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Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2006

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In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers can draw their own conclusions or join the intellectual battle-space. Please send comments to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.

How the Air Force Embraced “Partial Quality”
(and Avoiding Similar Mistakes in New Endeavors)

Lt Col Graham W. “Gray” Rinehart, USAF, Retired*

We’re also starting a whole new movement called “partial quality.” We think it’ll have a much larger following.

—David Langford
Fourth Annual National Governors’
Conferenceon Quality in Education, April 1995

Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne’s first letter to the force set out several goals, two of which started the service on a new journey toward “Best in Class” excellence in business practices and “Lean Processes.”1 Expanding these topics in his second letter, he called for “constant examination of our processes in order to recognize better ways of accomplishing the mission,” specifically by applying “LEAN concepts beyond the depots and maintenance operations into the flightline and the office.”2 In March 2006, the secretary released an expanded letter to Airmen with more details on this initiative, which had become known as Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO21): “a dedicated effort to maximize value and minimize waste in our operations.” In its emphasis on looking “at each process from beginning to end,” not just “how we can do each task better, but . . . why [we are] doing it this way” (emphasis in original), and in its promise to “march unnecessary work out the door—forever,” AFSO21 appeared reminiscent of other management revolutions many of us had been through before. The proclamation that “the continuous process improvements of AFSO 21 will be the new culture of our Air Force” could just as easily have been made for the era of Total Quality Management (TQM).3

Apparently an Air Force–specific packaging of industrial practice, similar to the Quality Air Force (QAF) program that repackaged TQM, AFSO21 even boasts its own Web site (http://www.afso21.hq.af.mil) and a dedicated Pentagon program office.4 We might imagine that TQM (or QAF) would have had its own Air Force Web site had the Internet been as developed then as it is now. Because innovations such as Web-based applications and training are commonplace today and because TQM originated when desktop computers were rare, it is easy to think of TQM as the product of a bygone era. But not everyone has forgotten TQM. As one retiring chief master sergeant recently put it, “I’ve been zero defected, total quality managed, ­micromanaged, one-minute managed, synergized, had my paradigms shifted, had my paradigms broken, and been told to decrease my habits to seven.”5 During the 1980s and 1990s, the Air Force empowered, quality-­circled, and off-sited its Airmen; opened quality-related offices and institutions; and poised itself for a great leap out of the McNamara-inspired past (i.e., away from the Management by Objectives program touted by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the 1960s).

From the perspective of the large number of changes in management philosophy Airmen have weathered, AFSO21 seems like TQM or QAF redux, so it behooves us to recall the lessons of our last foray into this battle. Today the remnants of continuous improvement are not what Airmen hoped they would be. Advocates unreasonably applied reasonable ideas, to the point that they were eventually laughed out of professional military education courses (which themselves inexplicably became “developmental education,” a phrase having more redundancy than precision). Airmen now snigger at anything that remotely resembles continuous improvement, rolling their eyes and declaring that it “sounds like another quality thing.” Furthermore, “lean,” “Six Sigma” (another concept borrowed from industry), and AFSO21 all sound very similar to what we heard in the days of TQM.6

We might think of the failure of TQM to permeate the Air Force as a battle lost or a battle won, depending on which side we took. The shame of the service’s failure to adopt quality-improvement practices the first time around, however, is not that Airmen nurtured an unworkable or unworthy idea, but that they induced its birth prematurely and left it to die. If we’re not careful, we may repeat our mistakes with new ideas—even if they are worthwhile.

Some Airmen already appear to be choosing sides for this latest round of initiatives. Therefore, we should examine how worthwhile ideas designed to improve Air Force operations and practices eventually, to quote President Reagan’s famous remarks to the British House of Commons, wound up “on the ash heap of history.”7 Hopefully, we may learn how to avoid repeating the same mistakes with AFSO21.

The Cult of Mediocrity versus
the Culture of Excellence

The US military adopted the ideas of continuous quality improvement from the commercial sector, which in the mid-1980s suffered by comparison with overseas competitors. To many observers and consumers, the most galling example of the industrial-quality shift was the increasing share of the automobile market held by Japanese manufacturers. Just under two generations after the United States nearly obliterated Japanese industry in World War II, Japan was somehow building better vehicles at competitive prices—and not because of cheap labor. When US industry learned that the Japanese credited their success to several US practitioners who taught them the quality philosophy in the 1950s—among them Dr. W. Edwards Deming and Dr. ­Joseph M. Juran—our companies approached those experts, hat in hand. They begged forgiveness for ignoring their teaching for so long and finally listened to what they had to say.

