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Document created: 1 September 06
Air & Space Power Journal - Fall 2006
Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes, USAF
Col Bradley D. Spacy, USAF
Lt Col John M. Busch, USAF
Lt Col Gregory J. Reese, USAF
|Editorial Abstract: The changing and increasingly dangerous global-security environment presents a considerable challenge for air-base defense and demands a new base-defense mind-set. The authors describe new initiatives in joint doctrine that empower deployed commanders to take increased control of base-security zones for force protection. Airmen can therefore expect to play a greater role in overall base defense, with expanded base-security perimeters and a movement toward better coordination of air and ground forces.|
If you joined the Air Force not long ago and became a security forces person, you would have spent a lot of your time guarding missile silos, guarding bombers, alert fighters, guarding gates, or at least being at a gate. But after we stood up 50 expeditionary bases in the Arabian Gulf and after we’ve had attacks on the bases, after we have had rockets and mortar attacks on the bases, after we’ve had aircraft hit on arrival and departure with surface-to-air missiles and small-arms fire, and after we’ve looked at what does it take to secure an airfield in an expeditionary sense, this security force business takes on a whole different light. . . . Get outside the wire with the Office of Special Investigations folks . . . and begin to think about what’s a threat to this airfield. What do we have to do to defend it so we can operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in a true joint sense, and in a true combatant sense, so that there are no threats to this airfield that we haven’t thought about?
—Gen T. Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force
THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC-SECURITY environment has changed dramatically in the last 15 years, and the Cold War comfort zone of heavy forces arrayed across the plains of Europe has given way to a dynamic new threat environment filled with irregular adversaries fighting an asymmetric style of warfare. In his book The Pentagon’s New Map, Dr. Thomas Barnett predicts that the “non-integrating gap countries” of the world—those states with the highest rates of poverty and unemployment, most corrupt governments, lowest standard of living, and least hope—will be rife with conflict and uncertainty.1 In this evolving environment, the Air Force remains committed to projecting air and space power as a lighter, leaner, and more agile expeditionary war-fighting force. Projecting air and space power in this new expeditionary environment means that we must position air bases close to (if not in) the fight, in austere locations far from the “safe” rear areas of the past.2
We have placed air bases throughout the combat zone in Iraq and Afghanistan (considered gap countries by Dr. Barnett) during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Surrounded by irregular enemy forces, these bases have sustained steady attacks. Ensuring airpower projection in this context requires a new look at how we establish, protect, and defend air bases—specifically, it demands new doctrine, tactical command and control (C2), intelligence capabilities, and more proficient expeditionary Airmen of all specialties. This represents not only a challenge to security forces alone but also one to the Air Force team to “fight the air base” much like the Navy fights as a combat team in a carrier battle group.
The combination of irregular threats, networked enemies, and the expeditionary nature of the Air Force’s operations dramatically increases the likelihood of attacks on its people and resources. Additionally, transforming the service to one that uses fewer, more capable weapon systems has increased each weapon’s criticality and amplified the impact of enemy attacks on our ability to sustain the projection of air and space power.3 Air Force bases have become harder targets for penetrating or direct attacks, and although gigantic vehicleborne explosive attacks such as the one on Khobar Towers are still a viable threat, the -enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan has relied upon mortars, rockets, and shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to attack expeditionary air bases. This situation resembles what happened in the Vietnam War, when the Air Force suffered 447 standoff attacks, resulting in 75 aircraft destroyed, 155 troops killed, and 1,702 wounded in action.4
In 1965 the Air Force conducted a detailed security survey of all bases in Southeast Asia that contained the service’s resources. In addition to pointing out that the Air Force’s security police lacked adequate organization, training, or equipment to provide security defense in an insurgent environment, the survey revealed that ground forces in South Vietnam would not conduct static defense of air bases. The study concluded that we had no satisfactory system for coping with attacks from standoff weapons, recommending that the Air Force continue seeking an early solution to this problem and emphasize testing the feasibility of new terminal-defense proposals.5 Standoff attacks against air bases since the beginning of Iraqi Freedom already exceed 1,500; although neither the operational impact nor human toll has proven severe, new weapons technology and improved enemy tactics and training promise to increase their effect. Undoubtedly, because of the enemy’s willingness, determination, and adaptivity, his aim will improve.
