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Document created: 1 December 2007
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2007

The Coalition Air Force Transition Team

Rebuilding Iraq's Air Force

Maj Gen (sel) Robert R. Allardice, USAF
Maj Kyle "Brad" Head, USAF

Anyone who walks into the dayroom of the Iraqi Air Force’s 2nd Squadron at Taji Air Base would likely see a group of pilots sitting around, talking flying with hand movements (“shooting their watch”), and sipping tea from porcelain glasses—a scene typical of flying squadrons around the world. A closer look would reveal that half of those pilots are American aviators. On this particular day, they recount the events of their mission that called for monitoring the oil pipelines and passionately argue about how to best respond and stay in formation when attacked by a shoulder-fired missile. At 1400, as if on cue, the power goes out, and the discussion ends. The coalition Airmen head back to their offices to put in several hours’ work on the next day’s activities. All in all, it’s just another day in the life of combat aviation advisors as they help build airpower capacity for a partner nation.

In August 1990, Iraq possessed the sixth-largest air force in the world.¹ Battle-hardened from a nearly decade-long war against its arch­rival Iran, the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) maintained and flew some of the most advanced aircraft in the world.² Then it lost most of its air assets in the Gulf War of 1991 and withered and regressed during the decade of United Nations sanctions and no-fly zones, with the expected degradation of Iraq’s once proud air force. By the end of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the aircraft, defense systems, heavy-maintenance capability, and command and control (C2) structure had all disappeared.³ All that remained were a few cratered runways and distant memories of the pre-1991 era.

On 18 August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority’s order number 22 authorized the creation of new Iraqi armed forces, including a new IqAF.⁴ Letters of authorization, however, do not build air forces. Airmen do, when apportioned the appropriate training, education, experience, and resources to assemble the essential elements: technically qualified and motivated Iraqi personnel, adequate infrastructure, mission-suitable aircraft, and all the relevant training systems and tech data necessary to field and sustain a credible force. Despite the Coalition Provisional Authority’s declaration and the United States’ generous gift of three 1960s-vintage C-130s in January 2005, it was not until October 2005 that a United States Central Command Air Forces assessment team was finally able to conduct site surveys in Iraq.⁵ Comprised of functional experts from across the US Air Force, the team rapidly completed its assessment and published a comparative aircraft study two months later, which recommended how best to organize, train, and equip the IqAF to effectively meet the needs of the government of Iraq (GOI).⁶ This document—the baseline for the relationship between the IqAF and the US Air Force—serves as the foundation that defines the mission of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT).⁷

One of the most effective means of fighting and winning the military element of a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment involves training and fielding a competent host-nation security force.⁸ Doing so has the dual effect of increasing the legitimacy of the host-nation government, while simultaneously diminishing the requirement for international/coalition forces, whose presence often only exacerbates the situation.⁹ The CAFTT has the responsibility for assisting the GOI in fielding and employing an air force capable of helping it fight and win the current conflict while laying the foundation for the air force it will need to defend its national sovereignty well into the future. An incredibly complicated process in itself, building an air force in the middle of a war becomes infinitely more complex.

This article provides only a snapshot—an incomplete picture—of the CAFTT’s effort in Iraq today. But the approach developed to ­address the unique challenges facing the IqAF offers a good framework to consider in future situations, if and when the US Air Force finds itself helping a struggling nation build or rebuild an air force. The main lines of operation and lessons learned include examples of what worked and the challenges that still limit rapid progress. Finally, although the CAFTT has only a brief history, we continue to establish baseline recommendations to improve the predeployment training of combat aviation advisors.

The Importance of a Plan

The CAFTT simultaneously operates across the strategic, operational, and tactical spectrums of conventional military activities. Aviation advisors work hand in hand with the chief of the IqAF and his Air Staff to develop the planning and management processes and practices necessary to develop, field, and sustain the IqAF. These advisors also engage with members of the IqAF’s Operational Headquarters to facilitate and envision a functioning air operations center and effective C2, as well as guide the development of the processes and procedures necessary to function at the operational level. Finally, over 200 US Airmen from virtually ­every career field work daily on the flight lines, in the back shops, and in the classrooms—from Basra to Kirkuk and several places in between. Their jobs entail assessing, training, advising, and assisting at the tactical level as well as nurturing the fledgling IqAF’s operations.¹⁰ Coordination of these efforts takes considerable energy and, of course, a plan. In fact, according to an old Arabic proverb, “The journey of 1,000 miles begins with a single step, and a plan.” Planners developed a campaign plan to establish a common sight picture to coordinate and synchronize efforts across the CAFTT (fig. 1).

