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Document created: 1 March 2007
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2007

Lt Gen Robert J. Elder Jr., USAF

Much has been written regarding the use of effects-based operations (EBO) theory and processes. In this article, I offer an operational perspective based on my experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom during major combat operations and follow-on operations. I have seen EBO used successfully as a command philosophy that enables a military commander to employ all elements of power in a self-adaptive way to meet tactical, operational, strategic, and even political objectives appropriate to the level of command. I recognize that considering EBO as a “command” or “leadership” philosophy differs from the standard understanding of the concept. In fact, Joint Forces Command removed EBO from its glossary in February 2006 and replaced its Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 7, Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (EBO), 17 November 2004, with the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations, 24 February 2006. This effects-based approach to joint operations focuses on improving our ability to affect an adversary’s behavior and/or capabilities through the integrated application of select instruments of national power; it also connects strategic and operational objectives with operational and tactical tasks by identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational environment. It is thought to apply primarily at the operational and strategic levels and have minimum impact on how tactical commanders apply their ways and means to accomplish tactical tasks. This approach addresses the science of EBO, but the art of effects-based war fighting involves using effects-based principles not only for planning but also for guiding all of our actions, particularly in joint, multinational, and multiagency operations.

I’ve watched successful commanders use EBO as a leadership or command philosophy to improve intelligence employment, incorporate operational assessment as a key part of strategy development, and conduct influence operations. In fact, I argue that every action is ultimately part of the combined/joint force commander’s (CFC) overall influence operation. Since actions can produce either favorable or adverse effects, EBO performs the ­important function of ensuring that all participants in military and international security operations remain sensitive to the potential strategic consequences of their actions.

Iraqi Freedom further demonstrated the utility of EBO concepts to provide opportunities for innovation—in particular, creative approaches to integrate multiservice, multi­national, and multiagency capabilities in an evolving security environment. As we move from joint integration to joint interdependency and from multiservice jointness to multiagency Jointness (with a capital “J”), EBO will serve as a key transformational enabler. It will become very difficult to determine which service or agency is “decisive” in a given operation; in fact, the concept of supporting and supported commands, at least in the traditional sense, is already becoming an anachronism.

Effects-Based Operations as a
Command Philosophy

The Army’s Gen Tommy Franks, the CFC, worked closely with his components to ensure clear understanding of the joint force’s operational objectives in the context of effects he desired to achieve. Although individual components were designated as the supported command for each objective, all components received encouragement to collaborate and offer innovative joint approaches to achieve contributing effects. For example, special operations forces (SOF) had responsibility for the protection of oil fields in northern Iraq, but a “blanket” of air assets operating in close coordination with ground controllers enabled a small force to control a large territorial area. In the west, the combined force air component commander (CFACC) served as the designated commander for theater missile defense, but SOF forces closely integrated themselves to provide “sensors” for possible targets. I was impressed that General Franks understood the importance of dialoguing with political leadership regarding the objectives as well as conversing with his component commanders regarding the effects; furthermore, he counted on his subordinate commanders to collaborate and devise integrated joint capabilities to achieve those effects quickly and efficiently. This shared understanding of objectives and effects enabled unprecedented joint-force integration and cooperation.

For example, tasked to provide air superiority for the ground assault, the Air Force’s Gen T. Michael Moseley, the CFACC, recognized that traditional air operations in advance of ground maneuver would not support the CFC’s objective to protect the oil fields in the south. Therefore, he worked with the ground forces to develop a plan that called for near-simultaneous air-ground attack on 19 March 2003. Less well known are the preparatory actions that began in June 2002, conducted as part of Operation Southern Watch, to reestablish air superiority in southern Iraq—crucial to achieving both objectives. In summary, we attained both desired effects by using nontraditional means, thanks to the cooperation of the components. Potentially ­negative effects of traditional air-superiority actions to fulfill the objective of protecting the oil fields led General Moseley, along with other component commanders, to devise an innovative, nontraditional joint alternative.

At Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), Gen Thomas Metz, USA, took a proactive approach to EBO when he appointed an Army general officer as director of his effects-coordination cell and an Air Force colonel as deputy. Before this time, the CFC had only air-support requests available to coordinate and prioritize air actions across his divisions. By establishing and prioritizing a system of desired effects, division commanders and the CFACC could integrate their actions in a manner that optimized fulfillment of the CFC’s priorities. Over time, MNC-I established a regular effects-­management process that provided commanders prioritized effects and recommended weights of efforts for joint operations. Ground-liaison elements at the combined air operations center (CAOC) and air-liaison elements with the ground units adapted existing joint and service tactics, techniques, and procedures to increase interoperability, effectiveness, and availability of joint effects across the area of responsibility.

Note that all of these commanders—Generals Franks, Moseley, and Metz—enabled EBO through their command philosophy, which cascaded to their staffs and units, just as operational risk management (ORM) programs—a concept parallel to EBO—cascade from commanders to every person in an operational unit. The success of ORM depends upon the commander’s establishing it as a (priority) command philosophy. Unit members at all levels must undergo training in its planning and execution. The same approach holds true for EBO because its effectiveness relies upon the full commitment of commanders, training (at all levels) in the positive and negative aspects of tactical actions, capable planning tools, and continuous application and assessment during execution.

Intelligence Employment

Because some significant effects-based accomplishments occurred in the intelligence mission area, relatively few people know about them. As one senior intelligence officer in the CAOC noted, except for the engagement itself, the elements of the “find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess” effects chain are primarily, albeit not exclusively, intelligence operational processes. This point illustrates not only the importance of intelligence for successful EBO but also the value of EBO as a powerful tool to improve ways of fully integrating all intelligence processes to support military operations and command objectives.

The first three elements of the chain are worth highlighting. “Find” primarily denotes an integrated intelligence-analysis/operations process that utilizes surveillance sensors such as RC-135 Rivet Joint and E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft; however, sensors in space and on the ground, including human intelligence, can contribute significant data as well. “Fix,” also an intelligence-intensive process, includes determining geolocation, establishing positive identification, and perhaps determining intent. Either reconnaissance or surveillance assets (or both) may lead the “track” process. Our ability to track adversary assets ensures that we maintain positive identification and the ability to engage at a place and time of our choosing. Frequent misunderstandings arise when we expect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms—which carry surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking sensors for data collection—to produce fully analyzed, final intelligence products. ISR is an operations/intelligence process focused on collecting and analyzing current situational data; the platforms are simply sources of data that may require additional verification prior to our taking action.

Following the end of major combat operations, we found it difficult to conduct fix-and-track operations because the best platform to provide data for that mission, the RQ-1 Predator, remained in high demand for surveillance applications, for which it was not particularly well suited. By demonstrating that we could meet many surveillance needs with alternative sensors, we freed the Predators to perform the mission that best suited them. The employment of EBO concepts demonstrated the value of conducting actions with Predator alternatives to achieve desired effects.

The “find” mission also benefited from EBO techniques. Rather than using various sensors and sources of information simply to collect data for subsequent analysis, we “cross-cued” them tactically to help focus search efforts. EBO offered a methodology to understand the actions we expected of an adversary and to establish a framework for linking otherwise random pieces of information. Cross-cueing very small signatures based on our adversaries’ patterns of activity allowed us to perceive almost imperceptible actions, “amplify” or “spotlight” them, and then determine if they warranted focused reconnaissance or other intelligence collection.

Operational Assessment

EBO, which improved the approach to overall operational-assessment efforts, proved instrumental in constantly improving and adapting joint operations. To enable the use of effects-based assessment (EBA), whereby documenting “effects-action” linkages pays the greatest dividends, the CAOC’s Strategy Division shifted the air operations directive (AOD) from a strategy-to-task format to an ­effects-action format. Building these effects-action matrices was time consuming, but they led to implementation of a highly effective ­operational-assessment regime. The remaining challenge lay in determining useful measures of effectiveness to associate with each effect; this process served us well in examining our activities, identifying shortfalls, and brainstorming opportunities for improvement.

We also found that subjecting these measures to EBA processes helped foster innovation. By exposing our entire team to issues in an easily understood form, we allowed people to contribute ideas, and those diverse perspectives helped create joint actions that produced effects requested by the CFC. We found that these innovation sessions permitted different service organizations to coordinate their capabilities in ways that achieved potent synergistic effects.

