my article “Nash in Najaf: Game Theory and Its Applicability to the Iraqi Conflict” (Fall 2007). My article represents only a small portion of a two-year research project. As Colonel Farney quite correctly surmised, a number of other potential Nash solutions emerged when we entered our players, moves, and payoffs into the Gambit extensive-form modeling program. While the majority of those solutions remained tightly correlated with the version presented in the “Nash in Najaf” article, Colonel Farney is wholly correct in noting that cooperation among Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite blocks did present itself as an alternative Nash solution. However, even in this scenario, alignment with US interests was not manifest as a Pareto improved strategy because the United States remains in the role of a strange attractor (as opposed to the role of a player). In fact, short of the United States’ taking on the role of a player by remaining in Iraq with large numbers of forces for many, many years; the emergence of a far-greater sacrifice on the part of the American people through rationing; a war tax on gasoline; and so forth (as I addressed in the article), the probability of a cohesive Kurdish/Sunni/Shiite block aligned with US interests falls well below my prior Bayesian analysis with an alpha set at .01. (That is, there is less than a one in 1,000 chance that this solution would come to fruition.)

Moreover, this probability is based on linear analysis, while the current Iraqi model is actually a nonlinear, extensive-form hypergame, so the reality of a “unified” Iraq aligned with US interests is even smaller than this Bayesian determination suggests. Again, as I noted in the article, there are likely many good humanitarian and economic reasons to remain in Iraq. I will also be the first one to acknowledge that the data analyzed for the article were examined prior to the 2007 surge in US forces. However, when dispassionately looking at the calculations, one finds that the most commonly encountered Nash solution was the one presented in the “Nash in Najaf” article.

Dr. Hank Brightman
Jersey City, New Jersey

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Mr. Charles Kamps’s article “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Forty-Five Years in the Balance” (Fall 2007) ends by saying, “The fact that we were off balance for operations against Cuba offers a lesson for the future” (p. 88). The author meant to warn the US military to learn from this event the lesson of how unbalanced strategy and military developments could cause serious consequences in case of a US-Soviet war. Fortunately, that war was avoided; however, the author’s reference to “balance” and “global responsibilities” (p. 88) reminds me of the broad global balance of power.

Since World War II, regional armed conflicts have not stopped. From the Korean War to the Vietnam War, from the Middle East wars to the Iraq-Iran War, from Afghanistan to the Balkans, we find regional imbalances everywhere even though the overall global balance endures. Who then is “responsible” for restoring regional balances in order to keep the overall balance from collapsing?

The world witnesses the United States interfering with other areas at will, the European Union expanding vehemently, Russia actively “recovering,” and China developing economically and militarily at an enormous speed. All of these powers appear to be working to maintain the world balance; however, I know that beneath the surface, each big power is pursuing different objectives. I believe that the relative balance between big powers may be more detrimental than beneficial because such a balance is based on arms races that seek new military advantages and therefore pose a real threat to the world balance. The Soviet-US race for military advantages that almost triggered war during the Cuban crisis serves as good evidence.

My view is that a few big powers alone cannot maintain the world balance. Military intervention is no longer a viable solution, as demonstrated by the United States’ inability to end the Iraq war. Whether it is the Cuban missile crisis, which almost escalated into a nuclear war, or the ongoing Iraq conflict, the application of military power may succeed in the short term but will never succeed in balancing the minds of people. It is the balance of the populace’s mind that provides the fundamental guarantee of world peace. In essence, the big powers’ pursuit of balanced strategic and military service development aims to gain military advantages and often results in upsetting the world’s overall balance. This global balance, rather than the small balance discussed in Mr. Kamps’s article, should make the author think twice.

San Jinsheng
Jiangsu, China

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
THE AUTHOR RESPONDS

My short piece was meant to highlight the imbalance between strategic nuclear forces and operational forces in the specific case of options for Cuba, but I understand Mr. San’s perspective. However, history shows that a few strong nations or alliances always provide the balance of power in the world, without which there would be total chaos.

The four decades of the Cold War featured a nuclear arms race that, in essence, kept the world safe for conventional war—in particular, very limited proxy wars. Additionally, the two major power blocs “kept a lid on” rogue regional powers and movements such as virulent Islamist extremism, which today threaten unchecked violence if not countered through inter­vention by coalitions of concerned nations.

The “civilized” world is still seeking a post–Cold War “readjustment” of the balance of power. This may take some time to come to fruition and will entail different players than before. As Plato said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war,” but a well-recognized balance of power can keep us from repeating the horrific experiences of the first half of the twentieth century.

