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Document created: 1 September 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2006
Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, Retired
|Editorial Abstract: True transformation in a military organization goes far beyond just making adjustments, “rightsizing,” altering methods of mission accomplishment, or reengineering. Dr. Kem argues that a unit attains transformation only when its ultimate purpose for existence changes. The final outcome for the US military could extend beyond fighting our nation’s wars, conceivably enabling peace and stability to obviate combat.|
—Romans 12:2 (American Standard Version)
IN MY OFFICE, I have a unique toy called a “transformer.” It looks like a simple car with working wheels and what appear to be chrome headlights. But wait! When I take it apart and transform it into a great warrior, the toy acquires a totally different purpose, appearance, and way of performing its duties even though its material makeup does not change.
In the military, one finds confusion about what transformation really means. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) asserts that transformation in the department “addresses three major areas—how we do business inside the Department, how we work with interagency and multinational partners, and how we fight.”1 Many of the initiatives at the OFT involve equipment and technologies in support of transformation, including the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship, operationally responsive satellites, airships, and directed-energy weapons. The late Vice Adm Arthur Cebrowski suggested that “one of the great rules for transformation is if you want to transform go where the money is and on arrival, change the rules.”2 As a result, billions of dollars have been reprogrammed in military programs. According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “a great deal of programmatic redirection has taken place.”3 The most visible transformational efforts by the OFT and the DOD focus on equipment and technologies.
Admittedly, the OFT’s efforts have moved beyond toys—the resources needed for war fighting. Admiral Cebrowski was adamant that the military transform the way it fights as well by strongly emphasizing such areas as network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, leadership development, and cultural intelligence. The war in Iraq has helped shepherd these efforts towards a new mode of war “dependent on fast movement, interdependence among forces, jointness down to the tactical level, persistent fires and persistent surveillance.”4 For these efforts, the OFT and DOD concentrate on methodologies—how the military does war fighting.
Dr. Francis Harvey, secretary of the Army, recently referred to the transformation of the Army as
an approach that is best described as evolutionary change leading to revolutionary outcomes. This priority . . . means we must make a smooth transition from the current Army to a future Army—one that will be better able to meet the challenges of the 21st Century security environment. It means we must prepare our forces, in mindset, training and equipment, to operate in future ambiguous and austere environments. But to be truly successful, this transformation must build on our enduring Army values and rich traditions—preserving the best of the past, while changing and improving for the future.5
However, in Breaking the Phalanx, a book widely read by military professionals, Douglas A. Macgregor, an expert on transforming the military, finds great resistance by the military to the concept of transformation, which he describes as a revolutionary concept:
Change in military affairs can be evolutionary or revolutionary. For it to be implemented quickly, however, the direction of organizational change must be more revolutionary than evolutionary. This is because most of the arguments against change are not based on disputes about warfighting; opposition is usually rooted in established, peacetime, bureaucratic interests. . . . In other words, changing the organizational structure and strategic focus of the U.S. Armed Forces will require not only pressure and influence from above and outside the services, but also anticipation of how the prior experiences and cultural norms of the rank-and-file professional military resistant to change will lead them to slow otherwise misdirected change.6
Macgregor’s later book, Transformation under Fire, continues his quest to change the military to a more relevant force for today. Here, he writes that his focus in the earlier book was consistent with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s requirement for the Army—the capability of “moving rapidly from widely dispersed staging areas overseas and in the continental United States, deploying into a crisis or regional conflict and initiating an attack, all without pausing.” His emphasis, however, has shifted to the organizational structure of the military: “how to organize army capabilities effectively to provide the joint force with needed ground capabilities.”7
Thomas P. M. Barnett has different ideas about military transformation, which become apparent when he writes about or briefs his vision to attentive audiences. He bases his worldview on a key assumption that the conventional and nuclear military might of the United States and global interdependence have made major warfare a thing of the past—that the United States is more likely to be “embroiled in dysfunctional parts of the world [what Barnett calls the “gap”] battling terrorists and rebuilding failed states.”8 For Barnett, transformation depends upon the geostrategic setting—the way the world has changed and the need to be proactive in response to those changes.