The proliferation of precision-guided mortars and rockets gives enemy forces the potential of 10-meter accuracy when attacking air bases.6 Such accuracy would have devastating effects on large aircraft and unsheltered small aircraft, not to mention increased casualties caused by strikes on living and working areas. Coupled with the “media” effect, this scenario will severely degrade the effectiveness of air and space power. Readily available commercial-satellite imagery and simple reconnaissance by sympathetic workers employed on the air base magnify the enemy’s capabilities even more. Successful standoff attacks could also result in reluctance to base expeditionary airpower close to the fight, thus reducing the responsiveness and effectiveness of the air component and risking an unintended shift back toward a conventional supporting role for the Air Force.
In part, Air Force security forces have not adjusted to combat the standoff threat because during the Cold War, the standoff-attack footprint became an Army mission—codified in 1985 in Joint Security Agreement 8, which specified that the Army would provide exterior defense for Air Force bases.7 Although this agreement gave the Army the “outside the wire” mission, several joint exercises as well as experience in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved this tasking impractical; consequently, in 1992 joint doctrine formally transferred this responsibility to base commanders. The formal abrogation of Joint Security Agreement 8 in 2005 meant that in future conflicts, the Air Force would have to defend its air bases in accordance with joint doctrine.8
Perimeter fences, barricades, and high-tech sensor systems are critical components of base security, but regardless of their effectiveness, they all detect the enemy only after he has begun an attack, or they help respond after he has already attacked a base. A base’s defense forces, however, must seize the initiative from the enemy by getting inside his planning cycle and launching a preemptive attack. Operation Desert Safeside / Task Force 1041 at Balad Air Base, Iraq, demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach. In response to over 400 standoff attacks against Balad, Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) launched this 60‑day operation, with Task Force 1041 capturing 17 high-value targets, over 100 other insurgents, and eight major weapons caches, sustaining no casualties despite heavy enemy engagement. Afterward, enemy attacks from the task force’s sector virtually ceased. The architects of Desert Safeside knew that “there is only one way to stop a determined enemy from attacking a base; you have to kill or capture him and take his weapons. This was true at Balad, and it will be true at other bases; and the brave men and women of TF 1041 proved it!”9
Task Force 1041 demonstrated that the Air Force possessed the capabilities needed to successfully dominate the base security zone (BSZ) and provide a secure operating environment from which to launch, recover, and sustain airpower. This operation also dispelled the perception that Army units are better organized, trained, and equipped than Air Force security forces to conduct such operations. Unlike previous Army units, the task force achieved the desired effect.
Whereas legacy base-defense doctrine was designed for Cold War–era linear battlefields, emerging joint doctrine treats expeditionary bases more like joint operating areas (fig. 1). The final draft of Joint Publication 3-10, “Joint Security Operations in Theater,” adapts the best practices of defending bases to the nonlinear battlefields of today. The core of this doctrine seeks to ensure that the designated base commander can dominate the area around the base from which the enemy can launch standoff and penetrating attacks. Importantly, the new publication establishes a BSZ as a joint operating area around critical fixed installations (such as air bases) and describes terrain that the base commander should influence as the battlespace from which the enemy can attack the base. The fact that this terrain includes the area traditionally known as the man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) footprint (the area the enemy could use to attack aircraft approaching/departing the base with shoulder-launched SAMs) is of critical importance to the Air Force. This requirement of influencing terrain outside the fence created a new battlefield-control measure called the “base boundary” (fig. 2), defined in the joint publication as
a line that delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. The base boundary is not necessarily the base perimeter; rather it should be established based upon the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and other support available, time available (METT-T), specifically balancing the need of the base defense forces to control key terrain with their ability to accomplish the mission.10
Figure 1. Emerging joint nonlinear battlefield. (Adapted from briefing, Command and Control General Officer Steering Group, subject: Headquarters USAF/XOS-F Integrated Base Defense Command and Control, 3 November 2004.)