Figure 1. CAFTT campaign plan

The essence of the plan is the CAFTT’s mission statement: “Build an Iraqi Air Force capable of conducting sustained operations, focused on the COIN fight in the near-term, in order to defeat terrorism and create a stable environment, while setting the conditions for achieving air sovereignty.”¹¹ Expanding on this statement, the CAFTT commander’s intent calls for

To meet this intent, mission analysis yielded the following objectives: (1) build, train, educate, and sustain air operations; (2) exhibit military professionalism; (3) conduct day/night/all-weather COIN operations; and (4) provide the GOI with homeland-defense capabilities.

Fulfilling these objectives requires that the CAFTT operate simultaneously along three lines of operation: (1) the traditional build-train-educate-sustain effort, (2) the operational charge to conduct COIN operations, and (3) the effort to build a force that can protect Iraq’s air sovereignty. Although these lines of operation are complementary and occur to some degree in parallel, the bulk of the CAFTT’s initial effort focused on the first line of operation—building, training, educating, and sustaining air operations. In early 2008, the focus will shift to contributing credible airpower capability to ongoing COIN operations. The homeland-defense mission will take years to develop and will require a genuine commitment by the GOI. Until the IqAF becomes capable of conducting this mission independently, the coalition’s airpower assets will have to weigh the level of synchronization and integration required for continued ongoing operations.

Line of Operation no. 1:
Building, Training, Educating,
and Sustaining

Although this important line of operation will take years to fully realize, the US Air Force, with full cooperation from coalition partners, has made significant progress in a very short time frame. The effort to “build” truly started from the ground. As previously mentioned, the IqAF effectively ceased to exist in 1991 and officially disbanded in the wake of the coalition invasion in 2003. The Coalition Provisional Authority approached former IqAF officers to form the nucleus of the new IqAF’s Air Staff. Following proper screening and vetting, these officers contacted other former members and convinced them to rejoin. Recruiting of new members began in earnest in 2007. The IqAF’s ability to field a credible air force will clearly depend upon its recruitment and retention of quality individuals. Current plans show the IqAF growing from 1,000 to 2,900 members by the end of 2007 and then doubling to almost 6,000 by the end of 2008. To support this rapid growth, the GOI and United States have invested $300 million in construction to provide the necessary infrastructure at each of the IqAF’s four main bases.

The most difficult challenge in building a credible air force entails quality people. Getting the right people, in the right place, at the right time, with the right training and equipment is critical to the success of rebuilding the force. The effort to recruit, educate, train, and integrate technically competent people from this war-torn nation has proven extremely difficult. More specifically, identifying and grooming quality leaders takes considerable time and concentrated effort. To fill the gap between authorized and assigned positions, IqAF leaders were encouraged to reach out to former IqAF members. Unfortunately, the average pilot who returned to the IqAF was approximately 43 years old, with most flying their last sortie—usually in some variant of a MiG—in January 1991. Clearly, rehiring former pilots was not a viable long-term solution. The only realistic approach to filling the gap—a method that allowed the CAFTT to make a lasting change to the culture of the IqAF—involved recruiting and training to produce a new generation of Airmen.

As recruiting efforts began generating qualified candidates, the herculean task of building an entire training and accessions pipeline fell to the 370th Expeditionary Advisory Training Squadron at Taji Air Base, home of the Iraqi Air Force Training School. In March 2007, five members from the 370th started the first Air Force Officers Course at the Iraqi Military Academy (the country’s premier military academy, often referred to as the “Sandhurst in the Sand”) at Ar Rustamiyah. To meet the growing demand for young officers, the CAFTT also developed and won approval from the Iraqi minister of defense to initiate a six-month Officer Training School–style commissioning program geared toward university graduates with engineering degrees. In May 2007, a team of military training instructors from Lackland AFB, Texas, ran the first class of basic military training for 62 janood (the Iraqi equivalent of airmen). The instructors also ­addressed a critical shortage of noncommissioned officers (NCO) by creating a program to enable the IqAF to recruit high-quality candidates for direct commissioning as warrant officers—the IqAF’s top NCO rank.