The US military often cited the woes of industry as a rationale for adopting similar quality-improvement practices. According to the Air Force Process Improvement Guide, for example, “We in the Air Force face a challenge similar to the fierce competition in consumer electronics and automobiles.”8 By the early 1990s, the Air Force found itself at the forefront of the “reinventing government” initiative: the Air Force had subsumed TQM into QAF, established a Quality Council and a Quality Institute, and had begun holding an annual quality symposium.9

In contrast to US industry—which grasped at the quality lifeline because it was drowning in its own failures—by the time the military discovered the quality movement, the Air Force was on its way up and out of a decade of post-Vietnam funk. In the midst of the Reagan-era buildup that would eventually win the Cold War, service people did not always welcome the concepts introduced as TQM (a term actually coined in the mid-1980s in a US Navy depot and rarely used by leaders of the quality movement). Industry-trailing companies might flock to quality for fear of falling further behind their competitors, but the military simply did not share that fear. It shouldn’t have been surprising that Airmen who saw the quality movement as a good thing—a way to extend our growing military edge and give taxpayers more value for their ever-inflating dollars—were outnumbered by those who saw it as just another square to fill.

Another factor militated against the services’ easily adopting TQM and its ilk: the military ethos itself. Perhaps because of its all-volunteer nature, the US armed forces have come to view themselves as different from—and in some ways better than—the business world. Different most obviously in the kill-or-be-killed nature of military duty—the casualty of a corporate raid still goes home safe and sound at the end of the day. Different in the risk of injury or death willingly accepted on a daily basis—which fits the military closer to police and firefighters than to corporate executives. Different also in that the profit motive does not drive the military. As for better: career military members in particular view the services as better in the commitment to shared values and shared sacrifice—the dedication to unit success over personal gain. Thus, corporately derived and bottom-line-focused quality initiatives do not find a ready audience in many military professionals.

Airmen didn’t know it at the time, but in the mid-1980s—the beginning of the TQM era—they had begun homing in on a great victory in Operation Desert Storm, which proved that our weapons, training, and personnel were second to none. The general euphoria following Desert Storm and the growing realization that the service had committed itself to a long-term “warm war” in the desert dropped a figurative laser-guided bomb into the corner office of the quality movement. By 2000, TQM and QAF had dropped out of vogue, and performance management became the new watchword.10 In the end, the Air Force did not get total quality: it got partial quality (PQ). Four main factors accounted for this.

The Four Pillars of Partial Quality

We often see Air Force briefings illustrated with pillars representing key concepts, the idea being that removing a pillar will cause the supported structure to collapse. In the mid-1990s, 10 years after he retired, Air Force general Wilbur “Bill” Creech even published a book titled The Five Pillars of TQM: How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You, choosing product, process, organization, leadership, and commitment as the pillars supporting TQM.11 It seems an odd practice since these days pillars support only the portico of a building—not the whole building itself—but following these leads, we may describe four “pillars” of partial quality: missing the mission, overmanagement, understandardization, and operational success.

Lack of Mission Focus

Precious little of the Air Force’s quality movement concerned itself with flying and fighting, let alone defending the United States. For example, of the Air Force Team Quality Awards earned in 1993, only one appeared directly related to war fighting: the one received by Kadena Air Base, Japan, for improving the reliability of LAU-114 missile launchers by 23 percent.12 Moreover, only one of the papers presented at the first Quality Air Force Symposium clearly dealt with weapons-system issues. That study discussed the activity of an ICBM standardization-evaluation improvement team but did not detail the team’s results or output.13

That lack of war-fighting focus doesn’t mean the emphasis on quality completely lacked merit. In some of the more industrial or service-oriented sectors of the Air Force (e.g., depot maintenance or hospital services), Airmen made great improvements in processes and functions. They created more efficient processes, improved customer service, and reduced costs. These gains were not universal, however. Sometimes the emphasis on productivity and efficiency overshadowed effectiveness, leaving Airmen with the perception that customer-oriented functions like finance and personnel provided worse service than before. In general, we made great strides in many administrative and ancillary functions, but Airmen wondered (rightly) about the military point of it all.