We used EBA to provide a viable alternative to “bean counting” as a means of assessing progress. For example, in Afghanistan we had to count the number of aircraft destroyed even though the remaining aircraft could not operate from the airfield or pose any threat to coalition forces. In Iraq, we evolved to the point that we concerned ourselves with effects: it really didn’t matter that aircraft were on the ground; if they couldn’t fly or otherwise pose a threat, we had achieved the desired effect. Similarly, we did not concern ourselves with the number of tanks destroyed. The desired effect called for removing them from the fight; once a unit surrendered, it no longer posed a threat, and we did not regard it as such.

We also established a daily AOD in conjunction with MNC-I that we found quite effective. We updated the AOD weekly but prepared a supplement each evening to guide the air planners’ development of the next day’s air tasking order (ATO). The AOD also helped units better understand their assigned tasks and the ways their missions related to each other. Acting on behalf of the CFC, MNC-I issued prioritized effects each day. The CAOC still processed air-support requests but worked with the fire/effects coordination cell at MNC-I to recommend weights of effort for each prioritized effect so as to best meet the CFC’s requirements. Once approved by MNC-I, we used these prioritized effects and weights of effort to construct an apportionment matrix to plan and execute the ATO. Planners understood the desired effects, division commanders understood the CFC’s intent, and aircrews understood the effects that their tasked actions should produce. The AOD also served very well as a communication tool that enabled the CFACC to command and control air in an optimum manner. Use of the daily AOD serves as a striking example of how the CFC and component commanders can use the concepts underlying EBO to command their forces in a way that allows adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances.

Influence Operations

It is easy to argue that attempts to conduct any type of effective influence operation at the operational or strategic level require the use of EBO in one form or another. Although we tend to focus on the desired effects of influence operations, we clearly need to consider the undesired effects of our actions as well. Virtually every action contributes to some effect, and, of course, not all effects are desirable. So by using an effects-based approach to plan operations that maximize our ability to influence the behavior of our adversaries and other affected actors, we can examine the linkage of each action and thus identify both desired and undesired effects. Iraqi Freedom offers some good examples of how we used EBO to influence our adversaries and the civilian population.

For instance, during that operation many Iraqi forces surrendered without a fight. The CFC intended to maneuver to Baghdad quickly, so the land-force commander worked with all components to minimize the time necessary to render opposition forces combat ineffective. Rather than do this through attrition, the land-component commander developed a plan to encourage quick surrender by calling on the joint force’s full range of capabilities to convince the enemy of the futility of fighting. This successful influence operation occurred through a combination of information techniques reinforced by clear demonstrations of superior force. Similarly, because we persuaded the Iraqi air force not to engage coalition forces, its leaders grounded their airplanes, which allowed nonfighter aircraft to fly in Iraqi airspace. This enhanced their effectiveness and contributed to the speedy advance of ground troops into Baghdad.

We also successfully employed EBO during the Iraqi elections to influence both the civilian population and our potential adversaries through a series of ground-force and airpower operations. The desired effects called for encouraging the population to vote and discouraging adversaries from disrupting the elections. In the first case, aircraft flew patrols at medium altitudes near polling locations, with their presence highlighted by forces on the ground. In the second case, fighter aircraft operated near suspected trouble areas at lower altitudes to demonstrate the coalition forces’ resolve that the elections would proceed without incident. Although we can’t quantitatively assess the specific contribution of the air patrols, we know that we realized the desired effects through combined actions of the joint force.

Dynamic Operations
(Strategic Effects from
Tactical Actions)

Despite the attention paid to effects-based planning, effects-based analysis proved particularly beneficial by helping all participants in military operations to consider the effects of their actions on overall objectives at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We must realize that unintended consequences of our actions may actually disrupt otherwise well-conceived plans to achieve the CFC’s objectives.

We prepare flight plans fully expecting that we will need to deviate from them. The same holds true for execution of our military operations: when we work the linkages and explain the effects to everyone involved in our operations, we give them the equivalent of a flight plan—a set of guidelines leading towards our ultimate objectives. Armed with this “road map,” individuals confronted with unexpected situations and forced to deviate from their original plans can still act in a way that supports the commander’s intent, produces the desired effects, and lessens the chance that their actions will undermine those of others working towards the same objectives. Not every individual needs to understand the linkages, measures of effectiveness, or distinction between contributing nodes and primary nodes, but everyone should appreciate how his or her actions can either contribute to or detract from achieving those effects.