With the pieces of the accession pipeline falling into place, another flight in the 370th focused on building the basic technical-training pipeline.¹³ A collection of motivated young officers and experienced NCOs drove the process to create the IqAF equivalent of the USAF’s Second Air Force.¹⁴ This Basic Technical Training Branch of the Iraqi Air Force Training School offers a myriad of courses ranging from air-intelligence applications to crash/fire rescue. A group of handpicked experts from across the US Air Force began with a baseline curriculum provided by Air Education and Training Command. Before teaching the courses, however, instructors modified them extensively to account for any IqAF-specific equipment and procedures. Instructors faced all the challenges of teaching in a foreign environment: translating slides into Arabic, learning to teach through interpreters, and remaining sensitive to differences in educational systems and learning styles. Additionally, instructors tailored each course specifically to ensure it provided the knowledge, skills, and abilities required by the IqAF. They did this through collaborative efforts and coordination with their functional counterparts on the CAFTT and IqAF staffs and with continuous input from subject-matter experts in the field. Initially conducted on an ad hoc basis, this process eventually became formalized in a regular series of meetings of an organization known as the Training Integration Working Group.

The final piece of the institutional training puzzle fell into place in October 2007 with the opening of the Flight Training School at Kirkuk. Although the first class started with only a handful of students, the school is structured and designed to produce 130 new pilots each year by the end of 2008. Beginning with basic flight screening in Cessna 172s, students progress through intermediate and advanced training in either a rotary- or fixed-wing track. Understanding that attaining credibility depends upon their ability to produce indigenous pilots, IqAF leaders have already identified several potential instructors.

Beyond conducting formal training in schools, CAFTT members also perform the more traditional missions of aviation advisors, typically performed by the operational aviation detachments of the 6th Special Operations Squadron. In this environment, aircraft maintainers and support personnel—as well as Army, Marine, and Air Force pilots—work side by side with their IqAF counterparts to fly, fix, and sustain the equipment and infrastructure at each base.¹⁵ More than just perform the training mission, these members serve as models for the leadership behaviors they hope the IqAF will adopt.

As late as February 2007, the IqAF effectively consisted of a collection of squadrons at four separate bases that reported directly to the Air Staff. The Iraqis lacked an operational-level C2 capacity to coordinate and prioritize the IqAF’s limited air assets. To fill that void, CAFTT advisors worked hand in hand with their IqAF counterparts to build a modest air operations center collocated with a newly formed IqAF Operational Headquarters in the Victory Base Complex. Attaining initial operational capability in April, the center has become fully integrated into the Iraqi joint force’s joint operations center, handling multiple taskings every day, including flying their C-130 aircraft on the daily air tasking order of US Central Command’s combined force air component commander (CFACC).

As the IqAF develops operational capacity, it becomes increasingly difficult to manage the balance between continuing training and conducting real-world operational missions. The long-term investment of training produces a more capable and effective air force, whereas operations provide an immediate contribution to the COIN fight. This fine balancing act happens every day. Combat aviation advisors commonly find themselves both flying an operational mission in support of COIN and conducting training on one or more crew positions. As the IqAF continues to improve its ability to conduct operational missions and provide credible combat capability, the demand for such services could quickly outstrip its ability to supply them.

Line of Operation no. 2:
Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations

Three distinct phases make up the CAFTT campaign. The first, building operational capacity, runs through December 2008. Major milestones during this phase include developing nonkinetic COIN capabilities focused on conducting battlefield mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions as well as reaching initial operational capability on kinetic COIN.