To be blunt, the Air Force did not need the quality philosophy in order to continue its forward-looking, forward-thinking operational traditions. Our entire history is based on the innovation of powered flight, and, from theorizing at the Air Corps Tactical School to testing the latest weapons, Airmen never stopped trying to improve how they accomplish the military mission. This effort continues today, as we discuss and debate the best ways to gain and maintain the advantages of space and information.

Could ideas from the quality movement apply to mission areas? Certainly—but how many people tried? Instead of applying Ishikawa charts (also known as “fishbone” diagrams) and force-field analyses to problems in our tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), we studied where to put the copy machine or how to fill out forms better.

If new approaches to continuous improvement are to permeate the entire Air Force and not just isolated enclaves, they must orient themselves toward the Air Force’s military functions. Improving logistical and service functions will benefit the service and even improve the chances for mission accomplishment, but they will not influence the overall military culture. Using a new analytical tool or process to improve the way Airmen accomplish the mission—how they gather intelligence or drop bombs or move troops and equipment—gives it a greater chance for acceptance as worthwhile.

Too Much Management, Not Enough Leadership

Airmen bristled at the “M” in TQM, another unsurprising result that turned TQ into PQ. They also quickly saw through the Total Quality Leadership (TQL) terminology as an attempt to hide the truth, and TQL soon faded from view. Airmen saw TQM as an abdication of leadership, especially when it combined with empowerment—another fine concept that became badly mangled and unrecognizable in the end.

We preached the virtues of empowerment without acknowledging that the US military—all branches—was already close to being the most empowered institution on the planet. It is easy to think of the M-16-wielding 18-year-old in that respect, if we don’t mind the stereotype, but the real power belonged (and still belongs) to the career noncommissioned officers (NCO) who run our units. Our professional NCOs saw TQM as the newest incarnation of micromanagement: that outlook lingers with the continuing emphasis on useless metrics that measure trivial things, threatening to undermine future improvement efforts. Our NCOs and Airmen would much rather be led than managed, and they perform better when given a clear sense of the mission along with the resources to fulfill it.

The current lean and Six Sigma efforts will follow the same PQ path if they just rain new tools and terminology down on our Airmen. Like so many cases of military loss, the failure of TQM was a failure of leadership: many leaders abdicated as they delegated, ignored the techniques themselves, or simply paid lip service to the whole idea. Airmen have no compelling reason to expect different results this time unless Air Force leaders do what they are expected to do—lead.

Too Little Standardization

In perhaps their most serious miscalculation, Airmen took the positive idea of process improvement to mean that those processes need not be standardized. Air Force regulations appeared to fall victim to the TQM putsch (not the “push” to implement TQM but the “putsch”—the attempt to overthrow traditional Air Force leadership and establish a new quality-oriented regime). It remains unclear whether the change was directly related to TQM. One should note that Air Force instructions do align the service with the Department of Defense, which also issues instructions as opposed to regulations. Nevertheless, it seemed that, overnight, regulations became instructions—and then were treated as if they were really only suggestions until something better came along. (The printed warning “Compliance . . . is mandatory” surfaced later, meaning that instructions eventually became regulations in all but name.)

In the early days of TQM, then, we were allowed to develop solutions for base X independently of those for bases Y and Z—often without much in the way of guidance from higher headquarters. With the loss of Air Force regulations, Airmen lost the rigor and regimen of thorough, centralized reviews of proposed changes. More importantly, they lost the benefit of disseminating new procedures throughout the force. Instead of a system in which regulations codified what worked, that is,

does it work? " make it better " document and standardize,

the practical (not intended) result was

does it work? " make it better . . . maybe " suggest or keep secret—essentially an antithesis of the quality philosophy.

