DISTRIBUTION A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
Document created: 1 December 2007
Air & Space
Power Journal - Winter 2007
|
In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space power Journals, “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusion or join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil . |
According to Field Manual 3-24/ Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, airpower plays primarily, if not exclusively, a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations such as the ones we are currently conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 This is not to say that the Air Force’s contributions are not significant—only that the Army and Marine Corps do the bulk of the killing, bleeding, and dying. Such is the nature of warfare against small-scale irregular forces, particularly in urban environments. Although we maintain complete air dominance over the battlespace, that alone clearly does not guarantee victory. Rather, the success or failure of the guys wearing muddy boots on the ground will determine the outcome. In the future, however, airpower may become the force of choice—if not by design, then by default.
Granted, the United States may yet pull a rabbit out of its Iraq-shaped hat, but most observers remain rather skeptical that the latest “surge” will have a decisive impact. So far, the boots we have on the ground have not proved decisive, and the addition of 20,000 more personnel will probably not make much of a difference. At this point, the best-case scenario would involve a withdrawal in some sort of orderly fashion, leaving in place a somewhat democratic regime able to maintain at least a modicum of stability. More-likely scenarios run downhill from there. Undoubtedly, a US withdrawal from Iraq will have broad strategic implications, the repercussions of which will be felt for years to come. Although we have paid much attention to how the future of the Middle East will play out in the wake of our withdrawal, we must also consider the future of a post-Iraq US military.
If we fast-forward a few years to the world after Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the next occupant of the White House faces an international crisis of some sort and seeks to explore the available military options, we have to wonder what sort of menu his or her advisers will offer. It seems highly unlikely that any options calling for the deployment and insertion of large-scale ground forces (multiple brigades) into hostile territory for a lengthy period of time will appear attractive, even if the advisers dare serve them up. Tempered by a largely unsuccessful experience in Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan, our future president, as well as the Army and Marine Corps leadership, will be loath to enter any situation with a high probability of a drawn-out slugfest. The old adage “Never wrestle with a pig in the mud since all you get is dirty, and the pig likes it” will be foremost in their minds. Most likely, the president will look to the Air Force and Navy leadership and say, “What do you have?” Air and naval options will become the weapon of choice, with perhaps a short-term intervention by the Marine Corps a distant second. This same kind of thinking may have already taken hold in Israel, where, given a previous bad experience, leaders selected airpower as the preferred option for the incursion into Lebanon. Once airpower proved unsuccessful, the Israelis tried a ground option with very limited, if any, tactical or strategic success. In this case, a seemingly inferior irregular force defeated—or at least fought to a standstill—a sophisticated, highly technological force that had overwhelming conventional military power.
Of course, many people can assert that such contingencies do not apply to the supporting roles played by the Air Force and Navy in Iraq and Afghanistan today and point to many other situations that air and naval power alone can solve. True, but, at least thus far, it is also true that ground power hasn’t solved the problem either—and may even have made it worse. Instead of “What’s the best mix of sea, air, and land power to deal with a given situation?” the question for the future may become “If I can’t do this with primarily air and naval power, is it really worth doing at all?” Although we might like to pretend that in terms of national security, the ends are fixed and that we must use any necessary means to achieve them, the reality is somewhat less black and white. Short of an invasion by Mexico or Canada, or the direct attack on American soil perpetrated by or closely linked to a nation-state, the future president will always have a choice about whether or not to use force—and, as always, some individuals will counsel against it. Like his or her predecessors, this president will engage in some sort of cost-benefit analysis and come to a decision. However, in a post-Iraq world, perception of the cost of a large-scale ground-combat operation will outweigh almost any conceivable benefit.
This cold calculus would seem almost scenario-independent. If we look at the high end of the spectrum involving conventional conflicts between nation-states—say, for example, the armed forces of the United States versus those of a future peer competitor such as China—we will still have a hard time imagining the deployment of large Army formations to the fight. In a dustup over Taiwan, does anyone seriously contemplate putting the US Army on the ground in mainland China—or even in Taiwan, where it could be surrounded and trapped? The Korean Peninsula represents another possibility, but here the Army would have to get to the fight fast enough to make a difference. The North Koreans have overwhelming numerical superiority in ground forces already in place. If the South Koreans, with help from the small contingent of American ground forces already there and backed up by airpower provided by the Air Force and Navy, can’t stop the North, then the Army won’t have much of a chance to get in the game. We could employ nuclear weapons, a choice that presents a host of additional problems, but even in that event, the Air Force and the Navy would deliver them.