All of these transformational efforts are important, but it becomes difficult to determine if the focus for transformation is on equipment and technologies, the way the military does war fighting, the organizational structure of the military, or the geostrategic setting. In fact, all of these components are critical, but we must tie them together coherently to produce a shared vision of transformation, allowing the military culture to transform the mind-set of those who do the fighting. Without the coherence of addressing all components of transformation, change can still take place—but it becomes something less than real transformation. The true version requires consideration of the ends, ways, and means of the organization within the strategic context.
Effective transformation requires that organizations address four specific considerations: the geostrategic setting (the context for transformation), the ends (the purpose of the organization), the ways (the methods that the organization uses to achieve those ends), and the means (the resources used to accomplish the ways). This approach of “context, ends, ways, means” provides a holistic, coherent approach to transforming an organization; without it, an organization does not truly transform.
The context provides the purpose for undergoing transformation. It could be the geostrategic setting or perhaps an emerging technology or method that demands dramatic, innovative change. For the United States, the context of the geostrategic setting changed dramatically in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent downfall of the Soviet Union. Today we still grapple with the impact of those changes—and the world keeps changing while we contemplate the end of the Cold War. Regardless of whether one believes that the world is shaped according to the “core” and the “gap,” as does Barnett, or by a “clash of civilizations,” as does Samuel Huntington, or the myriad other ways of depicting the world, we do not have a bipolar world on the edge of a superpower confrontation—at least not today. Since the world has changed dramatically, the military must do so as well or become irrelevant.
Organizations generally don’t have the luxury of setting the strategic context, but they do have a choice in their reaction to contextual change. Once the context is determined, three approaches—one of which is transformation—address the changing needs of large, complex organizations (similar to changes in the business world). The approaches, which deal with the ends (purpose or product), ways (methods), or means (technology and resources), include transforming the organization’s purpose (focusing on ends), reengineering its methods (focusing on ways), or downsizing or “rightsizing” its technology and resources (focusing on means) (see table).
Table. Focus of organizational change
Transformation is the most comprehensive approach. To transform a large organization, one must look at the end product and be willing to make major changes in the functions (which are related to the end product) and organizational structure. A transforming organization will make radical, fundamental changes in the entire organization to ensure relevancy in the marketplace, which requires an assessment of what the latter requires. As such, a transforming organization may well drop functions, add functions, and modify existing functions; it will also necessarily modify resources and the means—but the emphasis remains on the end product or the very purpose of the organization. A transforming organization may even have a “driver” of a new resource or a new means, but in true transformation, the purpose or ends of the organization quickly becomes the principal concern. During transformation, one considers the ends, ways, and means but keeps the strategic focus on the ends—the goals or end product.
The second approach to changing an organization calls for reengineering—a process that considers ways and means but does not address the purpose or end state. Reengineering is not transformation; it is organizational change that falls short of true transformation. During this process, one addresses functional requirements by assessing specific functions within the organization and modifying the organizational structure. Reengineering efforts may also look at the methods used, such as implementing doctrinal changes and altering the systems within an organization. Such actions may result in a downsizing of some functions and the organizational structure, as well as “upsizing” other functions and structures. Normally, reengineering requires not only changes in the ways or methods used in the organization but also modifications in its resources or means. But this process considers only ways and means, emphasizing the former—how one organizes and applies resources to functions or functional areas.
Like reengineering, downsizing or rightsizing—the third approach—falls short of true transformation. This process attempts to do more with less, often using technology as a force multiplier. Downsizing organizations rarely reexamine functions; instead, they try to gain efficiencies in organizational structure by consolidating functions and personnel. Of course, one of the common pitfalls of this approach is that the organizations indeed do less with less—and thereby frequently lose efficiency. This is particularly true when organizations reactively adopt a “cookie-cutter” or “salami-slice” approach to downsizing. A variant approach, though rarely used, involves upsizing or doing more with more—for example, President Reagan’s military buildup in the 1980s, which escalated the arms race at all levels to bankrupt the Soviet Union. Thus, downsizing or rightsizing considers only the means—the resources available to pursue objectives.