In a related case, the Air Force misapplied the quality idea to inspections. Our flirtation with the ill-advised and ill-fated “Quality Air Force assessments” provides the clearest example of this problem, from which Airmen finally extricated themselves. The motivation for that move remains unclear, but it seems to have involved a misreading of Deming’s “cease dependence on mass inspection” as meaning “cease inspection” altogether.14 Deming’s point was that inspection is a cost-added activity that takes away from the bottom line if one can build in the requisite quality in the first place; in other words, if things are going well, it may cost more to inspect than not to. While that’s true in many repetitive processes and industrial cases, the Air Force applied the idea without scrutinizing Deming’s own guidance for it. Had Airmen applied his “kp” rule, they would have found that in most military cases, given that the cost of failure may range from a loss of multimillion-dollar equipment to the losses of lives and liberty, not only inspection but also 100 percent inspection is required.15 The inspector general was right after all.

To avoid repeating this mistake, the military should codify and disseminate any new procedure, technique, or practice that benefits a unit or an operation to like units—potentially, even to similar units. This procedure is nothing new: the military learned to pass along “what works”—what in the big picture we know as doctrine—long before the quality movement came along. Airmen have good mechanisms for sharing best practices already, whether developed in everyday operations or war games or actual battles—and whether the documentation is a manual, TTP, or technical order. But distributing new guidelines is not enough. We must ensure that people know that the Air Force expects them to live up to the resultant standards and that the service inspects them on how well they do so. Airmen must maintain the rigor and discipline that make them unique as a military force.

Success of Operation Desert Storm

The bell began to toll for total quality in the Air Force during our unprece­dented success in the Gulf War of 1991, but it did not ring loudly enough for us to hear. Organizational inertia carried us several years beyond the war before that result materialized. The quality emphasis of the prewar years may have led to improved processes, maintenance, and services that enabled the successful deployment of US troops and equipment in the Operation Desert Shield buildup; however, since the TQM initiative had progressed only a few years at that time, it may be overly generous to ascribe much of the success to quality tools and techniques.16 But the devastating air war and resultant brief ground campaign did not appear to operate under any TQ mechanism. Furthermore, they reminded us most vividly of the nature of the military mission itself: to destroy our enemies when called upon to do so. Desert Storm and our success in it impressed upon us that the mission is paramount, that our greatest efforts should always support it, and that we need clear objectives and active leadership to accomplish it.

As mentioned before, however, that realization and its effect on TQM in the Air Force did not surface immediately. We continued to emphasize quality practices and assessments for many years after the war; indeed, into the late 1990s, parts of the Air Force still pursued the ideas of continuous improvement. Despite direction in 1995 from the chief of staff to “operationalize” TQM, Airmen generally missed the opportunity to shift their quality efforts to improving the ways they conducted the military mission.17 For example, the interwar period of the 1990s saw many changes in the way the Air Force organized and deployed for forward action, and quality-­improvement ideas and tools could have contributed to making those changes—if they had been used.

It appeared, for instance, that the air (now “and space”) expeditionary force (AEF) concept was born only of necessity—to cope with the high tempo of Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch—rather than, say, emerging as an output of a careful plan-do-study-act cycle.18 The initial AEF was “an airpower package (usually between 30 to 40 aircraft) that . . . [could] deploy to defuse a developing crisis situation, to quickly increase a theater’s airpower capability, or to maintain a constant theater airpower capability.”19 By the time the concept was applied Air Force–wide in 1998, it was billed as a way to “reshape [the Air Force] from a Cold War juggernaut to a more flexible force” and to produce “a less-stressful life for Airmen because they will be able to plan for known deployments in advance.”20 Its “fundamental objective,” however, was “to enhance . . . operational capabilities . . . while sustaining a viable force that can also provide those capabilities in the future.”21 Its strengths, weaknesses, difficulties, and successes notwithstanding, if the AEF concept were somehow conceived using any quality-movement methodology, our leaders were leery enough of tying those changes to quality that they didn’t share that fact with us.

Today Airmen are fighting to secure the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom—another fantastically effective initial campaign—and to secure victory in the global war on terrorism, on our terms. The full campaign will be longer, more brutal, and more difficult—and those fighting in it need not be burdened with AFSO21 and the like unless it helps them better detect the enemy, his weapons, and his intentions. If lean processes and other initiatives cannot improve battlefield operations, then frontline commanders and troops have every right to question their overall usefulness. On the other hand, if these processes can help secure a more complete victory, commanders and Airmen may be willing to accept and implement them.

