Document created: 1 March 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006

We encourage you to send us your comments, preferably via e-mail, to aspj@maxwell.af.mil.  You may also send letters to The Editor, Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.

Kudos to ASPJ for publishing Col Robyn Read’s “out-of-the-box” article “Effects-Based Airpower for Small Wars: Iraq after Major Combat” (spring 2005, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/read.html), which focuses on the job at hand and uses historical understanding to make a great proposal. As a marine, I am infinitely familiar with the “small-wars manual.” Colonel Read uses much of the same logic as this manual in making his argument. Too many folks today (including many in the US Air Force, unfortunately) are obsessed by technology and focus on things like the F-22A, Space-Based Infrared System, and other devices. The proposal for a low-tech, long-dwell OV-10D Bronco with a human (really two) in the loop (unmanned aerial vehicles are terrific, but taking the human out and putting him or her hundreds of miles away as an observer has severe drawbacks) to build and maintain situational awareness is a relearning of history we shouldn’t have to go through, but Colonel Read deserves praise for doing it. I have witnessed the immense force-multiplication capacity of the OV-10D in terms of sensors, radios, and—most importantly—a dedicated battle manager/forward air controller (airborne)/tactical air coordinator (airborne)/recce platform with two sets of eyeballs. When the OV-10D left station, the fight on the ground often came to a halt until another Bronco arrived on station, took a half hour or so to build situational awareness, and then resumed control of the fight. Colonel Read’s idea of teaming American and Iraqi crew members in the cockpit and using the OV-10’s loudspeaker to talk to people on the ground is absolutely brilliant. By the way, the push toward miniature munitions like the small-diameter bomb and 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munition could really breathe some new life into an old Bronco!

Lt Col Jeff “Huey” Hewlett, USMC
Ridgefield, Connecticut

MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: A 30-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE

It pains me greatly to discover a minor flaw in the vignette “The Mayaguez Incident, 12–15 May 1975: A 30-Year Retrospective” in your spring 2005 issue (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/vignette3.html)—especially so because I have followed the writings of its author, Dr. John Guilmartin, since his days as a cadet. I believe that he is one of the foremost military historians in America, and I have never before found a flaw in his work. It is all the more distressing to me because I well know that former editors (as he is) of your venerable journal seldom, if ever, make a mistake. Dr. Guilmartin said in the vignette, “Perhaps prompted by a retaliatory strike on mainland targets by A-6s based on the USS Coral Sea, the Khmer Rouge released the Mayaguez’s crew, sending them out in a Thai fishing boat” (80). Yet, according to the crew members themselves, they embarked in the fishing boat at 0620 that day, and the first bomb fell on a mainland target at 0957—making it difficult for the new Khmer Rouge to have been motivated by the bombing. Guilmartin’s book A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang, the best there is on the subject, cites the crew as being on board a US Navy vessel at 1005, just eight minutes after the first bomb hit many miles away (114). Too, the Mayaguez crew was embarked hardly 15 minutes after the first marines landed on Koh Tang Island, so whatever the Khmer Rouge’s motivation, it seems improbable that either the invasion or the bombing had anything to do with it.

Lt Col David R. Mets, USAF, Retired
Niceville, Florida

The Author Replies: Dave Mets is absolutely right! On reflection, his point raises an interesting issue: could US military headquarters have cancelled the retaliatory strike on learning that the crew had been released?

Lt Col John F. Guilmartin Jr., USAF, Retired
Columbus, Ohio

As we progress through our careers, we notice that the specialization that is so important at the start of our professional lives interferes with the macroview that should enable us to become more effective advisers to our commanders. Once we become conscious of this phenomenon, the importance of Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ) as a source of high-quality material that presents ideas related to the application of airpower becomes immediately apparent. My personal experience with ASPJ has been one of great anticipation about what each new edition might contain. As I plumb the themes covered in past editions, I always find a good article to cite in my works.

I was pleased to read, among other titles no less relevant, the article “Lorenz on Leadership” by Maj Gen Stephen R. Lorenz (ASPJ-English, summer 2005, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ASPJ/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/lorenz.html). That article, in particular, addresses in a simple and direct manner a topic of great importance that is seldom discussed or written about within the Brazilian armed forces. The author is at his best when he avails himself of personal experience to expound on leadership principles and invites us to ponder them. I quickly noticed that I could apply them to my own area of interest. I serve at Headquarters Brazilian Air Force Air Operations, a place undergoing major changes involving new equipment and doctrines for conducting air and joint operations that will certainly require “balancing shortfalls,” acquiring “knowledge,” making decisions that “pass the sunshine test,” and “applying overwhelming combat power to the point that will have the most effect.” Furthermore, and in particular, we need to “think and act out of the box” when we plan these changes, just as General Lorenz suggests.

Although the author offers an obviously American perspective of warfare, it is crystal clear that we can tackle our own problems by using the 13 principles he proposes, even if those principles were conceived under different conditions. Congratulations to the editor for selecting such a timely and informative article.