To go one step further, an organization undergoing downsizing attends only to the means—shortfalls in resources. Downsizing organizations rarely, if ever, heed the ways and ends. A reengineering organization focuses on the ways and, therefore, must also address the means to effect those ways. A transforming organization concentrates on the ends and, in turn, must emphasize the ways and means of accomplishing those ends.
Most of the changes taking place in organizations, particularly in the business world, address manpower shortfalls—only the resources or means within the organization. By concentrating solely on resources, one may rightsize—make some people work harder to get the same job done—but neither the ways of doing the organizational mission nor the products change. Of course, many organizations will say that they are transforming when in reality they aren’t considering their purpose; in fact, those organizations are either reengineering or rightsizing. A transformational approach requires that the ends, ways, and means tie together in a coherent fashion within the strategic context of the organization.
In a perfect world, organizations should address change with a transformational approach, focusing at the strategic level on the end product. After clearly communicating the ends (the product or purpose of the organization), one can identify the ways and means. Of course, we seldom find ourselves in a perfect world. The impetus for transformational change may arise not only from identifying a new product or ends but also from having drivers of ways or means.
For example, the period between the world wars may provide some explanation of how ends, ways, or means can drive transformation. Just after World War I, the military found the geostrategic setting dramatically changed—and still changing. This time, particularly in the late 1920s and 1930s, was one of “strategic pause.” Because the general public did not share military leaders’ concerns about rising threats, the military came under great pressure to reduce budgets. In spite of fiscal constraints—perhaps in some part due to them—the US military developed new organizations, doctrine, and technologies. These developments paid great dividends during World War II, enabling the United States to play the decisive role in winning that war. The National Defense Panel of 1997 noted the correlation between the present time and the period of the 1920s and 1930s:
This focus on the long-term capabilities and challenges [looking 10 to 20 years in the future] is essential, as is the need for military adaptation and innovation. Indeed, one can look back to the 1920s and 1930s—a period of great geopolitical and military-technical transformation—and see the services engaged in bold experimentation within tightly constrained budgets. That culture and process of innovation must be actively encouraged so that our military will emerge at the end of this transformation able to exploit the full potential of the [revolution in military affairs] and prepared to address the very different challenges the [Quadrennial Defense Review] correctly foresees beyond 2010.9
Each of the services approached transformation in a unique and innovative way, focusing on the ends of winning the next war in a rapidly changing world. Each of them, however, had different drivers for effecting those changes. The budding US Army Air Corps found that the driver for change was indeed the technology of the airplane—the means as the driver for transformation. The airplane only partially realized its utility during World War I, but at Maxwell Field, Alabama, young Airmen considered how to put this technology to work in the next war. At the end of World War I, airpower “was in its infancy. The new role of three-dimensional warfare was even then foreseen by a few farsighted men.”10 The increasing capability of the airplane (the means) drove doctrinal development of strategic bombing (the ways) to win the future war (the ends). The Air Corps’ strategic focus during the 1920s and 1930s remained on the ends—but the driver (the bomber) was the means.
The US Navy realized that its ways of approaching warfare required that it change from relying heavily on battleships to using aircraft-carrier battle groups. After World War I, the Navy deteriorated, but in 1934 it began to build up its forces—and in 1940 the service received authorization to build 11 Essex-class aircraft carriers.11 The goal of winning the war against the rising Japanese naval threat (the ends), which led to a change in the way of fighting by shifting to aircraft-carrier groups, served as the Navy’s driver for transformation in the 1930s.
