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Document created: 1 September 2007
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2007

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.8,
Counter–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations

The threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons by hostile regimes and terrorists represents one of the most difficult challenges facing our nation and our Air Force.” So observes Maj Gen Allen G. Peck, commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in the foreword to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.8, Counter–Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations, 26 January 2007.¹ This publication substantially revises and significantly improves its predecessor, published on 16 August 2000. The new doctrine document replaces the previous Air Force approach to counter–chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (C-CBRN) operations with a more robust methodology and provides Air Force–specific guidance for those operations.

Chapter 1 introduces the concept of Air Force pillars for C-CBRN operations as well as their relationship to joint mission areas, and chapters 2–6 elaborate upon those matters. These interlinked, operational-level pillars—proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management—are designed to support the overarching guidance provided in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [2006]); they also support the pillars identified in Joint Publication 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 July 2004, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002). The earlier edition of AFDD 2-1.8 addressed proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, and passive defense as major components to counter hostile nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) operations. The revised and expanded document adds consequence management and treats all five areas as pillars supporting an overall strategy, thus bringing AFDD 2-1.8 into closer alignment with national strategy and joint doctrine. Moreover, the earlier version devoted only five pages to proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, and passive defense, while the latest covers the five pillars in 32 pages. Clearly, measures to prevent proliferation or actions taken to deter, deny, degrade, destroy, or defend against CBRN weapons are important, but the inclusion of consequence management in the revised AFDD gives an expeditionary air force critical understanding of how to manage and mitigate the consequences of an attack.

The new document also describes, albeit briefly, the strategic enablers (intelligence, international partnerships, and strategic communications) that underpin the five pillars and enhance the Air Force’s C-CBRN operations. Its predecessor discussed only the use of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets and counter-NBC terrorism as crosscutting elements that could affect the components of counter-NBC operations. Additionally, terminology in the new AFDD 2-1.8 not only adopts the same title (strategic enablers) but also uses names and descriptions similar to those in the National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, again bringing Air Force doctrine closer to joint guidance. Furthermore, chapter 7, “Support Operations,” improves upon the logistics and sustaining activities discussed in the earlier document. Finally, chapter 8 addresses the requirement for education, training, and exercises in C-CBRN operations in much the same way as did the earlier publication.

The emergence of more guidance in the seven years following the appearance of the first version of AFDD 2-1.8 provided a rich foundation for updating it, resulting in a much-improved document. Further, the new, expanded AFDD—almost twice as long as its predecessor—offers in-depth treatment of C-CBRN operations. However, it still does not provide a detailed elaboration of CBRN weapon characteristics, the discussion of which remains generic and not entirely informative. Nevertheless, in light of the threat posed by CBRN weapons, all Airmen should carefully study the revised AFDD 2-1.8.

Note

1. The Air Force Doctrine Center will be renamed the Air Force Doctrine Development and Education Center, effective 1 August 2007.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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