Although neighboring countries generously provided Seeker and CH-2000 aircraft to get the new IqAF off the ground, it could not conduct traditional air force missions until it received the C-130s from the US Air Force, as mentioned above. These aircraft have flown a variety of missions, such as humanitarian relief, patient transfer, prisoner transfer, airlift of distinguished visitors, troop movements, and resupply. The C-130s recently moved battalions of Iraqi Army troops in support of Operation Fard Al Qanoon and delivered humanitarian-relief supplies in response to an earthquake in Irbil and a cholera outbreak in Sulayminiyah.¹⁶ The most common request for the IqAF’s C-130 airlift involves the transport of distinguished visitors and high-ranking government officials. According to an accepted rule of thumb, the hearts and minds of the host-nation population represent the center of gravity in COIN operations. Transport of distinguished visitors engenders a sense of pride and dignity in these officials and inspires confidence among the population. Seeing one of their own C‑130s, UH-1 “Huey” helicopters, or Mi-17 ­helicopters with the Iraqi flag prominently displayed evokes an instant patriotic reaction. Whether playing soccer in an empty field, shopping in a crowded market, or gathering on their roof-top patios, Iraqis will typically stop whatever they are doing, smile proudly, and wave vigorously at the sight of one of “their” aircraft. More than a largely regionalized army or police force, a credible air force serves as a source of national pride in people looking for something to unite them.

The IqAF recently took ownership of six more Huey IIs, and programming should allow for a total of 48 by the end of 2008. Several of these helicopters will form the 15th Squadron at Taji—a unit specifically trained and equipped to provide rapid response and mobility to the Iraqi special operations forces. Currently training to develop this capability, the squadron will greatly increase the effectiveness of special operations forces, enabling them to operate in the third dimension and quickly transport forces to achieve a desired effect. Special outfitting will permit other Hueys at Taji to perform medical- and casualty-evacuation missions in support of ongoing COIN operations. A recently delivered fleet of Mi-17 helicopters provides a medium-lift capability, which will enable the Iraqi Army to draw much-needed supplies and equipment from the Taji National Depot while avoiding unnecessary convoys on dangerous supply routes laden with improvised explosive devices.

Using a combination of Seekers, CH-2000s, and specially modified Cessna Grand Caravan aircraft, the IqAF offers real-time situational awareness through a combination of surveillance and reconnaissance missions in support of critical oil- and electrical-distribution infrastructure for the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and Ministry of Electricity. Flying a CH-2000 out of Basra on 11 July 2007, Colonel Karim, commander of the IqAF’s 70th Reconnaissance Squadron, spotted a large oil spot in the middle of the desert—a telltale sign of oil theft. As he approached the incident area, he discovered that a band of thieves had poked a hole in a pipeline to suck the oil from the pool and transfer it into waiting tanker trucks. After establishing a surveillance orbit, Colonel Karim called members of his squadron, who contacted the Iraqi police. He stayed on station, conducted real-time surveillance, and guided the police to the scene, where they apprehended the suspects. The Ministry of Oil estimates that the GOI loses approximately $10 billion each year due to oil theft. Small victories like this one serve not only to increase the credibility of the IqAF but also to provide a much-needed service to the GOI.

CAFTT program managers are currently working with IqAF leadership to acquire several aircraft through the foreign military sales program for the purpose of increasing the range of operational effects at the IqAF’s disposal. The latter include the production of kinetic effects with weapons such as guns, rockets, or— eventually—precision-guided munitions. As these kinetic capabilities become operational, the CAFTT will shift its emphasis from building initial operational capability to sustaining ongoing operations and training.

Line of Operation no. 3:
Providing Homeland Defense

No nation can remain truly sovereign if it cannot protect its own airspace. Key elements of homeland defense include airspace control, air defense, and air interdiction. As the GOI stabilizes and fields a competent security force capable of COIN, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) coalition will seek to reduce the size and scope of its military presence. In the airpower arena, until the GOI can perform basic functions such as air traffic control and weather operations, or more advanced functions such as air defense, the US Air Force and other CFACC coalition and US airpower assets will continue to fill the gap. Building an air force capable of homeland defense requires national will, as well as the proper resources to field and support the people and equipment that are core to Air Force operations and sustainment. Only the GOI and its leadership can determine when, and to what level, they want to invest in this range of capabilities.