In the Army, drivers of change included both ways and means, but the extent of change proved limited prior to World War II. In 1929 Col George C. Marshall became assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. As head of the Academic Department there, he had a free hand to develop the course of instruction for young officers. The future chief of staff of the Army played a key role in developing the doctrine and tactics that his service would use successfully on the battlefield. Forrest C. Pogue notes that Marshall had “strong and revolutionary ideas, many of which had been developing in his mind for some years” and found himself in a “position to apply them to the training of young combat officers [at the] basic training ground for the Army’s basic fighting branch.” Marshall felt that he “could now transfuse into the Army’s main blood stream” the things he had learned and thought.12
George S. Patton had strongly encouraged new tactics and the use of the tank for future warfare (at the Army War College, he wrote a thesis entitled “The Probable Characteristics of the Next War and the Organization, Tactics, and Equipment Necessary to Meet Them”), becoming deeply involved in a number of maneuvers that tested the tank in a combined-arms formation. At the beginning of World War II, “there was no living American soldier who knew as much as Patton about the mobility, mechanical features, fire-power, and tactical use of tanks.”13 Although he did not enjoy immediate success in his efforts to integrate the tank into the US Army, his drive and desire to use it in battle ultimately earned a prominent place for this weapon in modern warfare.14
The US Marine Corps, always concerned about its very survival, underwent the most dramatic change. Retaining the constabulary forces that characterized the Marines during the 1920s would not allow the Corps to maintain relevance in the looming global war that would require forces to conduct massive amphibious operations:
In the early 1930s, the Marine Corps issued the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, which became the “bible” of American amphibious assault doctrine in World War II, and created the Fleet Marine Force . . . to operate as an integral part of the fleet for the purposes of capturing advanced bases. The Marine doctrine covered all aspects of amphibious assault, including command relationships between land forces and the supporting fleet, ship-to-shore movement and communications, air and gunfire support, and amphibious logistics. No other country in the world, except Japan, had such an advanced doctrine by 1939.15
The resulting change constituted a completely different function for the Marine Corps, resulting in amphibious doctrine (ways) and the necessary equipment (means, such as the Higgins landing craft) to support the doctrine.
Interwar experiences with military change remain relevant today. Gen Henry H. Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that transforming the military requires more than just advances in technology; rather, one should focus on the resources and means as well as operational concepts and organizational structures to use these technologies on the battlefield:
In the 1930s the Allied powers were hard at work developing new airplanes, tanks, aircraft carriers, radar, and other advanced systems. As war broke out, the Allies had, across the board, better technology than the Germans, and more of it. When the Germans invaded France in May of 1940, they had fewer men, fewer artillery tubes, and fewer tanks than the Allies—and the tanks they did have were inferior.
But they had revolutionary operational concepts for employing their systems to achieve battlefield effects far greater than the sum of the parts. The next year they stood before the gates of Moscow, having conquered all of Europe from the arctic circle to the shores of Greece, from the coast of France to within sight of the Kremlin. In time, the Allies learned the hard lesson that how you employ technology is even more important than the technology itself. But these lessons came at a fearful cost.16 (emphasis in original)
People view the military, normally considered the primary instrument for executing the elements of national power, as the prime example of a bureaucracy with “fixed and official jurisdictional areas, a distributed structure, authority to give commands for discharge of duties distributed in a stable way and strictly delimited by rules, and methodical provision for the regular and continuous fulfillment of duties.”17 Is this an accurate description of the current state of the US military today? Does the traditional bureaucratic model work well for it in this new environment? Carl von Clausewitz wrote that “everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult,” continuing his treatise with a discussion of friction and how the simplest things get complicated in the “fog of war.”18 Planning and implementing new organizational structures, technologies, and doctrines can indeed prove difficult for an organization as large and steeped in tradition as the US military.
Warfare has become infinitely more complex since Clausewitz’s time. Despite this increased complexity and greater friction in warfare, military organizations have maintained a similar structure and organizational mind-set towards fighting. In many cases, the names have changed, but the mind-set has not (e.g., the renaming of the Army’s new “units of action” structure as “brigade combat teams,” described and used in much the same way as the former brigades they replaced). The advent of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions—such as the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia in the 1990s and the resurrection of counterinsurgency and stability operations today in Afghanistan and Iraq—has changed the nature of conflict. Today, most experts agree that the military will not fight alone: not only will the US military join coalition partners from other countries but also it will become more joint. That is, single-service missions will no longer be the norm for fighting; instead, an integrated, cross-service approach has taken hold.19 In new theaters of war, military commanders will coordinate closely with nongovernmental agencies and private volunteer agencies (e.g., Cable News Network, the International Red Cross, and Doctors without Borders—entities that have competing interests).20 These new challenges resemble the ones all public-sector actors face today: more players, press coverage, and input from decision makers. As Clausewitz would say, military operations will have more friction in the future. The military has to adjust its institutional character and structures to accommodate these new challenges.
