DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
Document created: 1 December 2007
Air & Space
Power Journal - Winter 2007
|
|
Maj Paul D. Williams, USAF*
I appreciate the insightful comments made by Lt Col Kenneth Beebe in the preceding article. When we wrote “Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?” (Summer 2007), my coauthors and I focused on the process of transitioning from how to build an IO force to how to build a cyber force, concentrating on network warfare as the most badly broken piece. We have since served on a team directed by Headquarters USAF to tackle the holistic cyber-force development effort, which involved treating electronic warfare (EW); space; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and command and control/battle management as having the same importance as network warfare (NW). The Air Force will use NW and EW forces as the defensive and offensive shooters it provides to combatant commanders as cyber capabilities. We agree with Colonel Beebe’s view that EW needs to transform to maximize the individual and integrated effects of EW and NW that we can deliver.
On the other hand, I disagree with his comment that Air Force Cyber Command marks the end of IO for our service. I believe that the Air Force is tackling cyber matters in a manner that will allow us to concentrate on those parts of IO that facilitate our bringing the most capabilities to the fight. The cyber realm’s emphasis on achieving effects across the electromagnetic spectrum both capitalizes on and enhances our ability to deliver global strike capabilities across the spectrum of warfare. It also represents an evolution in our understanding of IO versus kinetic warfare. As Lt Gen Robert Elder points out in his article “Effects-Based Operations: A Command Philosophy” (Spring 2007), all warfare ultimately involves influencing the minds and decision processes of both adversaries and nonadversaries (p. 17). To specify influence operations as a capability akin to EW and NW is confusing at best and damaging at worst if we fail to focus our efforts on achieving realistic and meaningful effects. As the Air Force continues to develop in this area, I foresee transformation in both service and joint doctrine to reflect our evolving understanding of both the cognitive and cyberspace domains.
Finally, do we need an influence-operations career force in the Air Force? We don’t yet know the answer to this question. Ultimately the Air Force presents the combatant commanders with forces that will need an understanding of how to integrate their service’s capabilities—such as public affairs (PA), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC)—into the joint IO fight. Successful operations across the entire war-fighting spectrum will require that senior war fighters understand Air Force PA, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC roles and responsibilities as well as those of our sister services, other US agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, and coalition partners. Adding those skills to the ones required of our war-fighting kinetic and cyber forces may prove too much—we risk diluting their combat effectiveness by spreading them too thinly. We hope that by applying our analysis of this developing area to a notional career force, we will better cultivate an understanding of which skills we need. Perhaps those skills make sense in a separate career force—or they may fit best into existing forces.
We wrote our article in the hopes of spurring discussion, and Colonel Beebe’s analysis and comments provide exactly that! We are in the process of making monumental changes to the Air Force’s mission, and now is the right time to grapple with some of these difficult issues.
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
* The author is an assistant professor of computer science and cyber operations in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
[ Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]