Because the terrain included in the base boundary is subject to constraints of the land component or host nation, the Air Force will use the BSZ to internally address the total area outside the base perimeter that might threaten the base with standoff attacks. The optimal joint situation would have the BSZ and base boundary encompassing the same terrain.
Figure 2. Notional base boundary. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 8.)
Analysis of the base’s mission as well as the enemy, terrain, time, troops available, and civilian considerations will determine the BSZ, which surrounds the base. Historical knowledge of the enemy’s use of standoff weapons like rockets and mortars in Vietnam, together with recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, shows that the BSZ must extend a minimum of five kilometers from base resources (e.g., aircraft operating surfaces, maintenance facilities, and billeting locations). Dedicated base-defense forces integrated under one commander should conduct security operations within the zone. Normal BSZ operations in the future will resemble offensive-style efforts such as Desert Safeside. The base’s area of interest, where the enemy can do planning and preparation for an attack against a given base, reaches beyond the BSZ to anticipate and counter enemy threats (fig. 3). Base-defense forces are not responsible for operations in the area of interest, but they can shape the environment by coordination with joint/coalition forces and/or the host nation.
Figure 3. Notional area of interest and base boundary. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 8.)
The next challenge for Air Force doctrine entails determining which component commands the air base. In Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, we assigned base command to the component with the preponderance of forces. Although doing so may appear appropriate on the surface, air bases have unique requirements—for example, countering the threat of shoulder-fired SAMs. If the Army commands an air base simply because it has a large logistics operation (and thus a large number of troops) on base, the commander may or may not place a high priority on the critical issue of defeating the MANPADS threat. The component with the most stringent security requirements should serve as base commander.
Prosecuting ground-combat operations in the BSZ will require a robust tactical C2 infrastructure run by the base-defense operations center (BDOC) (fig. 4). The C2 architecture for air bases in the future will make the BDOC coequal with the emergency operations center (which will focus on recovery after an attack) but subordinate to the base commander’s installation control center. Still commanded by the defense-force commander, the BDOC will act as a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) center to integrate the application of offensive and defensive actions in the force-protection battlespace—including the BSZ. By integrating and coordinating all defense efforts, the future BDOC will enable the commander to see first, understand first, and act first by finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assessing threats to the base. The security forces’ legacy BDOC does not currently possess the robust tactical C4ISR capability it needs to integrate the necessary intelligence and desired effects within the BSZ.11
Figure 4. Typical BDOC organization. (Adapted from Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3‑10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 14.)
The base-defense effort for a joint forward-operating location on a nonlinear battlefield bears striking similarities to the operational C2 issues faced by the air component commander at the operational level of war. Both missions require centralized control and decentralized execution of forces as well as capabilities brought together from several components. A BDOC and an air and space operations center (AOC) own some of these forces/capabilities but must also integrate forces and fires from other components and coalition partners. Additionally, both missions require predictive analysis to conduct direct-action combat missions that counter expected enemy courses of action and position forces to react swiftly to enemy forces not deterred or defeated by the proactive effort. As we transform the expeditionary BDOC, we can benchmark some lessons from the AOC’s battle-proven processes and methods.
Within the transformed BDOC organization, an intelligence-fusion cell will provide the base-defense force with analyzed, vetted all-source information that drives effective force-protection decisions and operations. Inherently multi-disciplined, the cell need not possess all capabilities locally since theater and strategic reachback provide many of them. Designed to equip the defense-force commander with a capability to arrive at courses of action based on continuous intelligence preparation/analysis of the battlespace, the intelligence-fusion cell must have situational awareness of events throughout the base’s area of interest (that area where tactical intelligence must be immediately available to the base-defense force so it can effectively counter enemy courses of action).12
This all-source threat information enables the BDOC’s future-operations cell to perform a function similar to that of an AOC’s Strategy and Combat Plans Divisions—but for tactical-level base defense. Using the intelligence-fusion cell’s analysis, the future-operations cell devises a strategy to counter enemy activities proactively for the next 24 hours and beyond. This strategy becomes a BSZ ground tasking order (GTO)—a fires-and-effects integration matrix for the BSZ—that postures and deconflicts forces to provide an executable “playbook” for operations. The GTO must integrate, deconflict, and document all planned activities of friendly forces within the BSZ, including those planned by other functional components or host-nation forces. When constructing a BSZ’s GTO, the BDOC will coordinate with the special-operations and land-component forces operating in the areas adjacent to the zone to minimize risks to all forces. The BSZ’s GTO must also consider the effects required to support the AOC’s air tasking order. Although a playbook, the GTO must remain flexible and easily modified during execution in response to urgent circumstances or developing situations. Additionally, the future-operations cell identifies expected shortfalls in defense-force capability and recommends appropriate requests for forces or capabilities for the base commander to forward through the chain of command.