Observations from the Field

Most importantly, US Airmen must prepare themselves to advocate the role of airpower from the very beginning of an operation. Airmen know that the measure of success lies not totally in the numbers of the coaliton ground forces in Iraq but in the effects brought to bear by the force as a whole.¹⁷ Some members of the joint force may not be fully informed about the inherent and wide-ranging capabilities that airpower brings to COIN operations. All Airmen, regardless of their specialty, must see themselves as advocates who know how to explain airpower’s critical role in COIN operations and the successes that are enabled by integrating the inherent speed, range, flexibility, and maneuver of an air force into those operations.

Traditionally, foreign internal defense falls into the realm of Army special forces, with specialized combat aviation advisors coming from Air Force Special Operations Command—most recently the 6th Special Operations Squadron. One hallmark of the special operations community is that it handpicks members who have excelled in their operational specialties and runs them through an extensive screening process. Those who pass the test then endure extensive, extremely rigorous training before going on their first real-world mission. Given the growing demand for this capability in Iraq and Afghanistan—which recently began rebuilding the Afghan National Army Air Corps—and with the new Africa Command looming on the horizon, requirements for foreign internal defense may quickly exceed the capacity of the special operations community as currently sized.

Is the US Air Force ready to embrace foreign internal defense as a growing mission that will be around for years to come? In a deployed war zone characterized by minimally manned functional areas, we must fill these jobs with the right people with the right skill sets and background. In the long run, the US Air Force may decide to build a large standing corps of advisors specifically trained and equipped to carry out this mission; however, in the short run, it must continue to conduct these specialized missions on an ad hoc basis, using existing line personnel.¹⁸ This situation will drive much-needed changes to the selection process and training pipeline for future advisors. Advising in an Arabic culture, where the strength of one’s relationships (which take time to develop) denotes the measure of one’s power, demands that future advisors serve tour lengths commensurate with appropriate objectives. The US Air Force must adjust its personnel system to effectively screen for people with the aptitude to excel in these critical jobs; furthermore, these members need to hit the ground running, ready to sprint a marathon.

Embracing the fact that a majority of its advisors will come from regular forces, the US Army has created a three-month training pipeline for them. The course starts at Fort Riley, Kansas, two months before a scheduled deployment, taught by instructors fresh from the field, who bring a wealth of current knowledge and expertise to share with those in the deployment pipeline. Attending training together as a unit has the effect of building the team before it deploys and gives advisors an opportunity to develop networks they can leverage after arriving in-theater. A five-day layover in Kuwait allows additional specialized tactical training, including convoy and combat lifesaving. Army advisors in Iraq spend their first week in country at the Phoenix Academy at Taji, where they attend briefings by the commander of MNF-I and his senior staff, along with a select group of subject-matter experts that includes members of the departing advisory team. The academy covers a range of subjects, such as organization of coalition and Iraqi security forces, policies and procedures of the Iraqi security forces, advanced COIN and advisor skills, and additional briefings on the most current insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures.¹⁹

The CAFTT’s predeployment training continues to evolve. The first wave of advisors attended a customized five-week course; later groups received only the weeklong Middle East Orientation Course; and the most recent group underwent two weeks of training generally designed for combat-convoy commanders. As Air Education and Training Command gathers feedback from each group, it continues to adjust the length and focus of predeployment training. While designing this training, the US Air Force must conduct a risk-reward assessment to balance competing demands between, on the one hand, dramatic and potentially lifesaving combat skills that advisors probably will not use, and, on the other hand, more mundane practical skills that comprise advisors’ core competencies.

To assure its effectiveness, we must specifically tailor future advisor training to the challenges and realities of the unique environment as well as the particular mission—principally, cultural awareness.²⁰ Beyond merely learning a few key words and phrases, which earn them instant credibility, advisors must understand several perspectives: what they believe about their counterparts, what they believe about themselves, what their counterparts believe about them, and what their counterparts believe about themselves.²¹

Gaining a better understanding of their Iraqi counterparts requires that future CAFTT advisors possess general knowledge of the history of the Middle East, with a specific focus on the development of Islam and Arab history—which are not the same thing.²² A basic understanding of tribal-based societies with an emphasis on social-network analysis helps in understanding the overlapping and competing spheres of influence at play in this complex culture. The ability to see the informal networks behind the formal bureaucracy enables advisors to more effectively comprehend and influence the behavior of their IqAF counterparts. The development of sufficient cross-­cultural communication skills might benefit from role-playing scenarios wherein advisors practice speaking through an interpreter and negotiate with someone raised in an Arab culture.²³