Two other developments, one technological and one demographic, may also make the deployment of large-scale ground forces less likely. Such forces—brigade-sized armor, mechanized troops, and infantry formations—are best suited (indeed, they were the only option in past years) for stopping an enemy’s large-scale ground formations. However, in light of the current and future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at the disposal of the United States, it would seem virtually impossible for a brigade-sized—or perhaps even a battalion-sized—formation to hide anywhere on the planet for very long. (Our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan today barely operate at platoon strength, much less company, brigade, or battalion.) Given the precision-strike capabilities available from the air—and in the near future, even from space—if we can find the enemy brigade, we can likely kill it with near impunity. The best way to stop an enemy tank may not call for another tank, according to the former mantra of the armor community, but a precision-guided bomb dropped from an airplane. The combination of technological advances in both sensor and shooter technologies may have brought the era of combat with large-scale ground formations to a close.
In addition to advancing technology, changing demography is also altering the landscape of combat. According to the United Nations, nearly 3 billion people—50 percent of the world’s population—live in cities, and that number is growing at a rate of 180,000 per day. Between 1990 and 1995 alone, about 260 million people migrated to cities and towns in the developing world. In the developed world, urbanization has leveled off at approximately 75 percent, but in the developing world, where most future conflict will likely occur, the figure is about 35 percent—but increasing rapidly.2 We can logically assume that as more people move to the cities, more conflict will take place there. Short of devastating the place, large-scale ground forces as well as air forces are not well suited to urban environments. The Fulda Gap of Cold War days is being replaced by the Baghdad Alley as the locus of future conflict—and the latter is not a friendly place for either “Big Army” or “Big Air Force,” for that matter. But if Big Army and Big Air Force don’t have roles to play in the urban fights, maybe we shouldn’t get into them at all. Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest not. If we do enter these types of fights, we must rethink the way we do business.
Thomas Barnett has spoken of using a “System Administrator force,” and Gen Charles Krulak, former commandant of the Marine Corps, has written about the “Three Block War.”3 Apparently, these tasks are best suited to rangers, special forces, marines, perhaps light infantry, specialized aviation, and various combat-support and combat-service-support capabilities. If we can’t take a city using these types of forces cooperating with local allies and if we can’t level it with airpower, then we should not attempt to take it in the first place.
Barnett also spoke of needing the “Leviathan” (most likely the Air Force and Navy) when we really have to punch somebody, preferably a nation-state, in the nose.4 If the crisis calls for a sustained air campaign well inland, the Air Force will be the star of the show. In a sense, this is what economists call playing to our comparative advantage. Despite the reputation of American soldiers on the ground as the best around, the small units of highly motivated insurgents and terrorists they face can probably match them in courage and determination, if not skill and training. Our enemies on the ground also possess asymmetric advantages, in that they know the terrain and people in ways we can never match. Furthermore, their moral code, or lack thereof, enables them to hide behind and kill civilians—something we would never ask American soldiers to do.
In the domains where the Air Force operates—air, space, and now cyberspace—it is the best. (As the service’s slogan once said, “No one comes close.”) Our capabilities in those mediums remain unmatched. Although that doesn’t mean we can rest on our laurels, the combination of our technological base, entrepreneurial and innovative economy, and wealth will likely give us the edge in these areas for some time to come. In short, the current fight may belong to the Army and the Marine Corps, but the future may belong to the US Air Force. When the nation needs overt military force, perhaps airpower will become the weapon of first—and last—resort.
Washington, DC
* The author is chief, Strategic Plans, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Public Affairs, Security and Review Division, Washington, DC.
[Feedback? Email the Editor]
Notes
1. Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, E-1 through E-5, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf.
2. “Homo sapiens to Homo urbanus,” Earthbeat, 16 November 2002, http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/stories/s726535.htm.
3. Thomas P. M. Barnett, “Mr. President, Here’s How to Make Sense of Our Iraq Strategy,” Thomas P. M. Barnett: Articles and Books, http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/esquire2004.htm; and Gen Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999, http://www.au.af .mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm.
4. Barnett, “Mr. President.”
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
[ Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor ]