A current-operations cell functions on behalf of the defense-force commander to monitor GTO execution and exercise C2 of all forces within the BSZ (the traditional S-3 role of Air Force base-defense and Army units). This cell also maintains current situational awareness of joint/coalition operations outside the base boundary but within the BSZ. Furthermore, it monitors the status of base-defense forces operating outside the base boundary under the tactical control of adjacent-area commanders for base-defense tasks.
A fire-support coordination cell, another critical current-operations cell capability, plans and integrates indirect joint-fire missions such as close air support or artillery in the BSZ. Although this cell integrates these fires, it does not control them; instead, it facilitates them within established joint procedures. Successful air-base defense in the dynamic threat environment of an expeditionary air base in one of Dr. Barnett’s “non-integrating gap” countries requires robust C4ISR. Fielding a transformed BDOC will prove critical in this effort.
Desert Safeside and other Iraqi Freedom / Enduring Freedom experiences showed that seizing the initiative in a hostile BSZ requires aggressive ground-combat operations. A new mission area called force protection intelligence (FPI), a key enabler for the active defense forces, began as a force-protection initiative by CENTAF to support base defense. The Headquarters Air Force FPI Working Group—run jointly by Headquarters Air Force Intelligence, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and Headquarters Air Force Security Forces—merged existing definitions of intelligence and force protection to define FPI as analyzed or vetted all-source information that drives effective force-protection decisions and operations. It simply means that the Air Force needs to apply the full spectrum of intelligence capabilities to commanders who must make effective decisions in the force-protection mission area.13
Continuous application of the entire intelligence cycle is critical to anticipating enemy tactics and/or developing target-intelligence packages to neutralize threats. Base-defense operations require the prioritization, collection, analysis, fusion, and tailoring of threat information into products and services for dissemination in support of current and future security operations. This capability demands advanced training in analytical skills and revised tactics, techniques, and procedures that incorporate AFOSI and intelligence methods and sources. FPI personnel must receive analytical training when initially placed in an FPI position, periodically refresh their skills in a cross-functional environment, and evaluate them prior to deployment. This assessment capability must allow rapid and thorough analysis of all-source information at the lowest possible level yet still provide reachback capabilities to theater and national sources. Intelligence and AFOSI assessment capabilities must be scalable to the defense situation and able to provide dedicated, full-time support to integrated-defense missions if necessary.14 The assessment capability requires new organizational structures, additional communications equipment, and either additional personnel or inventive manpower solutions to fully integrate intelligence and AFOSI with security forces in BSZ operations.
Just as all sailors have a battle station to which they report at designated times of elevated threat, so should Airmen have such a station and participate in base defense. Accordingly, a draft Air Force instruction has codified a fight-the-air-base concept, outlining a process by which Airmen gradually step up their participation in base-defense activities as threats increase.15 Each escalating phase of manning battle stations—coded green, yellow, orange, and red—has associated conditions of readiness attached (fig. 5). Assigning all Airmen to a battle station, training them in the appropriate duties, and exercising the plan repeatedly will dramatically expand the collective power of the base-defense force.
Figure 5. Proposed Air Force battle stations. (Adapted from Air Force Instruction 10-246, “Installation Arming and Response,” draft [four-digit coordination package], 17 January 2006, 2.)