Several analysts have criticized recent efforts at military transformation. Commenting in 1997 on Military Review’s republication that year of his article “How to Change an Army,” originally printed in 1984, Brig Gen Huba Wass de Czege, USA, retired, noted that “the issue is how to manage change, and that problem is with us in spades today. The article is still relevant. We are still ‘tinkering’ our way into the future.”21 Also in 1997, Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, commandant of the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command, and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales Jr., commandant of the Army War College, published an article in Parameters entitled “Preparing for War in the 21st Century.” Drawing on the writings of Clausewitz, the authors observe that “any sustained period of peace challenges military institutions. It requires holding on to the immutable and terrifying realities of war in a climate of peacetime pursuits and ease, because only by an understanding of what war has been can we hope to glimpse what it will be. To prepare for the future, we must keep a grip on the past.”22 Essentially, Van Riper and Scales warn against structuring a force to fight the last war, urging us instead to use history as a means to understand what may appear in the future. Years after these two articles appeared, their message still resonates because of our tendency to cling to the past way of war fighting.
Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, one of the more vocal writers about resistance to revolutionary change, has vigorously criticized the Army’s leadership:
The Army’s top leaders are like men who have raised a wonderful daughter, but who cannot accept the fact that she is no longer Daddy’s Little Girl. They do not want to let her change. These generals cling to outmoded organizations they grew to love and promote subordinates who share their prejudices. We have a great Army that is eroding to a good but increasingly troubled one. Our personnel policies are anachronistic, our organization is inefficient, our procurement policies are eye-rollers, our quality of thought has decayed, and our image is rotting. Our Army is inherently conservative. Occasionally, this serves our nation well. In times of crisis, it does not.23
In another article, he writes that “our generals are deer caught in the headlights of history. Courageous on the battlefield, they are terrified of the vibrant, challenging and simultaneous waves of change sweeping over our own nation and the world. They are good men, but they are old—indeed, they are far older in mindset than in body.” Concerning current evolutionary changes, he asks, “Is this a revolution in military affairs? Revolutions require revolutionaries, not just gadgets.”24 If we maintain our current focus on transforming the military’s gadgets and other means, we will not change its mind-set and culture.
We must keep our transformation efforts intellectually honest, taking a holistic, coherent view of transformation and looking beyond a gadget-oriented approach to change. Transformation requires full assessment of the geostrategic context for change, followed by linking the ends, ways, and means of war fighting. To do less than fully consider all four elements simply will not produce true transformation—and will prove inadequate in today’s context. Change is inevitable; mastering change in today’s environment requires full understanding of a restated purpose for our military, the methods of using it, and the necessary resources and technologies. The military may no longer have as its purpose merely fighting and winning America’s wars but now must create conditions—partnered with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies—for peace and stability at home and abroad. This purpose (ends) requires new ways and means of applying military force and capabilities.
The geostrategic context has certainly changed since the turn of the century, yet each of the services continues to state its purpose in terms of winning wars or fighting. Admittedly, war fighting will by necessity remain a core capability of the armed forces, but it is time to rethink the purpose of the American military in much broader and far-reaching terms. We should use it as an instrument of national power to guarantee the security of the United States—as well as the rest of the world—by proactively shaping the future. In concert with the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic), the military should have a primary focus of serving as a proactive agent of change to move the world towards greater integration and freedom. Regarding the military’s current status as a reactive force concerned with “hedging bets,” Gen Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, observes that “we cannot accurately characterize the security environment of 2025; therefore, we must hedge against this uncertainty by identifying and developing a broad range of capabilities. Further, we must organize and arrange our forces to create the agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the coming decades.”25
Although we may not be able to characterize the security environment of 2025, we should clearly identify our vision of that environment: shifting the emphasis away from war fighting towards a world characterized by freedom, liberty, and self-determination. This proactive vision of shaping the international-security environment has a precedent in the period prior to World War II. In his State of the Union address of 6 January 1941, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt offered his vision of a future characterized by four freedoms:
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.