Multiservice Integration

Unquestionably, EBO improves multi­service integration: having all components in a joint force working together to achieve common objectives and effects obviously provides a focused sense of direction and unity of effort. We’ve all heard the story of how different services might interpret a similar order, such as “secure the building.” Although we tell that story in jest, in reality, without explaining our objectives in greater detail, we can expect each component to interpret them differently, based on its own perspective of the situation. With EBO, we can better define that situation by using objectives and effects accompanied by clear measures of effectiveness that all components can readily understand.
We all recall the great concern about the possibility of missile launches from Iraq’s western desert against countries friendly to the United States. One objective involved ensuring that no country would do anything that could destabilize the coalition. The prevention of missile launches was the only effect with a high probability of meeting this objective. After the components quickly determined that none of them could meet this objective alone, the CFACC was assigned responsibility for it with the support of SOF forces, which provided strategic reconnaissance to detect possible missile movements, and airpower postured itself to engage the launchers upon detection. Enabling this ability required incredible intelligence preparation of the battlespace, superb communications, a highly responsive command and control (C2) network, and phenomenal teamwork. It worked—no launches occurred.

Similar cooperation between the air component and SOF personnel took place in northern Iraq, but in this case SOF served as the engagement force while air offered support in the form of overhead sensors. Here the objectives included preventing ethnic violence as well as damage to the oil fields. This combination leveraged capabilities of the relatively small component forces, allowing the production of much greater effects than any one force could achieve alone.

EBO also fostered solid ground and air ­cooperation in cordon operations. With regard to the cordoning of large areas, the land-component commander developed a joint approach that capitalized on the strengths of air and ground forces and collectively mitigated many of their weaknesses. In most cases, air forces could take actions to ensure that items of interest did not leave the area until ground forces responded or until personnel tracked items to their destination for subsequent ground-force action. Platforms such as JSTARS aircraft, other nontraditional sensors, and Predators significantly leveraged the capabilities of ground forces with whom they worked. It would have been difficult for either the ground or air forces to conduct this mission alone; together, however, they proved quite effective.

Air and ground forces also worked together in the infrastructure-protection mission. Clearly, protecting such assets as oil pipelines and electrical power lines—both of particular interest to the CFC—using ground forces alone would prove difficult due to the large areas involved. However, by working with closely integrated support from the CFACC, the land-component commander significantly reduced infrastructure attacks. In general, aircraft with targeting pods could monitor large areas, identify activities that required detailed examination, and vector ground forces to the area of concern. When aircraft flying patrol routes over Iraq detected unusual activity around pipelines or power lines, they would make their presence known and call for ground forces to respond. In short order, the insurgents learned that after aircraft had spotted them, ground forces would soon arrive. Had the desired effect entailed killing or capturing the insurgents, we would have used different actions; however, since all forces understood that we wished to prevent attacks on the infrastructure, these integrated joint tactics proved quite successful.

The value of using one force to serve as the sensor and another to perform engagement actions emerged as a common theme. As described earlier, SOF and air forces worked together effectively, the former providing strategic reconnaissance to cue indirect fires from air assets overhead and the latter operating sensors to extend the “view” of forces on the ground. We can attribute the success of these operations to a leadership philosophy that stressed joint integration and the tasking of effects rather than specific actions. Tasked to determine the best way to achieve those effects rather than simply acting on specific tasks assigned by the CFC staff, the components planned the actions together, thus allowing the joint force much more adaptability.

Multiagency Jointness

EBO can also serve as an enabler for multi­agency operations. C2 becomes complex in these situations because the CFC does not actually control all the assets involved in the operation. However, if the CFC can work with other participating agencies to reach consensus on the objectives, effects, and measures of effectiveness, then he or she can use that agreement as a means of aligning the activities of all agencies involved. We have observed some success in this area with the use of provisional reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. Additionally, we’ve seen this kind of shared understanding of objectives and desired effects build a foundation for cooperation among intelligence-agency activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Moving Forward

Although I’ve argued that more effective EBO requires a holistic approach based on a commitment to this philosophy from the CFC, the development of methodical, standardized processes to tie actions to effects remains critically important. A standard methodology will allow members from all components and even non–Department of Defense (DOD) agencies in the field to conduct cooperative actions that complement one another to meet the CFC’s and national objectives. A standardized approach will enable easier communication among combined/joint/coalition components and other agencies; moreover, it will allow all players to document their activities in a way that is readily distributed and shared. Such tools will permit commanders at all levels to monitor effects-based planning performed at subordinate levels to assure that it meets the supported commander’s objectives and desired effects. We establish flight plans to serve as points of departure for coordinating our actions with other agencies in situations that require changes from the planned routing. The same is true of EBO planning tools, which offer a road map for personnel at the tactical level to deal with situations that prevent the originally planned actions from taking place (including possible undesirable effects) and that communicate revised actions to joint partners.

