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Document created: 1 June 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Summer 2006
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Douglas E. Lee
Maj Timothy Albrecht, USAF
The Department of Defense (DOD) has defined the term effects to varying degrees; however, a cogent strategy for effects does not exist among the military services and agencies. Although one can understand the term in the abstract, responses at a more tangible level elicit myriad definitions. One needs an effects-based road map consisting of common terminology when disparate and geographically separated organizations (e.g., US Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq, US Central Command Air Forces, and Multi-National -Coalition-Iraq) work towards the same goal. A common language offers such benefits as
• translating objectives into a collective set of measurable goals applicable to all parties,
• providing a medium to bridge the “apples-to-oranges” paradox (e.g., measuring contributions from a concurrent-presence mission and a neighborhood patrol),
• standardizing the “sight picture” at all levels of command, and
• changing platform-based needs (one Predator and two A-10s) into effects-based requests (support a platoon hunting high-value target X in area Y).
At the strategic level, any road map should include US forces, the indigenous population, and the enemy (identified as terrorist forces for the war-termination phase in Iraq). Strategic-level effects might include (1) ensuring that US forces prevail, (2) making a successful transition to democracy, or (3) defeating terrorist insurgents. The next level of effects would deconstruct the insurgency into key attributes (see fig.).
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Figure. Key attributes of an insurgency |
A subsequent iteration would define effects for these key components: (1) deny access to sponsors, (2) make objectives unattainable, (3) shut down the resource pipeline, or (4) disrupt the organization. The next step would further define key attributes—for example, expanding resources into funding, technology, and manpower. The process would continue until an effect corresponds to a concrete action (e.g., confiscate funds at bank Y in account 123). After developing the road map, one could use it to establish the effects foundation for any operation.
Possible courses of action include the following:
• Increase the effects-based operations (EBO) segments in professional military education, professional continuing education, and the curriculum for general officers, with a goal of generating discussion that would move towards a comprehensive, effects-based doctrine for the Air Force.
• Establish a joint tiger team to develop a common framework for the services to build upon. This team would use the services’ models as a baseline for a DOD standard.
• Integrate standardized, effects-based metrics into the requirements-generation process as the basis for identifying service shortfalls.
• Link effects derived from service capabilities to potential measurements in order to focus assessment activities.
After one develops a common EBO language, an employment framework can follow, thus avoiding delays due to confused meaning.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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