Charles Kamps
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

DEVELOPING AIRMEN: EDUCATING AND TRAINING LEADERS

I read with interest Lt Col Paul Berg’s article “Developing Airmen: Educating and Training Leaders” (Summer 2007). The author asserts that “professional Airmen require a flexible balance between broad education, which teaches them how to think in creative, theoretical terms, and specific training, which teaches them how to perform practical tasks” (p. 26). While this statement certainly talks to the point about the relationship between training and education, the whole article reflects the typical American way of technical thinking (i.e., developing officers the way that a processing line makes products according to a fixed set of steps, which neglects the differences in human potential).

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, a German Army leader in World War II, supposedly said, “There are only four types of officer. First, there are the lazy, stupid ones. Leave them alone, they do no harm. . . . Second, there are the hard-working, intelligent ones. They make excellent staff officers, ensuring that every detail is properly considered. Third, there are the hard-working, stupid ones. These people are a menace and must be fired at once. They create irrelevant work for everybody. Finally, there are the intelligent, lazy ones. They are suited for the highest office.” (See “Von Manstein’s 4 Officer Types—Adapted for Managers,” En Avant: The Weblog of Jim Donovan, http://jimdonovan.net.nz/2008/03/06/von-mansteins-4-officer-types-adapted- for-managers.) The most important consideration here is personal qualities, and Field Marshal von Manstein knew how to use different officers according to their different qualities. In Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, we read another passage that discusses the human qualities that make a leader. Sun Tzu says, “By command, I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage and strictness” (trans. Samuel B. Griffith [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963], p. 65). More recent Chinese sayings such as “tutor people to bring out their best gifts” or “put the right people in the right places” further mirror this way of thinking that puts more weight on human qualities.

There is no doubt that in modern wars, military technologies and the knowledge of how to use them play increasingly important roles. Even so, it is a pity that this article focuses on skill training and theory education only, mentioning nothing about educating people and inspiring their different potentials.

Sui Feng
Beijing, China

MY FATHER AND I AND SABURO SAKAI

I found Col Francis Stevens’s article “My Father and I and Saburo Sakai” (Chronicles Online Journal, 21 June 2006) quite moving. My father served in the Pacific during World War II. When I was a kid, the Japanese were simply the bad guys until I read Sakai’s 1957 memoir entitled Samurai! That book humanized the common Japanese man and made me admire Sakai for his bravery and excellence in many areas. I share Colonel Stevens’s view that Saburo Sakai was a soldier doing his duty even if he did not relish it.

Steven Perry
Newnan, Georgia

THE MASTER SERGEANT WATERSHED

I do not currently supervise other noncommissioned officers (NCO), but I do get to interact with many of them. After stumbling upon Capt Raymond M. Powell’s article “The Master Sergeant Watershed: A Practical Guide for Supervisors of the Enlisted Corps’ Critical Stripe” (Chronicles Online Journal, 24 April 2003), I quickly tried to disseminate it to other NCOs, specifically brand-new staff sergeants. To adapt the article to my needs, I shifted its use of the master sergeant rank to staff sergeant and saw that Captain Powell’s principles worked equally well. I rated my own “level” as described by the article and tried to get other people to discuss which level they fit into. Just as I thought, the brand-new staff sergeants didn’t even respond, so they obviously fit into level one because they saw little reason to do anything not required of them. When I approached my flight chief (a master sergeant), he told me that this article is actually taught at the Senior NCO Academy. As I said, this article can fit anywhere with any rank, and I feel that it should be considered for use in all formal professional military education. I was impressed with the article and found it to be quite an eye opener.

SSgt Mark J. Adams, USAF
Luke AFB, Arizona

INTRODUCING THE CHINESE ASPJ

Thank you for sending the Chinese edition of Air and Space Power Journal to the Third Military Medical College. The journal discusses many topics that are highly interesting to Chinese servicemen, such as leading-edge thinking, military doctrine, strategy and tactics, armed-force development, leadership, military ethics, education, and so forth. Through this journal, we come to know that there exists a high-level military academic forum where interested professionals can exchange views. I look forward to reading more excellent articles and wish this journal success in enhancing international military academic exchange as well as promoting world peace.

Zhou Yan
Chongqing, China

As a librarian at a Nanjing University, I am impressed with the overall quality of Air and Space Power Journal-Chinese. University libraries like ours will be delighted to offer such quality journals to our readers. This one, in particular, will help readers gain a very valuable perspective when judging the China-US relationship. Personally, I regard the lack of sufficient exchange as the major cause for numerous misunderstandings and misconceptions. Your journal certainly can play a positive role in this arena.

Mr. Li
Nanjing, China

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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