Clearly, establishing mechanisms to determine, distribute, and explain objectives to the entire joint force is important to the effectiveness of any mission-order approach to military operations. It also remains a critical element of both EBO, particularly those operations that require close coordination across components and agencies, and the characteristically dynamic situations encountered in war fighting. In the air-operations business, we know that the ATO is truly effective when every crew member who reads it actually understands the commander’s intent. As desired effects become more complex, as strategy becomes more sensitive to undesired effects, and as actions become more interdependent, then attaining such understanding becomes both increasingly important and difficult.

Additionally, Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that EBO does not deal solely with “kinetic” or physical engagement. In fact, the EBO approach proves particularly useful in developing intelligence processes that not only respond to operational commanders’ needs but also allow intelligence operators and analysts to take a more proactive posture. We need our intelligence community to focus its efforts on “knowledge creation” rather than simply data collection and intelligence applications. This is particularly important as we attempt to fuse data from multiple sources, some originating outside the DOD, to enable precise actions in the dynamic environment of postconflict stability operations and preconflict shaping and deterrence operations. We are seeing great work in this area. More extensive use of effects-based methodologies and increased integration of operational and analytic intelligence activities will significantly enhance these efforts.

Furthermore, EBO can enable a shift from a traditional, hierarchical C2 structure to a command, control, and influence (C2I) approach that facilitates more effective operations with non-DOD agencies or the integration of highly compartmented and conventional military actions. In the latter, we can integrate compartmented effects into overall plans to allow proper coordination while safeguarding techniques used to achieve the desired effects. We found the ATO an effective tool to ensure the coordination of effects with air and space forces in this manner. But the C2I “influence” area is ripe for additional work. Clearly, in the military, we grew up with a hierarchical C2 structure that has worked well for us. As we become involved with more complex activities involving non-DOD and even nongovernmental agencies, these hierarchical approaches to C2 simply aren’t adequate. Use of EBO can act as an enabling function to establish effective C2I networks. The key here lies in negotiating with our partners, obtaining agreement on the desired effects, and then establishing a mechanism that allows each agency to coordinate its actions with the other participants to achieve those effects. Coordinating mechanisms such as effects boards have already proven effective within the military to coordinate component activities. There’s no reason to believe that they wouldn’t work across the spectrum of diplomatic, informational, economic, and similar nonmilitary activities when dealing with non-DOD agencies. Of course, attaining full effectiveness will require some cultural changes, particularly within the military, but EBO can provide a foundation for the necessary negotiations to enable the full range of Joint (with a capital “J”) and coalition capabilities to integrate and meet overall strategic and operational objectives.

It seems clear that influence operations benefit from an EBO approach, but in a strategic sense, isn’t EBO in large part a process to influence our adversaries and potential adversaries? When we take into account collateral effects, isn’t it also about how we influence the international community, including our friends—even our own countrymen? Certainly, when one examines war fighting and other military operations at the strategic and political levels, the objectives of EBO appear to closely resemble those associated with higher-level influence operations. To reiterate an obvious point, tactical actions can have major consequences at the operational and strategic levels. Therefore, as we discuss EBO and work to establish standard methodologies, it is useful to remember that such operations ultimately seek to influence behaviors so we can achieve our objectives at the operational and strategic (and even the tactical) levels. This perspective is important because regardless of the level, all personnel involved with military operations must remain sensitive to the impact of their actions at any other level, including the political.

In summation, all commanders who successfully employed EBO during Iraqi Freedom did so largely because they adopted a command philosophy that enabled them to adapt, integrate, and utilize all available elements of power to meet their objectives. It’s time to institutionalize the concepts they employed, develop standardized methodologies, and educate participants at all levels so that in future campaigns we can take joint, coalition, and even multiagency operations to higher planes of efficiency and effectiveness.

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