Excellence in All the Quality Force Does

The Air Force rank and file did not embrace the old quality movement; given a few years of retrospect, that is not surprising. It was not entirely surprising at the time either. A 1993 report on a survey conducted at Pope AFB, North Carolina, noted that “many individuals see problems with the way the Air Force is implementing TQM.”22 As is often the case, optimism sometimes trumped realism. In a paper titled “Is QAF Destined for Failure?” Capt Kenneth R. Theriot concluded that QAF would prevail: “When management commits its resources to all aspects of quality, and where a quality-friendly culture is established and nurtured, the TQ process will succeed.”23 Success is never guaranteed, however, so we should view AFSO21 with cautious optimism. Even Niccolò Machiavelli warned his prince that “nothing is harder to manage, more risky in the undertaking, or more doubtful of success than to set up as the introducer of a new order.”24

To better state the case, “It is not those who are well who need a physician, but those who are sick.”25 It is hard to believe in ourselves as the most powerful military force in the world and still believe we have room for improvement. Recent experience shows that we are the strongest and most respected air (and space) force in the world and that our consistently high level of performance will make any new quality-improvement efforts difficult for many people to adopt. But Airmen know we’re not the perfect air force—and if new initiatives will help us accomplish the mission better, we should be willing to give them a try.

Indeed, Airmen continue to improve the way we fly and fight without really thinking about it. Each of us would reject the idea of accepting PQ if presented in terms of shoddy work or service. This applies in our personal lives to consumer products, bank transactions, or restaurant meals, but it also holds true if the product is body armor, the transaction is an air tasking order, or the meal is in the chow hall. Privately or jokingly, we use phrases like “good enough for government work,” but in our everyday lives we seek the highest quality we can afford because quality is not a bad thing.

That bears repeating: quality is not a bad thing. Leaving things better than we found them and doing a little more than expected are hallmarks of the fine professionals serving in every Air Force unit—every US military unit—everywhere in the world. Being the best and doing the best are part of our national identity, something that Airmen depend on now and will continue to depend on in the future.

Maybe—hopefully—we will reach the point where we can fulfill and exceed our third core value of “excellence in all we do” by pursuing continuous improvement without resorting to slogans and programs; without obsessing over metrics out of the blind desire to measure something, anything, even if it’s the wrong thing; without attaching some negative stigma to studying a process closely enough to know how to improve it; and without compromising our first two core values of “integrity first” and “service before self.” Maybe we can adopt practices that add value and effectiveness to our military (i.e., battlefield) operations and not just to enabling functions behind the scenes. Maybe, as we move forward with lean, Six Sigma, and AFSO21, we will remember and not repeat the mistakes of the TQM era.

But the fact remains that we are a fine fighting force, the standard against which others are judged, protecting the greatest country in the history of the world. We will continue to get better because it’s the natural thing—the right thing—for us to do.

*Lieutenant Colonel Rinehart retired from the Air Force after 20 years of service. His last assignment was speechwriter to the undersecretary of the Air Force in the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Executive Action Group. Now living in North Carolina, he works as a writer and consultant.

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Notes

1. Hon. Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force, “Letter to Airmen,” 3 November 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=191.

2. Hon. Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force, “Letter to Airmen: Persistent Situation Awareness in Resource Management,” 6 December 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=189.
Lean processes use resources effectively, with minimal waste. The term lean is descriptive, not an acronym, although it is sometimes capitalized.

3. Hon. Michael W. Wynne, secretary of the Air Force, “Letter to Airmen: Air Force Smart Operations 21,” 8 March 2006, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/secaf.asp?id=219.

4. SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Smart Operations 21 Office Formed at Pentagon,” Air Force Print News, 11 May 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123020236 (accessed 22 May 2006).

5. CMSgt Gerard “Jerry” Gething, superintendent of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Executive Action Group (retirement remarks, Andrews AFB, MD, 31 March 2006).

