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Air & Space Power Journal - Spring 2006


Air & Space Power Journal

NOTAM    


Revised Air Force Doctrine Document
2-5.3, Public Affairs Operations

Col Bob Potter, USAF
1st Lt Alan Bosco, USAF

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.

—Abraham Lincoln

Every Airman is a spokesperson for our Air Force, and those who aspire to become the most effective communicators need to examine the recently revised Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.3, Public Affairs Operations, 24 June 2005. Communicating for effect is as important an Air Force mission as delivering bombs on target. Therefore, understanding the doctrinal foundations of communication is essential.

The national agenda can change in the flash of one headline, broadcast, or photograph. Airmen must realize that information—and the fluid information environment—are crucial to national power. That environment is as much a battlespace as land, air, sea, and space. In that information environment, it is critical that every Airman understand the art and science of communicating for effect in order to mitigate information threats to our national security. The newest edition of AFDD 2-5.3 serves as an excellent primer for preparing Airmen to communicate for effect in the evolving information environment.

Most welcome in the latest iteration of this doctrine document is the shift away from parochialism and the idea of public affairs (PA) as the sole mouthpiece of a particular organization, to a greater reliance on all Airmen as credible sources of truthful (and effects-generating) information about the Air Force and its missions, equipment, and people. This adjustment in emphasis recognizes PA as a means to an end and not an end in itself. In this regard, it “flattens” the communication process, recognizes the overlap between pure PA and the evolving information-operations practice, and pushes PA practitioners to think of effects rather than pure “messaging” as the primary function of all communication efforts. Such a shift should make it easier for PA planners to apply an effects-based model to communication planning and implementation. The following points summarize the relevant changes in the doctrine:

• “Through technology and a complex web of formal and informal support and integration relationships, today’s mass media outlets possess global reach with capabilities and tactics that mirror those of the modern US military” (p. 4). However, “the 24-hour news cycle results in more analysis and editorial commentary that may or may not present an accurate account of military operations” (p. 5). Thus, “all Airmen should be trained to have a basic ability to engage members of the news media with general Air Force and individual professional information. They may become spokespersons for the Service and, in some cases, may be considered by the media to be more credible sources than commanders or senior officials” (p. 9).

• “The growing access to the internet, web logs, cell phones, and e-mail by deployed Airmen is difficult to control and may make Airmen ‘official’ Air Force spokespersons in the public information environment whether or not they are aware of that status. The global information environment is so pervasive that every Airman is considered by the general public as a reliable source of information, and whose views, whether personal or professional, are sought by the media, posted to web sites, or relayed by family and friends as Air Force statements” (emphasis in original) (p. 5). Therefore, education in public affairs operations equips Airmen to represent the Air Force to the public and achieve desired information effects (emphasis added) (p. vii).

• “Public information elements can . . . directly affect the success or failure of military operations” (p. 3). Thus, “positive and/or balanced media coverage at the outset of military action can rapidly influence public . . . opinion and affect strategic decision making” (emphasis in original) (p. 30).

• “PA operations are an important military capability of information operations . . . , providing public information to defend against adversary propaganda and mis-information directed at domestic and international audiences” (pp. 1–2). These opera-tions can “achieve decisive effects in support of influence operations and . . . other military capabilities of influence operations, such as counterpropaganda operations” (p. 19).

• “PA operations are a force multiplier by analyzing and influencing the information environment’s effect on military operations and delivering increased battle-space awareness to the commander through analysis of the information environment. PA capabilities are most effective when planned and executed as an integral part of an overall operation” (emphasis in original) (p. 2).

• When “properly planned, executed, and assessed, PA operations are fundamentally -effects-based operations [EBO] that create an ‘effect’ by disseminating timely, truthful, and accurate information to achieve a particular objective. However, the success of PA operations is contingent upon the desired effects of PA operations being related to appropriate objectives” (p. 3). Additionally, “assessment of PA operations is fundamental to the EBO plan/execute/assess cycle” (p. 31). “Employing PA operations within the construct of EBO provides flexibility to adjust PA efforts, as effects and effectiveness are measured and operational situations change” (p. 29).

• “PA operations are most effective when their capabilities are integrated into strategic, operational, and tactical plans and employed by commanders at all levels to achieve desired effects” (p. 11) [and when] “backed by the authority and credibility of the [commander, Air Force forces] or [joint force air and space component commander]” (p. 25). “Failure to integrate PA operations in the strategy development and planning phases can result in a reduced ability to affect the public information environment and increased likelihood of conflicting with other objectives” (p. 11).

• “Truth is the foundation of all public affairs operations” (emphasis in original) (p. 1). “PA operations are truth-based, and will not intentionally misinform the US Congress, public, or media” (p. 22). “Truth enables credibility; credibility allows US military personnel to be believed or heard over an adversary or competing message” (p. 7).

• “The synergy between PA operations, which uses [sic] open-source information, and operations, which primarily uses [sic] classified information, is crucial to gaining and maintaining information dominance” (p. 28).

• “PA operations are a commander’s responsibility because of the asymmetrical effects associated with, and achieved by, PA operations. Even those PA operations conducted at the operational and tactical level may generate strategic effects. Commanders are ultimately responsible for successful integration of PA capabilities into operations. Commanders require a clear understanding of PA’s role in operations to help achieve their desired effects” (p. 1).


Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University


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