Increasing the capability for base defense requires including ground-combat tasks in the basic skill sets of all Airmen.16 For example, although Airmen currently receive instruction in firing a weapon, they do not learn how and when to employ that weapon; neither do they learn combat skills common in the other armed forces. Identifying the requirement for these skills in Iraqi Freedom / Enduring Freedom, CENTAF established the basis for expeditionary combat training for all Airmen with a theaterwide program called Combat Right Start. Developed as a short-term solution to the need for ground-combat skills, the program became a requirement (19 hours of training) for all Airmen in the CENTAF theater before they deploy to a designated combat zone like Iraq. Although an Air Force Expeditionary Airmen Integrated Process Team is building a road map to fulfill these requirements over the long term, Airmen must sustain these combat skills by undergoing periodic ancillary training, and the fight-the-base concept outlined above must become part of an installation’s defense plans. Lastly, the force must regularly rehearse going to battle stations in order to assure proficiency when called into action.
Along with better doctrine, robust C4ISR, FPI, and ground-combat training for all Airmen, security operations in the BSZ will require more effective use of security-forces capabilities than do traditional flight-line or perimeter-security missions. Whereas a notional expeditionary base in the current Iraqi Freedom threat environment might call for 200 to 300 security forces to protect its flight line and perimeter, that same base during -execution of robust BSZ operations will need closer to 1,200 such forces. In order to support this new responsibility, the Air Force’s security forces are undergoing a complete transformation designed to shift tactical doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures from a Cold War focus on an industrial-security model to an expeditionary war-fighting focus on offensive and defensive operations in the BSZ. Rather than follow the historical practice of training, equipping, and manning like a police force with some combat skills, the transformed security forces will train and organize as a competent war-fighting capability instead of an installation police force.
The Cold War force structure of our current security forces (designed to support home-station operations) has incrementally adapted to demands of the expeditionary Air Force, but most tasks and manpower structure remain focused on running the home station. This orientation has caused problems for commanders of security forces squadrons as they struggle to balance day-to-day law enforcement and security operations of a home-station Air Force base with the critical task of preparing troops for combat deployments. That is, if local requirements take precedence, security forces might either ignore combat training or perform it haphazardly—perhaps on scarce off-duty time. Conceivably, troops could go to war only partially prepared or prepared at the expense of other important events.
To ensure the best readiness for both home-base and expeditionary missions, the Air Force is in the process of redefining the mission of security forces so that it emphasizes two basic areas: security operations and air-provost (policing) services. The emerging model will require a mixture of military and civilian personnel, the former conducting war-fighting operations such as defending expeditionary air bases; protecting steady-state, high-threat locations; or securing nuclear weapons, and the latter performing most of the provost and industrial-security duties such as law-enforcement missions at locations in the continental United States. This construct will allow security forces to follow a basic train, deploy, and reconstitute cycle that will guarantee enough properly prepared personnel for war-fighting operations. During the reconstitution phase of the cycle, military security forces will integrate into the mostly civilian air-provost mission, not only ensuring that home-station bases have enough manpower to secure their resources but also keeping enough law-enforcement experience in the military force to conduct minimal law-and-order duties at deployed locations. A commander of such a transformed security-forces squadron will have both the resources and time to prepare for and conduct expeditionary and home-station missions.
A recent exercise called Headquarters Air Force Air Base Opening Tabletop exposed a seam between conducting hostile joint air-base-seizure operations and opening the base for operations.17 The base-seizure mission requires a rapid transition from combat forces seizing an air base to personnel readying a fully operational joint air base from which to project combat and mobility airpower. This mission lies beyond the organic capabilities of contingency response groups (CRG) but could take the form of a complementary Air Force capability by integrating CRG capabilities into those of the 720th Special Tactics Group and the 820th Security Forces Group, presenting them to the joint force commander as a scalable, tailorable force module known as an air expeditionary combat task unit (AECTU).18 These forces would arrive with the seizure force during the assault phase of the joint forcible-entry operation. Special tactics and security forces, inserted into the assault element, would fight alongside joint forces to eliminate resistance and then provide security and initial base defense as the remaining AECTU forces arrive to establish air operations.