Maj Davi Rogério da Silva Castro, Brazilian Air Force
Brasília, Brazil

Editor’s Note: Major Davi read the Portuguese translation of General Lorenz’s article, available at apjinternational/apj-p/2005/3tri05/lorenz.html . For a Spanish version, see apjinternational/apj-s/2005/3tri05/lorenz.html . We plan Arabic and French versions for 2006.

I enjoyed Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Gerald R. Murray’s article “Developing Airmen: Building a World-Class Noncommissioned Officer Corps” (winter 2005, airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/murray.html ). Chief Murray mentioned the importance of mentoring, and I have been fortunate enough to have had great mentoring over the years. One thing I discovered early on is that learning the next level of responsibility and leadership needs to start before one gets there. Hopefully I can mentor and inspire the next generation of leaders. As a junior noncommissioned officer (NCO) hoping to reach senior NCO leadership at the strategic level, I appreciate what Air and Space Power Journal does in allowing me to educate myself and my troops. Thanks!

TSgt James Warrick, USAF
Beale AFB, California

Chief Murray’s article contains an excellent figure labeled “development and utilization across a 30-year career.” Our unit plans to use it for Enlisted Professional Development purposes and for training our younger troops to give them a guideline on career progression.

SSgt Saundra J. Wilson, USAF
Cheyenne Mountain AF Station, Colorado

Lt Col Ed “Mel” Tomme and Col Sigfred “Ziggy” Dahl’s article “Balloons in Today’s Military? An Introduction to the Near-Space Concept” (winter 2005, airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/tomme.html ) made me think that, as with any new development in offensive capabilities such as near-space platforms, we should immediately look in the mirror and start thinking about how we might have those capabilities directed against us and what we would do about it. Based on historical experience, we Oregonians have a heightened sensitivity to the potential threat posed by lighter-than-air weapons delivered against the homeland. In addition to the well-known shelling of the Oregon coast by a Japanese submarine during World War II, -Oregon also experienced aerial bombardment by the Japanese. The adversary fixed incendiary devices to balloons and let the jet stream carry them over the forests of the Pacific Northwest. More recently, my concerns were further tweaked by an Iraqi informant’s (code name Curveball) report of an al-Qaeda mobile chemical-weapons laboratory project in northeastern Iraq that turned out to be “merely a system for launching weather balloons.”

After reading “Balloons in Today’s Military?” I would like to see ASPJ publish an article that addresses countermeasures the United States might apply if our adversaries choose to use this near-space concept against us. I am concerned that the low price tag of near-space weapons could facilitate a “swarming” sort of attack that would overwhelm any conventional air-defense capability we now have in place. Perhaps we should consider directed-energy countermeasures instead of antiaircraft artillery or air-intercept aircraft. All I know about directed energy is what I read in the newspapers, but I imagine the folks down at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, could provide plenty of input to an article about the inherent advantages of this sort of defense. The Air Force Research Laboratory’s Sensor Directorate might also have some ideas about detecting and targeting lighter-than-air offensive weapons.

MSgt Douglas G. Sauvageau, ANG
Oregon Air National Guard
Rilea Armed Forces Training Center, Oregon

Editor’s Note: Air and Space Power Journal would welcome the chance to review an article like the one Master Sergeant Sauvageau proposes. Prospective authors should read our article-submission guidelines at airchronicles/howto1.html#submissions.

Col Richard Szafranski’s article “The First Rule of Modern Warfare: Never Bring a Knife to a Gunfight” (winter 2005, airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/szafranski.html ) implies that the manned fighter is not a viable weapon system for the future—at least for the futures postulated. Although I agree that a human (rather, a pilot) in the cockpit will likely be obsolete in future weapon systems, I do not believe that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) are the way ahead simply because of implications regarding the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and rules of engagement (ROE).

Ultimately, the LOAC and ROEs give approval for armed-forces personnel to use violence. In the near future, within the decades stated in the article, it is inconceivable that the Western concepts of the LOAC and ROEs will migrate towards giving approval for machines to do the same. Inevitably, a human must be in the loop if one uses violence on a state’s behalf. Someone—some armed-forces personnel—must be held accountable for the death and destruction caused by UAVs and UCAVs; a machine cannot be held accountable. Perhaps uninhabited aerial vehicle or uninhabited combat aerial vehicle would be better terms since they suggest that a human controls the weapon system but is not in the vehicle itself.

Therefore, although I agree that it seems increasingly unlikely that future weapon systems will have a human in the cockpit, I do not agree that UAVs or UCAVs are the way ahead. Instead, the human will be in a safer, more secure place controlling those systems. This place can be on the ground, on or below the oceans, or in space. At the end of the day, however, unless a significant change occurs in the Western interpretation of the LOAC and ROEs, a human responsible for the death and destruction rained from above will be present to some extent in every UAV and UCAV.

Air warriors of future squadrons will likely spend very little time in the air. Very likely they will be “chairbound,” looking more like my son and his video games than anything I resembled in my more than 20 years in Canada’s air force.