Given that their role involves helping the IqAF build an effective COIN force, advisors must know and understand the general principles and specific airpower applications in a COIN environment.²⁴ The US Air Force currently lacks a doctrinal framework to guide the building of a COIN air force.²⁵ The recently released Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, and AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, 15 September 2007, represent a start in the doctrinal framework required for building fledgling air forces; however, the specific mission area of “building partnership capacity” requires further thought and may warrant its own doctrine.

A majority of the CAFTT’s flying aviation advisors never served in the 6th Special Operations Squadron, and several had never learned basic tactics. They arrived lacking basic skills necessary to operate in a combat zone, much less train Iraqi pilots to function in this environment. Aviation-related air advisors require tactical flying training in the continental United States (CONUS) to avoid longer-than-necessary theater indoctrinations that expend the host nation’s limited flying hours. Bare-minimum qualifications for ongoing consideration should include practicing strafing patterns, formation flying with night-vision goggles, and low-level threat analysis performed in the CONUS. Aircraft mechanics find themselves working on a variety of general-aviation aircraft unlike anything they have seen before. Providing airframe and power-plant commercial certifications not only would produce better-qualified advisors but also would serve as an incentive for potential volunteers.

The US Air Force can no longer afford to treat the advisory mission as a niche endeavor; rather, we must embrace it as a core competency of our twenty-first-century Air Force. Current geopolitical reality suggests that the need for a highly qualified advisor corps will grow significantly in the near future.²⁶ Effectively engaging these opportunities will require a well-thought-out doctrine that explains how airpower, beyond US Air Force–unique capabilities, contributes to COIN operations and concentrates specifically on building fledgling COIN air forces. The US Air Force owes it to future advisors to make available both the general skills and specialized training necessary to excel in their jobs. To do it right, the service also will have to provide sufficient manpower and resources.

Iraq is a nation torn by a stifling combination of insurgency, terrorism, and communal conflict—all within the confines of a failed state.²⁷ No one knows what the future holds for that country; however, Airmen understand that no state or government will remain truly sovereign unless it can control and defend its own airspace. Building an air force capable of responding across the spectrum of operations in Iraq’s complex environment differs fundamentally from anything the US Air Force has prepared the current generation of Airmen to accomplish. Like previous generations, today’s Airmen are rapidly stepping up to the challenge.

Until Iraq can fully defend its own air sovereignty, US Air Force–led coalition air assets will likely assist the IqAF in maintaining a protective umbrella. Meanwhile, CAFTT members will continue performing one of the most challenging, exciting, and rewarding jobs in today’s air force.²⁸ Embracing the mission of building or shaping a partner’s airpower capacity, if required, as a critical component of any successful irregular-warfare campaign demands that the US Air Force leverage the lessons learned by the CAFTT and consider institutionalizing this capability.

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1. “Reaching Globablly,Reaching Powerfully:The United States Air Force in the Gulf War: A Report, September 1991,” 28 August 1997, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/desstorm.htm.

2. For more on the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, see Maj Ronald E. Bergquist, The Role of Airpower in the Iran-Iraq War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1988), http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/ aupress/Books/Bergquist/Bergquist_B25.pdf.

3. For a fascinating after-action review of Operation Iraqi Freedom, see Kevin M. Woods with Michael R. Pease, The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam’s Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006).

4. “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army” (Baghdad, Iraq: Coalition Provisional Authority, 18 August 2003), http://www .iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22
_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

5. For a comprehensive history on the genesis of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team’s mission, see Michael Bauer, Training the Iraqi Air Force: Lessons from a U.S. C-130 Advisory Mission, Policy Focus no. 71 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2007).

6. Operational Assessment of the Iraqi Air Force (Shaw AFB, SC: US Central Command Air Forces, 30 October 2005).

7. CAFTT falls under the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a major subordinate component of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), under the command of Gen David Petraeus, USA, who previously stood up and commanded MNSTC-I. The latter has the overall responsibility for training, mentoring, and developing the Iraqi security apparatus, a subset of nation building commonly referred to as foreign internal defense.

8. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 / Marine Corps War­fighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, 6-1, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf.

9. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007, 15, https://www.doctrine.af. mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-3.pdf.

10. Ibid., 28.

11. “Coalition Air Force Transition Team: Iraq Campaign Plan, 2007–2015,” 16 August 2007, 7.

12. Ibid., 10.

13. For a good historical study on the development of tech training to support the Vietnamese Air Force, see Capt Drue L. DeBerry, “Vietnamese Air Force Technical Training, 1970–1971,” Air University Review, January–February 1973, http://www.airpower.
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1973/jan-feb/deberry.html.

14. Second Air Force is the command responsible for conducting basic technical training for the entire US Air Force.

15. US Army National Guard officers and warrant officers are the primary instructors on the Bell Jet Ranger helicopters at Taji and Kirkuk. The US Marines recently provided several pilots with tactical experience to advise the IqAF’s Huey II pilots at Taji.

16. Operation Fard Al Qanoon refers to the Iraqi Army’s operations in conjunction with the surge in coalition forces in the summer of 2007.

17. As of early September 2007, about 6,000 Airmen were assigned to MNF-I, which boasts a total force of approximately 170,000 personnel.

18. For a proposed comprehensive approach to establishing a standing corps of army advisors, see John A. Nagl, “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007); and Lt Col Norman J. Brozenick Jr., “Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 2002).

19. This description is based on discussions with the cadre and staff of the Phoenix Academy during a site visit and review of the academy’s program of instruction on 25 April 2006.

20. For an excellent summary of the importance of cultural awareness in stability operations, see Maj Jennifer V. Chandler, “Why Culture Matters: An Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program” (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005).

21. Ike Skelton and Jim Cooper, “You’re Not from Around Here, Are You?” Joint Force Quarterly, issue 36 (first quarter 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/ 0436.pdf; and Moshe Sharon, “Negotiating in the Bazaar,” Jerusalem Post, 10 October 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 1159193413129&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter.

22. For a good primer on this subject, see Edward V. Badolato, “Learning to Think Like an Arab Muslim: A Short Guide to Understanding the Arab Mentality,” March 2004, http://www.blackwaterusa.com/btw2004/articles/0503arabs.html.

23. For further reading on this subject, see Lt Gen David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review, January–February 2006, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb06/Petraeus1.pdf; David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” http://www.smallwarsjournal.com /documents/28articles.pdf; Capt Ryan T. Kranc, “Advising Indigenous Forces,” Small Wars Journal 8 (May 2007), http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v8/kranc-swjvol8-excerpt.pdf; and Sgt Robert M. Massie, “Advice for Advisors: Lessons Learned from a Tour with the New Iraqi Army,” Marine Corps
Gazette, July 2007, http://www.marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/ marinecorpsgazette/200707/?pg=44.

24. For the definitive work on this subject from an airpower perspective, see James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003). For further readings on the general principles, see David Kilcullen, “Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival 48, no. 4 (December 2006): 111–30, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content? content =10.1080/00396330601062790.

25. Maj Kenneth Beebe, “The Air Force’s Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 27–34, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf; and Lt Col Wray R. Johnson, “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense?” Airpower Journal 11, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 66–85, http://www.airpower.maxwell .af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj97/spr97/johnson.pdf.

26. For options on how best to organize this capability, see Col Billy Montgomery, “USAF Irregular Warfare Concept,” White Paper (Hurlburt Field, FL: Air Force Special Operations Command, May 2007), http://www.excaliburrd .com/docs/AT-6Project/AFSOCWhitePaperUSAFIrregular Warfare.pdf; and Alan J. Vick et al., Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/ 2006/RAND_MG509.pdf.

27. Dr. David Kilcullen, “A Framework for Thinking about Iraq Strategy,” Small Wars Journal Blog, 12 January 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/a-framework -for-thinking-about.

28. For regular updates on the overall effort to build the Iraqi security forces, see MNSTC-I’s Advisor at http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/advisor.htm.