After the forcible-entry operation transitions to the stabilization phase of the lodgment, the AECTU becomes primarily responsible for air-base defense operations while the seizure force reconsolidates and moves on to its next objective. When the initial element of the CRG deems the air base open for air operations, follow-on Air Force and joint capabilities will flow into the air base. Assessment of the security environment by the AECTU commander constitutes a significant portion of this opening. The AECTU will remain in place to hand over air-base defense operations to security forces of the air and space expeditionary force. This transition might take between 30 and 60 days, but the goal remains reposturing the AECTU for the next operation as soon as practical. Embedding the AECTU with the assault force creates an environment of joint interoperability between the two components; it also allows a quicker transition to operations while ensuring that the seizure force can rapidly advance to follow-on objectives without waiting to link up with a separate follow-on force. Establishing the tasks, conditions, and standards for the AECTU in the mission statements of the CRGs, 720th Special Tactics Group, and 820th Security Forces Group would go far in closing this joint seam.
As the Air Force continues to retool its capabilities to fight effectively on the battlefields of The Pentagon’s New Map, the expeditionary air base is becoming more than just an airpower-projection platform.19 With the added ground-combat mission in the BSZ, newly focused FPI, and a more-capable force of expeditionary Airmen trained in ground combat, the future air base may become more of a platform for air and ground combat. Not only would air assets strike joint-force targets across the theater but also base-defense forces could strike theater targets in their respective BSZs—just as Task Force 1041 did in Iraq. Multiplying this capability across a geographic combatant command covers a significant part of the air-and-ground battlespace with coordinated air and ground forces.
One can easily imagine projecting that influence even farther into the combat zone by pushing logistics, civil engineering, communications, and other capabilities out from the air base to other joint forces in the area of responsibility. This proposal—not a roles-and-missions argument and not one that would require large, new forces—would simply harness and focus the potential combat power of currently deployed base-defense as well as “support” personnel and project that power outward. Establishing the future air base as a power-projection platform would give the joint force commander another formidable tool for the joint fight.
The shift from garrison security and law enforcement to security operations has already begun. In order to ensure that these changes are in step with the Air Force’s vision and goals, we must pursue a systematic program to shepherd such alterations. This effort began with the Air Force Requirements and Operational Capability Council tasking Headquarters Air Force Security Forces to draft a recommendation that addressed capability gaps in integrated defense. This process will culminate with approval of a program action directive to enact these changes through the service’s corporate structure.
These changes will need support and understanding at all levels of Air Force leadership as we continue to realize the desired capabilities of our expeditionary Air Force in the future battlespace. Many of the changes will prove difficult; however, they are vital to success in the long war against terror. Land-component maneuver forces will be stretched thin for the foreseeable future, so the Air Force must invest in its capabilities to securely project combat air and—now—ground power. Because the uncertainty and asymmetry of noncontiguous, nonlinear battles will create dangerous locations for air bases, expeditionary Airmen must ready themselves for the fight.
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1. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 156.
2. Rebecca Grant, briefing to Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes et al., subject: Securing Airpower Projection in Noncontiguous and Nonlinear Battlespace Operations, April 2006.
3. David A. Shlapak and Alan Vick, “Check Six Begins on the Ground”: Responding to the Evolving Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 13.
4. Roger P. Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961–1973 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 207.
5. Lt Gen William W. Momyer, Operation Safe Side Final Report, Seventh Air Force, 1 October 1967.
6. Shlapak and Vick, “Check Six Begins,” 50.
7. Richard G. Davis, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force–Army Cooperation (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 125.
8. “Validating the Abrogation of Joint Service Agreement 8,” AF/XOS-F staff package, 18 November 2004.
9. Col Bradley Spacy, director of force protection, USCENTAF (Task Force 1041 presentation, Headquarters USAF Threat Working Group, 28 April 2005).
10. Joint Publication 3-10, “Joint Security Operations in Theater,” final draft, November 2005, II-2.
11. Headquarters USAF/XOS-F, briefing, Command and Control General Officer Steering Group, subject: Integrated Base Defense Command and Control, 3 November 2004.
12. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-10.2, “Integrated Base Defense Command and Control,” draft [topline coordination copy], 1 April 2006, 14.
13. Lt Col John Busch, AF/A7SO, white paper, Institutionalizing Force Protection Intelligence (Washington, DC: Headquarters USAF/A7S, n.d.).
14. Integrated defense involves providing a secure operating environment for base commanders to generate and sustain combat power for joint war-fighting operations. Headquarters USAF/A7S, “DOTMLPF Change Recommendation for Integrated Defense” (Washington, DC: Headquarters USAF/A7S, 14 April 2006).
15. Air Force Instruction 10-246, “Installation Arming and Response,” draft [four-digit coordination package], 17 January 2006.
16. Long-Term Integration of Expeditionary Airmen Concepts into the Air Force, Chartered Expeditionary Airmen Integrated Process Team Report (Washington, DC: Headquarters USAF/XO, July 2005), 10.
17. Minutes of the USAF General Officer Air Base Opening Tabletop Exercise, Headquarters Air Force Security Forces, 6 April 2006.
18. CRGs provide “a unique subset of capabilities designed specifically to respond rapidly to contingencies as well as secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and open air bases, and perform initial airfield / air base operations to ensure a smooth transition to subsequent operations.” See Alexander M. Wathen, “Contingency Response Group: Time to Expand the Box and Think ‘Coalition,’ ” Aerospace Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 70.
19. Grant, briefing.
|Brig Gen Robert H. “Bob” Holmes (BA, David Lipscomb College; MS, Georgia State University) is deputy director of operations, Headquarters US Central Command, MacDill AFB, Florida. His previous service includes tours as director of security forces and force protection, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC, and commander of the 37th Training Wing at Lackland AFB, Texas. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the general served as deputy commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force-South (Task Force K-Bar), responsible for directing and conducting joint combat operations in southern Afghanistan. A master parachutist and military free-fall parachutist, General Holmes is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and Armed Forces Staff College.|
|Col Bradley D. Spacy (BA, Fresno State University; MS, University of Southern Mississippi) is commander of the 375th Mission Support Group, Scott AFB, Illinois. A career security-forces officer with extensive experience in air-base defense and antiterrorism / force protection, he has served as commander of the 47th Security Forces Squadron, Laughlin AFB, Texas; director of force protection for US Central Command Air Forces Forward in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, during which time he created, planned, and participated in Operation Desert Safeside / Task Force 1041, an offensive combat operation to kill or capture insurgent forces attacking Balad Air Base, Iraq; and chief of the Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorate of Security Forces, Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. Colonel Spacy also commanded the United States Air Force Honor Guard, leading 250 men and women in over 6,000 Air Force and joint-service ceremonies for the president, secretary of defense, chief of staff of the Air Force, and other high-level military and civilian leaders. Colonel Spacy is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Joint Forces Staff College.|
|Lt Col Gregory J. Reese (USAFA; MS, University of South Carolina; MS, Air Force Institute of Technology) is commander of the 51st Security Forces Squadron, Osan Air Base, South Korea. He has served in numerous installation, training, and staff assignments in the security-forces career field. Previous assignments include commander, 332d Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, Balad Air Base, Iraq; security forces staff, Headquarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia; Air Mobility Warfare Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey; and chief of air base defense and police-service policy, Headquarters USAF, Pentagon, Washington, DC, where he developed new air-base defense concepts and doctrine. Colonel Reese is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.|
|Lt Col John M. Busch (BS, University of Michigan; MS, University of Kansas) is chief of the Threat and Intelligence Doctrine Branch, Force Protection and Operations Division, Directorate of Security Forces and Force Protection, Headquarters US Air Force, Pentagon, Washington, DC. A member of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), he is a veteran counterintelligence and special--investigations officer who has held a variety of command and staff positions, including OSI detachment commander, director of staff, operations officer, and Air Staff officer. Colonel Busch also served as task force counterintelligence coordinator for Combined Joint Task Force 7 and Multinational Force-Iraq in Baghdad, responsible for all counterintelligence activities supporting operations and force protection.|
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
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