6. “Six Sigma” refers to a process-improvement approach aimed at reducing the rate of defective products. A process operating under statistical control at plus-or-minus three standard deviations (three sigma) from the mean (the arithmetic average) will have a predictable outcome, with only about three items per 1,000 produced outside those statistical limits. A process operating under control at Six Sigma (six standard deviations) will produce only about three items per 1,000,000 outside the limits—thus offering greater predictability and less wasted effort. For information about the link between lean, Six Sigma, and AFSO21, see SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Air Force Improving Production with Smart Operations 21,” Air Force Print News, 9 January 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123013978 (accessed 25 April 2006).

7. “‘The Evil Empire,’ President Reagan’s Speech to the House of Commons, June 8, 1982,” http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/evilemp.htm.

8. Air Force Process Improvement Guide: Total Quality Tools for Teams and Individuals (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Quality Center, n.d. [1991]), iii.

9. These actions occurred in addition to developing a new vision and mission as well as codifying core values, basic principles, and operating styles. See, for example, Karen Bemowski, “The Air Force Quality Flight Plan,” Quality Progress 27, no. 6 (June 1994): 25.

10. TSgt Michael Spaits, “Air Force Simplifies Quality Processes,” Air Force Print News, 2 February 2000, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/newsroom/00146.html (accessed 1 May 2006).

11. See Bill Creech, The Five Pillars of TQM: How to Make Total Quality Management Work for You (New York: Penguin Books, 1995).

12. Bemowski, “Air Force Quality Flight Plan,” 28 (sidebar).

13. Capt Michael S. Lamb Sr., “A Tale of Two Teams,” in Proceedings: Quality Air Force Symposium, 1993: The Quest for Quality (Montgomery, AL: Air Force Quality Institute, 19–22 October 1993), 269.

14. This was the third of Deming’s 14 points. See W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1986), 28–31.

15. By the kp rule, the proportion of defective items (p) is compared to the ratio between the cost to inspect each item (k1) and the cost of repairs, rework, and so forth, if a defective item fails (k2). If p is greater than k1/k2 the rule calls for 100 percent inspection. If failure is taken as either a lost battle, Class A mishap, or “broken arrow,” the cost of inspection (k1) will almost always be much less than the cost of failure (k2). Therefore, even a very small defect rate would call for 100 percent inspection. See Deming, Out of the Crisis, chap. 15.

16. References linking the first Gulf War to the quality movement are scarce. Lt Gen Vernon J. Kondra wrote a paper titled “Operation Desert Shield–Desert Storm: Focus on Quality,” presented at the Juran Impro Conference in 1991 and included in the conference proceedings. See Bemowski, “Air Force Quality Flight Plan,” 29.

17. “Air Force Manpower Agency,” Air Force Fact Sheet, March 2006, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=3663 (accessed 25 April 2006).

18. The plan-do-study-act cycle, essentially the scientific method applied to practical problem solving, was one of the quality-improvement tools taught by Dr. Deming.

19. Brig Gen William R. Looney III, “The Air Expeditionary Force: Taking the Air Force into the Twenty-first Century,” Airpower Journal 10, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 5–6, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj96/win96/looney.pdf. The AEF was “the brainchild of [then] Lt Gen John Jumper and his Central Command Air Forces . . .  staff” (5).

20. Sandra I. Erwin, “Air Force Realignment Aimed at Boosting Retention, Morale,” National Defense 83, issue 541 (October 1998): 22.

21. Lt Gen Donald G. Cook, Col Robert Allardice, and Col Raymond D. Michael Jr., “Strategic Implications of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 8, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/win00/cook.pdf.

22. The comment was part of the interpretation of results from the survey item “TQM could work in the Air Force if some modifications were made” as compared with the item “TQM works in the Air Force.” Julia Palladini, “Total Quality Management: Perceptions and Attitudes of Military Personnel Assigned to Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina,” in Proceedings: Quality Air Force Symposium, 82–83.

23. Capt Kenneth R. Theriot, “Is QAF Destined for Failure?” in Proceedings: Quality Air Force Symposium, 230.

24. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, 2d ed., trans. and ed. Robert M. Adams (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 17. Machiavelli continues, “Such an innovator has as enemies all the people who were doing well under the old order, and only halfhearted defenders in those who hope to profit from the new.” Ibid.

25. Jesus of Nazareth, quoted in Luke 5:31 (New American Standard Version).


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University


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