Lt Col John Foster, Canadian Air Force, Retired
Kagawong, Ontario, Canada

In “Mahan on Space Education: A Historical Rebuke of a Modern Error,” 1st Lt Brent D. Ziarnick (winter 2005, airchronicles/apj/apj05/win05/ziarnick.html ) is absolutely right to point out that the education of a space professional must not necessarily be limited to technical fields, but that the humanities, too, provide a useful source of knowledge and understanding for champions of the space medium. He is also on target with his observation that operations in the medium of space will not forever remain free from conflict and that space professionals will soon (in fact, I believe they do today) have a responsibility to control the space medium and deny its advantages to adversaries.

But much of the rest of Ziarnick’s argument seems to fall prey to one or more logical traps. The first is a recurring false dilemma, which appears to rest on an assumption that technical and nontechnical skill sets are somehow mutually exclusive. While there may be a functional difference between “engineering” and “operations” in a given mission area or unit, I don’t believe we should automatically project the distinction onto individuals, categorically pigeonholing them as either engineers/technicians or operators/managers/nontechnicians. A space professional is indeed that—a professional—and, ideally, should be constantly learning and applying all aspects of his or her business.

Accompanying the recurring false dilemma are occasional non sequiturs, such as the apparent reasoning that (a) if someone has an education in primarily technical areas, then (b) he or she is less equipped to deal with matters of strategy and doctrine than someone with a nontechnical education. Did Napoléon (who studied engineering and received science awards before embarking on a military career) and Robert E. Lee (a West Point engineering student who worked on engineering projects in Georgia, Virginia, and New York before the Mexican War) gain reputations as military geniuses in part because of their technical skills or in spite of them? I would prefer to make the case that the individual with the broadest range of educational background and experience is likely to be the most effective strategist and combat leader, and that no particular skill or lack thereof—technical or nontechnical—should automatically disqualify him or her from being one.

Another non sequitur connects the paraphrased Mahanian quotation “that the knowledge sufficient to run and care for [space systems] can be acquired by men of very little [technical] education is a matter of daily experience” (67) with current space operations, apparently suggesting that very little expertise is required to sustain on-orbit space systems. In the squadron where I serve, nothing could be more different; it takes the fullest possible range of skills and expertise—current operations, system-resource planning, engineering actions and problem solving, communications analysis, logistics, and more—to keep our complex space system flying daily and delivering combat effects. And the most effective individuals in the mission are the ones who gain proficiency in several of these skill areas, demonstrating abilities to think across disciplines and make decisions with a comprehensive -understanding of all the factors involved.

In short, Ziarnick’s basic thesis is correct—that we must be careful, in the push to increase technical expertise among space professionals, not to assume that the nontechnical disciplines serve little or no purpose. But let that not be a rush to segregate the skill sets and, in so doing, propagate a self-fulfilling mechanism that encourages space professionals to be either “techies” or “nontechies” but not continually strive to be both. I’ll end with a recapitulative quotation from a World War II–era general (and an apology to those who know it and might have seen it coming): “There is no type of human endeavor where it is so important that the leader understands all phases of his job as that of the profession of arms.”

Lt Col John E. Shaw, USAF
Schriever AFB, Colorado

LEADING = Influencing

Lt Col Russell C. Barnes’s article “Leading = Influencing: A Simple Equation: Influence as the Essence and Foundation of Leadership” (Chronicles Online Journal, airchronicles/cc/barnes.html ) is very appropriate. The author’s recommendations about what we have to take into account regarding influence are closely related to the essence of leadership. I share his view that there is a leadership style applicable to each specific situation and circumstance. Congratulations to Air and Space Power Journal for the marvelous work it is doing and for making available such valuable and beneficial information. Best wishes.

Sanlley Sanchez
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic

Editor’s Note: Mr. Sanchez made these comments after reading the Spanish version of Colonel Barnes’s article, available at apjinternational/apj-s/2trimes04/barnes.html.

Brig Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF
Langley AFB, Virginia

It’s wonderful to see you publish the inaugural issue of the French-language ASPJ! Congrats to you, and thanks for all the hard work. This will become the hallmark publication cementing relations with French-speaking nations in Africa and the rest of the world.

Brig Gen Bobby J. Wilkes, USAF
McGuire AFB, New Jersey

I read with great pleasure the first issue of Air and Space Power Journal en Français. I find this new journal an excellent initiative that can only serve to strengthen bonds between the US Air Force and its French-speaking sister services and improve dialogue with French-speaking countries. The articles are highly applicable to the current world context and written in clear, balanced French. It is a first-class journal with an attractive and beautiful cover, just like the other language editions of Air and Space Power Journal. My compliments to the editor.

Martine de Blauw
Bruges, Belgium

The first issue of the French-language Air and Space Power Journal holds great interest for Europeans concerned with military affairs. The editorial sets the stage, and the articles reinforce it. The whole issue presents thoughts and new, interesting perspectives into the nature of current and future conflicts and how to deal with them. The reader is at once struck not only by the articles’ geopolitical analyses but also by the pragmatism and concrete operational aspects that flow from these analyses. I would say they are “action-oriented thoughts.” Moreover, reading this first ASPJ issue is a refreshing relief from the standard, trendy ideas seen in the conformist popular European press where practically every media outlet presents the same views of military topics.

Benoît Drion
Marne la Coquette, France

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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