The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.26
President Roosevelt clearly understood and identified the geostrategic changes taking place in the world of 1941, proposing a clear vision of how he felt the United States should endeavor to change the future for the better. Achieving that end state required the buildup of a war-fighting capability, yet the purpose (building a better world) went well beyond merely reacting to a threat. As we transform our military forces, we should utilize the same purpose as our driver—proactively creating conditions for a better world rather than responding to threats and challenges. These changes go well beyond organizational and doctrinal approaches; they seek to alter the mind-set and purpose of the US military.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, former senator Sam Nunn said that “the United States struggled for forty-five years to create a defense establishment that could effectively and efficiently prepare for and wage a conflict such as World War II or a possible global clash with the Soviets. Hopefully the Pentagon will not take as long to reorganize for the security challenges of the post–Cold War era, in which organizational adaptability and quickness are major assets.”27 Without a doubt, we are struggling with organizational adaptability in the post–Cold War era, and it is time to address these issues with an open mind and intellectual honesty. To do otherwise courts disaster on the battlefield.
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1. The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, January 2005), 6, http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/ library_files/document_387_NCW_Book_LowRes.pdf.
2. K. L. Vantran, “Transformation Begins with Leadership,” Armed Forces Press Service, 11 February 2004.
3. Rebecca Christie, “Rumsfeld: Military Transformation More Than Program Cuts,” Wall Street Journal, 8 November 2004.
4. Jefferson Morris, “Iraq Operations Accelerating Transformation, Cebrowski Says,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 4 August 2004.
5. Dr. Francis J. Harvey, “A Letter to the Soldiers of the United States Army,” January 2005, http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sa/messages/2005Feb21.html.
6. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 229.
7. Douglas A. Macgregor, Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 3.
8. Greg Jaffe, “At the Pentagon, Quirky Powerpoint Carries Big Punch,” Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2004.
9. “The National Defense Panel Assessment of the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review,” United States Department of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.html.
10. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific War) (30 September 1945, 1 July 1946; repr., Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1987), 5.
11. Paul S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 4–5.
12. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1889–1939 (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 248–49.
13. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., 19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership, 2d ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), 384.
14. Martin Blumenson, Patton: The Man behind the Legend, 1885–1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1985), 131–40.
15. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 184.
16. Gen Henry H. Shelton, “Operationalizing Joint Vision 2010,” Airpower Journal 12, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 104, shelton.htm .
17. Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 196.
18. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968), 164.
19. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 319.
20. Nik Gowing, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997), 10.
21. Huba Wass de Czege, “How to Change an Army,” Military Review 77 (January–February 1997): 162–73.
22. Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales Jr., “Preparing for War in the 21st Century,” Parameters 27, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 10.
23. Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, “Ruinous Generals, Heroes Gone Astray,” Army Times, 16 February 1998, 31.
24. Lt Col Ralph Peters, USA, retired, “Generals, It’s Time to Face Reality,” Army Times, 5 May 1998, 37.
25. Gen Peter Pace, “Chairman’s Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,” in Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), A-6, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
26. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress, January 6, 1941: The ‘Four Freedoms’ Speech,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html.
27. Quoted in J. Paul Reason with David G. Freymann, Sailing New Seas, Newport Paper no. 13 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998), 6.
|Dr. Jack D. Kem, Colonel, USA, retired (BA, Western Kentucky University; MPA, Auburn University–Montgomery; PhD, North Carolina State University), is a supervisory associate professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as a military intelligence officer with major assignments with Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, 82d Airborne Division, 3d Armored Division, and 3d Infantry Division. For his last active duty assignment, he served as the commanding officer, 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Dr. Kem is a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and Army War College. He is the author of Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, June 2005).|
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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